MR J WARD v MR & MRS E VAUGHAN T/A VAUGHAN HAULAGE [1999] UKEAT 390_99_2307

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
BAILII case number: [1999] UKEAT 390_99_2307Case No Appeal No. EAT/390/99Venue 58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS
Between
MR J WARDAPPELLANTMR & MRS E VAUGHAN T/A VAUGHAN HAULAGERESPONDENT
Before
Mr Justice Charles Mr D J Hodgkins Cb Mrs T A MarslandDate 23 July 1999
[1]APPEARANCES For the Appellant NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY THE APPELLANT MR JUSTICE CHARLES: This appeal comes before us by way of Preliminary Hearing today. The parties are a Mr Ward and Mr and Mrs Vaughan, trading as Vaughan Haulage. Mr Ward appeals against a Decision of the Employment Tribunal sent to the parties on 28 January 1999. The issue before the Employment Tribunal related to guarantee payments and the appeal is directed to the conclusions of the Employment Tribunal contained in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Extended Reasons and primary to paragraph 11. This appears from the Notice of Appeal which sets out the grounds as follows:
"That the case of Reed v Camphill Engraves [1990] ICR 435 is authority for the assertion that the limitation contained in s.34 (2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 does not apply where there is a series of guarantee payments and there has been a series of demands for payment in accordance with the act. Accordingly the appellant is entitled to claim guarantee payments dating back to January 1993."
[2]Mr Ward, through solicitors, has written to us saying that he will not be attending today and inviting us to deal with this appeal on the papers. The appeal deals with a point concerning the application of the time limit in section 34(2)(a) of the Employment Rights Act. Reed v Camphill is a case which, as the Employment Tribunal pointed out, dealt with earlier legislation. The earlier legislation is, as the Employment Tribunal point out, in different terms.[3]In our judgment there is no reasonably arguable point of law that in their approach and reasoning to the issue as to the application of that case the Employment Tribunal erred. Accordingly, in our judgment there is no reasonably arguable point of law raised on this appeal and it must be dismissed.