Abid, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 114 (19 May 2026) [2026] PBRA 114

PBRA
Abid, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 114 (19 May 2026)
[2026] PBRA 114 · 2026-04-08
[1]This is an application by Abid (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing panel dated 8 April 2026 not to direct his release.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair. This is an eligible case, and the application was made in time.[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the oral hearing decision, the dossier consisting of 517 pages and the application for reconsideration. Request for Reconsideration[4]The application for reconsideration is dated 20 April 2026. It submits that the decision contains errors of law, was procedurally unfair and was irrational.[5]The grounds for seeking a reconsideration are that there were errors of law in not applying the public protection test and failing to consider manageability in the community. The grounds submit that the decision was procedurally unfair in failing to properly consider relevant evidence and was irrational as the conclusion was not supported by the evidence and was internally inconsistent.[6]The grounds also submit that the Applicant has engaged in assessments, engaged with probation, maintained stable behaviour in custody and that any risk can be managed in the community. Background[7]The Applicant received a sentence for offenders of particular concern on 26 June 2024 of two years six months with an extended licence of a year, for two breaches of notification requirements under the Counter Terrorism Act 2008. His sentence expiry date is July 2027. He had been sentenced in March 2018 to 51 months imprisonment for failing to disclose information which may be of material assistance in preventing the commission of terrorism. He was also made subject to 10 years notification under the same Act.[8]The breaches of the notification requirements were that he failed to notify the authorities that he held a financial account and that he failed to notify that he no longer had the right to use a particular vehicle.[9]The Applicant was aged 33 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 35 years old. Current parole review 10.The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) in January 2025 to consider whether or not it would be appropriate to direct his release. 11.The case proceeded to an oral hearing via videoconference on 27 March 2026. The panel consisted of two independent members and a psychologist member. It heard oral evidence from the Applicant, together with his Prison Offender Manager (POM), Community Offender Mangager (COM) and a prison appointed psychologist. The Applicant was not represented at the hearing. The Respondent was not represented by an advocate. 12.The panel did not direct the Applicant's release. The Relevant Law[13]The panel correctly sets out in its decision dated 08 April 2026 the test for release. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[14]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[15]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)). Irrationality[16]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words:
"if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere"
. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[17]In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board 2018 EWHC 694 (Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words at para 116:
"the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it." 18.In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board 2019 EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)"
. This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R(on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board 2022 EWHC 1282 (Admin). 19.As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J. It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses. 20.Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision. In summary an applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either: (a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision; (b) they were not given a fair hearing; (c) they were not properly informed of the case against them; (d) they were prevented from putting their case properly; (e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or (f) the panel was not impartial. The overriding objective is to ensure that the applicant's case was dealt with justly. Error of law[24]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel: a) misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed; b) has no legal authority to make the decision; c) fails to fulfil a legal duty; d) exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose; e) takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or f) improperly delegates decision-making power.[25]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State 26.The Respondent has submitted no representations in response to this application. Discussion Ground 1 - Error of Law 27.The Applicant submits that the panel applied the wrong legal test. It did not. None of the matters raised by the Applicant amount to an error of law. The submissions amount to complaints regarding the panel's decision, picking on particular words and phrases to suggest that the panel did not properly consider the minimal risk of future serious harm test. This is not a sensible, proper or fair reading of a decision which must be read as a whole without selection of particular words. The question of manageability is of importance in considering compliance, engagement and ultimately risk. The panel made it clear that external controls are inadequate not least because there has been no reduction in risk, there are "ongoing compliance concerns" and there is lack of engagement. The grounds submit that what is required is "an assessment of whether risk can be managed". That is precisely the assessment the panel undertook and concluded that it could not be. This ground discloses no error in law and therefore cannot succeed. Ground 2 - Procedural Unfairness 28.The grounds submit that the panel failed to properly consider evidence of the Applicant's attempts to ensure compliance, his participation in Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG) related work and relied on "lack of understanding/information" as a basis for refusing release. Again the application is selective in its submissions. The panel clearly considered all the positive entries in support of the Applicant's case and whilst he declined to participate in ERG assessments the panel noted his positive engagement with his practical mentor. It was a matter for the panel what weight it attached to his non-engagement, which continued. Contrary to the submissions the panel dealt in some detail with the Applicant's involvement in ERG assessment. 29.The grounds submit that the panel's decision was unfair as the panel reached conclusions despite finding that there was a lack of understanding and incomplete assessment of the Applicant's risk. These grounds fail to properly appreciate the panel's responsibility. Professional witnesses gave evidence regarding the Applicant's non-engagement in programmes, noting that his failure to engage and to discuss his offences left them without a clear understanding of his risk profile. That was the evidential position which the Applicant appeared to consider was not properly established for the panel to make a decision upon. It was not for the panel to wait to see if the Applicant would engage and provide information. The panel was required to and did assess the position on the basis of the evidence presented at the time of the hearing. The Applicant had had his opportunity to engage during his custodial sentence but had chosen not to do so. That failure meant that there was a lack of clear understanding about his risk. The panel was entitled to attach weight to that failure and was not obliged to wait to see if the situation could or would be reversed; no procedural unfairness arose as a consequence of its consideration of the case on the evidence available and presented at the hearing. This ground therefore must be dismissed. Ground 3 - Irrationality 30.The grounds argue that the decision is irrational as the panel's conclusion is not supported by the evidence accepted and is internally inconsistent. The arguments here are based on disagreement with the panel's conclusions and in particular regarding the issue of lack of engagement. The grounds also repeat the Applicant's positive custodial behaviour and steps taken to engage with professionals and ensure compliance. 31.There was nothing irrational about the panel's decision. In a fully set out decision, which took into account the Applicant's positive behaviour entries and steps towards compliance, the panel made clear that in view of the Applicant's non-compliance, lack of engagement, rejection of polygraph testing and his concerns about some of the licence conditions, it could not be satisfied that the risk management plan would be sufficient to manage his risk. It was always open to the Applicant to have requested an adjournment if he wanted the panel to see more evidence of change. He did not make any such request. On the basis of the evidence presented the panel could have reached no other conclusion than that it was necessary for the protection of the public that the Applicant remained confined. There was nothing irrational or internally inconsistent in that conclusion or the assessment of the evidence on which it was based. This ground must also therefore fail. Decision 32.For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational, procedurally unfair or contained any error of law and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. Barbara Mensah 19 May 2026