Eminson, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 20 (22 January 2026) [2026] PBRA 20

PBRA

Eminson, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 20 (22 January 2026)

[2026] PBRA 20 · 2025-12-03

[1]This is an application by Eminson (aka Donaldson) (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision dated 3 December 2025 not to direct his release. The decision was made by a panel following an oral hearing.

[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) (the Parole Board Rules ) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,

(b) that it is irrational and/or

[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the decision, the dossier (consisting of 323 numbered pages), and the application for reconsideration. I have also listened to an audio recording of the hearing. Background

[4]On 11 February 2016, the Applicant was convicted after trial of three counts of rape of a female aged 16 years or over and received three concurrent extended sentences each consisting of nine years imprisonment followed by a six year period on extended licence. His sentence ends in August 2030.

[5]The Applicant was 34 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 44 years old.

[6]He was released on 22 March 2023. His licence was revoked on 5 September 2023, and he was returned to custody on 12 September 2023. His recall followed allegations of controlling and coercive behaviour, stalking and common assault. The police investigation was subsequently discontinued, and no further action was taken. Request for Reconsideration

[7]The application for reconsideration has been submitted by solicitors on behalf of the Applicant. It argues that the decision was procedurally unfair.

[8]The submissions are supplemented by written arguments to which reference will be made in the Discussion section below. Current Parole Review

[9]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) to consider whether to direct his release. This is the Applicant's second parole review since recall.

[10]The case proceeded to an oral hearing on 20 November 2025, before a two-member panel. The panel took oral evidence from the Applicant, the Prison Offender Manager (POM), and the Community Offender Manager (COM). The Applicant was legally represented throughout the hearing.

[11]In the professional opinion of the POM, the Applicant was suitable for release. The COM did not consider the Applicant to be suitable for release. In her professional opinion, the Applicant needed to engage with further accredited risk reduction work in custody.

[12]The panel considered the Applicant to present a significant risk of serious harm, given the nature of the index offending and his wider offending history. Although the Applicant had completed some relevant risk reduction work in custody and had demonstrated generally positive custodial behaviour, the panel was not persuaded that this translated into sustained behavioural change or sufficient internal controls in the community.

[13]In reaching its conclusion, the panel placed some weight on the offence-paralleling concerns that arose during the Applicant's period on licence, and which led to recall. Without making formal findings of fact, the panel considered that these concerns indicated either continuing risk-related behaviours or, at the least, a lack of insight into situations likely to trigger escalation. The panel therefore concluded there was limited evidence of enduring change and further intervention was required within closed conditions to address the Applicant's remaining risk factors.

[14]The panel also considered whether the Applicant's risk could be managed through external controls in the community. While a structured and restrictive risk management plan was proposed, the panel was concerned that its effectiveness depended heavily on the Applicant's compliance. Given ongoing concerns about openness, honesty, and the reliability of compliance, the panel concluded that the proposed plan was unlikely to provide sufficiently effective safeguards. For these reasons, the panel was not satisfied that the statutory test for release was met and did not direct release. The Relevant Law

[15]The Parole Board will direct release if it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

[16]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

[17]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).

[18]A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay

[2019] PBRA 6

. Procedural unfairness

[19]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.

[20]In summary an applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;

(b) they were not given a fair hearing;

(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly; and/or

(e) the panel was not impartial.

[21]The overriding objective is to ensure that the applicant's case was dealt with justly. The reply on behalf of the Respondent

[22]The Respondent has advised that no representations will be submitted in response to this application. Discussion

[23]The Applicant argues that the panel's decision was procedurally unfair on two grounds. Ground 1 - Failure to apply the relevant law

[24]The Applicant first submits that the panel's decision was procedurally unfair because it failed to apply the correct legal framework for release.

[25]The Applicant relies on the fact that the decision records the statutory test as being whether the Board is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the Applicant should be confined, but contends that the panel's conclusion - expressed in terms of risk not being manageable in the community - was not supported by the evidence and did not demonstrate that continued detention was necessary for public protection. He further argues that the panel placed unfair weight on issues of openness and honesty, that it should have accepted the POM's assessment that the proposed risk management plan was sufficiently robust, and that the panel could have added further licence conditions if it considered this necessary.

[26]I do not accept that these submissions disclose an arguable case of procedural unfairness. Procedural unfairness is concerned with whether the proceedings were conducted in a way that was fundamentally unfair. The Applicant's submissions under this ground do not identify any such procedural defect. Rather, they amount to a disagreement with the panel's assessment of the evidence and the evaluative judgement it reached on risk and risk management.

[27]The panel directed itself to the correct statutory test for release and recorded it accurately. The fact that the panel expressed its ultimate conclusion in terms of risk not being manageable in the community does not demonstrate that it applied an incorrect legal test. It is well established that panels commonly express the statutory question in practical terms of whether risk can be managed safely in the community, because that is the mechanism by which the statutory test is primarily answered. The panel's conclusion that it was not satisfied that risk could be managed in the community was therefore a conclusion reached within, and not outside, the correct legal framework.

[28]The Applicant also relies on the contention that the evidence did not justify the panel's conclusion and that, in particular, the POM considered the risk management plan robust and sufficient. However, the panel was entitled to evaluate the evidence for itself and to attach such weight as it considered appropriate to the differing professional opinions. A panel is not obliged to accept the view of any particular witness, even where that witness supports release, and it is not procedurally unfair for a panel to prefer the assessment of one professional over another, provided that it gives rational reasons for doing so (see R(Wells) v Parole Board

[2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin)

). The panel was entitled to prefer the COM's assessment of ongoing risk and the need for further work. The fact that professional views evolved over time does not of itself demonstrate unfairness: it was for the panel to assess the evidence before it at the hearing.

[29]The Applicant further submits that the panel unfairly attached weight to perceived deficits in openness and honesty and to concerns about internal controls. Again, these matters go to the panel's assessment of risk and the likely effectiveness of community supervision, rather than to the fairness of the hearing process. The question of whether the panel attached too much weight to these factors is, in substance, a merits challenge. It does not establish that the Applicant was deprived of a fair opportunity to present his case or that the panel acted outside proper procedure.

[30]I note that the Applicant also asserts that the decision contains factual inaccuracies, including in relation to his attitude towards certain proposed licence conditions and his engagement with a counselling service in the community. Even if such points were capable of being substantiated, they would not of themselves demonstrate procedural unfairness. In any event, the Applicant has not demonstrated that any such alleged inaccuracies were material to the panel's ultimate conclusion that it was not satisfied that the statutory test for release was met.

[31]For these reasons, Ground 1 does not establish that the proceedings were procedurally unfair. It amounts to a disagreement with the panel's evaluative assessment of risk and the weight it attached to the evidence, rather than identifying a procedural impropriety or failure to apply the correct legal framework. Accordingly, this ground fails.

[32]For completeness, I find no arguable error of law. Ground 2 - Unproven allegations

[33]The Applicant next submits that the decision was procedurally unfair because the panel relied upon unproven allegations which led to recall, notwithstanding that it made no findings of fact in relation to them. The Applicant argues that the panel placed significant weight on the circumstances surrounding recall to support its conclusion that he posed a level of risk requiring continued confinement. The Applicant also contends that the panel referred to the allegations during the hearing but discouraged him from commenting on aspects of them, and that he was therefore denied a fair opportunity to respond to material which ultimately influenced the outcome (especially since the Applicant claimed he was told that the panel would not place any weight on the allegations).

[34]I do not accept that this ground establishes procedural unfairness. It is important to distinguish between a panel making findings of fact that adverse allegations are proved to the requisite (civil) standard, and a panel taking account of the existence and nature of allegations as part of an overall risk assessment, including as indicators of potential offence-paralleling behaviour or as part of the context for recall. The panel expressly acknowledged that it was not making findings of fact. It nevertheless explained why it attached some weight to the allegations, namely their offence-paralleling character and their relevance to the assessment of whether the Applicant had demonstrated sustained behavioural change and sufficient internal controls in the community. That approach was open to the panel and does not render the proceedings unfair.

[35]The panel's reasons make it clear that it was aware of the limitations of the material and the fact that the allegations were not determined in criminal proceedings. The panel did not treat the allegations as established facts in the manner suggested by the Applicant. Rather, it treated them as part of the information available to it when considering risk and manageability, and it explained the basis upon which it did so. A panel is entitled to consider such information, provided it does so in a balanced manner and does not purport to determine disputed matters of fact without a proper evidential foundation.

[36]The Applicant further submits that the panel acted inconsistently by stating within the hearing that it would not place weight upon the allegations, whilst nonetheless concluding that the allegations were indicative of deficits in thinking skills and internal controls. Having listened carefully to the recording, that is not what was said. When the Applicant said that he wished to comment on the complainant's statement, the panellist said that the allegations would be treated as ' not proceeded with '. That is materially different to saying the panel would disregard them. The Applicant gave oral evidence and I do not find that he was prevented from putting his case properly. Moreover, the hearing was conducted with the Applicant legally represented throughout proceedings. The panel's decision also records the Applicant's position in relation to the recall circumstances. Even if the Applicant would have wished to say more, it has not been demonstrated that the conduct of the hearing deprived him of a fair opportunity to address the matters that were material to the panel's assessment.

[37]Moreover, the panel was entitled to take a cautious approach to the disputed details, while still considering that the overall circumstances giving rise to recall - viewed alongside the Applicant's wider history and risk profile - were capable of informing its assessment of whether risk reduction had been consolidated and whether community supervision could safely manage the Applicant's risk, notwithstanding the fact that the complainant withdrew support for prosecution and the police took no further action.

[38]In reality, Ground 2 amounts to a challenge to the weight the panel attached to the recall allegations and the conclusions it drew from them. That is properly characterised as a disagreement with the panel's evaluation of risk rather than a procedural defect rendering the hearing fundamentally unfair. The panel was entitled to attach some weight to the allegations in the manner described, and it explained why it did so. Ground 2 is therefore not made out. Decision

[39]For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the panel's decision was not procedurally unfair. The application for reconsideration is therefore refused. Stefan Fafinski 22 January 2026