Hewson v Spectrol Reliance Ltd [1994] UKEAT 655_94_2411

EAT

Hewson v Spectrol Reliance Ltd

[1994] UKEAT 655_94_2411 · 1994-11-24

JUDGE BULL QC:

This is a preliminary hearing ex parte of an appeal by Mr M J Hewson against the decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at Bristol on the 18 May 1994, by which it refused jurisdiction to entertain his claim for unfair dismissal. The Decision was sent to the parties on 24 May 1994.

Mr Hewson, who is plainly a man of substantial abilities, was employed by the Respondent company, Spectrol Reliance Ltd, as their Chief Accountant. He was dismissed, it is alleged, by reason of redundancy with effect from 8 October 1994.

The Industrial Tribunal first of all faced the issue whether it was reasonable for this Appellant to bring his application outside the statutory three months time limit on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Machine Industry Research Association -v- Simpson

[1983] IRLR 187

. Upon the facts of this case they found in favour of Mr Hewson and decided that it was reasonable for him not to be aware of the factual basis upon which he might bring an application within that three month limitation period. Thus he crossed the first hurdle.

However, the chronology thereafter needs to be scrutinised with some care. Taking the time-table from the findings of the Industrial Tribunal, at paragraph 8 and onwards, they found that he learnt of information on 20 January 1994 by which he then became aware, through consulting an advertisement in the local paper and other information, that a new appointment had been made of an accountant to do the job which he had done. Being, therefore, apprised of the relevant facts on 20 January 1994, the Industrial Tribunal found that he did not appear to have taken steps to investigate his legal position until 29 January 1994, when he met a Mr Fullagar who acted for him at the hearing before the Industrial Tribunal.

Speaking for this Appeal Tribunal we are unanimous in the view that had the necessary steps been taken on or very shortly after, by which we mean within a day or so, of the 29 January 1994, we have little doubt that the Industrial Tribunal would have found that they had jurisdiction to entertain his application. However, the matter does not cease there. It appears that Mr Hewson sent some documents to Mr Fullagar on 5 February 1994; in turn Mr Fullagar sent a questionnaire to be completed; this was despatched back to Mr Fullagar on 16 February; thereafter a draft originating application was sent to Mr Hewson on 21 February for approval and when it had been approved in draft it was prepared and sent to the Central Office of Industrial Tribunals which it reached on 3 March 1994.

We take the view that the important period scrutinised in this application is the period from 29 January to 3 March 1994. The Industrial Tribunal make the point at paragraph 10 where they say:

" It was suggested in the course of the hearing that Mr Fullagar might have considered making a much more rapid application on the basis of a skeleton or draft outline of what the applicant was claiming, rather [than] on the basis of detailed instructions."

The Industrial Tribunal found that although they had sympathy with the idea that, where possible, one should endeavour to ensure that one's pleading is as correct as it can be before submitting it, it seemed to them, and this is a matter which we would endorse, that this was not the usual case. In the words of the Industrial Tribunal:

"....this was not the usual case, where that aspiration could be indulged."

Mr Hewson approaches this matter by saying to us that the Industrial Tribunal erred in law in that they failed to have regard to the guide lines laid down by this Appeal Tribunal in the case of Marley (UK) Ltd -v- Anderson

[1994] IRLR 153

, a case over which the President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Mr Justice Mummery presided.

However, it is important to see, in relation to that case that there is no question of Industrial Tribunals applying a rigid or arbitrary time limit, for example 4 weeks, without looking at the whole of the background facts of the instant case with which they are dealing. It is plain that that would be an error of law. It is our unanimous view that this Industrial Tribunal in looking at Mr Hewson's case did consider the global reasons and all the matters which were put before them. If those advising an Applicant, who is already outside the statutory limit, delay in putting forward his case their delay cannot be put forward as an excuse on his behalf.

Sympathetic, as we are, to Mr Hewson time limits in this jurisdiction are crucial and once the statutory time limit has been exceeded it is of the utmost importance that every application is put forward with the maximum speed. We have looked with care at everything that has been said by Mr Hewson but we can detect no error of law in the way in which the Industrial Tribunal have approached this case. Thus, we are driven to the conclusion that his appeal must be dismissed.