Ricketts, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 137 (15 June 2026) [2026] PBRA 137

PBRA

Ricketts, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 137 (15 June 2026)

[2026] PBRA 137 · 2026-04-20

[1]This is an application by Ricketts (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision dated 20 April 2026 not to direct his release. The decision was made by a panel on the papers.

[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,

(b) that it is irrational and/or

[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the decision, the dossier (now consisting of 579 numbered pages), and the application for reconsideration. I have also seen written legal representations dated 28 April 2026 seeking an oral hearing. Background

[4]On 12 November 1999, the Applicant was convicted of rape and sentenced to detention at Her Majesty's Pleasure with a minimum tariff of six years. He was also convicted of two counts of indecent assault on a female, receiving a five year concurrent term on each, and attempted rape, receiving a further six year concurrent term. His tariff expired in November 2005.

[5]He was most recently released on licence on 16 July 2020 following an oral hearing. His licence was revoked on 16 December 2025 and he was returned to custody the following day. It is reported that his recall followed his arrest in connection with an allegation of rape. It is also reported that at the time of his arrest, he allegedly headbutted one of the arresting officers. The allegations of rape remained under investigation, although it is reported that a charging decision should be made by June 2026. The Applicant was reportedly charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm with a trial due in July 2026.

[6]The Applicant maintains his innocence in relation to both matters.

[7]The Applicant was 19 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 45 years old. Request for Reconsideration

[8]The application for reconsideration has been submitted by solicitors on behalf of the Applicant. It argues that the decision was procedurally unfair and/or contained an error of law.

[9]The submissions are supplemented by written arguments to which reference will be made in the Discussion section below. Current Parole Review

[10]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) on 12 January 2026 to consider whether or not it would be appropriate to direct his release. This is the Applicant's first parole review since his recall.

[11]His case was considered on the papers by a Member Case Assessment (MCA) panel on 20 April 2026.

[12]The MCA panel acknowledged his previous progress, including offence-focused work, psychological work, progression to open conditions, release in 2020, and apparent compliance on licence before recall. However, the panel considered that the unresolved matters leading to recall created serious uncertainty about his current risk.

[13]The MCA panel's central concern was not simply that disputed allegations existed, but that they appeared relevant to the Applicant's known risk profile. Because those matters had not yet been resolved, the MCA panel concluded that it could not safely rely on the existing risk assessments, even though some assessment scores were in the low-to-medium range. It considered that those assessments might no longer give an accurate picture of the level or nature of risk.

[14]The MCA panel also considered the proposed risk management plan, including Approved Premises placement, curfew, monitoring, victim-related restrictions, relationship disclosure, offence-focused work if directed, and polygraph testing. It found the plan appropriate in structure, but concluded that it could not be satisfied that the plan was adequate when the underlying risk picture remained unclear.

[15]The MCA panel therefore found that the codified public protection test was not met and made no direction for release.

[16]However, the MCA panel's decision did comment that it " would support an early re-review of this case, once the two sets of allegations of offending have been fully resolved."

[17]The decision not to direct the Applicant's release on the papers was made under rule 19(1)(b). This was a provisional decision (rule 19(6)), and, following rule 20(2), the Applicant had the opportunity to apply in writing within 28 days for a panel at an oral hearing to determine the case.

[18]The Applicant did so. Submissions dated 28 April 2026 emphasised that he had been in the community for over five and a half years following his release in July 2020, and that his recall arose from matters which he disputed. They submitted that he had previously progressed through supervision to monthly appointments and had most recently been assessed as presenting a medium risk of serious harm before the recall allegations led to an increase in risk assessment.

[19]They argued that the recall allegations remained unresolved. One matter was said to be awaiting trial, while the other remained under investigation and had not resulted in charge. The Applicant disputed the matters leading to recall, and the representatives submitted that this created a factual dispute which ought to be considered at an oral hearing rather than determined finally on the papers.

[20]The representatives submitted that an oral hearing was required so that a panel could assess the Applicant in person, consider his current level of risk and change, question him about the alleged licence breaches, and test the evidence of the Community Offender Manager (COM) and Prison Offender Manager (POM) on suitability for re-release.

[21]In short, the oral hearing application was put on the basis that the case turned on unresolved and disputed recall allegations, that the Applicant had something material to contribute, and that Osborn fairness required oral testing of both his account and the professional evidence before the paper decision became final.

[22]On 12 May 2026, a Duty Member considered this application and dismissed it on the basis that it was not an appeal against the merits of the paper decision, and that the Applicant's representations did not introduce any material difference from the information and considerations already before the MCA panel. The duty member noted that the outstanding criminal matters were unlikely to be resolved within the next 12 weeks and that the MCA panel had already considered that position. The duty member therefore concluded that the request repeated matters already taken into account and did not provide additional detail capable of justifying an oral hearing.

[23]The decision not to direct release remained provisional, and subject to reconsideration by operation of rule 20(6)(a).

[24]The Applicant now applies for reconsideration. For the avoidance of doubt, this must be limited to reconsideration of the MCA panel's decision not to direct release (made under rule 19(1)(b)). It cannot concern the Duty Member's decision to refuse an oral hearing under rule 20(5) which is not a decision eligible for reconsideration within rule 28(1). The Relevant Law

[25]The Parole Board will direct release if it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

[26]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

[27]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).

[28]A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay

[2019] PBRA 6

. Procedural unfairness

[29]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.

[30]In summary, an applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;

(b) they were not given a fair hearing;

(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;

(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or

(f) the panel was not impartial.

[31]The overriding objective is to ensure that the applicant's case was dealt with justly. Error of law

[32]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel:a. misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed;

b. has no legal authority to make the decision;

c. fails to fulfil a legal duty;

d. exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose;

e. takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or

f. improperly delegates decision-making power.

[33]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. The reply on behalf of the Respondent

[34]The Respondent has submitted no representations in response to this application. Discussion

[35]Although the Duty Member's decision under rule 20(5) is not itself eligible for reconsideration, the Applicant is entitled to argue that the rule 19 release decision became procedurally unfair because, in all the circumstances, it should not have been made without an oral hearing.

[36]The application is advanced on the basis that the decision was procedurally unfair and/or contained an error of law. The substance of the argument is that the Applicant disputed the matters leading to recall; that those matters were unresolved; that the MCA panel relied on them as central to its risk assessment; and that fairness required an oral hearing before the paper decision became final. It is also argued that the MCA panel erred in referring to an early re-review of the case once the criminal matters had been resolved.

[37]The Applicant's argument has some force. The matters leading to recall were serious, disputed and unresolved. They were also plainly relevant to risk. The MCA panel acknowledged that the Applicant had previously made progress, had been released in 2020, and had apparently complied on licence for a substantial period before recall. The case was therefore not one in which the Applicant's position could simply be dismissed as hopeless or academic.

[38]However, the Applicant's argument does not sufficiently distinguish between two distinct questions. The first is whether disputed allegations should ordinarily be resolved or tested orally before findings adverse to the prisoner are made. The second is whether, in this case, the MCA panel made such findings. In my judgment, it did not. The MCA panel did not find that the allegations were proved. Nor did it purport to determine criminal liability, resolve the factual disputes underlying the recall or make a finding of fact to the civil standard of proof. Its reasoning was more limited. It concluded that, while those matters remained unresolved, it could not safely rely on the existing risk assessments or the proposed risk management plan as demonstrating that the statutory test for release was met.

[39]That was a conclusion available to the MCA panel. The MCA panel was required to decide whether it was satisfied on the evidence before it that it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the Applicant should remain confined. It was not required to release him unless satisfied that the statutory test was met. Where serious unresolved matters appeared relevant to the Applicant's known risk profile, the MCA panel was entitled to conclude that the existing assessments might not provide a reliable picture of the current level and nature of risk.

[40]The Applicant submits that an oral hearing was required because he disputed the recall allegations. I do not accept that submission in those broad terms. The existence of a factual dispute is an important consideration, but it is not conclusive. The question is whether fairness required oral evidence before the Board could make the decision it had to make. In this case, the MCA panel's concern was not a narrow factual issue capable of resolution by questioning the Applicant. The concern was that the unresolved position created an evidential uncertainty which prevented the MCA panel from being satisfied that the release test was met.

[41]Nor was the MCA panel required to convene an oral hearing in order to conduct a parallel inquiry into matters which were still before, or potentially before, the criminal courts. The Applicant's denial was known. The unresolved status of the matters was known. The likely timescales were considered. An oral hearing might have allowed the Applicant to repeat his denial and might have allowed some testing of professional evidence, but it would not necessarily have supplied the missing clarity on which the MCA panel's risk assessment turned.

[42]The Applicant also relies on the need to test the evidence of the COM and POM. Again, that submission is understandable, but it does not establish procedural unfairness. The MCA panel recorded that there was no current professional support for re-release. It also considered the proposed risk management plan and accepted that, in structure, it provided oversight of relevant risk factors. The reason release was not directed was not that the plan had been ignored or misunderstood. It was that the MCA panel could not be satisfied that the plan was adequate when the underlying level and nature of risk remained unclear.

[43]The Applicant's reliance on Osborn does not alter that conclusion. Osborn requires an oral hearing where fairness demands it in the circumstances of the particular case. It does not require an oral hearing in every case where allegations are disputed, nor in every case where a prisoner wishes to participate orally. The relevant question is whether the paper procedure was unfair in the circumstances of the particular case. Here, the Applicant had the opportunity to make written representations; the MCA panel had considered the unresolved status of the recall matters; and its conclusion rested on the absence of a reliable evidential foundation for release, not on a positive finding that the allegations were proved.

[44]I have also considered whether the MCA panel's reference to supporting an early re-review discloses an error of law. It does not. The MCA panel did not purport to direct a future review or to exercise a power it did not have. Read fairly, the statement was no more than an indication that, if the unresolved matters were clarified, an early re-review initiated by the Respondent would be appropriate. It was not a substitute for applying the statutory test, nor was it the basis on which release was refused. The MCA panel had already concluded that the codified public protection test was not met.

[45]There is also no material unfairness arising from that reference. The MCA panel's decision did not depend on an assumption that the Applicant would necessarily receive an early re-review. The operative reasoning was that the current evidence did not permit the MCA panel to be satisfied that risk could be managed safely in the community. That conclusion stands independently of the panel's comment about what might happen if the evidential position changed.

[46]For those reasons, I find that the decision was cautious, but not procedurally unfair or legally flawed. The MCA panel was entitled to conclude that the statutory test for release was not met on the evidence before it. It was also entitled to reach that conclusion on the papers. The Applicant has not shown that an oral hearing was required before the decision could fairly be made, nor that the MCA panel made a material error of law. Decision

[47]The application for reconsideration is refused. Stefan Fafinski 15 June 2026