CAPE INDUSTRIAL SERVICES LTD v MRS P AMBLER [2001] UKEAT 0950_01_1311
[1]APPEARANCES For the Appellant EAT/0950/01 PETER OLDHAM (Of Counsel) Instructed by: Messrs Hartley Linfoot and Whitlam Solicitors Princess House 122 Queen Street Sheffield S1 2DW EAT/1077/01 NICOLA BRAGANZA (Of Counsel) Instructed by: Messrs Morley Mitchell Solicitors Beech House Horsforth Office Park Manor Road Leeds LS18 4DX JUDGE D PUGSLEY This is an appeal from a decision of the Leeds Employment Tribunal in which the Applicant was found to have been unfairly dismissed. Mrs Amber had commenced employment in 1991 with the Respondent company. She was employed for half the time as the secretary to the Managing Director and for the other half of her time as a personnel manager; according to the Tribunal's finding she was initially the only personnel manager. The job expanded and an administrative assistant was taken on and later a staff administrator. Both reported to Mrs Ambler who retained a general oversight of the personnel function.[2]In August 2000, Mrs Eastwood, the staff administrator, resigned as she had been offered a job with another company. There was a discussion between the applicant Mr Ainley, the managing director, and Mrs Ambler in which it was suggested by Mrs Ambler that she should take on the personnel role full time. Whilst Mrs Ambler was away on holiday Mr Ainley provisionally offered Mrs Eastwood a full time job as the Personnel Officer at a higher salary. Mrs Eastwood withdrew her resignation to stay on with the Respondent firm. When Mrs Ambler returned from holiday she was upset at these proposals and thereafter was away from work due to stress related problems. Mrs Ambler activated the grievance procedure and in November 2000 she resigned.[3]The Tribunal found that there was a breach of contract in removing from Mrs Ambler's responsibility the oversight of two members of staff and that there was a breach of the term of mutual trust and confidence. Mr Oldham argues that there is no basis for the tribunal deciding that the reorganisation which took place was a breach of contract in the way in which the 8 tribunal found and further contends that certain of the tribunal's findings were perverse.[4]Mr Oldham has responded with dignity to the many objections raised by all members of this tribunal to what we regard as the somewhat broad nature of his submissions in the grounds of appeal and the skeleton argument. We consider that the findings the tribunal made as to the breaches of contract were open to them and we regard the arguments as to perversity as an attempt to reargue issues of fact that the tribunal has already determined.[5]However Mr Oldham has persuaded us that there is one arguable issue which we consider merits the consideration of a full tribunal. It is not sufficient for an applicant who resigns to establish that she left the company in circumstances, which constitute dismissal. There still has to be a finding that such a dismissal was unfair within the meaning of Section 98 (4) of the Act. This ground is set out at Ground 6 (xi) of the grounds of the appeal under the contention that the tribunal failed to determine/consider whether the alleged dismissal was unfair and to express reasons any such determination. We consider that it is arguable that the tribunal failed to give this issue the consideration, which it merits in the decision.[6]Ms Braganza, who appears for the Applicant, the respondent to this appeal, has withdrawn the ground of appeal that she had raised but does, of course, reserve her right to raise that, and any other issue she thinks relevant at the full hearing. Leave is given to amend the grounds of appeal within 14 days. The Chairman's notes are not required. We make the usual argument as to skeleton arguments and we consider this is a Class C case with a time estimate of half a day. .