Bhattacharya & Ors v Rishi [1994] UKEAT 919_93_2305

EAT
Bhattacharya & Ors v Rishi
[1994] UKEAT 919_93_2305 · 1994-05-23
MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal against an order made by the Registrar on the 14th January 1994. By that order the Registrar dismissed an application for an extension of time to appeal. The application was made to the Registrar by a Mr Bhattacharya, Mr Chadha, Mr Anand, Mr Bhasin, Mr Bhargava, Mr Bahri and Mr Goel, described as Trustees and Committee Members of the Hindu Cultural Society. The Respondent was named as Ranjit Singh Rishi.The Appellants were dissatisfied with the decision and therefore appealed to have that decision reversed and for an extension of time. The relevant dates are that the order which the Appellants wish to appeal against was a Certificate of Correction issued by the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal held at London (North). The circumstances in which the Certificate of Correction had been issued on the 30th April 1993 are these. As long ago as 1986 proceedings were started by Dr Ranjit Rishi.The Respondents to the proceedings were identified as the Trustees and Executive Committee for the time being of the Hindu Cultural Society in Slough. Attached to the Originating Application were the names of those who were alleged to be Trustees and members of the Executive Committee. The Trustees named included a Mr Bhattacharya, Mr Bhargava, Mr Chadha, Mr Sharma, Mr Dogra and all other persons for the time being the Trustees of the Hindu Cultural Society.Dr Rishi complained that he had been unfairly dismissed from his position as Priest to the Hindu Community in Slough.The proceedings were heard and decided in favour of Dr Rishi. The proceedings, entitled Dr R S Rishi v. The Hindu Cultural Society, were heard at London (North) on the 6th August 1987. The unanimous decision of the Tribunal was that Dr Rishi had been unfairly dismissed and a reinstatement order was made. That decision was notified to the parties on the 13th August 1987.There was subsequently a hearing before the Industrial Tribunal on remedies. That took place on 6th September 1991. Again, the proceedings were entitled Dr Rishi v. The Hindu Cultural Society. For reasons notified to the parties on the 16th September 1991 the Tribunal unanimously decided that Dr Rishi should be awarded the sum of £9,673.30.The Certificate of Correction, dated 30th April 1993, was issued in respect of that decision. The Certificate states:
"In exercise of the powers conferred on me by Rule 9(9) of the Rules of Procedure Schedule 1 to the Industrial Tribunals (Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1985 SI No.16 I hereby correct the clerical mistake in the Decision of the Tribunal in the case of:

DR R S RISHI

v.

THE HINDU CULTURAL SOCIETY

dated 16 September 1991.The name of the Respondents should read The Trustees and Executive Committee for the time being at The Hindu Cultural Society, Slough whose names are set out in the schedule below."The Schedule then names as Trustees, Mr Bhattacharya, Mr Bhargava, Mr Chadha, Mr Sharma, Mr Dogra and concludes
"and all other persons being for the time being the Trustees of The Hindu Cultural Society, Slough"
There followed the names of the Executive Committee.In accordance with that Certificate the decision, notified on the 6th September 1991, was amended and signed by the Chairman with the date 30th April 1993. A letter was written to the Chairman of the Tribunal on the 17th May 1993, referring to the Certificate of Correction and submitting that his decision was ultra-vires and/or defective on a number of grounds set out in the letter. The letter is signed individually by Mr Chadha, Mr Bhattacharya, Mr Bhasin and Mr Anand.The Chairman wrote in reply to that letter, on the 7th June 1993, through the Assistant Secretary of the Tribunals. The letter stated:

"Dear Sir

Your letter dated 17 May 1993 has been referred to a Chairman who has no observations to make and does not propose to enter into further correspondence."As far as the Industrial Tribunal at London (North) was concerned that was the end of the matter.Mr Bhattacharya, who has appeared today on his own behalf and on behalf of Mr Chadha, Mr Bhargava, Mr Bhasin and Mr Anand, said that enquiries were later made of the Industrial Tribunal about the Chairman's decision. The information given by the Office of the Industrial Tribunal was that there was no right of appeal against the Chairman's decision. A notice of appeal was in fact made to this Tribunal on 27th September 1993 on behalf of the gentlemen just mentioned. That notice of appeal was well outside the time limit laid down by the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1980 then in force. Rule 3(1A) provides:
"The period within which an appeal to the Appeal Tribunal may be instituted is 42 days from the date on which full written reasons for the decision or order of the industrial tribunal were sent to the appellant, or, in the case of an appeal from a decision of the Certification Officer, 42 days from the date which the written record of that decision was so sent."
The Employment Appeal Tribunal has power to extend the time prescribed by the Rules under Rule 30 of the Rules. In this case the time for appealing started to run from the 30th April, that being the date of the Certificate of Correction and the date on which it appears to have been notified. It was in those circumstances that the Registrar refused an extension. In my judgment, she was right to refuse an extension.Mr Bhattacharya submitted this morning that the Registrar was wrong. He referred to a number of decisions dealing with the circumstances in which the Tribunal, on hearing an application for extension of time, should take into account the state of belief of the Appellant as relevant to the reasons why proceedings had not been brought within time limits prescribed. He referred to Foster v. South Glamorgan Health Authority [1988] IRLR 277 and London International College Ltd v. Sen [1993] IRLR 333 and Marley (UK) Ltd & Another v. Anderson reported in the "Times" on 16th December 1993. Those decisions are not relevant to the present application, since they all concerned other provisions in other statutes i.e. with time limits for commencing proceedings in an industrial tribunal either under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 or under Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 where a claim is made for unfair dismissal. The relevant time limit in those cases refers to such matters as what is just and equitable, in the case of sex discrimination proceedings, and what is reasonably practicable, in relation to proceedings for unfair dismissal. This case is not concerned with commencing proceedings out of time. Those statutory provisions are not relevant. The relevant time limit in this case is that on appealing against a decision of an industrial tribunal. That is laid down as 42 days. It is a generous period. The fact is that this appeal was not brought within those 42 days. There are cases on extension of time. They lay down these principles: that the time limits for appealing must be strictly adhered to in order to bring certainty and finality to litigation. An extension of time is granted only in rare and exceptional circumstances. There must be a justifiable excuse for not bringing the proceedings within time. The excuses which justify an appeal out of time do not, in my view, include an erroneous belief on the part of the Appellants that they had no right of appeal. It was for them to find out, by taking advice or making enquiries from appropriately qualified people, what rights they had in the matter. In this case it does not appear that they did so. They were under the impression that they had no right of appeal. That was a false impression. It could have been dispelled by taking qualified legal advice in relation to their rights.There have not been shown in this case to be any circumstances which would justify extending the time for appealing. The appeal will therefore be dismissed. In dismissing it I should make it clear that the Employment Appeal Tribunal is not involved in the dispute as to who are the people against whom Dr Rishi is entitled to enforce the order. I heard submissions from Mr Bhattacharya about the circumstances in which he, and those who he represents this morning, came to be concerned about their situation. Their case is that they were not the Trustees of the Hindu Cultural Society at any relevant time and that they were not involved in resisting the proceedings brought by Dr Rishi. In fact I was told by Mr Chadha and Mr Anand that they had been concerned to assist Dr Rishi. They say that any involvement that they might have had as Trustees of the Society was stated by the Charity Commission to be the result of invalid elections and appointments. I understand their submissions but in the Employment Appeal Tribunal I am not in any position to make any decision one way or the other about their constitutional position in the Hindu Cultural Society. That is a matter which would have to be determined either in the proceedings brought to enforce the award made in favour of Dr Rishi or in proceedings brought in the High Court to clarify their status in the Society at the relevant time. I therefore do not express any view on what their position is or was in this Society. I have gone out of my way to mention this because submissions were made on the history of the involvement of Mr Bhattacharya and others in the affairs of the Society in a skeleton argument submitted on this appeal by Mr Grice on behalf of Dr Rishi. I am not in a position to express any view about the matters which he sets out in that skeleton argument. All I would add is that I fail to see how a Certificate of Correction, issued by the Chairman on the 30th April 1993, without holding any hearing in relation to the matters which he directed should be amended, could resolve one way or the other whether in fact Mr Bhattacharya and others are, or are not, Trustees of the Society at the relevant time. Those matters will have to be decided at a contested hearing in some other place, either on the proceedings for enforcement in a County Court, or as I have mentioned, in proceedings brought in the High Court to clarify the legal position of this Society.I dismiss this appeal with no order for costs.