Kuabaib, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 81 (27 April 2026) [2026] PBRA 81

PBRA
Kuabaib, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 81 (27 April 2026)
[2026] PBRA 81 · 2026-03-30
[1]This is an application by Khubaib (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing dated 14 March 2026 not to direct release.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair. This is an eligible case, and the application was made in time.[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are: · The oral hearing decision. · The application, in the form of a letter from the Applicant's current solicitors dated 30 March 2026. · The dossier, which now consists of 540 numbered pages, ending with the decision. Request for Reconsideration[4]The grounds for seeking a reconsideration are as follows:(1) The decision to refuse release was irrational, in that the panel considered further work and consolidation to be required but did not explain what meaningful further progress remained available in custody.(2) The panel did not explain why external controls in the community would be insufficient to test and manage any remaining concerns.(3) The panel wrongly treated incomplete insight as an automatic bar to release. Background[5]The Applicant was 43 years old in 2015 when he was convicted after trial of one offence of rape of a 14-year-old girl and nine offences of trafficking teenage girls for sexual purposes. His total sentence was an extended sentence of 18 years, of which 13 years was the custodial term and 5 years the extended licence period. His parole eligibility date was 12 December 2023. His conditional release date will be in April 2028. His sentence expiry date will be in April 2033. The Applicant had two previous convictions, for stealing a cheque and arranging for the proceeds to be paid into his account, and for unlawfully evicting an occupier. He continues to deny the fraud, as well as the index offences.[6]The offence of rape was committed in 2007 against a girl he met when she was 13. He took her and two friends to an address, where he plied them with alcohol. He demanded oral sex from one of the other girls, who complied with the demand, and then forcibly orally raped the complainant. She reported the rape a few hours later, and the Applicant was arrested. He denied sexual activity with the girls, saying he took the girls to the flat to clean it. The complainant told the police she did not want to proceed with the accusation but changed her mind when the other offences came to light in 2013. The jury believed her evidence.[7]The nine offences of trafficking for sexual exploitation took place between 2010 and 2013. The Applicant would frequently pick up girls in their early teens and drive them to properties, to many of which he had access because they were on the books of his letting agency. He would provide them with alcohol, give them food, tobacco, flowers and small sums of money, and he and his associates would make sexual advances to them. He was arrested in January 2013 when the police went to an address where there were two 14-year-old girls, the Applicant and two other men. There was a supply of vodka in the property, and videos with pornographic scenes were playing on a laptop. The Applicant claimed he was only there to collect rent. The sentencing judge found that the Applicant targeted vulnerable young girls for his sexual gratification over a substantial period. During his sentence the Applicant has attributed his behaviour to a lack of understanding of the Islamic religion rather than a sexual attraction towards young girls. Current parole review[8]This was the second review of the Applicant's sentence. He is now 54 years old. The Respondent's referral is dated February 2024, asking the Parole Board to consider whether it would be appropriate to direct the Applicant's release. A first panel adjourned the case in September 2025, to enable the Applicant to undertake further risk-related consolidation work and for the preparation of an up-to-date psychological report.[9]The panel that heard the case on 24 February 2026 consisted of the original chair, who is a judicial member of the Board, an independent member and a specialist psychologist member. The Applicant was represented, as was the Respondent. The witnesses were the Prison Offender Manager (POM), the Community Offender Manager (COM), a prison-based psychologist and the director of Prison Support Services. The Applicant gave evidence. The Relevant Law[10]The panel correctly sets out in its decision letter the test for release. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[11]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision and of sentence which are eligible for reconsideration. This was an eligible sentence, and the decision not to direct release is eligible for reconsideration. Irrationality[12]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words " if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere". The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[13]In R (DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to parole board hearings in these words at para 116:
"the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. "
[14]In R (on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law, which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R (on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board [2022] EWHC 1282 (Admin).[15]As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.[16]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.[17]Further, while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses.[18]In Oyston [2000] PLR 45 , at paragraph 47 Lord Bingham said:
" It seems to me generally desirable that the Board should identify in broad terms the matters judged by the Board as pointing towards and against a continuing risk of offending and the Board's reasons for striking the balance that it does. Needless to say, the letter should summarise the considerations which have in fact led to the final decision. It would be wrong to prescribe any standard form of Decision Letter and it would be wrong to require elaborate or impeccable standards of draftsmanship. "
The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State[19]The Secretary of State (the Respondent) has indicated that he does not seek to make any representations with regard to this application. Discussion[20]The application, which is drafted by a firm of solicitors different from that which represented the Applicant at the oral hearing, shows a troubling lack of understanding of the legal basis on which the Parole Board must operate.[21]It is not a matter for the Parole Board whether further interventions or consolidation are available in custody. If the Board decides that the test for release is met, it must release the prisoner. If it does not so decide, it must not direct release. The availability of interventions is a matter for the Secretary of State for Justice. Ground (1) above is misconceived. Incidentally, the panel carefully recorded the Applicant's representative's submission that it was not evident what work would be both suitable and available in custody.[22]The Board does not release prisoners so that they can be tested in the community. It releases prisoners who satisfy the test for release, which involves an assessment of risk and of the effectiveness of the risk management plan (RMP). The issue raised in Ground (2) is whether the panel adequately explained its reasoning: see Paragraph 18 above. In my judgement any sensible reading of the decision establishes that the panel did so. The POM, who knew the Applicant well and has worked closely with him, did not believe that that the Applicant had the necessary insight and the willingness to explore his risk factors. To the panel, the Applicant continued to deny the offences and said that his wife, daughters and important elements of his support network did not disagree with him. He blamed others, including the young victims themselves, for the offences of which he was convicted. He told his COM that he intended to re-involve himself in the business which he had used as the mechanism and the cover for his offending. The COM expressed substantial doubts, supported by evidence, as to whether the Applicant's wife actually supported the plans he has expressed for his release. The COM expressed concern that the Applicant would be in a position to manipulate his family to achieve his goals, including those which support re-offending and seeking ways to remain undetected.[23]The panel carefully considered the evidence about the Applicant's risk of harm to children by sexual offending and agreed with the COM that the statistical risk assessment did not take account of his lack of understanding and honesty. The panel considered that the risk of direct contact sexual offending should be assessed as high. There was evidence upon which the panel was entitled to reach that conclusion, and it clearly expressed its reasons for doing so.[24]The psychologist regarded the Applicant's risk of sexual violence if released now as moderate to high. She would expect him to impression manage. She was concerned that he would only disclose details that he thinks are relevant, and he consistently displays himself in a positive light by minimising or avoiding talking about things that may undermine his image. She believed he may push boundaries to see what he could get away with. The panel found that protective factors in the Applicant's case are limited and explained why it came to that decision.[25]The panel discussed the RMP and accepted that it was, on the face of it, robust. However, the psychologist expressed concern that if the Applicant thought he could do something that might not be noticed, he might well go ahead with it. The panel expressed its reasoning in clear terms:
" In view of [the Applicant's] current lack of insight into the risks he posed to female children and his unwillingness to be open about them, the Panel does not consider the RMP adequate to manage his risks in the community. It is over-dependent on external controls which are insufficient for that purpose. It would also depend on [the Applicant] being open and honest with professionals and the Panel as not convinced he would be ."
That was a conclusion plainly open to the panel on the evidence. It was in no sense irrational, and it was, demonstrably, properly explained.[26]The panel was careful to acknowledge that denial of offending cannot, in itself, be a reason not to direct release, but that it is relevant to the assessment of risks and their management. At no stage did the panel suggest that lack of insight was a bar to release.[27]None of the professional witnesses supported release at the present time. The panel considered there to be a clear need for the Applicant to fully comprehend the damage done to his child victims and his responsibility for it. To say that is not to regard lack of insight as a bar to release: it is an element of undertaking a proper risk assessment and coming to a proper decision on the facts of this case.[28]The panel's conclusion that the Applicant did not pass the codified public protection test, and that the protection of the public requires him to remain confined, cannot be described as irrational. Decision[29]For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. HH Patrick Thomas KC 27 April 2026