Oram v Initial Cleaning Services Ltd [1998] UKEAT 346_98_0603

EAT

Oram v Initial Cleaning Services Ltd

[1998] UKEAT 346_98_0603 · 1998-03-06

MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT) : This is an appeal against a tribunal's refusal to grant certain witness orders. It is a complaint of discrimination, equal pay and dismissal which has been brought by Mrs Oram against her former employers, Initial Cleaning Services Ltd.

The case was due for hearing on 10th March 1998, but we have been told by Counsel for the respondents on this appeal that that date has been adjourned. A further hearing is anticipated later in the Spring, and that before then the Industrial Tribunal will have a directions hearing.

In refusing the application for witness orders. The Industrial Tribunal said this:

"A Chairman has refused your application for Witness Orders. They have been made too late and, in any event, the Chairman is not satisfied from the information provided that the evidence which can be given by the witnesses is material to the issues to be determined by the Tribunal.

Further a party is not entitled to cross-examine their own witnesses and a Witness Order will not be made if it is apparent that a proposed witness will be hostile to the party seeking to call that person.

Subject to these matters, application may be renewed at the hearing."

The letter of appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal dated 4th March 1998 was supplemented by a document dated 6th March 1996. The applicant has the benefit of representation through an organisation called Law at Work of whom the principal is Mr John Wright who appears to have a legal qualification in the sense that he has an LL.B. He has been acting on Mrs Oram's behalf.

It seems to me that although Mr Wright may have some good comments to make about the tribunal's decision, this appeal was wholly and completely unreasonable and misconceived because the tribunal have indicated that the applications could be renewed at the hearing, when of course he would have had an opportunity to have amplified the reasons why it would be in his client's interests to call as a witness a representative of the employers against whom serious allegations were being made. We do not consider that the Industrial Tribunal has in any way exercised its discretion perversely or has misdirected itself in law. All the matters referred to in their letter are ones which seem to me to provide good reason for rejecting the application.

Accordingly, I unhesitatingly dismiss this appeal. It is my understanding that the Industrial Tribunal have sensibly decided to have a directions hearing. It seems to me that at that directions hearing the Industrial Tribunal will wish to consider the desirability of requiring the parties to serve on each other statements of evidence in writing of any witness whom they intend to call at the hearing. This will enable both parties to understand the nature of the case which is being advanced on either side, and will enable the Industrial Tribunal to take proper management control of the proceedings at the hearing. It will then become apparent to Mr Wright exactly what witnesses he thinks he requires. We regard his request for a witness order against the Chief Executive of the Company as being an attempt simply to apply pressure to the Company by causing inconvenience to them. There is no suggestion that that person would have any relevant evidence to give on the matters in dispute. It was to that extent a mischievous application.

Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

Counsel on behalf of the respondents has asked for £450 by way of costs, there being no attendance by or on behalf of the appellant on this appeal.

I am satisfied that there has been unreasonable conduct in the making of this appeal. This is a case where I am entitled in the exercise of the discretion under our rules to make an order for costs. I am willing to make such an order in this case, but I note of course, that the appellant and her representative have not been here to deal with it.

Accordingly, I propose to make the following order namely that an order for costs be made and to be enforced unless within 14 days of today, unless the appellant and/or her representative shows cause why such an order should not be made by sending a letter to us within that 14 day period.

The amount of the costs requested was £450. It seems to me somewhat excessive for the matter at issue. I assess the costs at £250 in this case which I consider to be a reasonable figure.

The effect of this is that the appellant will have 14 days from today to decide whether to contest the application for an order for costs. If she does so within 14 days, the matter will be relisted for a hearing on the question of costs when a final order will be determined.