"... an Industrial Tribunal decision is not required to be an elaborate formalistic product of refined legal draughtsmanship, [ They are not even obliged to set out their reasons in a form which resembles a judgment in a court of law. What is required is this ] ... an outline of the story which has given rise to the complaint and a summery of the tribunal's basic factual conclusions and a statement of the reasons which have led them to reach the conclusion which they do on those basic facts. The parties are entitled to be told why they have won or lost. There should be a sufficient account of the facts and of the reasoning to enable the EAT or, a further appeal, this court to see whether any question of law arises; and it is highly desirable that the decision of an Industrial Tribunal should give guidance to employers and trade unions as to practices which should or should not be adopted."
"Finally, it was submitted that the Industrial Tribunal was under a duty to state the law, its primary findings of facts, its secondary findings of fact, and its conclusions. This is wholly misconceived. The duty of an industrial tribunal is to give reasons for its decision. This involves making findings of fact and answering a question or questions of law. So far as the findings of fact are concerned, it is helpful to the parties to give some explanation for them, but it is not obligatory. So far as questions of law are concerned, the reasons should show expressly or by implication what were the questions to which the industrial tribunal addressed its mind and why it reached the conclusions which it did, but the way in which it does so is entirely a matter for the industrial tribunal."
"The failure on the part of the Tribunal to include many of the salient points raised on behalf of the applicant in the notes of evidence is a breach of natural justice. I accept that there is no duty to make a verbatim record of all that transpired. That, however, is a long way from supporting the proposition that a failure on the part of a Tribunal Chairman to provide a note of the evidence can never amount to an error of law. It may be that there are cases where the need for a note is less crucial, eg where there is a single point of law which disposes of the case and in respect for which no evidence could make any difference. But in the instant case where the findings of fact are crucial, it seems to me to be fundamental that the parties must be able to see from the decision from what evidence the findings of fact were derived. I have listed innumerable instances where the tribunal have omitted evidence supportive of the applicant. It has long been held that where the findings show that certain evidence has been rejected, the tribunal must explain why. The Tribunal have not included substantial parts of the evidence supportive of the applicant.
"I also asked the Tribunal to have due cognizance to what I consider to be an astonishing statement by the CSA's Counsel. He said he was not asking the Tribunal to believe everything that Mrs Badger had said. If this statement was made in a criminal court of law, I opine that the judge would throw the case out because a conviction would be unsafe. Counsel did not say what part of Mrs Badger's evidence was the truth, and which parts amounted to mendacity."
"We conclude the applicant has failed to satisfy us on the balance of probabilities that the respondent discriminated against him contrary to the Act. We find his case to be extremely weak. We are unable to find the applicant was subjected to unfavourable treatment on the grounds of his sex. Therefore on that ground alone his claim must be dismissed.