Bakewell v Transam Trucking Ltd [1993] UKEAT 69_92_0102

EAT

Bakewell v Transam Trucking Ltd

[1993] UKEAT 69_92_0102 · 1993-02-01

MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal by Ms Bakewell against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at London (North) under the Chairmanship of Mr Williams who on the 4th and 5th November 1991 heard an application by Ms Bakewell that she had suffered sex discrimination under the 1975 Act.

She was employed from the 31st May 1989 until the 5th March 1990 by Transam Trucking Limited. This, as explained in the decision, was a Company which operated vehicles, I imagine large vehicles, in connection with the entertainment world, taking groups of musicians around the Country and maybe others. That is the background against which this case is to be judged.

The Applicant was a qualified and experienced Heavy Goods Vehicle Driver. She had been driving trucks for about thirteen years; she was a Class I Driver since 1985 having passed as a Class III Driver with smaller vehicles in 1987. She worked, therefore, in this male dominated activity. Her basis of employment was a self-employed basis and she was given opportunities to refuse, or to accept work as and when it was offered to her. She made a number of complaints which the Tribunal described in paragraph 4 under some seven headings. They say:

"(i)she was given the more lowly jobs;

(ii)she was allocated the worst vehicles which were in bad condition, one of the examples of her being allocated the worst vehicles having resulted in a breakdown in the Milton Keynes area;

(iii)she was given too much `double driving' for her status and experience;

(iv)other drivers did not assist, or assisted reluctantly, in Eire;

(v)her participation in the Bob Dylan tour in June 1989 was cancelled at the last moment;

(vi)she was cancelled for the Debbie Harry tour and replaced by another driver;

(vii)for the Wembley event, there was an incident involving a spotlight when she says that she was asked to be there at a certain time but was earlier replaced by another driver."

The complaints, therefore, spread over these nine months and some were obviously more serious than others. The background was as described by the Industrial Tribunal, a male dominated background where there was a fairly free flow of "language" and reaction and attitude, and it was said that there was a number of sexist remarks which were made. This is the primary complaint in the Notice of Appeal, that greater import should have been attached to the comments made by the various employees.

Ms Bakewell was represented by Solicitors and Counsel before the Industrial Tribunal and advised by them in connection with this appeal. So that her case must have been forcefully and properly presented.

The view taken by the Tribunal was that the Applicant was a little over sensitive and that the remarks were not aimed at her as "a woman" but they were remarks which might have been made in any event in this fairly tough world. The Tribunal then came to, what they call, the "final events" of February and March 1990; they find that there was discourteous behaviour by other drivers, that she was ostracised. This arose out of an incident where she had been placed upon a vehicle, that ostracism and behaviour was certainly something to deprecated. They looked into the question of whether the employers could be made responsible for it, and decided against that. They looked to see - the matter had worried them - whether there was sufficient investigation. On balance they came to the conclusion that there had been. They looked also at the final incident at Wembley. Then they summarise their views in paragraph 11, and I read from that paragraph:

"Summarising our findings and views, we have come to the conclusion that there is nothing in the evidence of the background events that supports the Applicant's contention that she was discriminated against on grounds of sex. The same applies to the final incidents which we have outlined. The Respondents applied a general principle throughout in preferring the more senior members of their team (using a neutral word and comprising those who were employees and those who were engaged on an ad hoc casual basis as was the Applicant) albeit not on an inflexible basis. For example, the Applicant was given lucrative and more enjoyable tour work at a very early stage although she had been `employed' by the Respondents for a very short period. On the facts of this case, we find that the Respondents have not discriminated against the Applicant on grounds of sex."

The Notice of appeal, as we have already indicated started from the earlier remarks and argues that those remarks should have been regarded as discriminatory and that the remainder of the decision, depended to some extent, upon that view.

This is a preliminary hearing, it is a type of hearing where this Tribunal is looking to see whether there is any discernible error in law in the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. It is only if there is an error of law that an appeal lies to this Tribunal under the provisions of the 1978 Act. Questions of fact are essential at the Tribunal, whether or not any other person agrees with those findings of fact is immaterial providing there was evidence upon which those facts should be found and that the overall view and the conclusions reached from those primary facts is not wholly perverse. There is no such suggestion in the present case, this was a careful reasoning setting out the findings of fact, it might have gone one way, it might have gone the other, the Industrial Tribunal were perfectly entitled to reach the conclusion which it did in taking account of the background and the scene as it found it to have been. We are quite unable to find any error of law and the appeal must be dismissed at this juncture, which it is.