"We regret that we have been driven to the conclusion that the Vice President resorted at times to bullying tactics. She treated the staff without due consideration demanding immediate response to her own wishes without regard to their other duties. Her treatment of staff was at times demeaning and humiliating and at other times offensively aggressive. In many ways, she usurped the Secretary General's role as head of staff and introduced an atmosphere of fear and confusion in the line of command."
"The senior managers and I are experiencing some problems in our relations with the Deputy Vice President, whose leadership style is proving to be highly authoritarian and confrontational rather than collaborative. Two members of the management team have been deeply upset by her style, others have developed a coping mechanism of 'giving as good as you get' and the rest are beginning to disengage. Until last week I have tried to mediate and deal with each incident individually but now the overall problem seems to be building up into something considerably more serious. There is a growing sense of disappointment and frustration that the relationship with the putative head of the executive committee is not working better. If not dealt with promptly, the result could be to the detriment of the essential team spirit between Council members and staff that we have tried (with considerable success) to build over the past two years."
"I think we need to tackle the problems caused by the behaviour towards the staff of the Deputy Vice President. I have, as you know, found her conduct towards me unacceptable on a number of occasions, and I have equal concerns about her conduct towards a number of other members of my Directorate. I know from informal conduct [sic] with colleagues that I am not the only Director who has encountered similar problems. I think it may now be necessary for me to initiate a formal complaint under the Dignity at Work Policy, both in respect of my own position and on behalf of others in the Directorate. However, I recognise that this is a serious step. I would be grateful, therefore, for the opportunity to discuss it with you before taking matters any further."
"As I said last Thursday, I don't want to fall out with you. I had an issue raised with me by a member of staff about the way you had treated them. Fortunately they did not want to make it official provided I raised it with you. If I had not and an official complaint had been made by a member of staff about the way you treated them it would have caused embarrassment not only to you but to the Society and I would have been at fault. I hope you will accept that. If so then I suggest we put it behind us…. We have both got more important things to spend our energies on. If you support me on what I want to achieve I will support you. That offer is on the table…. So do we have peace, will you work with me and put last week behind us or not? If the answer is yes then please accept that we both have different strengths. You can get the beurocracy [sic] under control, I have an almost infinite range of ideas, some good some impracticable but I can throw them out like a machine gun. Let's work together to set up some dedicated teams to try them out. If half of them work it would transform the Society within ten months. If you don't want to be part of that I'll do it on my own. I prefer you onboard but it has to be on the basis that we have to adopt a more active and imaginative approach then we have at present."
"This was an important email in our judgment, hence the length of the quotation. It had all the hallmarks of an ultimatum. We consider that Robert Sayer was content to tolerate Kamlesh Bahl's behaviour until the point where the staff complaints about it impinged directly upon him and his objectives for his presidency. His message in the email was clear. Unless Kamlesh Bahl reined in or heeded his instruction (as Michael Napier recorded in his notes of the meeting) to: "take note and ease off", she would be cut loose and left to her own devices. Contrary to his assertion, we find this was anything but a conciliatory email. The cooling off between them that followed was due to his belief, well founded as events transpired, that Kamlesh Bahl could damage both the Law Society and his position as President by her behaviour."
"We cannot accept that any reasonably competent senior employee could hold out such reassurance nor that a competent solicitor holding the officer of President of the Law Society would lend himself to it, without having clearly assessed and weighed its implications. They did not do so recklessly."
"Jane Betts joined the meeting 1.5 hours after the schedule time."
"Jane Betts sent a statement of the Special Committee. She represented that it was a complaint "on behalf of all staff" and offered to act as a witness at the inquiry. It was a substantial analysis of the matters entitled "
"…we found it …inconceivable that there could have been any member of the Law Society staff who, upon hearing that announcement, did not immediately realise that the meeting concerned the complaints against Kamlesh Bahl. To that extend the tannoy message was a clear reference to her and would have been embarrassing and humiliating."
"A person discriminates against another in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if - (a) on racial grounds he treats that other less favourably than he treats or would treat other persons." "
"A comparison of the case of a person of a particular racial group with that of a person not of that group under section 1(1) must be such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same, or not materially different, in the other."
"Section 2 should be read in the context of section 1. Section 1(1)(a) is concerned with direct discrimination, to use the accepted terminology. To be within section 1(1)(a) the less favourable treatment must be on racial grounds. Thus, in every case it is necessary to inquire why the complainant received less favourable treatment. This is the crucial question. Was it on grounds of race? Or was it for some other reason, for instance, because the complainant was not so well qualified for the job? Save in the obvious cases, answering the crucial question will call for some consideration of the mental process of the alleged discriminator. Treatment, favourable or unfavourable, is a consequence which follows from a decision. Direct evidence of a decision to discriminate on racial grounds will seldom be forthcoming. Usually the grounds of the decision will have to be deduced, or inferred, from the surrounding circumstances."
"As [Lord Brightman] put it in Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah[1980] QB 87 , 104B, one must take all the circumstances into account. This is a test of materiality. Is the treatment of such a kind that a reasonable worker would or might take the view that in all the circumstances it was to his detriment? An unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to "detriment": Barclays Bank plc v Kapur and others (No 2)[1995] IRLR 87 . But, contrary to the view that was expressed in Lord Chancellor v Coker and Osamor[2001] IRLR 116 on which the Court of Appeal relied, it is not necessary to demonstrate some physical or economic consequence."
"Under s.54 of the 1976 Act, the complainant is entitled to complain to the Tribunal that a person has committed an unlawful act of discrimination, but it is the act of which complaint is made and no other that the Tribunal must consider and rule upon. If it finds that the complaint is well founded, the remedies which it can give the complaint under s.56 (1) of the 1976 Act are specifically directed to the act to which the complaint relates. If the act of which complaint is made is found to be not proven, it is not for the Tribunal to find another act of racial discrimination of which complaint has not been made to give a remedy in respect of that other act."
"These two appeals demonstrate the importance, in my opinion, when dealing with complaints under the 1975 Act and the other anti-discrimination Acts, of keeping in mind that they are intended to combat discrimination. They are anti-discrimination statutes. Absent discrimination, objectionable conduct by employers must be countered by other means than complaints under these Acts."
"The reasoning of the industrial tribunal on this issue is wholly defective. The Act of 1976 requires it to be shown that the complainant has been treated by the person against whom the discrimination is alleged less favourably than that person treats or would have treated another. In deciding that issue, the conduct of the hypothetical reasonable employer is irrelevant. The alleged discriminator may or may not be a reasonable employer. If he is not a reasonable employer he might well have treated another employee in just the same unsatisfactory way as he treated the complainant in which case he would not have treated the complainant "less favourably" for the purposes of the Act of 1976. The fact that, for the purposes of the law of unfair dismissal, an employer has acted unreasonably casts no light whatsoever on the question whether he has treated the employee "less favourably" for the purposes of the Act of 1976. I cannot improve on the reasoning of Lord Morison, delivering the opinion of the court, who expressed the position as follows, 1997 S.L.T. 281, 284: "
"His case was that the evidence showed two critical things. One was the preconceived hostility to him: this depended on matters of fact which it was for the industrial tribunal to ascertain or refute on the evidence placed before them. The other was a racial bias against him evidenced by such hostility: this was a matter of inference for the industrial tribunal if and in so far as it found the hostility established. Experience shows that the relationship between the two may be subtle. For example, a tribunal of fact may be readier to infer a racial motive for hostility which has been denied but which it finds established than for hostility which has been admitted but acceptably explained. The industrial tribunal in paragraph 5 of its reasons directed itself correctly in law about this, with one arguable exception: it concluded the paragraph with this remark: "
"Frequently, of course, a woman may claim that her employer discriminated against her in a situation where she cannot point to any actual case in which a male employee has been treated more favourably. What she says is that the employer treated her less favourably than he would have treated a male employee in the same circumstances. The words "would treat" in article 3(1)(a) specifically recognise that she can do this. In a contested claim before a tribunal the applicant has to prove how her employer would have treated a male employee in circumstances which, ex hypothesi, have not actually occurred. That male employee is often referred to as a "hypothetical comparator"
"I turn to consider the application of these provisions in practice. In deciding a discrimination claim one of the matters employment tribunals have to consider is whether the statutory definition of discrimination has been satisfied. When the claim is based on direct discrimination or victimisation, in practice tribunals in their decisions normally consider, first, whether the claimant received less favourable treatment than the appropriate comparator (the 'less favourable treatment' issue) and then, secondly, whether the less favourable treatment was on the relevant proscribed ground (the 'reason why' issue). Tribunals proceed to consider the reason why issue only if the less favourable treatment issue is resolved in favour of the claimant. Thus the less favourable treatment issue is treated as a threshold which the claimant must cross before the tribunal is called upon to decide why the claimant was afforded the treatment of which she is complaining. No doubt there are cases where it is convenient and helpful to adopt this two step approach to what is essentially a single question: did the claimant, on the proscribed ground, receive less favourable treatment than others? But, especially where the identity of the relevant comparator is a matter of dispute, this sequential analysis may give rise to needless problems. Sometimes the less favourable treatment issue cannot be resolved without, at the same time, deciding the reason why issue. The two issues are intertwined. The present case is a good example. The relevant provisions in theSex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976 are in all material respects the same as those in theSex Discrimination Act 1975 which, for ease of discussion, I have so far referred to. Chief Inspector Shamoon claimed she was treated less favourably than two male chief inspectors. Unlike her, they retained their counselling responsibilities. Is this comparing like with like? Prima facie it is not. She had been the subject of complaints and of representations by Police Federation representatives, the male chief inspectors had not. This might be the reason why she was treated as she was. This might explain why she was relieved of her responsibilities and they were not. But whether this factual difference between their positions was in truth a material difference is an issue which cannot be resolved without determining why she was treated as she was. It might be that the reason why she was relieved of her counselling responsibilities had nothing to do with the complaints and representations. If that were so, then a comparison between her and the two male chief inspectors may well be comparing like with like, because in that event the difference between her and her two male colleagues would be an immaterial difference. I must take this a step further. As I have said, prima facie the comparison with the two male chief inspectors is not apt. So be it. Let it be assumed that, this being so, the most sensible course in practice is to proceed on the footing that the appropriate comparator is a hypothetical comparator: a male chief inspector regarding whose conduct similar complaints and representations had been made. On this footing the less favourable treatment issue is this: was Chief Inspector Shamoon treated less favourably than such a male chief inspector would have been treated? But, here also, the question is incapable of being answered without deciding why Chief Inspector Shamoon was treated as she was. It is impossible to decide whether Chief Inspector Shamoon was treated less favourably than a hypothetical male chief inspector without identifying the ground on which she was treated as she was. Was it grounds of sex? If yes, then she was treated less favourably than a male chief inspector in her position would have been treated. If not, not thus, on this footing also, the less favourable treatment issue is incapable of being decided without deciding the reason why issue. And the decision on the reason why issue will also provide the answer to the less favourable treatment issue. This analysis seems to me to point to the conclusion that employment tribunals may sometimes be able to avoid arid and confusing disputes about the identification of the appropriate comparator by concentrating primarily on why the claimant was treated as she was. Was it on the proscribed ground which is the foundation of the application? That will call for an examination of all the facts of the case. Or was it for some other reason? If the latter, the application fails. If the former, there will be usually be no difficulty in deciding whether the treatment, afforded to the claimant on the proscribed ground, was less favourable than was or would have been afforded to others. The most convenient and appropriate way to tackle the issues arising on any discrimination application must always depend upon the nature of the issues and all the circumstances of the case. There will be cases where it is convenient to decide the less favourable treatment issue first. But, for the reason set out above, when formulating their decisions employment tribunals may find it helpful to consider whether they should postpone determining the less favourable treatment issue until after they have decided why the treatment was afforded to the claimant. Adopting this course would have simplified the issues, and assisted in their resolution, in the present case."
"It is, I think, open to question whether the issue of less favourable treatment should be examined separately from the third issue with which the tribunal dealt under Article 3(a) namely which was whether the treatment which the appellant received was "on the ground of her sex"
"Parliament has not spelled out what constitute "the relevant circumstances" in article 7. The meaning of the words must therefore be deduced from the context. They occur in a provision prescribing how anyone administering the Order is to determine whether an alleged discriminator treated a woman less favourably than a man on the ground of her sex under article 3(1). So "the relevant circumstances" must be those circumstances that are relevant for that purpose. In Nagarajan v London Regional Transport[2000] 1 AC 501 , 510H - 511B, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead pointed out that in every case of alleged discrimination it is necessary to enquire why the complainant received less favourable treatment. As he went on to say, save in obvious cases, this will call for some consideration of the mental processes of the alleged discriminator in order to identify the grounds of his decision. I accordingly infer that "the relevant circumstances" in article 7 are those which the alleged discriminator takes into account when deciding to treat the woman as he does or when deciding to treat the man as he treats, or would treat, him."
"It has on a number of occasions been made plain that the decision of an Industrial Tribunal is not required to be an elaborate formalistic product of a refined legal Draughtsmanship but it must contain an outline of the story which has given rise to the complaint and a summary of the tribunals basic factual conclusions and a statement of the reasons which led them to reach the conclusion which they do so on those basic facts. The parties are entitled to be told why they have won or lost. There should be a sufficient account of the facts and the reasoning to enable EAT or on further appeal this court to see whether the question of law arises……"
"More often racial discrimination will have to be established, if at all, as a matter of inference. It is of the greatest importance that the primary facts from which such inference is drawn are set out with clarity by the Tribunal in its fact-finding role, so that the validity of the inference can be examined. Either the facts justifying such inference exist or they do not, but only the Tribunal can say what those facts are. A mere intuitive hunch, for example, that there has been unlawful discrimination, is insufficient without facts being found to support that conclusion."
"…in my judgment it is not fair to those found guilty of racial discrimination that…an inference should stand in the absence of primary facts that would support it."
"There is at least one further obstacle to Mr Underhill's stalwart defence of the industrial tribunal's decision. The courts have repeatedly told appellants that it is not acceptable to comb through a set of reasons for hints of error and fragments of mistake, and to try to assemble these into a case for oversetting the decision. No more is it acceptable to comb through a patently deficient decision for signs of the missing elements, and to try to amplify these by argument into an adequate set of reasons. Just as the courts will not interfere with a decision, whatever its incidental flaws, which has covered the correct ground and answered the right questions, so they should not uphold a decision which has failed in this basic task, whatever its other virtues."
"In my judgment the Employment Appeal Tribunal were correct to hold that there was an error of law in the decision of the Employment Tribunal as identified by the Employment Appeal Tribunal. In a situation in which it is expressly found that there was no deliberate or conscious racial discrimination, it is necessary, before drawing the inference sought to be drawn, to set out the facts relied on and the process by which the inference is drawn. In some cases that process of reasoning need only be brief; in other cases more detailed reasoning will be required. The Employment Appeal Tribunal approached the matter in this way: "... we do suggest that the less obvious the primary facts are as pointers or the more inconclusive or ambivalent the explanations given for the events in issue are as pointers, the more the need for the Employment Tribunal to explain why it is that from such primary facts and upon such explanations the inference that they have drawn has been drawn. The more equivocal the primary facts, the more the Employment Tribunal needs to explain why they have concluded as they have."
"As we have mentioned the tribunal repeatedly said that there had been no intention to discriminate. That, of course, is not in itself an answer but it is likely to lead to a position in which the reasons for the inference of racial discrimination need to be fully explained."
"Justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why one has won and the other has lost"
"Where permission is granted to appeal on the grounds that the judgment does not contain adequate reasons, the appellate court should first review the judgment, in the context of the material evidence and submissions at the trial, in order to determine whether, when all of these are considered, it is apparent why the judge reached the decision that he did. If satisfied that the reason is apparent and that it is a valid basis for the judgment, the appeal will be dismissed…."
"It is common ground that an error in law is made by a tribunal if it finds less favourable treatment on racial grounds where there is no evidence or material from which it can properly make such in inference. See North West Thames Regional Health Authority v Noone[1988] ICR 813 ,[1988] IRLR 530 at p.824 of the former report. Although an employment tribunal is less formal in its procedures than a court of law and is not bound by the rules of evidence, it must be satisfied that the complaint is proved, on the balance of probabilities, by the person who makes it. In the absence of direct evidence on an issue of less favourable treatment on racial grounds, the tribunal may make inferences from other facts which are undisputed or are established by evidence. However, in the absence of adequate material from which inferences can be properly made, a tribunal is not entitled to find a claim proved by making unsupported legal or factual assumptions about disputed questions of less favourable treatment on racial grounds. This is so whether the discrimination is alleged to arise from conscious or subconscious influences operating in the mind of the alleged discriminator."
"we record our findings on both the six primary allegations and the 31 factual allegations. We then consider whether we may draw inferences of less favourable treatment and, if so, to what extent. …. We leave these to the end. We do so that we may be sure that our drawing of inferences is done, and may be seen to be done, in accordance with Qureshi , by looking at "the totality of [the] facts."" 130. In its factual analysis, the tribunal reaches certain conclusions as to whether Dr. Bahl has suffered what it terms a "detriment."
"After26 August 1999 there were no attempts to discuss the matter informally despite Ann Frazer's further complaints which she made to Robert Sayer. He had last spoken to Kamlesh Bahl about her conduct towards staff on26 August 1999 . His evidence was that her behaviour had improved for a short period after he had done so. He decided not to do so again. If he had spoken to her there would have been the possibility of informal resolution. That treatment was to Kamlesh Bahl's detriment because the opportunity for early, informal resolution was not offered to her at that stage. Whether informal resolution would have succeeded, or whether the final outcome would have been materially different, is another matter."
"These two allegations overlap to such an extent that they can properly be taken together. As a matter of fact the allegations are correct. The panel was convened and Kamlesh Bahl was not told of the complaint prior to the meeting. The procedure that was adopted was broadly in accordance with Bindmans' advice. However, Bindmans had referred explicitly to paragraph 6.10 of the Dignity at Work Policy, which required that a copy of the complaint be copied to the council member. This was not done. They also advised in emphatic terms that those investigating the complaint should not be "connected with the allegation in any way"
"These allegations are closely allied. Robert Sayer did not, in fact, refuse either of these requests but said he would take legal advice on them. Kamlesh Bahl was a member of Council. Robert Sayer could not have thought for an instant that she was not entitled to see the documents or to place her views before the Council, when her own position was to be considered. The effect of saying that he wanted to take legal advice was to stall or temporise over these matters. By doing so he created a doubt that the requests would be granted. That was, to a limited extent, to Kamlesh Bahl's detriment at that time."
"As to there being no attempt at informal resolution Robert Sayer's explanation was that he could have spoken to Kamlesh Bahl but he did not want to fall out with her and that he did not want to make the wrong working relationship any worse. When Robert Sayer had last spoken to Kamlesh Bahl about her behaviour it had improved, albeit briefly. It seemed to us that the natural, logical thing for Robert Sayer to do would have been to speak to Kamlesh Bahl informally. We would have expected the President at least to warn his Vice President in general terms of potential formal complaints when Ann Frazer reported further problems to him. It might well have been a difficult meting, but the failure to do so cried out for an explanation. We have already rejected part of Robert Sayer's evidence on this point…. The explanation he gave for not speaking to Kamlesh Bahl again was weak to the point where it was not credible. Robert Sayer, above all, had no reason to be cowed by Kamlesh Bahl. In our judgment, had the person complained of been a white person or male, then Robert Sayer would at least have attempted to deal with the matter informally. The explanation Robert Sayer gave for believing that he was not "connected with" the complaint in any way when convening the panel was not satisfactory. Anybody receiving Bindmans' advice would realise that there was not justification whatsoever for such a restricted reading. That the Law Society's President, Secretary General and Director of Human Resources would choose to read it in such a way was astounding. We came to the conclusion that had the person concerned been a white person or a man the Respondents would have taken particular care to ensure that an "unconnected" panel was convened. Robert Sayer explained the he reasonably wanted to seek legal advice on Kamlesh Bahl's requests both to see the papers that were to be put before Council and to have an opportunity to speak at the meeting. As we have explained we did not accept that he believed he needed such advice at the time. The requests were obviously in line with all rules of natural justice."
"We have also found that Robert Sayer set his face against Kamlesh Bahl after the meeting of28 August 1999 . From then on, in our judgment, his actions had the effect of making the presentation of formal complaints more likely. We have found that he deliberately omitted to read her email on8 September 1999 . He did not, for that reason, respond to it. We found that he was informed about the process of taking legal advice from Bindmans to a greater extent than he admitted. We noted he had changed his evidence about the date when he alleged Jane Betts had warned him that MSF were preparing to submit a formal complaint. We found that Robert Sayer and Jane Betts were discussing the question of formal complaints from at least15 November 1999 onwards. We found that Robert Sayer did tell Jane Betts to "get it sorted"…. We also too into account in assessing the way in which Robert Sayer treated Kamlesh Bahl the way in which John Young was treated. The comparison was restricted to two specific aspects. The informal raisings of allegations with the office holder and the conduct of the relevant Council meetings."
"Looking at the totality of the facts we have found, the explanations we have rejected and the respects in which we have found Robert Sayer's evidence wanting, we draw the inference that an effective cause of his treatment of Kamlesh Bahl was on both racial grounds and the ground of her sex. In each of the allegations of detrimental treatment we have upheld we find that Kamlesh Bahl was treated less favourably by Robert Sayer than a white person or a man who would have been treated in similar circumstances. But for her race and sex she would not have been subjected to detriment in those respects. We do not distinguish between the race or sex of the Applicant in reaching this conclusion. Our reason for that is simple. The claim was advanced on the basis that Kamlesh Bahl was treated in the way she was because she is a black woman. Kamlesh Bahl was the first office holder that the Law Society had ever had who was not both white and male. There was no basis in the evidence for comparing her treatment with that of a white female, or a black male, office holder. We can only draw inferences. We do not know what was in the minds of Robert Sayer and Jane Betts at any particular point. It is sufficient for our purposes to find, where appropriate, that in each case they would not have treated a white person or a man less favourably. If we need to refine our approach for the purposes of dealing with remedy the parties may address this issue at that stage."
"that on9 December 1999 she was a member of the panel comprising three people who were all connected with the complaint of Russell Wallman in some way. that on13 December 1999 she breached confidentiality by confirming to Isabel De Sa that a complaint had been received about Kamlesh Bahl. that on15 December 1999 she did not alert the IEC that Andrew Hall's complaint was not validly made under the Dignity at Work Policy, nor of the need to follow the procedure that had been established. that on20 December 1999 she instructed Robin Lewis of Bindmans to make enquiries of the Union at the EOC about other allegations against Kamlesh Bahl. that on26 January 2000 she permitted the Union to broadcast a tannoy message to all staff."
"Jane Betts did tell Isabel De Sa about the complaint against Kamlesh Bahl in response to a query which suggested that the latter knew of the complaint in any event. In our judgment the news of the complaint having been made formally was probably common knowledge to Law Society staff within a matter of hours. It was to Kamlesh Bahl's detriment that Jane Betts did confirm the complaint because at that stage there was still a likelihood that Kamlesh Bahl would have to work with Isabel De Sa and other Law Society staff. The Law Society and the named Respondents were all purporting to deal with the matter confidentially. In our judgment Jane Betts would have been more likely to have maintained confidentiality had the complaint involved a white person or a male. Her explanation for doing so was that Isabel De Sa seemed to know what was going on."
"We came to the view that once Andrew Hall's complaint was put before the IEC it was inevitable that they would refer it to Council which was shortly to meet. The real issue was thus how it came to be before the IEC. That was wholly due to Jane Betts. Jane Betts was an extremely well qualified and very experienced manger. She was entirely familiar with the circumstances of Andrew Hall leaving the Law Society 2 months earlier. She, above all, had been a key person in reviewing the Dignity at Work Policy and taking advice from Bindmans on how to apply it. We came to the conclusion that Jane Betts would, in these circumstances, have recognised the problems with the complaint immediately. She would have taken this complaint to the IEC at this time irrespective of the race or sex of the person about whom the complaint was made. However she should have alerted the IEC that it was not valid or, at least, of the need to follow the procedure that had been established."
"This message was broadcast in general terms but there could have been no member of staff who was not aware that it referred to Kamlesh Bahl and complaints against her. It was broadcast after three emails to staff abut the presentation of such complaints and very shortly before the expiry of the extended deadline for presenting complaints. By permitting the Union to broadcast to all staff in this way Jane Betts was facilitating the making of further complaints. Whilst the announcement of union meetings may have been standard practice the same was not true of meetings of all staff organised by the MSF. The announcement was detrimental of Kamlesh Bahl."
"We also took into account Jane Betts' stated perception that Kamlesh Bahl was taking over her role. Understandably Jane Betts resented this. She, as we have found, kept Robert Sayer informed about the process by which the formal complaints came forward. It was she in whom Phillip Hamer detected a sense of triumph when she brought in the complaint from Andrew Hall to the IEC meeting at Carey Street on 15 th December 1999. She commented to Lord Hunt about working closely with the Union. In the case of Jane Betts we find that her use of language in the document she gave to the Special Committee and that she used at Lord Griffiths' Inquiry both give a clear indication that, perhaps unconsciously, her actions and omissions were on racial or gender based grounds. Her use of the expression that it was as if a culprit was to be found "and hands were going to be chopped off" to describe Kamlesh Bahl's behaviour to Lord Griffiths was the prime example of this. This phrase, descriptive of a sanction in Shariyah law, had clear racial overtones. In evidence she apologised for speaking of Kamlesh Bahl's "quite girlish, charming chatter"
"We find in respect of both Robert Sayer and Jane Betts that there was a substantial element of deliberation in the acts they did which were detrimental to Kamlesh Bahl. That is not to say that we find that they were consciously motivated by grounds of race or gender. On the balance of probabilities we find that they were not conscious of their behaviour towards them being, in part, motivated by her race or sex."
"We do not distinguish between the race or sex of the applicant in reaching this conclusion. Our reason for that is simple. The claim was advanced on the basis that Kamlesh Bahl was treated in the way she was because she is a black woman. Kamlesh Bahl was the first office holder that the Law Society had ever had who was not both white and male. There was no basis in the evidence for comparing her treatment with that of a white female, or a black male, office holder. We can only draw inferences. We do not know what was in the minds of Robert Sayer and Jane Betts at any particular point. It is sufficient for our purposes to find, where appropriate, that in each case they would have not treated a white person or a man less favourably. If we need to refine our approach for the purposes of dealing with remedy the parties may address this issue at that stage."
"There was a further tirade from Kamlesh to me in the ladies' toilets at the Bournemouth conference on the subject of Andrew Hall. I was embarrassed but also fascinated by her self-control. Once she had got her way she went back to quite girlish charming chatter and we went back into the Conference hall…."
"I spent much of early 1999 focussing on Russell Wallman and how to find enough "lebensraum" for him to continue working whilst KB was around."
"It was confrontational and it felt as though there was a culprit going to be found and blame was going to be apportioned and hands were going to be chopped off."
"We also took into account the way in which Robert Sayer treated Kamlesh Bahl in the way in which John Young was treated. The comparison was restricted to two specific aspects. The informal raising of allegations with the office holder and the conduct of the relevant Council meetings."
"The tribunal's decision is vitiated by two fundamental errors. First, it overlooked the fact that Superintendent Laird had no authority over the two male chief inspectors who were in different regions. So, if they continued to do assessments, this was not because of any decision which Superintendent Laird had taken to allow them to do so. He did nothing in relation to them - he did not "treat" them at all. For that reason, it was not open to the tribunal to find in terms of article 3(1)(a) that Superintendent Laird treated the appellant less favourably than he treated the two male chief inspectors."