Benaziz, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 111 (21 May 2026) [2026] PBRA 111

PBRA

Benaziz, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 111 (21 May 2026)

[2026] PBRA 111 · 2026-04-23

[1]This is an application by Benaziz (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing dated 09 April 2026, making no direction for his release.

[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,

(b) that it is irrational and/or

[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are as follows: · The dossier, totalling 537 pages · The decision · Submissions from the Applicant's legal representatives, including clarifications as requested. Request for Reconsideration

[4]The application for reconsideration is dated 23 April 2026.

[5]It is submitted that the decision was irrational and procedurally unfair.

[6]I asked for further particulars clarifying the Applicant's grounds, which the Applicant's legal representatives provided. The substance of the grounds is included in the discussion section below. Background

[7]The Applicant was sentenced on 18 September 2019 to a determinate sentence and two sentences for offenders of particular concern, all of which were to run consecutively. His total sentence amounted to 14 years and nine months. He had been convicted of a range of sexual offending against four child victims, and violence against one of the same victims. The offending took place over a period of five years. He was 52 years of age when sentenced.

[8]The Applicant had undertaken a range of accredited programmes and other work during his time in custody. There were no concerns around his custodial behaviour. Current parole review

[9]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board on 11 February 2025. His case was initially concluded on the papers by a Member Case Assessment (MCA) member, however, following an application under Rule 20 his case was directed to an oral hearing.

[10]The Applicant's oral hearing took place on 01 April 2026. The panel consisted of two members, one of whom was a specialist psychologist member. The panel considered a dossier of 515 pages, and heard oral evidence from the Applicant, his prison offender manager (POM), and his community offender manager (COM). The Applicant was legally represented throughout the parole review and oral hearing.

[11]The dossier indicates an application for adjournment was made on 30 March 2025, two days before the oral hearing. This was on the basis that the Applicant wished to obtain a psychological risk assessment. It was also suggested that a three-member panel was required to avoid the potential for a split decision. This application was refused. I will address this issue further below. The Relevant Law

[12]The panel correctly sets out in its decision the test for release. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

[13]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

[14]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)). Irrationality

[15]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words " if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere". The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.

[16]In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board

2018 EWHC 694

(Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words at para 116 "the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. "

[17]In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board

2019 EWHC 2710

(Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R(on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board

2022 EWHC 1282

(Admin).

[18]As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in Parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.

[19]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.

[20]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness

[21]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.

[22]In summary an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;

(b) they were not given a fair hearing;

(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;

(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or

(f) the panel was not impartial.

[23]The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant's case was dealt with justly. Reconsideration as a discretionary remedy

[24]Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That means that, even if an error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness is established, the Reconsideration Member considering the case is not obliged to direct reconsideration of the panel's decision. The Reconsideration Member can decline to make such a direction having taken into account the particular circumstances of the case, the potential for a different decision to be reached by a new panel, and any delay caused by a grant of reconsideration. That discretion must of course be exercised in a way which is fair to both parties. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State (the Respondent)

[25]The Respondent has made no submissions. Discussion

[26]As noted above, the Applicant has mounted this challenge on the basis of irrationality and procedural unfairness. The challenge is presented on three grounds. Ground 1- The evidence of the COM and POM

[27]The Applicant submits that both the POM and COM supported release and that no further offender behaviour work was recommended.

[28]As previously outlined, the panel is not obliged to accept the opinions of professional witnesses. The panel has highlighted that it took into account the professional opinions, but the decision is clear about why the panel has departed from them, specifically the panel's concerns around the Applicant being sexually attracted to children, his continued denials of the index offending, and the lack of insight he shows into his risks.

[29]Equally, the fact that no further offender behaviour work is recommended is not a determinative factor. The panel has noted the work the Applicant has undertaken but has outlined why they did not believe this had addressed his sexual offending behaviour.

[30]I am satisfied that neither of these points has any merit.

[31]Under this ground the Applicant also raises concerns around the panel's approach to the evidence of the COM around the Applicant's wife being a protective factor. This is linked to the possibility of the family home being his move on accommodation. It is suggested that further checks were required to allow the panel to make a fair decision.

[32]I am satisfied that there was no procedural unfairness or irrationality in not requiring further checks of the family home for suitability. If the panel's decision had been finely balanced and turned on the Applicant's move on accommodation, then this point may have had substance. However, it is evident from reading the decision as a whole, the panel were not convinced that the Applicant could have been safely managed in the community at all, no matter where he was residing. In those circumstances, there was no requirement to seek further checks or information. Ground 2- Lack of a psychological risk assessment

[33]This ground is effectively pleaded on two separate bases. Firstly, a psychological risk assessment risk assessment was required to allow a fair decision to be made. Secondly, the decision to refuse an adjournment to allow the Applicant to obtain a psychological risk assessment was unfair.

[34]With respect to the first basis, the Applicant highlights a number of issues they say indicate a psychological risk assessment was required. These include the Applicant trying to manipulate the COM around risk assessments in the OASys, the panel's concerns about whether the Applicant had completed the necessary work to address sexual offending behaviour, and the Applicant's stance on the index matters.

[35]This is a case where many MCA members or oral hearing chairs may have directed a psychological risk assessment. Equally, however, many would not have. I remind myself that it is not my role to substitute my decision for the panels in this respect. Rather, I need to consider whether proceeding without a psychological risk assessment was irrational.

[36]With respect to this, the Applicant has highlighted the case of Alnoor

[2025] EWHC 922 (Admin)

, where Fordham J considered what anxious scrutiny requires in a reasonableness review. I accept those principles apply in this case; whilst this does not displace the general Wednesbury principles around unreasonableness / irrationality, it does require a deeper analysis of how the panel reached their conclusion.

[37]Taking that into account, I am satisfied that it was not irrational for the panel to proceed without a psychological risk assessment. The issues at the centre of the panel's decision in this case were the Applicant's lack of insight and whether he had addressed his risk of sexual offending. In the light of the evidence, the panel were able to draw clear conclusions; there was no confusion or ambiguity that necessitated a psychological risk assessment.

[38]Considering the second basis this ground is advanced on, the circumstances of the application for adjournment need to be considered. This application was made two days before the scheduled oral hearing, six months after the case had been directed to oral hearing. However, on the day of the hearing itself, the Applicant's legal representative resiled from their position in the Stakeholder Response Form and indicated this was a misunderstanding. On that basis alone, I am satisfied that it was not procedurally unfair to proceed.

[39]However, notwithstanding this, I have considered the wider point, should the legal representative have persisted in the application for an adjournment. As noted in the Applicant's submissions, guidelines around legal aid would have made instructing such a report very difficult, as no prison psychological risk assessment had been directed. It is unclear why that position would have changed. More broadly, whilst a prisoner has a right to present a case on their own terms, a panel is entitled to consider the request in light of the entirety of the evidence before it.

[40]In the circumstances of this case, including the timing of the adjournment request, I am satisfied that it would not have been procedurally unfair to deny the application. Ground 3- The Applicant's denial of the offence

[41]The Applicant submits that his account of the offending has not altered since his sentencing. It is argued that this was a factor which supported the need for a psychological risk assessment. It is further submitted that should the Applicant's continued denials be a conclusive factor in refusing to direct his release, this would be irrational.

[42]The Applicant also suggests that the panel failed to take into account his presentation and mental health diagnosis (recurrent depressive disorder) at the time of his offending. Whilst not explicitly made, it also appears that the Applicant is submitting there was a need for a specialist psychiatrist member on the panel.

[43]It is inaccurate to state that the Applicant's account of his offending has remained static. There are multiple changes to the exact account given by the Applicant over the years, but most significantly, is a letter submitted by the Applicant dated 01 February 2026 (pp 289-292). In that letter, he states " I take full responsibility for my index offence and the harm caused ." That acceptance of responsibility is not restricted to certain victims or to certain types of offending. On that basis I am satisfied that the panel could conclude that there had been changes in the Applicant's acceptance of guilt throughout his sentence.

[44]Notwithstanding that point, I am not convinced that this suggests any additional need for a psychological risk assessment. This is in effect a different presentation of the second ground, and the same principles apply.

[45]It is also evident from reading the entirety of the decision, that continued denials were not conclusive in not directing the Applicant's release. The panel rightly considered the denials but assessed them in the context of how they impacted his risk and ability to be safely managed in the community.

[46]Finally, the panel did consider the Applicant's mental health at the time of the offending. In doing so they noted that they did not accept the Applicant's position that his mental health was a primary factor in his offending, rather, they considered there were deeper issues around sexual interest in children. This was not a complex matter, and I can find no reason why it would have been essential for a psychiatrist member to have been on the panel. Conclusions

[47]Considering the proceeding conclusions, I do not consider that the Applicant has come close to showing the decision was in any respect irrational. Neither do I consider there was any procedurally irregularity or unfairness in how the hearing was conducted. Decision

[48]For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational or procedurally unfair and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. John Marley 21 May 2026