Chorlton, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 36 (13 February 2026) [2026] PBRA 36

PBRA
Chorlton, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 36 (13 February 2026)
[2026] PBRA 36 · 2025-12-30
[1]This is an application by Chorlton (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision dated 30 December 2025 not to direct his release. The decision was made by a panel after an oral hearing.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) (the Parole Board Rules ) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair.[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the decision, the dossier (consisting of 774 numbered pages), and the application for reconsideration. I have also seen the hearing timetables that were issued throughout the parole review period. Background[4]On 12 February 2016, the Applicant was convicted after trial of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. He received an extended sentence consisting of 12 years in custody with a four year licence extension period.[5]His parole eligibility date passed in July 2023. His conditional release date is in July 2027 and his sentence expiry date is in July 2031.[6]The Applicant was 27 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 37 years old. Request for Reconsideration[7]The application for reconsideration has been submitted by the Applicant. It argues that the decision was irrational and/or procedurally unfair.[8]The submissions are supplemented by written arguments to which reference will be made in the Discussion section below. Current Parole Review[9]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) in September 2022 to consider whether or not it would be appropriate to direct his release. This is the Applicant's first parole review.[10]The review has been prolonged by a number of adjournments for reasons including short-notice non-disclosure matters, panel directions for further information, unavailability of panel chair and HMPPS forensic psychologist and administrative delays in producing an addendum psychological risk assessment.[11]The case eventually proceeded to an oral hearing on 15 December 2025, before a three member panel including a psychologist specialist member. The panel heard oral evidence from the Applicant, the Prison Offender Manager (POM), the Community Offender Manager (COM), the Head of Security at the Applicant's prison, a forensic psychologist commissioned by HMPPS and a forensic psychologist commissioned by the Applicant. The Applicant was legally represented throughout the hearing.[12]Both the COM and the POM supported the Applicant's release. They described his custodial behaviour as positive and noted a prolonged period without adjudications. The Applicant had successfully completed a number of periods of Release on Temporary Licence (ROTL), including overnight releases, without recorded concerns. The COM proposed a structured and restrictive risk management plan in the community, including residence at an Approved Premises, exclusion zones, GPS monitoring, curfew requirements, and close probation supervision. While acknowledging the existence of recent police intelligence, the COM and POM did not consider it sufficiently substantiated to outweigh the Applicant's progress or to undermine the proposed plan.[13]The psychologist instructed on behalf of the Applicant also supported release. She assessed that the Applicant had engaged with psychological work and had made progress in understanding his risk factors. In her view, the Applicant's risk had reduced and could be managed in the community through the proposed risk management arrangements. She did not consider the intelligence material to demonstrate a significant escalation in risk.[14]The panel also considered probation and psychological evidence which expressed a more cautious view. This material raised concerns about the Applicant's insight, the extent to which internal controls had been fully developed, and the degree to which risk management relied on self-report. Particular concern was expressed regarding openness and honesty, especially in circumstances where indicators of potential risk escalation might arise.[15]A central feature of the panel's consideration was police intelligence received in 2024. The panel acknowledged that this intelligence had not been investigated by the police, that it was limited in detail, and that it had been provided late in the process. Nonetheless, the panel considered it relevant to the assessment of risk, particularly as it was viewed as consistent with known risk factors and as undermining confidence in the Applicant's self-reporting. The panel concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was more likely than not to have made the threat referred to in the intelligence.[16]Having considered all of the evidence, the panel concluded that the Applicant continued to present a risk of serious harm which could not yet be safely managed in the community. While the panel accepted that the proposed risk management plan was robust in structure, it considered that it relied too heavily on the Applicant's compliance and honesty, and that external controls alone were insufficient in the absence of stronger internal controls. The panel was not satisfied that risk escalation would necessarily be identified sufficiently early in the community.[17]The panel acknowledged that the COM, POM and the Applicant's psychologist supported release. However, it explained that it did not accept those assessments, as it considered that they did not sufficiently address the implications of the intelligence material, placed excessive reliance on past compliance, and did not adequately resolve concerns regarding insight and internal risk management.[18]For those reasons, the panel concluded that it was not satisfied that the statutory test for release was met and accordingly made no direction for release. The Relevant Law[19]The Parole Board will direct release if it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[20]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[21]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).[22]A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay [2019] PBRA 6 . Procedural unfairness[23]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.[24]In summary an applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;(b) they were not given a fair hearing;(c) they were not properly informed of the case against them;(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or(f) the panel was not impartial.[25]The overriding objective is to ensure that the applicant's case was dealt with justly. Irrationality[26]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) by Lord Greene in these words:
" if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere "
. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[27]In R(DSD and others) v Parole Board [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin) the Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words (at [116]):
" the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it ."
[28]In R(Wells) v Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was " to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied ". This test was adopted by the Divisional Court in R(Secretary of State for Justice) v Parole Board [2022] EWHC 1282 (Admin).[29]As was made clear by Saini J in Wells, this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.[30]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.[31]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. The reply on behalf of the Respondent[32]The Respondent has submitted no representations in response to this application. Discussion[33]I have reviewed the Applicant's submissions carefully to determine whether they disclose an arguable basis for reconsideration.[34]The Applicant contends that the parole process was procedurally unfair due to the participation of a panel member who, it is said, had a conflict of interest which was not declared. He asserts that the panel member had previously held a senior role within Greater Manchester Police and had been involved in investigations connected to organised criminal activity in the Greater Manchester area. The Applicant submits that, given his own background and previous police interest in him and his family, this prior involvement created a real possibility of bias. He contends that the panel member could not have remained impartial and should have recused himself from the panel.[35]The Applicant further submits that the failure to declare this alleged conflict rendered the proceedings unfair and contrary to the requirements of the Parole Board Rules, internal conflict of interest policies, and Article 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights. He also raises concern about the length of time taken for his parole review to be completed, which he attributes, in part, to the continued involvement of the same panel member across adjourned hearings.[36]In addition, the Applicant contends that the decision was irrational. He submits that the panel attached disproportionate weight to police intelligence received in 2024 which had not been investigated, was limited in detail, and was provided late in the process. He argues that it was irrational for the panel to conclude that he was more likely than not to have made the alleged threat when the police had been unable to investigate the matter or identify an offender.[37]The Applicant submits that excessive weight was placed on this intelligence when assessing risk, to the exclusion of other evidence. He contends that the panel failed to give appropriate weight to the consistent support for release from the COM, POM, and the psychologist instructed on his behalf. He also relies on his positive custodial behaviour, prolonged enhanced status, absence of adjudications, and successful completion of numerous periods of ROTL.[38]The Applicant further argues that the panel relied on adverse information which was either inaccurate or not properly explored at the hearing, including reference to a warning for failure to attend a work placement, which he states was subsequently removed from prison records. He submits that this further undermined the fairness and rationality of the decision.[39]Taken together, the Applicant contends that no reasonable panel, properly directing itself, could have reached the decision not to direct release on the evidence before it. He therefore seeks reconsideration of the decision. Procedural unfairness - panel composition[40]The Applicant's primary procedural complaint concerns the participation of a panel member who is said to have had an undeclared conflict of interest arising from previous senior employment with Greater Manchester Police.[41]This ground is substantially undermined by the chronology. The panel member in question was first assigned to the panel in August 2024. The Applicant was aware of the panel's composition well in advance of the final hearing and was legally represented throughout the proceedings. No objection was raised at the time, nor was any concern expressed during the course of the hearing. No exceptional circumstances have been identified which would justify permitting the Applicant to raise this issue only after the outcome was known.[42]Where a party is aware of the basis of an alleged conflict or apparent bias and proceeds without objection, it will be taken that the point has been waived. The reconsideration mechanism is not intended to permit a party to reserve such an objection and deploy it only after an adverse outcome has been reached.[43]In any event, the Applicant has not demonstrated that the circumstances relied upon would give rise to a real possibility of bias. The alleged prior involvement relied upon was historic and indirect, and there is no suggestion of any personal connection with the Applicant or involvement in the prosecution of the index offence. The panel's decision is detailed and demonstrates careful and independent reasoning. There is no indication that any panel member relied on extraneous knowledge or approached the case with a closed mind.[44]The Applicant's reliance on delay does not assist him. The panel's decision records the reasons for adjournments and delay, including evidential and procedural matters. There is no basis for attributing the delay to the participation of the panel member concerned, nor does delay of itself establish procedural unfairness in the absence of resulting prejudice of a kind capable of undermining the fairness of the decision.[45]This aspect of the application does not disclose an arguable basis for reconsideration. Procedural unfairness - reliance on intelligence[46]The Applicant further submits that the proceedings were procedurally unfair because of the panel's reliance on police intelligence and other adverse material.[47]The panel's decision demonstrates that it was alert to the limitations of the intelligence relied upon. It expressly acknowledged that the intelligence had not been investigated by the police, was limited in detail, and had been provided late in the process. The panel also applied the non-disclosure process and provided a gist. There is no indication that express procedures laid down by law were not followed.[48]The panel did not treat the intelligence as determinative of risk in isolation. Rather, it explained why it considered the intelligence relevant when viewed alongside established risk factors and concerns about insight and self-reporting. That was a matter for the panel's evaluative judgment.[49]The Applicant also relies on reference in the decision to a warning for failure to attend a work placement, which he says was later removed from prison records.[50]Even accepting the limitations identified by the Applicant, the panel was entitled to attach weight to the intelligence as part of its overall assessment. In any event, the decision does not turn on that matter. The panel's conclusions were based on a broader assessment of risk, insight, and risk management. The Applicant has not demonstrated that any such error was material to the outcome or rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair.[51]This ground therefore does not meet the threshold for procedural unfairness. Irrationality[52]The Applicant contends that the decision was irrational, primarily because the panel attached excessive weight to uninvestigated police intelligence and insufficient weight to the professional evidence supporting release.[53]The panel correctly directed itself to the statutory public protection test and undertook a structured assessment of the evidence. It expressly considered the positive custodial behaviour relied upon by the Applicant, his successful periods of ROTL, and the professional support for release from witnesses.[54]The panel explained why it did not accept those assessments. In particular, it concluded that they placed insufficient weight on the implications of the intelligence material, relied too heavily on past compliance, and did not adequately address concerns about insight, openness, and the development of internal controls. The panel was entitled to reach those conclusions and to prefer other evidence before it.[55]The panel also explained why it was not satisfied that the proposed risk management plan, while robust in structure, provided sufficient safeguards. It concluded that the plan relied heavily on the Applicant's compliance and honesty and that external controls alone were insufficient in the absence of stronger internal controls. That was a rational conclusion open to the panel on the evidence.[56]The Applicant's submissions on irrationality amount, in substance, to a disagreement with the panel's evaluative judgment and the weight it attached to particular evidence. The reconsideration panel may not substitute its own assessment for that of the panel who heard the evidence. The decision cannot be said to be one that no reasonable panel, properly directing itself, could have reached. Conclusion[57]Taken individually and cumulatively, the grounds advanced by the Applicant do not disclose procedural unfairness or irrationality, nor do they disclose any other basis on which the decision could properly be reconsidered. Decision[58]For the reasons set out above, the application for reconsideration is refused. Stefan Fafinski 13 February 2026