COLMAN COYLE v MRS Z GEORGIOU [2001] UKEAT 535_00_1501

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
BAILII case number: [2001] UKEAT 535_00_1501Case No Appeal No. EAT/535/00Venue 58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS
COLMAN COYLEAPPELLANTMRS Z GEORGIOURESPONDENT
His Honour Judge D Pugsley Mr P DawsonDate 15 January 2001
[1]APPEARANCES For the Appellant MR I GATT (of Counsel) Instructed by: Colman Coyle Solicitors Wells House 80 Upper Street Islington London N1 ONU For the Respondent MISS McKIE (of Counsel) Instructed by: Messrs Kay Georgiou 15-15 Guilford Street London WC1X 1DX JUDGE D PUGSLEY This is a case in which the Tribunal have had a temporary advantage of both advocates, because we have seen both Skeleton Arguments. This is an appeal by the Respondent Employer, and a cross appeal by the Appellant.[2]Having considered the matter, we have come to the view that there really is an arguable case on both grounds. Without doing violence to the industry of Counsel in producing these Skeleton Arguments, it could be said that in the broadest terms the argument on behalf of Colman Coyle is that the Tribunal has erred in concluding that Mrs Georgiou was constructively dismissed and that the Tribunal has misdirected itself in law as to the circumstances in which a Tribunal can find constructive dismissal.[3]The Respondent Applicant argues that the Tribunal has misdirected itself in that having found various matters, the Tribunal wrongly went on to say that the requirement to work full-time was objectively justifiable. There is, it could be said, a whiff of perversity as a ground of appeal in both grounds of appeal, but our view is, and we have not hesitated to make it clear, is that having read both Skeleton Arguments, we all think, and this was a view reached both individually and, as it were, collectively, this is an arguable issue on both sides.[4]Secondly it is very difficult to see how one could isolate one ground of appeal from the cross-appeal, because in Mr Gatt's words we do not think he would claim originality for, they are different sides of the same coin.[5]We have asked Counsel if they assist us as to what evidence they need from the Chairman. Paragraph 62 of the decision reads thus:
"62 The Applicant realised that this was the basis of the proposal and even though the Respondents later withdrew that term and accepted that there would be continuous employment, the damage had already been done and the trust and confidence in the employer had been compromised. Following that, the Respondents' proposal as set out in the terms of 25 February that the Applicant should only work one day a week and that she could not demand a second day amounted to the fact that the Applicant felt that she would never regain her commercial property work of five days a week."
[6]It would be helpful if Chairman's Notes could set out all evidence upon which that conclusion was based and in particular the finding that the damage had already been done and the trust and confidence in the employer had been compromised.[7]Counsel have very helpfully agreed they will put in a schedule of the evidence that they require from the Chairman, and in this case, we are prepared to leave that to their professional judgment. They are, I am sure, not going to require evidence that is unnecessary. What they have said, in general terms, is they would like the evidence of Mrs Georgiou, the Applicant, Mr Coyle, Mr Wighton and Mrs Kyriacou.[8]It is not necessary that the evidence should be as to the personal detriment suffered by the Applicant, i.e the evidence of the difficulty the Applicant would have in working full-time, and the difficulty she would find in obtaining adequate child-care facilities to look after the child.[9]We agree, and it is by consent, that the Skeleton Argument be 14 days prior to the full hearing, but the parties to give notice to each other, within 7 days of any matters upon which they are asserting there was no evidence before the Tribunal. We think this is appropriate to be a Category C case, further we think, and Counsel agree, that this is a half day case. Leave given for the Respondent to delete ground A of the Notice of Appeal.