Pearse v East Sussex County Council [1994] UKEAT 428_94_1509

EAT
Pearse v East Sussex County Council
[1994] UKEAT 428_94_1509 · 1994-09-15
MR JUSTICE FRENCH : We are grateful to Mr Pearse, the Appellant, for the clarity and restraint with which he has put forward the arguments before us. Mr Pearse presented before an Industrial Tribunal a complaint of unfair dismissal and he sought compensation in respect of that dismissal. The issue before the Industrial Tribunal was whether, as Mr Pearse contended, he had been unfairly dismissed or whether, the Respondents, the East Sussex County Council, contended that the employment had terminated by consent. The decision of the Tribunal which was entered on 23 March 1994 was short and to the point and it reads:

"This application for compensation for unfair dismissal fails and is dismissed."

The nub of their reasons for the decision is to be found on page 20 of the bundle before us and at paragraphs 48 and 49 of the reasons for decision. Having reviewed the evidence they say:
"48. Therefore we find that there was no dismissal, but a mutual agreement for early retirement for medical reasons within the contractual arrangements applicable to the Applicant. We find that there was no duress whatsoever, and that the Applicant was acting with the advice of his own union when he sought early retirement."
49. Because we have found that there was a mutual agreement over early retirement as stated above, there can be no finding that there was a unilateral resignation by the Applicant because of the Respondents' conduct such as to enable the Applicant to show that he had been constructively dismissed within the meaning of Section 55(2)(c). The two findings are mutually exclusive.The Industrial Tribunal decided on the evidence before them therefore that the Applicant had consented to voluntary retirement. The Applicant contends before us that this decision was not open to the Industrial Tribunal on the evidence and that therein there lies an error of law.We have considered the Tribunal's reasons for this decision and the correspondence made available to us with great care and we conclude that there was evidence on which the Tribunal could decide as they did. Neither in this respect nor in any other can we identify a point of law. Accordingly this appeal must be dismissed.