"4. The applicant's evidence was that the telephonist, employed by the respondents, notifies to him the patients he is to attend and gives him information, with outline medical indications but, we find on the evidence, that he used to take the ultimate decision as to the order in which he is to go to patients and it is for him, and not the telephonist, to decide on those who are to have priority. He kept records of the calls . . ."
"He was paid gross. No tax was deducted. He is taxed under Schedule D, which is the method applicable to someone who is in business on their own account rather than an employee. On the evidence that is the way in which the respondents organise the payments made to all the doctors who work for them.The initiative for that method of payment comes from the respondents, but it seems that the deputising doctors, and certainly the applicant in this case, accept gross payments without question. We find the applicant is aware that the payment of gross fees has significant tax advantages for him.
"6. We find, on the evidence, that the applicant did not have to do the work on Thursday nights personally. He could give notice that he was not going to do the work and if he did so it would be normal for him to arrange a deputy from among those doctors who were, as it were, on the books of the respondents and who were known by them to be insured. The reason he had to give some advanced notice was, we find, to avoid administrative difficulties for the respondents and, we find, there was no contractual obligation to give any notice at all. It was a matter of good practice and convenience . . ."
"For that reason, and as a matter of courtesy, he would give as much notice as he could. However we find, and this is the real point, that the applicant was not required to perform the work personally, he could send a deputy or arrange for a deputy to do it who had to be, however, from the particular pool of doctors to whom we have referred. In an emergency the respondents might however ask some general practitioner, who did not work for them regularly to perform the deputising service at short notice. We find that he did not have to give any reason for non-attendance, and that the respondents found doctors to take over his work on some occasions.
"11. A number of tests and criteria have been suggested. [this is as to whether it is a contract of service or contract for services, they refer to a number of tests.] We ask ourselves, in this case, whether it is of the essence of the contract that the applicant undertakes to provide a personal service to the respondents. If he is entitled to send a substitute to perform his duties instead, that will usually be enough to demonstrate that the contract is not a contract of service [see Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) v. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance[1968] 2QB 497 ]. It has been said that the obligation to render personal service is of crucial importance, but of course it not conclusive. In the special circumstances of this case, and we remember that we are dealing with doctors, it was open to the applicant to send some other doctor preferably from among those who were already on the books of the respondents and who were known to be insured, although, on the evidence, it might be some other doctor. The applicant could make those alternative arrangements himself and, we find on the evidence, in practice, the respondents did not object if those arrangements were made by the applicant."
"15. We find that the reality of the situation in this case was that the applicant was in every relevant sense running a business in his own time, bearing in mind that he was employed by the Sandwell District Health Authority as an employee. The business was broadly one giving medical services. He prepared accounts on that basis, at any rate for tax purposes, as we have already indicated. This was not the only deputising or extra mural job which the applicant did, as is apparent from his accounts. We bear in mind that some times a cynical view can be taken concerning arrangements the parties make between themselves. They may dress up a situation in some particular form because it suits them for fiscal or other purposes and that form may not correspond with the reality of the situation."
"17. We have paid particular attention to the following factors. First the control over the applicant when he was doing his work was minimal. That, we note may be ambiguous because control would be minimal if he was clearly employed in some capacity as a doctor. He would not wish to say that his professional obligations override any contractual obligation. But, nevertheless, bearing in mind, we find in this case that there was minimal control over what this doctor did for the respondents. He organised the sequence in which he responded to calls, ultimately, and, of course, nobody could interfere with the way in which he actually treated patients. There could be criticism of the priority of calls, or the treatment of patients, but while he was actually doing the job he was responsible for deciding those matters. The control was, as it was called by the respondents, not a direct disciplining control but more a monitoring exercise."
" We find, on the evidence, that the Inland Revenue had not been complacent and compliant about this matter. This point is secondary. It merely tells us how others have perceived the relationship . . ."