Slattery v Nynex [1997] UKEAT 203_97_0205

EAT

Slattery v Nynex

[1997] UKEAT 203_97_0205 · 1997-05-02

JUDGE LEVY QC:

This is an appeal by Mr M R F Slattery who appeared in person before an Industrial Tribunal held at Brighton on 29 August 1996.

The Tribunal determined that there was no practical reason why he had not brought an application within three months of 6 July 1995 seeking relief from the Industrial Tribunal. In fact his application was received by the Industrial Tribunal on 1 May 1996, many months after an accident on 24 August 1995. It was his unfortunate involvement in this accident on which we understand Mr Slattery in part wished to rely.

The reasons which are neither called Summary nor Extended, were sent to him on 7 October 1996. We are a little puzzled as to why it should take so long for a decision (following a hearing late in August) to be sent to a litigant who is obviously very concerned about the result; but that is neither here nor there on this appeal. What the Tribunal said in their reasons is this:

"1. ... The Applicant told the Tribunal that there was no practical reason why he had not brought the application within three months of 6 July 1995, and the only explanation he had to offer in this regard, was that the Department of Social Security, when he had signed on, failed to inform him of the necessity to do so.

2. There being no practical reason why the Applicant should not have made the application within three months, the application is dismissed."

Mr Slattery has put in a Skeleton Argument explaining at some length the medical problems he had following a motor accident on 24 August 1995, he having been dismissed on 6 July 1995. At the outset in that letter he said he consulted a solicitor in mid-November 1995, only four months after the dismissal.

The application was started many months out of time, and though we have sympathy with somebody in Mr Slattery's position acting as he was in person, we are quite sure that the position was well explained to him about the time limits in which applications have to be brought and what is meant by "practical reason" if there is to be a delay in lodging an application.

An applicant is entitled to a hearing. Mr Slattery had that hearing. He is not normally entitled to a second hearing if additional evidence comes forward, which could not reasonably have been available at the first hearing. Such evidence as Mr Slattery seeks to adduce could have been available at the hearing before the Industrial Tribunal.

In our judgment, and we have had the benefit of hearing from Mr McMullen QC under the ELAAS scheme on behalf of Mr Slattery, the judgment given below is one which the Tribunal were entitled to make on the facts which they heard. There is no point of law arising here and in these circumstances we dismiss the appeal at this stage. Obviously we have sympathy with Mr Slattery whose case has not been determined on its merits, but we cannot judge appeals on sympathy alone.