“8. You claim that on26/5/2003 your father was killed by the RCD movement when they came to your home. RCD is a former rebel group. Formed by rebels in August 1998, the organisation split into two separate groups in 1999: RCD-Goma and RCD-Kisangani (later renamed RCD-ML). The leader of RCD-Goma is Adolphe Onusumba and the leader of RCD-ML is Mbusa Nyamwisi. A faction of the RCD-ML, called the RCD-National (RCD-N) has recently formed. The leader of RCD-N is Roger Lumbala. Another RCD faction, called RCD-Originale (RCD-O) has recently formed. The RCD-O leader is Felix Mumbere. You described how the men from the RCD movement wanted to rape your mother, and that when your father tried to prevent this they cut off his head, took his heart out and ate it. After killing your father you stated that they then raped your mother. During this incident you claimed that you were able to run for your life and found a man that was eventually to help you leave the country. The circumstances and ease with which you were able to escape from the RCD movement casts considerable doubt on the authenticity of your claim. It is not accepted that you would be able to escape from such ruthless and vicious men, who were no doubt armed, simply by running away. Having persecuted your family, such individuals would not let you escape in the way you claim. 9. You claim that you cannot go back home because a man [T] from the UPC movement has tried to make you join the aforementioned organisation. As you did not want to do the UPC, you claim that this man tried to kill you. In the Ituri region of the north east, two tribally based armed groups emerged in 2002. These were the Lendu-dominated Patriotic Army of the Congo (APC) supported by the RCD(ML), and the Hema dominated UPC, led by Thomas Lubanga and supported by the Rwandan and Ugandan governments. Your claim regarding you being made to join the UPC movement is deemed fallacious on the grounds that had such an organisation wanted you to join them, you would have little if no choice as to whether you wished to be part of them. Likewise, any refusal on your part given the nature and strength of the group would have resulted in certain death, and not just someone trying to kill you. 10. You claim to belong to the Hema clan who in turn fight against the Lendu clan. You stated that the reason for this fighting was because within the province where you lived there was a lot of gold. [T] from the UPC movement (see paragraph 9 above), you claim is part of the Hema people. You stated that the town that has the gold is called Ituri. It is accepted that during 2002 in the Ituri province in Orientale province, fighting between members of the Lendu and Hema ethnic groups resulted in thousands of civilian deaths and the displacement of more than 500,000 persons. UPDF and rebel factions have armed both groups and manipulated ethnic tensions resulting from long standing land disputes and colonial patriotism to the Hema, to exploit the region’s resources. There have been reports that the Rwandan government has supplied and trained Hema militia led by Thomas Lubanga, while the RCD-ML have supported Lendu combatants. With this information in mind it is considered that the risk to yourself, and many others, of being embroiled or affected by such a conflict, was no less and no greater than any other civilian in similar, albeit difficult circumstances.”
“1. The Appellant was born on12 April 1986 and so is now aged 20 years. He is a citizen of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Immigration Judge found that the appellant is a member of the Hema clan who had lived with his family in Bunia in the DRC. 2. He had refused an invitation to join the UPC. 3. He left the DRC shortly after this mother was raped and his father was murdered brutally in a racially inspired attack by RDC rebels. 4. The Immigration Judge found that the appellant could return safely to the DRC because the ‘situation in the Ituri area and around Bunia has … substantially improved, as it set out in the CIPU report and, indeed, in the second refusal letter’. 5. The Immigration Judge did not accept that the appellant would be at risk now because he declined to join the UPC. The Immigration Judge also ruled that the appellant’s removal would [not] be contrary to his protected human rights. 6. We see no basis for criticising either of these findings. It was not suggested before us that the UPC is able, or even inclined, to extract vengeance on people who chose not to join it and there was no suggestion before us that the decision to dismiss the appeal on human rights grounds was in any way erroneous. 7. Additionally the determination was attacked because, it was said, the Immigration Judge had made contradictory findings and because he had not considered properly (or at all) the background material. 8. The suggestion that the Immigration Judge had made contradictory findings is wrong. It was based on a misreading of the determination. At paragraph 107 of his determination the Immigration Judge says “I do not find that this Appellant was, himself, persecuted on account of his ethnicity”
“The situation of the Hema in the DR Congo is closely linked to the popular feeling of being invaded by a ‘Nilotic network’ and by the ‘Hema-Tutsi’. There are persistent rumours about such an invasion. The major part of the Congolese population is Bantu and there is a tendency to assimilate the Congolese with the Bantu speakers, excluding the pygmies, the Sudanese and the Nilotic peoples. The conflict with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda also explains the situation of insecurity for the Tutsi and Hema populations from these countries in the DRC. A trans-national anti-Nilotic ideology reigns in the DR Congo. It stigmatises the ‘Hema-Tutsi arrogance and hegemonic drive’ and it attacks a trans-national complot of the ‘international Tutsi power’ aiming at the submission of Bantu peoples.”
“They are thus assimilated to ‘the Tutsi’. It is still very dangerous to be Tutsi or to pretend to be and to return to the country. They are considered to be enemies or more or less permanent suspects. The animosity of the Congolese against the (real or so-called) ‘Rwandans’ is so intense and visible that one does not need to look very far to have elements of proof. The policy by the regime in Kigali to threaten regularly and untimely to invade the eastern part of the DRC has a direct and adverse effect for the ethnic ‘Rwandans’ in the DRC. This concerns firstly the Tutsi but the Hutu are also associated. The security services sometimes consider them even more dangerous because they resemble morphologically the ‘real’ Congolese.”
“The people of the eastern Congo, buffeted by years of war, endured more armed conflicts and human rights abuses, including murders, rape, and the recruitment and use of child soldiers, despite political agreements meant to resolve conflicts in the eastern province of North Kivu. Early in the year combatants loyal to the renegade General Laurent Nkunda were integrated into the national army in a process called ‘mixage’. The newly organised mixed brigade killed scores of civilians and committed rapes and other abuses in their operations against the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a Rwandan rebel group based in eastern Congo. By August the political agreements had collapsed and many of Nkunda’s former troops returned to his control; renewed clashes between Nkunda’s troops and government soldiers followed. Government policy towards the FDLR followed a confused and contradictory course, with the army sometimes supporting and sometimes attacking this group. The FDLR composed largely of Rwandese combatants, is supposedly committed to overthrowing the current government of Rwanda, but in recent years its members have attacked Congolese civilians more than they have engaged the Rwandan military. The shifting configurations of the conflict have variously seen all forces fighting each other. The Congolese government, backed by the international community, tried various measures to end the fighting, but failed to address its underlying causes. Although crimes by all parties constituted violations of international humanitarian law, virtually none has been investigated let alone prosecuted.”
“3.10.6 Sufficiency of protection: the government is seeking to establish its authority throughout the entire country, but the government’s control in certain areas of the East of the country remains weak. As such the state is as yet not fully able to provide sufficient protection to either the Lendu or Hema in the Ituri region. The government can however provide sufficient protection within areas fully under its control.”
“3.10.9 Conclusion. Despite tangible improvements in the government’s anti-rebel offensives and disarmament programmes in 2005 and 2006 the security situation in the Ituri region remains unstable and serious human rights abuses of the civilian population continue to be reported. Nevertheless claimants who cite a serious risk of ill-treatment at the hands of non-state agents in the Ituri region as a consequence of their ethnic origin are able to escape that treatment by relocating to Kinshasa or other government controlled areas where they will, should the need arise, also be able to seek protection from the state authorities. It is therefore unlikely that the grant of asylum will be appropriate in such cases.”
“51. Building on previous country guidance cases and in particular M and VL, the Tribunal would reformulate and summarise the current risk categories as follows: (i) We confirm as continuing to be a risk category those with a nationality or perceived nationality of a state regarded as hostile to the DRC and in particular those who have or presumed to have Rwandan connections or are of Rwandan origins. (ii) We consider that in light of recent developments there is now a risk category consisting of those who are Tutsi (or Banyamulenge) or are perceived to be Tutsi (or Banyamulenge). The only possible exception to it arises in relation to high-level officials of RCD/Goma. We accept that in practice there is considerable overlap with (i) since, as a result of the events of 2004 “Rwandan” and “Tutsi” are more often regarded as the same by the DRC authorities and civilian population and as a result Tutsis and those perceived as such face higher risks than before. However, they are distinct categories, one nationality-based, the other ethnicity-based. (iii) We also confirm as an existing risk category those having or being perceived to have a military or political profile in opposition to the government. The risk fluctuates in accordance with the political situation. On the basis of the evidence before us, the current position is as follows. The Tribunal accept that there is a real risk at present for UDPS activists. In the eyes of the authorities in Kinshasa UDPS supporters are assimilated with supporters of the RDC/Goma movement because of the alliance reached in 2003 even if later officially ended. At present there is a lesser risk for PALU members. There is a potential risk for DSP members who are considered as potential or actual collaborators for JP Bemba and his MLC movement. The risk for those associated with the Mobutu regime has considerably lessened. It is clear from the background evidence that close relatives of Mobutu have returned to the DRC from exile: CIPU report paragraph 6.110-2. It is reported that those not suspected of collaboration with the rebels would no longer be at risk and affiliation to the MPR would not normally involve the risk of political persecution. No repression has been organised against PDSC members since the death of Laurent Kabila. (iv) The evidence before us sought to identify a number of further potential risk categories: rebel movement members now in opposition to their own movement and those who come from the east (including Kivu) but are returned to Kinshasa without a political or military profile. However, these issues do not arise in the present appeal and we do not have sufficient evidence to make it appropriate to reach conclusions about them.” (i) We confirm as continuing to be a risk category those with a nationality or perceived nationality of a state regarded as hostile to the DRC and in particular those who have or presumed to have Rwandan connections or are of Rwandan origins. (ii) We consider that in light of recent developments there is now a risk category consisting of those who are Tutsi (or Banyamulenge) or are perceived to be Tutsi (or Banyamulenge). The only possible exception to it arises in relation to high-level officials of RCD/Goma. We accept that in practice there is considerable overlap with (i) since, as a result of the events of 2004 “Rwandan” and “Tutsi” are more often regarded as the same by the DRC authorities and civilian population and as a result Tutsis and those perceived as such face higher risks than before. However, they are distinct categories, one nationality-based, the other ethnicity-based. (iii) We also confirm as an existing risk category those having or being perceived to have a military or political profile in opposition to the government. The risk fluctuates in accordance with the political situation. On the basis of the evidence before us, the current position is as follows. The Tribunal accept that there is a real risk at present for UDPS activists. In the eyes of the authorities in Kinshasa UDPS supporters are assimilated with supporters of the RDC/Goma movement because of the alliance reached in 2003 even if later officially ended. At present there is a lesser risk for PALU members. There is a potential risk for DSP members who are considered as potential or actual collaborators for JP Bemba and his MLC movement. The risk for those associated with the Mobutu regime has considerably lessened. It is clear from the background evidence that close relatives of Mobutu have returned to the DRC from exile: CIPU report paragraph 6.110-2. It is reported that those not suspected of collaboration with the rebels would no longer be at risk and affiliation to the MPR would not normally involve the risk of political persecution. No repression has been organised against PDSC members since the death of Laurent Kabila. (iv) The evidence before us sought to identify a number of further potential risk categories: rebel movement members now in opposition to their own movement and those who come from the east (including Kivu) but are returned to Kinshasa without a political or military profile. However, these issues do not arise in the present appeal and we do not have sufficient evidence to make it appropriate to reach conclusions about them.”
“53. The Tribunal would reiterate some earlier observations on the task of assessing whether a person falls within the new second risk category as now extended. There are two main aspects to this. Firstly on the evidence before us, most but not all Tutsis would be at risk. As noted in paragraphs 39-40, some Tutsis may be able to obtain the protection of MONUC albeit in practice they may be limited to those with wealth who are high-level officials within RCD/Goma and appear able to look to the authorities for protection. 54. Secondly, as with the military or political category, much depends on the perception of the authorities as to whether they view someone adversely. It is not sufficient for an appellant simply to state that he is Rwandan or Tutsi or would be perceived as such. Evidence as to ethnicity will need to be scrutinised carefully. Given that Tutsis are described as being physically distinct from other tribes (CIPU report October 2004 para 6.71) a person is more likely to be viewed as a Tutsi by the authorities if he or she has those distinctive characteristics. Similarly those whose dialect, tribal links and geographical origins link them closely to Tutsis such as the Banyamulenge would also appear to fall within the at risk category. However, the mere fact of coming from the East or being of mixed ethnicity is unlikely without more to give rise to a perception of being Tutsi. The assessment must be made on the basis of a careful analysis of an appellant’s ethnicity, background and profile.”