MS G J YOUNG v (1) TIMBMET LTD (2) MR A SUMNER [2000] UKEAT 667_99_1307

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
BAILII case number: [2000] UKEAT 667_99_1307Case No Appeal No. EAT/667/99Venue 58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS
Between
MS G J YOUNGAPPELLANT(1) TIMBMET LTD (2) MR A SUMNERRESPONDENT
Before
His Honour Judge David Wilcox Mr D J JenkinsDate 13 July 2000
[1]APPEARANCES For the Appellant THE APPELLANT NEITHER BEING PRESENT NOR REPRESENTED For the Respondents MR A LLOYD (Representative) Shaw Personnel Services Ltd Brinkworth House Brinkworth Wiltshire SN15 5DF JUDGE WILCOX : This is an appeal by the appellant arising from her complaint that she was not provided with a written statement of particulars of employment to comply with section 1 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 . The tribunal below agreed that her complaint was well founded. They then went on in their finding thus:
"6 … As the applicant's employment has terminated the Tribunal makes no other determinations in this respect."
[2]The terms of her engagement were contained in a letter of appointment that did not set out matters such as notice. No formal contract of employment was given to her in the requisite time setting out the material terms and conditions of her employment.[3]Going to the findings of the tribunal, it seems that the respondent employed the appellant for about 12 weeks; that her departure from their employment came about in this way as found by the tribunal, referring to 9th January:
"8 … the applicant attended her office, which was not a day she was designated to work, clearing her desk and leaving a note for the respondent addressed to Sumner stating that she intended to leave as soon as she found another position, but up to that point would be attending to work only 16 hours per week."
She was then given a weeks notice. It is contended before us that the employers were entitled to dismiss her summarily for her conduct, that was not a matter that was, it seems, argued below or if argued below, no finding was made in relation to it. The respondents contend today that it was a matter of grace that she was paid one week's salary in lieu of notice.[4]We go to the finding at paragraph 13 of the findings:
"13 As regards to the complaint that the applicant was dismissed for asking for her contract, ie. an assertion of the statutory right, the respondent's evidence was that this was not broached during her employment. The Tribunal prefers the respondent's evidence on this matter and also because if the applicant had been aerated regarding this particular issue it is likely that she would have raised it in her letter to Mr Sumner. We find no evidence that the reason for the applicant's departure was in relation to an assertion of a statutory right. …"
By implication there and the reference to dismissal, it seems that the tribunal is hinting that they accepted that there was a dismissal. If there was, they do not say so in terms, neither do they spell out the reasons or consider the matter of justification. It is perhaps an unsatisfactory reasoned judgment in relation to this specific matter.[5]We have come to the conclusion that there is an absolute right under the statute to the terms of the contract. They have not been provided. The tribunal ought to have directed that they should be provided or found terms certainly as to notice, if not as to wider terms.[6]We are not in the position to adjudicate ourselves as to what the proper terms should be. Those are matters essentially of fact. We very reluctantly in this case feel constrained to send this matter back to the same tribunal to consider what in fact the contract was. On that limited issue, therefore, we remit the matter to the tribunal below.