Ahmed v Tower Hamlets Law Centre [1992] UKEAT 388_92_2506

EAT

Ahmed v Tower Hamlets Law Centre

[1992] UKEAT 388_92_2506 · 1992-06-25

JUDGE HARGROVE QC:

On the 16th May 1991 Mr Ahmed applied to an Industrial Tribunal alleging unfair dismissal, racial prejudice, violation of the constitution, breach of the Equal Pay Act, sex discrimination and breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Not surprisingly the Respondent sought to strike out the application as being scandalous, frivolous and vexatious.

A pre-hearing assessment was arranged for the 2nd September. On 10th July, 22nd August and 28th August, the Respondent supplied to the Appellant letters on the first two occasions and a letter plus a bundle of documents which set out the basis of the application to strike out. The latter was heard and Mr Ahmed took part in the hearing and made no representation that the Tribunal should not decide the matter there and then. Mr Ahmed's application was struck out.

On 4th October 1991 Mr Ahmed applied for a review under Rule 10. On the basis that the Tribunal had given no notice under Rule 12(2) to show cause, the review was, on 27th April 1992, allowed and the original decision was revoked. One should say at this point that it was upon the merest technicality that that revocation took place. In spite of that success Mr Ahmed protested that the matter should not be heard by the same Tribunal but on that point he was overruled.

On 2nd June the Applicant applied to this Tribunal. The Notice of Appeal is a disgrace to anyone calling himself a lawyer much less someone who calls himself a person who has had experience over twenty years. So far as we can divine from what is said in that Notice and what has been represented to us today, it seems that the following are the matters under appeal.

First it is said that the Respondents were not entitled to make application to strike out because Rule 12(2)(e) does not mention this can be done by an applicant; there is nothing in that point. Rule 12(2)(e) merely sets out the power of the Court, it does not limit those who may apply to seek the Court to exercise that power. The procedure has been for many years for parties to be able to come to the Courts and make such applications. If an example is required, as early as 1981 Mulvaney v. London Transport Executive

[1981] ICR 351

provides it.

His second ground is that the Industrial Tribunal should not, in line with the review provision on revoking the order, have allowed the matter to be heard by the same tribunal when it next meets. An array of allegations of prejudice and bad faith have been levied against the Chairman, Mr Heggs, in a wholly deplorable fashion, and there is not one jot or tittle of support for any of those allegations in any of the matters we have been considering. It has been urged that Rule 6(4) gives some support to the claim that in a case such as this those who have listened to the original hearing, should not take part in the later hearing. Rule 6 deals with pre-hearing assessments and is concerned with those cases where a warning is given to an applicant that it may be, in the future, that an order for costs be made against him upon the basis on the nature of his representations and Rule 6(4) of the Industrial Tribunals (Rules of Procedure) Regulations 1985, Schedule 1 reads:

"Where a tribunal has indicated its opinion in accordance with paragraph (2) of this Rule no member thereof shall be a member of the tribunal at the hearing."

Mr Ahmed says that that should be applied a fortiori to 10(4). But that, unfortunately for him, again is without foundation.

First Rule 10(4) deals with a totally different aspect. Rule 6, on this aspect, deals with the question of whether a tribunal would be aware of a previous pre-hearing assessment and the terms of it. It would be very difficult under Rule 10 where the review has resulted in a revocation ever to find a case where the Tribunal has not come down on one side or the other. We find that there is nothing in that point either. The only question we have to decide is whether as a matter of law the discretion has been exercised by the Industrial Tribunal in a judicial manner.

In the course of the decision the Industrial Tribunal Chairman in paragraph 9 said this:

"Having acceded to the application for review by revoking the original Decision and ordering a re-hearing of the respondents' application we are prepared to give due weight to any further material documents or to any further evidence or submissions which may be made. If these indicate that the previous Decision was wrong the tribunal will have no hesitation in coming to a decision in conformity with the true merits of the application. It is implicity in Mr Ahmed's submission that once a tribunal has come to a decision against a party and has granted his application for a review, the re-hearing ought, in the interests of justice, to be ordered to take place before a differently constituted tribunal because the tribunal has demonstrated that it is predisposed in favour of the other party by coming to its original decision. However, Rule 10(4) specifically envisages that the re-hearing may be ordered before the same tribunal. As we are properly seised of the matter and have had the benefit of reading all the previous material we see no reason in justice or equity why we should disqualify ourselves from continuing with the proceedings simply because Mr Ahmed takes exception to us. It is ordered pursuant to Rule 10(4) that the re-hearing shall take place before the original tribunal."

There could hardly be clearer exercise of proper discretion and this appeal fails.