Harrad, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 72 (02 April 2026) [2026] PBRA 72

PBRA

Harrad, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 72 (02 April 2026)

[2026] PBRA 72 · 2026-02-04

[1]This is an application by Harrad (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision dated 4 February 2026 not to direct his release. The decision was made by a single member panel on the papers.

[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) (the Parole Board Rules ) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,

(b) that it is irrational and/or

[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the decision, the dossier (now consisting of 241 numbered pages), and the application for reconsideration. Background

[4]On 9 December 2016, the Applicant was sentenced after conviction for a number of offences: two counts of rape of a female aged 16 or over, distributing indecent photographs of children, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, stalking causing serious harm or distress, and causing/inciting a female child under 15 to engage in a penetrative sexual act. He was convicted after trial.

[5]He received an extended sentence consisting of a custodial period of 15 years with an extended licence period of three years.

[6]Key dates relevant to his sentence are reported to be: a) Parole eligibility date: June 2026; b) Conditional release date (CRD): June 2031; and c) Sentence expiry date: June 2034.

[7]The Applicant was 55 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 64 years old. Request for Reconsideration

[8]The application for reconsideration has been submitted by solicitors on behalf of the Applicant. It argues that the decision was procedurally unfair.

[9]The submissions are supplemented by written arguments to which reference will be made in the Discussion section below. Current Parole Review

[10]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) in September 2025 to consider whether or not it would be appropriate to direct his release. This is the Applicant's first parole review.

[11]On 4 February 2026, his case was reviewed on the papers in a Member Case Assessment (MCA) exercise undertaken by a single member of the Parole Board (the MCA panel).

[12]The MCA panel considered the index offending to be extremely serious and prolonged, involving sexual exploitation, coercion and manipulation of a vulnerable victim over a sustained period. The sentencing judge emphasised the predatory and manipulative nature of the offending.

[13]The panel noted the Applicant's extensive antecedent history, including a large number of previous convictions across a wide range of offending behaviour and repeated failures to comply with orders and licences in the community.

[14]The panel observed that no offence-focused work had been completed in custody and that risk factors had not yet been fully assessed. Further psychological work was anticipated, including assessment by Therapy Services at the Applicant's establishment, in order to clarify formulation and identify appropriate objectives for risk reduction work.

[15]Although the Applicant's custodial behaviour was described positively and he was reported to be an enhanced status prisoner working in trusted roles, the panel considered that there remained insufficient evidence of reduced risk. In particular, there was no completed or tested risk management plan capable of demonstrating that the risk of serious harm could safely be managed in the community.

[16]The MCA panel concluded that the statutory test for release was not met and made no direction for release.

[17]The decision not to direct the Applicant's release on the papers was made under rule 19(1)(b). This was a provisional decision (rule 19(6)), and, following rule 20(2), the Applicant had the opportunity to apply in writing within 28 days for a panel at an oral hearing to determine the case.

[18]The Applicant did so. On 5 February 2026, a Duty Member considered this application and dismissed it. The Duty Member concluded that the representations advanced on the Applicant's behalf did not identify any issue which could not properly be determined on the papers and did not demonstrate that fairness required an oral hearing.

[19]The decision not to direct release remained provisional, and subject to reconsideration by operation of rule 20(6)(a).

[20]The Applicant now applies for reconsideration. For the avoidance of doubt, this must be limited to reconsideration of the MCA panel's decision not to direct release (made under rule 19(1)(b)). It cannot concern the Duty Member's decision to refuse an oral hearing under rule 20(5) which is not a decision eligible for reconsideration within rule 28(1). The Relevant Law

[21]The Parole Board will direct release if it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

[22]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

[23]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).

[24]A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay

[2019] PBRA 6

. Procedural unfairness

[25]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.

[26]In summary, an applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;

(b) they were not given a fair hearing;

(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;

(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or

(f) the panel was not impartial.

[27]The overriding objective is to ensure that the applicant's case was dealt with justly. The reply on behalf of the Respondent

[28]The Respondent has submitted no representations in response to this application. Discussion

[29]The sole ground relied upon is procedural unfairness. The decision under reconsideration is the MCA panel's decision not to direct release. The Duty Member's refusal to direct an oral hearing under rule 20(5) is not itself a decision eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. The relevance of the oral hearing issue arises only insofar as it is said that determination on the papers rendered the non-release decision unfair.

[30]It is well-established that fairness may require an oral hearing where this is necessary in order to enable the panel properly to assess risk or where significant factual disputes or evaluative issues cannot fairly be resolved on the papers. There is, however, no general entitlement to an oral hearing. The question is whether the absence of an oral hearing deprived the panel of material evidence necessary in order fairly to determine whether the statutory test for release was met. I have considered the application on its merits notwithstanding the absence of submissions from the Respondent.

[31]The Applicant submits that unresolved issues relating to risk formulation, responsivity, trauma and maintaining innocence required oral exploration. However, the central difficulty identified by the MCA panel was not the existence of disputed factual issues requiring oral determination, but the absence of evidence demonstrating a reduction in risk to a level compatible with release. The panel noted that offence-focused work had not been completed, that aspects of risk formulation remained outstanding, that further psychological assessment was anticipated, and that there was no sufficiently developed or tested risk management plan available for evaluation. The issue was therefore the absence of evidence demonstrating reduced risk, rather than any procedural inability on the part of the panel to evaluate the evidence available.

[32]A case in which a prisoner is maintaining innocence requires careful consideration but does not of itself necessitate an oral hearing. The absence of completed offence-focused work and of a sufficiently developed formulation of risk represented an evidential gap in the panel's ability to assess whether risk had reduced to a level compatible with release. Similarly, the possibility that responsivity or trauma-related factors may affect engagement with interventions does not render determination on the papers unfair; rather, it indicates that further assessment and work may be required before risk can properly be evaluated.

[33]Nor does the decision appear materially to depend on disputed custodial allegations requiring oral testing. The panel recorded that the Applicant's custodial behaviour caused no concern and that he was assessed as suitable for enhanced status and trusted roles.

[34]Even if an oral hearing had been directed, the panel would still have been faced with the absence of completed offence-focused work, the lack of a sufficiently developed formulation of risk, and the absence of a tested risk management plan capable of demonstrating that risk could safely be managed in the community. In those circumstances, the Applicant has not demonstrated that the absence of an oral hearing deprived the panel of material evidence necessary to determine whether the statutory test for release was met.

[35]Taking all matters together, I am not satisfied that the procedure adopted rendered the decision fundamentally unfair. Decision

[36]For the reasons set out above, the application for reconsideration is refused. Stefan Fafinski 02 April 2026