Meredith v Rockwell International [1994] UKEAT 229_92_1801

EAT

Meredith v Rockwell International

[1994] UKEAT 229_92_1801 · 1994-01-18

MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal by Mr Meredith, a former employee of Rockwell International, against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal sitting at Birmingham on the 11th December 1991.

For the Reasons stated in the Industrial Tribunal's decision, notified to the parties on the 25th February 1992, the Industrial Tribunal dismissed Mr Meredith's claim that he had been unfairly dismissed.

Mr Meredith was dissatisfied with the decision and on the 24th March 1992 he presented to this Tribunal a Notice of Appeal.

At the preliminary hearing today Mr Meredith has appeared "in person" because his application for legal aid did not extend to representation at this hearing.

The jurisdiction of this Tribunal is confined to errors of law arising from decisions of the Industrial Tribunal. Mr Meredith explained to us, in his submission, that this decision is wrong. He submits there was no concrete evidence of misconduct. His evidence in this matter should have been accepted. The Industrial Tribunal was wrong to accept the case of Rockwell International.

Rockwell's case was that there had been no unfair dismissal because, on reasonable grounds, they genuinely believed that Mr Meredith was guilty of misconduct. The misconduct, which they reasonably believed had occurred, was that Mr Meredith had falsely claimed sick pay and had ignored an instruction from the Company to attend work.

The Industrial Tribunal considered the evidence. They heard oral evidence from three witnesses from Rockwell, a Mr Wise, the Personnel Director, Mrs Backs, a Personnel Administrator and Miss Banks, the Personnel Assistant. The Tribunal made serious criticisms of the way in which the initial dismissal procedure had been handled by Rockwell International. They listed a number of criticisms in paragraph 17 of the decision, but went on to hold that Mr Meredith appealed against the decision to dismiss taken at the disciplinary hearing. On the appeal the procedural defects, which occurred in the disciplinary procedure, were rectified. The appeal consisted of a full consideration of the evidence afresh and was properly conducted. The procedural defects in the initial procedure had therefore been rectified.

The Tribunal summarised its decision in the final paragraph of the Full Reasons in this way:

"Accordingly, we are satisfied that the respondent had a genuine belief in the misconduct of the applicant, which was based upon reasonable grounds. There was a full investigation into the matter. The applicant had a reasonable opportunity to state his case and produce evidence. Dismissal was a sanction open to a reasonable employer. The dismissal was fair. This application is dismissed."

Those are all conclusions of fact from which this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear appeals. The Tribunal correctly directed themselves on the law. They said, in paragraph 15 of that decision, following their conclusions in paragraph 14, that there was a genuine belief in misconduct on the part of Mr Meredith. They said in paragraph 15:

"We have gone on to consider whether the employers acted reasonably in treating that misconduct as sufficient reason for dismissing the applicant. We remind ourselves of the words of Section 57(3) of the 1978 Act. We recognise that it is not for us to stand in the shoes of employer, but to ask ourselves whether the employer's action fell within the range of response of a reasonable employer."

That is an impeccable direction on the correct legal test to determine whether the dismissal was unfair. There has been no error of law on the part of the Tribunal. The conclusions which Mr Meredith seeks to attack on this appeal are conclusions of fact. We can not determine those matters. Therefore, at this preliminary hearing, we shall dismiss the appeal.