MR C H PERKINS v DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY / BENEFITS AGENCY [1999] UKEAT 386_99

EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
BAILII case number: [1999] UKEAT 386_99Case No Appeal No. EAT/386/99 EAT/559/99Venue 58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS
Between
MR C H PERKINSAPPELLANTDEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY / BENEFITS AGENCYRESPONDENT
Before
Mr Justice Holland Mrs R Chapman Mr S M SpringerDate 18 October 1999
[1]APPEARANCES For the Appellant NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT MR JUSTICE HOLLAND : By an IT1 dated 29 May 1997 Mr Perkins make a complaint alleging unfair or constructive dismissal. The Respondents to the complaint were his former employers, the Benefits Agency. That matter came before an Employment Tribunal held at London (North). The hearing was one of length. The Tribunal sat on two days in April 1998, on three days in November 1998 and finally, on 3 December 1998. In the overall result, by way of a decision sent to the parties on 12 January 1999, the following was expressed:
"The unanimous decision of the Tribunal is that the Applicant was not unfairly dismissed, constructively or directly, and that the Respondents were not guilty of race discrimination. The application is therefore dismissed in respect of all claims."
[2]Against that decision an appeal has been mounted to this Tribunal. It is our task this morning to see if it is possible to discern a point of law that would found an inter partes hearing. If such a point is to be found then it is our task to identify it; it is our further task to adjourn this matter to enable that further hearing to take place. If, on the other hand, we cannot find any such point then it is our task to say so. Yet further, it is our task then to dismiss this appeal, there being no apparent basis for it.[3]We tackle this problem in the absence of Mr Perkins. We have had a letter dated 17 October which starts:
"I write further to your letters of October 99. I will not be attending the Preliminary Hearing of 18/10/99 due to personal matters. Also I am not in the right frame of mind to deal with the case at this point. If it is at all possible to hear the case fairly in my absence please do so. Otherwise, please arrange an alternative hearing date by which time I should have appointed someone else to represent me should the need still be apparent."
[4]The balance of the letter, which we have read carefully, deals with certain matters germane to his appeal. We have taken the view, having read the papers carefully, that it is possible to hear the case fairly in his absence and that is what we are now doing. Had we any doubt in the matter, then we certainly would have adjourned it in order to allow him to attend, either himself or by way of some representative.[5]In forming that view we have inevitably concentrated upon the Notice of Appeal and the accompanying documentation. The Notice of Appeal is dated 19 February 1999. It is a formidable document. It has appended to it, by way of successive paragraphs, an extensive litany of complaint that in all occupies no less than 115 paragraphs. The Notice itself extends from page 1 of our bundle to page 16. That, in its turn, has been supplemented in the course of time with a statement made by the Appellant and yet further, by an affidavit that he swears in order to further his complaints about the conduct of the hearing below. Those allegations in their turn have been responded to in writing by the Chairman of the Tribunal and by the two of his lay members. It is to be observed that the whole of this preliminary documentation occupies no less than 59 pages of our bundle.[6]We readily concede that the sheer bulk of all this material does not make it necessarily easier for us to try to undertake our essential task and that is to discern, if we can, one or more points of law that would found an arguable appeal. Despite the difficulties however, we have carefully considered all this material and we are quite confident that we are in a position to come to a view about it.[7]Turning then to that which is under appeal, we pay tribute to the Extended Reasons for the quality of such and, in particular, for the way in which such reveal the determination on the part of this Tribunal fully to explore the facts as they emerged in the evidence before them.[8]The facts are set out in detail and in a fashion that excites admiration. Those facts are further supported by directions to themselves as to the law that was necessary for the underpinning of any decision. Thus in paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 the Tribunal carefully and accurately sets out the principles of law relating to constructive dismissal. Those principles are then succeeded in paragraphs 34 and 35 with the principles relating to race discrimination. Thereafter, the Tribunal carefully sets out the submissions, having had the advantage of receiving from the parties submissions in writing. There then follows for the balance of the Extended Reasons their conclusions, first under the heading "Constructive Dismissal" and second, under the heading "Race Discrimination".[9]It is plain that the Tribunal did its best to accomplish the task that had been set by the circumstances of the case. Turning to the directions as to law, there is nothing in such which immediately strikes the beholder as being erroneous and, on the face of it, this is a decision that would be beyond any appeal to this Tribunal.[10]We turn then to what is said in the prolonged documentation. We have to say that there is nothing that we can find in that documentation, be it in the Notice of Appeal, the statement or the affidavit, which could conceivably found an appeal to this Tribunal.[11]The complaints that are made about the conduct of the Tribunal are angrily refuted by those who took part in this marathon hearing and, understandably so. There is nothing that we can see in those complaints that could conceivably cause concern, certainly not the concern that is sufficient to found the appeal.[12]The essential problem with the complaints is that they lead to a robust rebuttal, in particular, on the part of the respective lay members, who quite obviously felt that they had done their best to achieve justice and are concerned that anybody should question the manner in which they, or the Chairman, set about their task.[13]This Tribunal is not slow to look into complaints about the conduct of Employment Tribunals as and when there is a sufficient prima facie case raised. This simply is not one such. The essential point that emerges from the papers is that every decision by the Tribunal is seemingly subject to misinterpretation, that is, interpretation by reference to some premise that the Tribunal was in some way biased against him and determined to arrive at the decision under appeal. This, in our eyes, would appear to be a travesty of that which the Tribunal put in into achieving a result that satisfies their consciences and, in our judgment, satisfies the requirement of the law. Were the matter otherwise we would, of course, adjourn this matter for further argument.[14]For those reasons we are satisfied first, that we can proceed in the absence of Mr Perkins and second, that in his absence our proper task is to say that there is no good point raised by this appeal and therefore this appeal must be dismissed.