Piatkowski v London Borough Of Camden [1996] UKEAT 991_95_0706

EAT

Piatkowski v London Borough Of Camden

[1996] UKEAT 991_95_0706 · 1996-06-07

MR JUSTICE BUTTERFIELD : This is an appeal against the decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at London (North) promulgated to the parties on 21st June 1995 after a four day hearing, whereby the appellant's complaint that he had been unfairly dismissed was rejected.

The matter comes before us ex parte as a preliminary hearing to determine whether the Notice of Appeal discloses an arguable point of law so as to justify allowing the case to go on to full hearing.

The appellant does not appear before us today, and is not represented. He had been represented by his trade union, UNISON. However, by letter dated 16th May 1996 he informed the Employment Appeal Tribunal that he was no longer represented by his union, and requested a postponement of the preliminary hearing. The Registrar refused that application and informed the appellant accordingly. In those circumstances we propose to proceed to deal with the matter today.

The document which stands as the Notice of Appeal is a letter dated 18th July 1995 from the Regional Officer of the appellant's union. The relevant passage reads:

"The grounds on which the appeal is based are that the Tribunal misdirected itself in the evidence it took and that its decision was perverse given the evidence it heard. Additional information, embellishing the grounds on which the appeal is made, will be provided once I have taken advice."

The Registrar of the Employment Appeal Tribunal directed that the appellant's representative should provide further and better particulars of the Notice of Appeal by 22nd August 1995. The Regional Officer replied that he was currently taking legal advice and hoped to respond shortly. He did not do so. There are no amplified or amended grounds of appeal before us. In the absence of any particulars we are quite unable to discern any error of law in the tribunal's decision. We have nonetheless carefully considered the decision given in the extended reasons.

The appellant was employed by the respondents in August 1990 as an operating team leader in the Department of Information and Technology. He had 15 years experience with other employers in the information technology field. In the summer of 1991 the appellant joined his union, then known as NALGO. His line manager, Mr Stegner, was not a lover of unions, and indeed had apparently evidenced an intense dislike of their membership and activity. In December 1991 the respondents had to implement cutbacks in the appellant's department. There were three operating team leaders, the number had to be reduced by one, the appellant was the unlucky one, and after interview was deselected from that position. He was offered and accepted a post of operations assistant. His salary, however, was protected.

In July 1992, the respondents were compelled to reduce staff levels again. There were six operations assistants. That number had to be reduced to four. The process of selection was not to be by interview but by assessment by a panel. This procedure was agreed by the trade union. The assessment panel consisted of Mr Stegner, the appellant's line manager; Mr Thorn, a personnel officer; Mr Hall, the appellant's immediate superior and a Mr Reynaert. The panel considered the skills and aptitude of each operations assistant against defined criteria and marked each employee after discussion. In the result the appellant came fifth out of six assistants. He was accordingly deselected. He was offered the choice of going into the redeployment pool or taking severance pay with the financial inducement that offered. He chose the latter course.

He appealed internally against the assessment. Miss Barker carried out the appeal in accordance with the respondents' appeal procedure, again as agreed with the union. She rejected the appellant's appeal.

At the hearing before the Industrial Tribunal, the appellant contended that the marks he received in the assessment carried out in July 1992 were tainted by malice. Mr Hall and Mr Stegner were determined he should go, and that the marks were accordingly deliberately, unfairly, and maliciously depressed. The Industrial Tribunal carefully considered that allegation, and plainly had at least some doubts about the matter. They concluded, however, that there was not sufficient direct or hearsay evidence on which they could find, however suspicious they might be, that the marks were tainted by malice. That meant, concluded the tribunal, having regard to the law, that the procedure has not been breached and the application must be dismissed. The tribunal clearly correctly directed itself on the law that should be applied, it heard and determined the facts, no error of law is disclosed in their decision, and for those reasons this appeal is dismissed.