Westwood Tools Ltd v Cawte [1992] UKEAT 31_92_1003

EAT

Westwood Tools Ltd v Cawte

[1992] UKEAT 31_92_1003 · 1992-03-10

MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): This is an Appeal by Westwood Tools Ltd who were the respondent and the employers of a Mrs Cawte. She complained to an Industrial Tribunal sitting at Ashford in Kent that she had been unfairly dismissed on the basis of redundancy, which case was heard on the 18th November 1991. The Applicant appeared in person. The Company was represented by a solicitor. The Tribunal decided unanimously, in favour of the Applicant and awarded her compensation of £10,000.

The Company is a small engineering Company employing about 25 people. There was a management buy out at the beginning of March 1991 whereby the three Directors, Mr Messeter, Mr Pullman and Mr Robertson bought out the "Metal Box Company".

Originally, Mrs Cawte was a general clerk but by March of 1991 she was dealing with a wide range of matters and was the only one in the office. She worked part-time from 10 am to 4 pm Monday to Thursday and 10 am to 1 pm on Fridays.

The business improved under the new management and it was decided by the Board on the 3rd May 1991 that Mrs Cawte's position should become full-time. The Board decided that she should be replaced therefore, with a full-time employee. On the 10th May Mr Messeter called Mrs Cawte in to see him, told her that she was being dismissed as redundant and gave her a letter setting out that reason, he also gave her a cheque for £1,000 including payment in lieu of notice and said that she need not return to work.

The following Tuesday which was the 14th May, Mrs Cawte told Mr Messeter, by telephone that she was willing to work full-time. He said he would discuss it with Mr Pullman but later that day a letter was delivered to Mrs Cawte's home stating that she would not be reinstated. Those are the basic facts of the matter.

The Tribunal looked at those facts and they are critical of the way that this redundancy was handled. In paragraph 6 of the Decision they say this:

"Prior to dismissal, the applicant was not warned that her job was in jeopardy. She was not consulted about the possibility that she may be made redundant. She was not given an opportunity to consider that situation. She could have been consulted and if she had been she would have agreed to work full-time, because that was her response very soon after dismissal, once the shock of her sudden loss of employment had worn off.

Then they go on:

"The respondents argued that the applicant had previously refused to change to full-time working. We find as fact that she had not. [They reject it] In any event, those alleged discussions were not in the context of a redundancy and therefore a dismissal situation."

There was then a suggestion that management did not consult the Applicant because they did not wish her to work full-time under duress. The Tribunal reject that argument and indicate that it is clear that in any redundancy consultation should take place; they therefore find that the dismissal was unfair.

We can find no error of principle in the application of the law to those facts. The facts are short, the position is abundantly clear.

When it came to compensation the Tribunal awarded £10,000 and that on any view is, in our judgment, a most generous award. However, it is not so generous that we should take the view that there must have been some error in law. The reasoning and the facts and the calculations are all set out and there is nothing that we can see to suggest that a multiplier of 5 was beyond the bounds of a permissible calculation. We appreciate that this Company, in times of recession, may very well be having difficult financial decisions to make, and as Mr Pullman has rightly pointed out, if the Company does "wind-up" some other twenty-five people are going to face unemployment as a result of this award.

I am afraid this is not something about which we can help. The only jurisdiction we have here, as we have pointed out to Mr Pullman is to consider issues of law, issues of fact and the sort of points that we have been mentioning in this judgment are essentially matters for the industrial tribunal and not for us. In the circumstances therefore we are unable to help Mr Pullman and his Company and this Appeal must be dismissed.