Leslie, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 32 (16 February 2026) [2026] PBRA 32

PBRA

Leslie, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 32 (16 February 2026)

[2026] PBRA 32 · 2025-12-14

[1]This is an application by Leslie (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing panel dated the 14 December 2025 not to direct release and not to make a recommendation for open conditions.

[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,

(b) that it is irrational and/or

[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the oral hearing decision, the dossier consisting of 684 numbered pages, the application for reconsideration and representations in response to the application. Request for Reconsideration

[4]The application for reconsideration is undated. It has been drafted by representatives on behalf of the Applicant. It submits that the decision is irrational, contained an error of law and fact and was procedurally unfair.

[5]The submission is on the grounds that the panel's approach disregarded the professional evidence presented without justification and undermined the fairness of the hearing by placing weight on " incomplete and unsupported evidence " from the Community Offender Manager (COM). The submission is supplemented by written arguments to which reference will be made in the Discussion section below. Background

[6]The Applicant received a mandatory life sentence on 25 June 2008 following a conviction for murder. His tariff was set at 18 years and expired on 1 March 2025.

[7]The Applicant was 38 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 56 years old. Current parole review

[8]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) in May 2024 to consider whether or not it would be appropriate to direct his release. If the Board did not consider it appropriate to direct release, it was invited to advise the Secretary of State whether the Applicant should be transferred to open conditions.

[9]The case proceeded to an oral hearing which took place via videoconference on 20 November 2025. The panel consisted of two independent members and a psychologist member. It heard oral evidence from the Applicant together with his Prison Offender Manager (POM), Community Offender Manager (COM), a psychologist from the prison service and a psychologist instructed on behalf of the applicant. The Applicant was legally represented throughout the hearing. The Respondent was represented by an advocate. The Relevant Law

[10]The panel correctly sets out in its decision letter dated 14 December 2025 the test for release and the issues to be addressed in making a recommendation to the Secretary of State for a progressive move to open conditions. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

[11]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

[12]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).

[13]A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay

[2019] PBRA 6

. Irrationality 14.The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words " if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere". The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality. 15.In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board

2018 EWHC 694

(Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to parole board hearings in these words at para 116 "the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. " 16.In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board

2019 EWHC 2710

(Admin) set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R(on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board

2022 EWHC 1282

(Admin). 17.As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in Parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J. 18.It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses. Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision. In summary an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;

(b) they were not given a fair hearing;

(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;

(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or

(f) the panel was not impartial. The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant's case was dealt with justly. Error of law

[22]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel: a) misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed; b) has no legal authority to make the decision; c) fails to fulfil a legal duty; d) exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose; e) takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or f) improperly delegates decision-making power.

[23]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State 24.The Respondent submits that there has been no procedural irregularity regarding the COM's professional opinion or lack of opinion. It is submitted that the correct policy was followed governing the giving of professional opinions. Discussion 25.The application sets out the relevant test with regard to irrationality (paragraphs 2 and 3) and submits that the panel's decision to depart from the recommendations of the professionals was unjustified and irrational (paragraphs 6 and 7). It is also submitted that the panel's departure from the recommendations was not properly reasoned with a "better safe than sorry" approach which was not the correct test (paragraphs 8 and 9). Error of Law and Fact - the application submits that the panels reasoning based on preference or convenience is inconsistent with the public protection test (paragraphs 4 and 5). It is submitted that the panel based its decision on vague concerns and hypothetical scenarios unsupported by the evidence. It is submitted that the COM's failure to provide a recommendation affected the fairness of the hearing (paragraphs 10 to 15). The application submitted that the intelligence evidence provided was uncorroborated or contradicted and should have carried little or no weight (paragraph 16). 26.In a very detailed decision setting out the extensive evidence that had been received by the panel, the views of the professionals were set out clearly and considered fairly by the panel. 27.The Panel is not obliged to follow the evidence of professionals even if all recommend one way - if that were the case there would be no need for a panel. It is a matter for the panel (with appropriate and proper reasons) what evidence they accept, or to which they afford weight, and what they reject. They must form their own conclusions and judgment on the matter. In not accepting the evidence of the professionals including the psychologists, it must be remembered that the Panel also included a specialist psychologist member. The panel set out its reasons for disregarding the recommendations. Those reasons were based on its conclusions regarding the OASys assessment, non-compliance with rules whilst in custody, concealing information, mistrusting authority figures, lack of insight into the need to engage with supervision and concerns about his willingness and ability to do so. The panel noted that these concerns applied equally in the community as in open conditions where the Applicant could be unsupervised in the community under temporary release provisions. There was plainly material before the panel to justify and support its conclusions. 28.The COM's position, as identified by the Respondent, was not contrary to any policy governing the giving of opinion and in any event the COM explained his position and did provide an opinion at the hearing. Far fairer to an Applicant to offer an explained position of no opinion when an opinion writer is unable to do so than to invent or maintain an opinion that cannot be supported. There was no error, irregularity or unfairness presented in the COM's position or change of position, which was accompanied by reasons set out in the decision. When pressed by the panel, the COM gave an explanation and offered an opinion. The Applicant was represented at the hearing and in a position to question and challenge the COM, as were the panel in a position to challenge him if there were any concerns. If more time were required to consider the change of position, the Applicant's representatives could have made an application for such, but none was made. I am satisfied that there was no procedural unfairness, irrationality or error in the panel's approach, analysis, or conclusions. 29.Whilst the application submits that there was an error of law and fact by the panel, the submissions are in very general terms, the panel relying on what is " preferable or convenient ," the panel basing its decision on " vague concerns and hypothetical scenarios unsupported by the evidence ." No examples are given in support of these submissions. Having carefully read the decision, I am satisfied that it was not based on preference or convenience in substitution for the public protection test. Nor am I able to identify any vagueness or hypothetical scenarios as a basis for the conclusion. It is not for me to make the Applicant's argument, and, as an entirely unfounded argument, it must fail. 30.The panel's decision was detailed, reasoned, balanced and fair. It identified and gave credit to the Applicant for the positive aspects of his progress. It attached such weight to evidence as was supported by the evidence presented. It applied the correct test both for release and open conditions. The Applicant is clearly disappointed at the panel's decision, particularly since he continues to maintain his innocence in respect of the index offence. However, that is not the test. The decision makes it clear that the Applicant currently has risk factors that need to be addressed in custody before release and those risk factors are sufficiently great that he cannot be safely released or recommended for transfer to open conditions. Decision 31.For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational, procedurally unfair or contained any error of law or fact and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. Barbara Mensah 16 February 2026