Lewin, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 38 (18 February 2026) [2026] PBRA 38

PBRA

Lewin, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 38 (18 February 2026)

[2026] PBRA 38 · 2026-01-06

[1]This is an application by Lewin (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing panel dated the 6 January 2026 not to direct release.

[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,

(b) that it is irrational and/or

[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the oral hearing decision, the dossier consisting of 443 pages and the application for reconsideration. Request for Reconsideration

[4]The application for reconsideration is dated 23 January 2026. The grounds for seeking a reconsideration are that the decision contained material errors of law, lacks reasoning to justify its conclusions and was irrational.

[5]The submission is supplemented by written arguments to which reference will be made in the discussion section below. Background

[6]The Applicant received a sentence for offenders of particular concern of six years and six months with an extended licence of one year on 20 January 2023 following conviction for engaging in conduct in preparation for terrorist acts. His sentence expiry date is in February 2029.

[7]The Applicant was 39 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 42 years old. Current parole review

[8]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) in March 2025 to consider whether or not it would be appropriate to direct his release.

[9]The case proceeded to a public oral hearing on 18 December 2025 and a closed hearing on 22 December 2025. The panel consisted of two independent members and a psychologist member. It heard oral evidence from the Applicant together with his Prison Offender Manager (POM), Community Offender Manager (COM) and a psychologist appointed by the prison. The Applicant was legally represented throughout the hearing. The Respondent was not represented by an advocate. 10.The panel did not direct the Applicant's release. The Relevant Law

[11]The Parole Board will direct release if it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. The test is automatically set out within the Parole Board's oral hearing decision. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

[12]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

[13]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).

[14]A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay

[2019] PBRA 6

. Irrationality 15.The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words:

" if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere"

. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality. 16.In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board

2018 EWHC 694

(Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words at para 116:

"the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. " 17.In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board 2019 EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied"

. This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R (on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board

2022 EWHC 1282

(Admin). 18.As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J. 19.It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses. 20.Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Error of law

[21]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel: a) misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed; b) has no legal authority to make the decision; c) fails to fulfil a legal duty; d) exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose; e) takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or f) improperly delegates decision-making power.

[22]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State 23.The Respondent has submitted no representations in response to this application. Discussion 24.Ground 1 submits that the Panel was irrational in its decision that the test for release was not met. The application argues that the Applicant was convicted of a preparatory offence and that in concluding that there would be more than a minimal risk that the Applicant would commit a further offence he would need to go further than the index offence and to exceed it. The ground relies on the ERG+(Extremism Risk Guide) Report conclusions, the oral evidence from witnesses, the circumstances of the offence and the recommendations of the professionals. 25.This ground misunderstands the nature of the offence for which the Applicant was prosecuted and convicted and seeks to re-argue findings that were open to the panel. The Applicant was not convicted of an inchoate offence but of the substantive offence of engaging in conduct in preparation for acts of terrorism. He did not therefore, as in an attempt, have to take a "more than merely preparatory 'step' to the commission of an offence. The acts he committed, as the jury found, amounted to the offence, he did not have to go beyond the commission of those acts to commit the Terrorism Act offence. The panel did not need to look for more serious offences, it had in its consideration the offence before it and was correct in the application of the test to that offence. 26.The panel sets out the evidence of the witnesses and their recommendations and gave reasons for its conclusions which were soundly and logically based. Panels of the Parole Board are not obliged to adopt the opinions and recommendations of professional witnesses. It is their responsibility to make their own risk assessments and to evaluate the likely effectiveness of any risk management plan proposed. They must make up their own minds on the totality of the evidence that they hear, including any evidence from the Applicant. The witnesses were not all in agreement with regard to release and the panel was, having heard the evidence, in the best position to determine which evidence it preferred. The panel, in not agreeing with the recommendations of the offender managers, gave clear reasons for doing so which were sufficient to justify its conclusions. 27.There is no basis for this ground which therefore fails. 28.Ground 2 submits that the panel's view that the Applicant could avoid raising issues in community supervision to avoid recall lacked factual foundation and was irrational or required adequate reasons. 29.This ground relies on a paragraph in the decision in which the panel makes a common sense observation regarding the Applicant's likely compliance if the threat of custody is a deterrent to offending, but unlikelihood of admission of issues if he simply wants to avoid custody without understanding his risks. It is an obvious and rational conclusion based on the evidence presented, the Applicant's position and the inferences of human nature. 30.No irrationality arises here and this ground fails. 31.Ground 3 submits that the decision that the Applicant poses a high risk of serious harm involves a misdirection of law and lacks reasons and is irrational. 32.There is no evidence that the panel applied the wrong legal test or misdirected itself in law. The legal test is set out at the start of the decision. In considering the likelihood of further offending and serious harm the panel was not applying a test but noting the current position of the Applicant in the absence of engaging in any further work. The reasoning set out in that section of the decision provides a conclusion that follows from evidence, in short as the panel identified not enough was known about "[ the Applicant's] risk and the drivers for his offending ." In those circumstances much reliance was to be placed on external proposals and for the reasons it had given the panel concluded that his risk to the public would be greater than minimal. 33.The reasons are set out, the test is correctly applied, and the Applicant may disagree with it but that does not mean it is irrational. There is no identified error of law, and this ground therefore fails. 34.Ground 4 submits that the panel placed undue weight on the prison psychologist's evidence noting in particular that she had " had only limited interactions " with the Applicant in contrast with the POM with whom there had been " a longstanding relationship ". 35.The panel was entitled to prefer the evidence of the psychologist who, even though she had known the Applicant for a shorter period than the other witnesses, provided a detailed and reasoned objective analysis of risk. As she herself stated at the start of her report:

" Forensic risk assessment and therapeutic psychological services should be conducted by someone independent of the treatment process as per the Rice report (2006). As such I have had no previous contact with [the Applicant], allowing objectivity in writing this report ."

In addition, as the panel noted much of the evaluation by the professionals was reliant on the Applicant's own narrative of his life and he had not shown himself to be a reliable historian. 36.There is no reasonable basis for this ground, and it therefore fails. 37.Ground 5 submits that the panel's conclusion that the Applicant was seeking to justify his behaviour was irrational. The application sets out a series of questions regarding the Applicant's position in January 2021 and July 2025 and submits that the panel was irrational in counting the Applicant's answers against him rather than seeing them as an example of insight, openness, and honesty. 38.The panel considered the Applicant's evidence as a whole. In doing so it is clear, as the panel sets out, that the Applicant does present justifications for his behaviour, some of which were the incidence of the coronavirus, belief in conspiracy theories and social isolation. There was no irrationality in the panel relying on those answers, as the panel itself noted that risk reduction can be evidenced not only by completion of relevant offending behaviour work but also by self-reflection. The panel's approach to the analysis of the evidence may not have been what the Applicant had hoped for but it was logical, fair, rational and sound. 39.I am entirely satisfied that the panel did consider the evidence thoroughly, fairly, and rationally. The fact that having done so it reached a different conclusion to the Applicant and his representative is not a reason for me to interfere with it. This ground therefore fails. Decision 40.For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision contained any error of law or was irrational and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. Barbara Mensah 18 February 2026