Butterworth v Yeoman Computer Bureau Services Ltd [1991] UKEAT 226_91_1009

EAT
Butterworth v Yeoman Computer Bureau Services Ltd
[1991] UKEAT 226_91_1009 · 1991-09-10
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): This is an Interlocutory Appeal from a Judgement of the learned Registrar dated 15th July 1991 refusing an extension of time for appeal to this Court from a Decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at Manchester under the Chairmanship of Mr Scott. The Hearing was the 4th February 1991 and the date of promulgation of the Decision the 27th February. Mr Butterworth tells me that he received it on the 3rd March.As a result of receiving that letter and the documentation that goes with it, which is sometimes referred to as an IT9 he wrote to this Court in a letter dated 19th March asking for an official appeal form:"as per instructions given to me with the decision of my Industrial Tribunal hearing".those instructions are well known to me and they include a warning that it is essential that a Notice of Appeal is entered within 42 days of the date of the Decision.By return of post a letter was sent by this Court indicating that they were sending and enclosing some notes for guidance and drawing attention to requirements, in particular that appeals to this Tribunal from decisions from industrial tribunals must raise a question of law, and must reach this Tribunal within the 42 day time limit prescribed. Also enclosed was a form for the Notice of Appeal, one copy of which had to be:
"completed and returned to this office together with a clear copy of the industrial tribunal decision from which you wish to appeal. You may, if necessary, continue your Notice of Appeal on further sheets of paper of approximately the same size as the form and asking that the writing be legible."
It is quite clear therefore that on receipt of that letter of the 20th March, for the second time Mr Butterworth was informed of the 42 day time limit; he was given the form; and the form has now been sent to this Office but it was dated 13th May 1991 and was therefore some 30 days out of time. The form requires the name of the Appellant;the address of the Regional Office and the name of the Respondent and also any grounds of appeal.The grounds of appeal now presented, are that the Respondents failed to provide a Contract of Employment as required under Section 1 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978; secondly, that the Decision was at variance with the evidence and was wrong and incorrect.The reasons given by Mr Butterworth for not entering his Notice of Appeal in time was that he was moving his business from Bolton down to Gloucester and that he did not enter his new business in Gloucester until the 31st March, and therefore the letter of 20th March was not given attention. Thereafter he and his wife had been working night and day to establish the new business, and it was not until the 3rd May that he realised he was out of time and sought an extension of time.The learned Registrar, in the exercise of her discretion thought that was no excuse in the light of the fact that the 42 day time limit which, in her letter she says, must reach the Tribunal within that time, together with a clear copy of the Industrial Tribunal decision such as to make it abundantly clear to Mr Butterworth that he must enter his Notice of Appeal within the time. In the exercise of her discretion, she decided that that was not good grounds for extending time and I am quite unable to find that the exercise of her discretion was in any way outside the lawful range which was which was given to her.Whilst looking at these cases it is always my practice, as I regard this just as a Hearing on an Appeal I am asked to judge as the Queen's Bench Judge in Chambers that it is a re-Hearing and I look to see whether there is any obvious merit in the Appeal itself.I read the Decision of the Industrial Tribunal, it was based on a constructive dismissal and Mr Butterworth resigned because he had been asked to move from working from his home in Bolton to an office elsewhere. The Tribunal looked at the whole history of this matter and found that there was power to require him to move; that it was reasonable and well within the discretion of the Respondent employer, "The Yeoman Computer Bureau Services Limited" to require him to do so and there was no justification for his resignation and certainly no constructive dismissal.Looking at that I can find no solid basis for criticising that Decision on a point of law and I take that into account in these proceedings.