"At all material times, the rates of pay for the work of secretaries and typists (the First to Sixth Applicants' work), the work of clerk-typists (the Seventh Applicant's work) and the work of messengers (the comparators' work) have been determined by separate collective bargaining and arbitration awards. Since the coming into force of the 1970 Act, the different rates of pay have been determined without regard to and irrespective of the sex of the employees."
"At all material times, the respondents were and are directly discriminating against the applicants on the ground of their sex, in that, if secretaries and/or typists, and/or clerk-typists, employed by them did not consist wholly or mainly of women, and/or if messengers employed by them did not consist wholly or mainly of men, then higher rates of pay would be awarded to the applicants in each of them."
"(13) Provisions of this section and sections 2 and 2A below framed with reference to women and their treatment relative to men are to be read as applying equally in a converse case to men and their treatment relative to women."
"An equality clause shall not operate in relation to a variation between a woman's contract and a man's contract if the employer proves that the variation is genuinely due to a material factor which is not the difference of sex and that factor - (a) ... (b) in the case of an equality clause falling within subsection (2)(c) above, may be such a material difference"
"In determining whether the work of these applicants is of equal value to that of the checker warehouse operatives and in determining whether ... the difference in pay between the warehouse operatives and the checker warehouse operatives is explicable by the operation of factors which are unconnected with any discrimination on the grounds of sex, the industrial tribunal should give such weight to the factor that there is a man, or there are men, doing the same work as the applicants and being paid no more, as is appropriate having regard to all the circumstances. These are determinations of fact."
"For the above reasons we find that the applicants submissions in relation to indirect discrimination must be rejected. We reiterate that our finding is that the bargaining process on which the respondent relies as a material factor was tainted by direct sex discrimination and cannot therefore constitute an offence under S.1(3)"
"They say that the cause of the pay differences here was (a) the traditional view and assumptions on all sides about the value (in money terms) of the respective jobs; (b) similar traditional assumptions about men being breadwinners and women being secondary wage earners; and (c) the respondent's failure at any time before6 February 1989 to accept that the jobs were of equal value."
"23 It is common ground that the applicants are paid less than the male comparator for work of equal value. The secretaries, typists and clerk typists employed by the respondent consist mainly of women. The messengers consist almost entirely of men and originally consisted entirely of men. Against that background the onus is on the respondent to prove an objective non-sex based reason for the differences in pay between the two groups. Having regard to the comments we have made in paragraph 18 on the documentary evidence, it appears to us that the respondent is in a real difficulty here. Even in the absence of any evidence from the applicants, we should find it hard to believe that the traditional assumptions referred to in paragraph 21 were wholly absent from the minds of the negotiators and the ultimate arbiters of at least some of the pay awards made over the years. It seems to us highly probable that such assumptions did influence such awards, whatever the minutes may or may not say. To the extent that that happened, whether on a conscious or an unconscious level, there is a taint of direct discrimination and that, we find, is insufficient to refute the respondent's argument that the material factor is not the difference of sex."
"28 To sum up so far, we find that the pay inequality complained of originated in the early 1970s on the basis of gender based assumptions and attitudes; that the pay inequality remained and increased: see Mr Waine's proof of evidence, paragraphs 35 to 47, and the statistics he produced (Schedules A, B and C). Further, there is no evidence that the respondent sought to eliminate sex discrimination as between the respective pay structures so as to remove the inequality complained of. Thus, even if the respondent could prove that each individual pay award over the years was wholly free of the taint of sex discrimination, the already existing taint was not removed, so that argument would be of no avail."
"... They say that the cause of the pay differences here was (a) the traditional view and assumptions on all sides about the value (in money terms) of the respective jobs; (b) similar traditional assumptions about men being breadwinners and women being secondary wage earners; and (c) the respondent's failure at any time before6 February 1989 to accept that the jobs were of equal value."
"This pattern of inequality derives partly from the under-valuation by many employers of work in predominantly female occupations and from the weaker bargaining collective bargaining power in such occupations. Both these factors apply in the present case. No effort has been made by the respondent to deal with this pattern of inequality."
"... the cause of the pay difference here was (a) the traditional view and assumptions on all sides about the value (in money terms) of the respective jobs; (b) similar traditional assumptions about men being bread-winners and women being secondary wage earners; and (c) the respondent's failure at any time before6th February 1989 to accept that the jobs were of equal value."
"24. The applicants go further and produce evidence. The most significant evidence, we find, is that of Mrs Marsland, who said that during her time as a national officer with NUBE, between 1968 and 1972, there were both clear and recognised assumptions by both parties to the collective bargaining that in negotiations for messengers they were dealing with 'men's work'. For example, the Beveridge notion of a social or family wage always figures highly in the negotiations. She was confident that this was so, whether or not it was reflected in the minutes. This was because messengers joining the respondent bank at an early age were married and had families to support. She also said that when they were looking for groups to compare messengers with, they chose the manual sections of industry, which were predominantly male.