Armstrong v Devon County Council [1995] UKEAT 1211_95_0412

EAT
Armstrong v Devon County Council
[1995] UKEAT 1211_95_0412 · 1995-12-04
MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal by Mr H Armstrong against the interlocutory decision of the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal held at Exeter on 31 October 1995. On that date the Chairman held a pre-hearing review of Mr Armstrong's complaint of sex discrimination against Devon County Council. The pre- hearing review was held under Rule 7 of The Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1993 , which provides that:
"(1) A tribunal may at any time before the hearing of an originating application, on the application of a party made by notice to the Secretary or of its own motion, conduct a pre-hearing review, consisting of a consideration of-- (a) the contents of the originating application and notice of appearance; (b) any representations in writing; and (c) any oral argument advanced by or on behalf of a party."
Under Regulation 7(4) it is provided that:
"If upon a pre-hearing review the tribunal considers that the contentions put forward by any party in relation to a matter required to be determined by a tribunal have no reasonable prospect of success, the tribunal may make an order against that party requiring the party to pay a deposit of an amount not exceeding £150 as a condition of being permitted to continue to take part in the proceedings relating to that matter."
In this case, the Chairman held a pre-hearing review, and for reasons explained in the decision sent to the parties on 2 November 1995, he ordered that Mr Armstrong should pay a deposit of £100. A review of that order has been refused. The claim by Mr Armstrong was that he was the victim of sex discrimination, in relation to a decision of the Devon County Council not to engage him to conduct one evening class in computer literacy.The Originating Application presented on 24 July 1995 alleged that Mr Armstrong had discovered, on reading the prospectus for 1995/96, that he had been replaced in the class which he had taken for two years, by a Mrs Griffiths. He believed that that contradicted the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 . He gave an account in his Originating Application of how he had been informed in May 1995, by the Community Tutor at the Newton Abbot Adult Centre, that he would not be given the opportunity to continue with the Tuesday evening computer class. The reason he was given was financial cut-backs from Devon County Council. No other reason was offered. He requested more details. He was offered the other class which he had taken since April 1994 on Mondays, but not offered an alternative class in place of the Tuesday evening class.The Council resisted the claim in their Notice of Appearance dated 5 September 1995. They denied that he had suffered any detriment on the ground of sex. They denied that he was discriminated against under the provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 . They gave details of how they had received a letter from the RSA and were concerned that a breach of their exam regulations may have occurred. The RSA were concerned about exam work submitted to them in April 1995 by Mr Armstrong and asked that the exam practices be investigated and explained to them. Mr Armstrong was interviewed about this and, after he had given his explanation, he was given a warning that his exam practices were unacceptable and that he placed, not only the centre itself, but the whole of the district, at risk of losing registration with the RSA. Reference was also made to a discussion between Mr Armstrong and Dr Dixon the Community Tutor about the state of Mr Armstrong's health.The Chairman, in ordering a deposit of £100, said that Mr Armstrong's point was straight-forward; that Mrs Griffiths was put into a post instead of him, and that he jumped to the conclusion that this was sex discrimination. He could see no reasonable prospect of Mr Armstrong persuading a Tribunal that it was sex discrimination. It was clearly a case where there should be a deposit. He considered that Mr Armstrong was acting vexatiously. The maximum he could order as a deposit was £150. Having heard something of his financial position, he fixed the appropriate deposit at £100.Mr Armstrong appeals against that. His Notice of Appeal was served on 14 November 1995. He has not attended the hearing today because of commitments. We have therefore decided this matter on the basis of his Notice of Appeal and the documents attached to a copy of the Notice of Appeal and forwarded to this Tribunal on 29 November 1995. We have considered his submissions. In our view they are misconceived. We agree with the submissions which of the Devon County Council in their Skeleton Argument. They have not attended to develop this argument. The submission is clearly correct. They say that Mr Armstrong's appeal is on the grounds that the opinion of the Chairman was perverse. They said it was quite the contrary. The decision of the Chairman was properly made under Rule 7, and was wholly within his discretion. This Tribunal, with a limited jurisdiction on questions of law only, could not intervene unless it was shown that the Chairman's decision, in ordering the deposit, was contrary to established legal principle or was a decision which no reasonable Tribunal exercising that discretion could have reached.We agree with that approach. Our conclusion, after considering the papers and the arguments advanced by Mr Armstrong in his written submissions, is that there is no arguable error of law in the way in which the Chairman exercised his discretion. He was entitled to make the order for £100 deposit. He was also entitled to include in the order a warning to Mr Armstrong that, if he persisted in participating in the proceedings relating to this matter, may have an award of costs made against him and lose his deposit. There is no legal error in that decision. This appeal is dismissed.