"For re-determination on the issues of whether the appellant would be at risk if he were returned to Pakistan" and in the case of the second appellant, on two bases, first, whether the appellant would be at risk if he were returned to Pakistan, and alternatively: "
"Contrary to what is said in KM (Pakistan)[2004] UKIAT 00302 , MM (Pakistan) CG[2002] UKIAT 05714 , KK (Pakistan)[2005] UKIAT 00033 , MC (Pakistan)[2004] UKIAT 00139 , and AZ (Pakistan) CG[2002] UKIAT 02642 , Rabwah does not constitute a safe haven for any Ahmadi at risk of persecution elsewhere in Pakistan and should not, without more, be treated as an appropriate place of internal relocation."
"3. The matter be remitted back to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal for re-determination, on the issues of whether the appellant would be at risk if he were returned to Pakistan."
"…whether it is open to the appellant to internally relocate to Rabwah as well as whether it would be unduly harsh to do so."
"28. It is wrong to assume that Rabwah, because of its majority Ahmadi population, is either accessible or safe for those who, on the evidence, need a place of safety. Each case will depend on its facts but in no wise can the existence of Rabwah be regarded generally as a reason for dismissing an appeal that would otherwise be allowed."
"7. Response to the preliminary submissions of the Respondent (a) The risk of persecution and the risk on return cannot be determined solely on the issue of preaching or proselytizing. In any event the religious obligation of Ahmadis (as indicated in the case of Mohammed Suleiman Malik and referred to in the case of Iftikhar Ahmed – at page 282 of the bundle) is to "propagate" their faith. Propagation can take place in many ways. The idea that only those who preach or proselytize are at risk is a gloss put on the obligation of Ahmadis by the Tribunal. Objective evidence indicates that Ahmadis who merely wear a badge with Koranic verse or watch Ahmadi TV can be at risk. (b) Nor can the risk of persecution be assessed by a statistical exercise. In any event different reports give different figures and the data relied on by the Respondent are not necessarily accurate. It is not clear how the information has been gathered. Furthermore, it is important to take note of unreported incidents particularly where such incidents occur in remote areas. In any event the Appellants do not claim that every person who is an Ahmadi by birth is at risk. The most reasonable test is whether the person in question is a practising Ahmadi. (c) Although the words "exceptional" and "unexceptional" are unhelpful, some of the categories referred to in KK are certainly at risk. However, the categories are too restrictive. Thus Ahmadis who are targeted by [Khatme Nabuwwat] because they regularly watch Ahmadiyya TV or those who are engaged in distribution of Ahmadi literature may not fall within the KK test unless they can be covered by the term "other particular feature"
"(i) The first appellant had not put forward a credible explanation as to why he could not relocate to Rabwah or another part of Pakistan, or why the mullahs would track him down at a new address. Other aspects of his account now gave cause for concern: his evidence about his shop was discrepant and the position appeared to be much better than he had originally stated. The first appellant had not satisfactorily explained why he could not return to his shops in Sargodha, or go elsewhere in Pakistan, for example Rabwah. (ii) The first appellant's evidence about the persecutory motive for the killing of Sardar Barkatullah Mangla was not supported by the First Information Report from Mr Mangla's son , stating that he had been murdered by "some unknown assailants" and that the family had "no animosity with anyone"
"Ahmadi individuals and institutions long have been victims of religious violence, much of which organised religious extremists instigated. Ahmadi leaders charged that in previous years, militant Sunni mullahs and their followers staged sometimes violent anti-Ahmadi marches through the streets of Rabwah, a predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual centre in central Punjab. Backed by crowds of between 100 and 200 persons, the mullahs reportedly denounced Ahmadis and their founder, a situation that sometimes led to violence. The Ahmadis claimed that police generally were present during these marches but did not intervene to prevent violence. In contrast with the previous reporting period, there were no such reports during this reporting period." [Emphasis added]
"The Government took steps to bolster religious freedom during the period covered by this Report… The Government continued to include human rights awareness as part of its police training program…Relations between the country's religious communities remained tense. Violence against religious minorities and between Muslim sects continued. Most believed that a small minority were responsible for attacks; however, discriminatory laws and the teaching of religious intolerance created a permissive environment for attacks. Police often refused to prevent violence and harassment or refused to charge persons who commit such offenses. Mobs occasionally attacked individuals accused of blasphemy, their family, or their religious community prior to their arrest. When blasphemy and other religious cases were brought to court, extremists often packed the courtroom and made public threats against an acquittal. Religious extremists continued to threaten to kill those acquitted of blasphemy charges. High-profile accused persons often went into hiding or emigrated after acquittal. …Ahmadi individuals and institutions long have been victims of religious violence, much of which organized religious extremists instigated. Ahmadi leaders charged that in previous years militant Sunni mullahs and their followers staged sometimes violent anti-Ahmadi marches through the streets of Rabwah, a predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center in central Punjab. Backed by crowds of between 100 and 200 persons, the mullahs reportedly denounced Ahmadis and their founder, a situation that sometimes led to violence. The Ahmadis claimed that police generally were present during these marches but did not intervene to prevent violence. In contrast with the previous Report, there were no such reports during this reporting period."
"14. …The principal and perhaps most important element of the documentary evidence is a Report dated26 January 2007 by the (United Kingdom) Parliamentary Human Rights Group entitled "
"Put at its very simplest, the Ahmadis have been in long-standing dispute with mainstream Sunni Islam on the question of religious authority. The majority of Islam regards Mohammed as the last prophet: the Ahmadis claim to have received divine revelation since. Professor Friedmann records that: "
"Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis or by any other name), who, directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever, outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine."
"26. That is not to say that every Pakistani Ahmadi is at risk of persecution and is a refugee. As Mr Waite pointed out, the evidence of serious harm to Ahmadis in Rabwah is relatively sparse. … The incidence of actual harm to Ahmadis is, on the evidence, not high in Rabwah, and, on the evidence, is not high elsewhere in Pakistan. … 27. The Tribunal will look in due course at the other issues relating to Ahmadis. In the meantime, however, we draw attention to one comment in particular in the evidence given by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan to the Parliamentary Human Rights Group and recorded at paragraph 4.1 of the latter document. "… The HRCP stated that safety in Rabwah depends on the nature of the persecution and/or the influence of the persecutor. For example, if a neighbour wishes to take over an Ahmadi's business by capitalising on anti-Ahmadi sentiment, then the job of the persecutor is complete once the Ahmadi has left the local community. However, should the persecutor be a person of influence or means, they may use this to follow their target to Rabwah as well. … ."
"Insufficient protection of religious minorities" 15/05/01 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRBC): "
"The situation of members of the Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam etc." 31/08/05 UK Home Office: Operational Guidance Note: Pakistan 19/06/06 Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2006: Pakistan 06/09/06 US Department of State International Religious Freedom Report 2006 15/09/06 Parliamentary Human Rights Group: "
"Pandering to Extremists Fuels Persecution of Ahmadis" 06/05/07 USCIRF, Pakistan: "