MR D R GOULD v (1) THE GOVERNORS OF HAILEYBURY & IMPERIAL SERVICE COLLEGE (2) THE GOVERNORS OF LAMBROOK HAILEYBURY SCHOOL [2001] UKEAT 769_00_0606

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
BAILII case number: [2001] UKEAT 769_00_0606Case No Appeal No. EAT/769/00Venue 58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS
Between
MR D R GOULDAPPELLANT(1) THE GOVERNORS OF HAILEYBURY & IMPERIAL SERVICE COLLEGE (2) THE GOVERNORS OF LAMBROOK HAILEYBURY SCHOOLRESPONDENT
Before
Mr Justice LindsayDate 6 June 2001
[1]APPEARANCES For the Appellant IN PERSON MR JUSTICE LINDSAY (PRESIDENT) This is the second appeal before us which involves the basic matter Gould against The Governors of Haileybury & Imperial Service College and The Governors of Lambrook Haileybury School. We have given one judgment already in this matter and that needs to be read into this, as does an earlier judgment of ours given on 7 February 2001.[2]This particular appeal headed 769/00 is an appeal against the Chairman's decision of 8 June 2000 to refuse a review.[3]On 8 June 2000 the Chairman sent his decision declining a review and giving Extended Reasons for his decision. On 19 June 2000 the Notice of Appeal was received in hard copy; it is dated 16 June 2000 and in it Mr Gould raises a relatively small number of points. He says he has a claim for personal injury and he refers to Sheriff v Klyne Tugs [1999] IRLR 481 . As we see that case, it is of no assistance to Mr Gould. There is a statutory tort of sex discrimination and loss and damage suffered by reason of tortious behaviour falling within that tort can be compensated for by the Employment Tribunal. That includes injury to feelings and personal injury by way of psychiatric illness in consequence of the tort of sex discrimination if the tort is so found. But here there was no finding of that tort. The Tribunal says of Sheriff v Klyne Tugs :
"This case referred to is in relation to damages for personal injuries arising out of a discrimination claim. The Tribunal has found against the applicant on his discrimination claim and therefore does not have to consider the question of remedy. Any application for review in this respect can therefore have no reasonable prospect of success."
That seems to us to be right and, moreover, there is no general jurisdiction in the Employment Tribunals to deal with claims for personal injuries, see Employment Tribunals Act 1996 section 3(3). That was, I think, the first point raised in the Notice of Appeal.[4]The second is this. The main hearings ended on 27 March 2000 with the Employment Tribunal considering matters privately on 30 March and 4 April and the main decision was sent to the parties on 4 May. It was not until 16 May that Mr Gould requested leave to amend to add a claim, and, it has to be said, a somewhat nebulous claim at that, for breach of duty and care. The matter was dealt with by the Tribunal which said:
"The amendment sought by Mr Gould was this: "
The Respondent owed me a duty of care. It breached that duty of care in how it treated me. In particular, issuing written warnings without any form of a disciplinary hearing or appeal was a breach of this duty of care. I have suffered loss as a result for which I have not been compensated (e.g. my salary and benefits for the summer term 1998 and the academic year 1998/2000)." The Chairman said this:
" Breach of Duty of Care This is an application for leave to make an addition to the applicant's claim. This cannot be just at this stage of the proceedings and such application is refused. Moreover, the applicant's alleged losses in respect of his claims for unfair dismissal and breach of contract for which there have been findings in his favour are to be assessed at the remedy hearing."
[5]As we see it, there is no conceivable error of law in that ruling. The fact, which Mr Gould emphasises, that in law there can in exceptional cases be an amendment to a claim even after judgment, is far from saying that that has to be done where no exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. There has to be, even as to Mr Gould's claims, some notion of finality. The Chairman did not err in law here, even arguably, in our view, and accordingly the appeal in this case is dismissed even at this preliminary stage.