Boorman v Dorsett & Anor [1997] UKEAT 1368_96_2802

EAT

Boorman v Dorsett & Anor

[1997] UKEAT 1368_96_2802 · 1997-02-28

Judge N Butter QC:

This is the preliminary hearing of an appeal by Mr Boorman in respect of the decision of the Industrial Tribunal held at Truro on 4 October 1996. The Tribunal sent out its reasons for the decision on 9 October 1996. The decision was that the Applicant, Ms Dorsett, was entitled to outstanding pay of £444.00p and that the Applicant, Mrs Gibbs, was entitled to outstanding pay of £127.00p.

At the hearing before the Chairman, who sat alone, there was evidence from the Applicants only but he also considered correspondence from Mr Boorman. The Applicants said that the firm by which they had been employed, consisted of Mr Boorman and a Miss Kelly Davies.

The Chairman said:

"2 I only have the evidence of the applicants this morning. I accept that at no time were they told that they were employed by the limited company. They were interviewed by Mr Boorman and Miss Davies and of those two Miss Davies apparently did most of the talking."

The Chairman referred to a fax message and pointed out that there was no reference in the document to a limited company and he concluded, on the evidence before him, that the correct title of the employers was David Boorman and Kelly Ash trading as Barclay Ash and Associates.

The Appellant, Mr Boorman, is apparently ill, but representations on his behalf have been made to us today simply by means of a written argument which we have considered. The essential point raised is that Mr Boorman was not an employer and accordingly that the Tribunal should not have reached the decision which it did.

It is important to bear in mind that the Industrial Tribunal must act on the evidence which is before it. Mr Boorman has sent to the Employment Appeal Tribunal a letter dated 29 July 1995 from one K. Sanghara, appointing or purporting to appoint Mr Boorman as UK Sales Manager. The Employment Appeal Tribunal will, in limited circumstances, admit the addition of new evidence if there is some reasonable explanation as to why it was not tendered to the Tribunal below. There is no satisfactory explanation presented to us in relation to that.

Accordingly, we revert to the question "Was there evidence which permitted and entitled the Chairman to reach the conclusion which he did?" In answer to that, in our judgment, the answer is "Yes, there was such evidence". It cannot be said that he erred in law in reaching the conclusion that he did, nor that his decision was perverse.

In these circumstances there is, in our unanimous view, no reasonably arguable point of law and for these reasons it follows that the appeal fails and is dismissed.