"not be opposing the appeal"
"will rely on written submissions"
"to investigate allegations of serious negligence, which had become evident through the results of Newton Aycliffe LDCs bi-annual audit, a loss of£405,153.00 at cost."
"You demonstrated a total lack of management control across the areas of the business for which you were responsible, specifically in stock management, administration controls and security of the stock on the site. As outlined at our meeting these factors have significantly contributed to the site stock loss of£406,000.00 identified at the recent audit. Due to the above I feel there is no confidence in you effectively undertaking your management role in the business and your summary dismissal from the company is effective from16 May 2003 ."
"I believe that serious negligence and lack of management control had occurred. This includes non-checking of BIs from the Hub, which were a major contributor to the stock loss as was your overall lax Hub procedures. You admitted that the correct procedures, which you fully understood were not in place. In terms of the£144,000.00 which was put on to your stock file during the adjournment I raised this with Bob Hilsely. He confirmed that the£144,000.00 went on to your stock file as there was evidence to support the fact that the stock had been returned to the Hub. This is further evidence of the lack of management control and non-attendance to procedures."
"9 We consider that fundamentally the procedure that was followed at all stages did not satisfy the test of being within the band of reasonable responses. There was no reasonable investigation including a reasonable opportunity for the applicant to present his case. We refer in particular to the absence of any opportunity to challenge or obtain confirmation from Mr Hilsely. We concluded in that respect the decision taken was procedurally unfair. However we also went on to reach a conclusion as to whether or not in all the circumstances a decision to dismiss fell within the band of reasonable responses. We conclude that it did not. We entertained serious doubts whether any reasonable employer would have concluded that what the applicant did amounted to gross misconduct justifying summary dismissal. It the principal reason for the applicant's dismissal was lack of management control, this was not a matter which should have been laid exclusively at the applicant's door in circumstances where he escalated the problems concerning lack of space, excessive stock delivery, inadequate warehouse facilities and lack of physical security to higher management as he explained during the disciplinary procedures. These assertions were not considered properly. The applicant's allegations were not unsupported by other evidence. He produced some of it at the appeal hearings."
"It is the employer who manages to discharge the onus of demonstrating those three matters, we think who must not be examined further. It is not relevant, as we think, that the tribunal would themselves have shared that view in those circumstances. It is not relevant, as we think, for the tribunal to examine the quality of the material which the employers had before them, for instance to see whether it was the sort of material, objectively considered, which would lead to a certain conclusion on the balance of probabilities, or whether it was the sort of material which would to the same conclusion only upon the basis of being "sure," as it is now said more normally in a criminal context, or, to use the more old-fashioned term, such as to put the matter "beyond reasonable doubt."
"76. It impermissibly substituted itself as employer in place of the bank in assessing the quality and weight of the evidence before Mr Fielder, principally in the form of the investigation officer's report. Instead it should have asked whether, by the standards of the reasonable employer, the bank had established reasonable grounds for its belief that Mr "
"[24] We conclude, therefore that the Tribunal erred in their approach to Grattan's belief as to Mr Hussain's guilt by relying on their own analysis and conclusion as to whether there were reasonable grounds for that belief and by failing to consider whether a reasonable employer. on the material available, could reasonably have reached the conclusion as to Mr Hussain's guilt which Grattan reached in this case. [26] We turn next to the Tribunal's conclusions in the issue of the adequacy of Grattan's investigaton. On this issue, in our judgment, the decision reveals that the Tribunal made the same error of approach as that which they made on the issue of Grattan's belief. The Tribunal criticised Grattan for failing to make sufficient enquiries as to who else might have been involved and for not following up sufficiently the points made by Mr Hussain as to dropping his brother off and as to working in a garage. However the Tribunal did not, in para 23 of their decision, analyse the information that was before Grattan, which we have set out in the first part of this judgment, … . The issue was not whether further investigation might reasonably have been carried out but whether the investigation which had been carried out could be regarded by a reasonable employer as adequate; the Tribunal, however, did not approach the case in that way."
"36 These considerations, we think, explain why, in the workplace investigation of misconduct, cross-examination of complainants by the employee whose conduct is in question (or even confrontations between them) are very much the exception. …Whilst, in order to be fair, it is incumbent on an employer conducting an investigation followed by a disciplinary hearing both to seek out and take into account information which is exculpatory as well as information which points towards guilt, it does not follow that an investigation is unfair overall because individual components of an investigation might have been dealt with differently, or were arguably unfair. Whilst of course an individual component, on the facts of a particular case, may vitiate the whole process, the question which a tribunal hearing a claim for unfair dismissal has to ask itself is: in all the circumstances, was the investigation as a whole fair? 38 Mr Horne accepted, as he was bound to, that there was no rule of law which rendered it incumbent on an employer, when dismissing an employee for misconduct, to arrange a hearing which gives the employee who is liable to be dismissed the opportunity to cross-examine the person making the complaint. He accepted that the law was accurately stated in paragraph 21 of Ulsterbus v Henderson , supra, where O'Donnell LJ stated: 'It is quite clear in this case that a careful investigation was carried out by Mr Campbell, an appal was heard by Mr Wilson, and a most meticulous review of all the evidence was carried out as is evidenced by Mr Heubeck's letter of 31.12.85. As I have indicated, in that letter Mr Heubeck meticulously reviewed all the evidence and considered whether there was any reasonable possibility, indeed any possibility, that a mistake had been made. What the tribunal appears to be suggesting is that in certain circumstances it is incumbent on a reasonable employer to carry out a quasi-judicial investigation with a confrontation of witnesses, and cross-examination of witnesses. While some employers might consider this to be necessary or desirable, to suggest, as the tribunal did, that an employer who failed to do so in a case such as this was acting unreasonably, or in the words of Lord Denning, acting outside: "…a band of reasonableness, within which one employer might reasonably take one view, another quite reasonably take a different view", is in my view insupportable.'"
"We consider that there was no reason …"
"We can see no reason why he should why he should not ……."
"We consider that this alone could in no way be described as fair or reasonable."
"We conclude that a reasonable employer ……"