Montgomery v The Islington Motor Co Ltd (t/a Highbury Ford) [1997] UKEAT 1262_96_1002

EAT
Montgomery v The Islington Motor Co Ltd (t/a Highbury Ford)
[1997] UKEAT 1262_96_1002 · 1997-02-10
MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT) : The purpose of this hearing is to determine where Mr Montgomery has an arguable point of law in an appeal which he wishes to make against a Tribunal Decision which was sent to the parties on 21 October 1996.The issue before the Industrial Tribunal was whether, in the circumstances, they had jurisdiction to hear the application made by the Applicant, Mr Montgomery, that he had been unfairly dismissed by his former employers, The Islington Motor Co Ltd t/a Highbury Ford.The facts set out in the Industrial Tribunal's Decision were simply these: that Mr Montgomery was employed as a car salesman from 1 October 1984 until the end of business on Friday 2 February 1996. He claimed he had been unfairly dismissed.The Originating Application which he made, was signed on 30 April 1996, sent by Recorded Delivery on 1 May 1996 and received at the Industrial Tribunal, London (North) on 2 May 1996. If the effective date of termination of the contract was 2 February 1996, then this complaint was presented to an Industrial Tribunal one day beyond the three month time limit.When he gave evidence Mr Montgomery explained that he had been to the Citizens Advice Bureau within a week of his dismissal and it was suggested to him that he had a good arguable case for making a complaint of unfair dismissal, and that he had three months within which to submit his application. He was told where he could obtain the application form and he duly obtained it.He wrote to his employers on 14 February 1996 requesting information regarding the termination interview which he had had with his employers. He did not receive a reply and made a further request on 29 April 1996, for outstanding holiday pay and other documentation which he had previously requested. He did not receive an answer to that letter either and, therefore, completed his form on 30 April, which was then presented to the Tribunal one day out of time.The test for what is within time and what is not within time is well known and there is no dispute that, if the Tribunal have got the dates right, the application was one day out of time.What Mr Montgomery submits to us is that it is arguable that his employment did not end on the evening of 2 February, but that it extended into 3 February, so that in those circumstances his application was not out of time. He says, "I feel the dismissal should count from the 3rd February because I was called into the office outside normal hours when I was leaving to go home on 2nd February". That seems to us not to be a point of law fit for hearing before a full panel of the Employment Appeal Tribunal.It is to be observed that in his document of complaint, his IT1, the Applicant himself gave the dates of his employment as from 1 October 1984 to 2 February 1996, and in their response to that complaint the employers indicated that the dates of employment given by the Applicant, in the IT1, were correct.In those circumstances this is one of those very unfortunate cases where an Applicant, acting in person, has simply allowed time to slip so that the application is presented to the Industrial Tribunal one day out of time, in circumstances where it was manifestly clear that it was reasonably practicable for it to have been lodged with the Industrial Tribunal within time.As the Tribunal themselves said in paragraph 4 of the Decision:
"4 We cannot accept Mr Montgomery's explanation that he did not complete his Originating Application form until 30 April 1996 because he was awaiting documentation and information from the Respondent since he had only re-applied for the documentation and information on the day before."
And we would add, "had not received a response to it by the time he lodged his application to the Industrial Tribunal".Accordingly, it cannot be Mr Montgomery's case that he was awaiting the delivery of this information before he filed his complaint, because he filed his complaint before he received the information.In those circumstances it seems to us that there can be no arguable point of law in relation to the Tribunal's decision, and bearing in mind the limitation on our jurisdiction, we must dismiss this appeal.