Bashir, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 108 (18 May 2026) [2026] PBRA 108

PBRA
Bashir, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 108 (18 May 2026)
[2026] PBRA 108 · 2026-04-01
[1]This is an application by Bashir (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of a panel of the Parole Board dated the 1 April 2026 making no direction for release, following substantive oral hearings on 15 January 2026 and 26 March 2026.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2025) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair. This is an eligible case, and the application was made in time.[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the application for reconsideration, the decision and the contents of the dossier. Request for Reconsideration[4]The application for reconsideration is dated 19 April 2026.[5]The grounds for seeking a reconsideration are extensively set out over 20 pages by the Applicant's solicitor. It is claimed that the decision was irrational and procedurally unfair, on the following bases: Irrationality: i. departure from the majority professional opinion without adequate reasoning; ii. irrational and unsupported findings regarding victim blame and grievance thinking; iii. irrational treatment of the Applicant's insight; iv. irrational conclusion regarding disclosure of relationships; v. inconsistency in the treatment of unsupported assertions; vi. irrational finding regarding patriarchal attitudes; vii. inaccurate finding regarding employment; viii. failure to engage adequately with situational risk factors and the expert formulation of the prisoner commissioned psychologist; ix. misleading, inconsistent and inaccurate evidence by the COM which was relied upon by the Panel and preferred over the other professional witnesses; Procedural unfairness x. failure to put a central concern to [the Applicant] before concluding against him; xi. failure to adequately direct progress on the Skills for Relationships Toolkit; xii. failure to apply anxious scrutiny. Background[6]The Applicant, who was then aged 41, was sentenced on 20 September 2018 to a 14 years 6 months extended determinate sentence with a custodial term of 10 years 6 months, and an extended licence of four years for an offence of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm. The offence was committed against his estranged wife against whom he had a longstanding grievance.[7]He deliberately drove his car into collision with her car and smashed the window next to her with an axe. He then tried to drag her through the window. He used a pruning saw to attack her and her daughter, causing injury to their hands. He got his estranged wife to the ground and used the pruning saw to target her face and throat, causing cuts to her jaw and throat. He then drove at her in his vehicle, causing her to be thrown in the air, trying again to attack her with the pruning saw before members of the public intervened to stop him. He received concurrent sentences for assault occasioning actual bodily harm against his step-daughter, dangerous driving and breach of a restraining order - all arising from the same incident.[8]The Applicant's parole eligibility date was 31 March 2025, his conditional release date is September 2028 and his sentence expiry date is September 2032. Current parole review[9]The case was referred to the Board on 18 June 2024.[10]The case was considered at oral hearing on 7 August 2025 when it was adjourned so that the Applicant could undertake release on temporary licence. The case was considered again at oral hearing on 15 January 2026 and adjourned part heard as there was insufficient time to hear from all of the witnesses. The case was further considered at an oral hearing on 26 March 2026. A panel of three members heard the case, one of whom was a psychologist. The panel heard evidence from the Prison Offender Manager (at the hearing on 15 January), a stand-in Prison Offender Manager (at the hearing on 26 March), the Community Offender Manager (COM), a prison commissioned psychologist and a prisoner commissioned psychologist. The Applicant had legal representation. The Relevant Law[11]The panel correctly sets out in its decision dated 1 April 2026 the test for release. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[12]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[13]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)). Irrationality[14]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words:
" if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere"
. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[15]In R (DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words at para 116:
"the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. "
[16]In R (on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what is described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R (on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board [2022] EWHC 1282 (Admin) .[17]As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.[18]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.[19]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness[20]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.[21]In summary an applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;(b) they were not given a fair hearing;(c) they were not properly informed of the case against them;(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or(f) the panel was not impartial.[22]The overriding objective is to ensure that the applicant's case was dealt with justly. Reconsideration as a discretionary remedy[23]Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That means that, even if an error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness is established, the Reconsideration Member considering the case is not obliged to direct reconsideration of the panel's decision. The Reconsideration Member can decline to make such a direction having taken into account the particular circumstances of the case, the potential for a different decision to be reached by a new panel, and any delay caused by a grant of reconsideration. That discretion must of course be exercised in a way which is fair to both parties. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State (the Respondent)[24]The Respondent has made no submissions in relation to this application. Discussion[25]The Applicant committed a sustained very serious index offence involving a weapon and premeditation which caused severe injuries. He was in breach of a restraining order, having previous convictions of domestic abuse against his estranged wife against whom he had a longstanding grievance.[26]The Applicant has engaged in a Therapeutic Community during his sentence, spending over three years there. He then spent time in a Psychologically Informed Planned Environment. In March 2025 the Applicant progressed to open conditions and undertook releases on temporary licence where there were no concerns over his behaviour. Ground 1 - Departure from the majority professional opinion without adequate reasoning[27]Panels of the Parole Board are not obliged to adopt the recommendations of professional witnesses. The panel is required to make their own risk assessments and to evaluate the risk management plans proposed. They have the expertise to make up their own minds on the totality of the evidence that they hear and read.[28]In my judgment the panel set out the assessments of the professionals and gave clear reasons for the conclusions they reached. They noted that the Therapeutic Community report contained a mixed picture of the Applicant's progress in reducing risk of violence in relationships. The panel formed their own view that he continued to present a risk in relationships, lacked insight into his behaviour, continued to blame the victim, and lacked the internal controls needed to manage his risk in relationships. They were not confident that the Applicant would comply with the external control of disclosing developing relationships due to historical non-compliance. They also concluded that the Applicant's assessed risk of harm to the public, specifically future partners, was underestimated. The panel preferred the structured professional judgment tools used by the prison commissioned psychologist to assess risk of intimate partner violence (assessed as high if the same risk factors were present), to the prisoner commissioned psychologist's view who did not utilise these tools.[29]The panel explained clearly the reasons for rejecting the recommendation(s) from some of the professional witnesses, and the stated reasons are sufficient to justify its conclusions as per Wells above. For this reason, I do not find that this ground amounts to a basis for reconsideration. Ground 2 - Irrational and unsupported findings regarding victim blame and grievance thinking[30]The grounds state that the Applicant gave "uncontradicted evidence" about what he says are " false" allegations made by the victim which lack credibility, and are critical that no weight was given to this by the panel.[31]The panel's expressed view, having considered all of the evidence, was that the Applicant continued to blame the victim for "all of his offending". There was clear evidence in the dossier from the trial judge, the pre-sentence report (PSR) and the psychiatric report that the Applicant had a longstanding grievance against his wife prior to / at the time of sentencing. The COM reported current ongoing concerns that grievance thinking and rumination by the Applicant could lead to further harm, noting that the accounts given by the Applicant highlighted the victim's behaviour and blamed her.[32]This ground does not accurately reflect the careful decision, which records the assertion of the Applicant that he was merely setting the context of his offending, not seeking to blame the victim. The panel assessed the Applicant's grievant thinking and rumination, including about the perception of infidelity, to be a key area of risk for the Applicant. This was a conclusion they were entitled to reach and was evidence based. Accordingly I find there is nothing in this ground. Ground 3 - Irrational treatment of the Applicant's insight[33]This ground essentially argues that the Applicant has insight into his risks and it was irrational of the Panel to rely upon his statement that he was "not a risk to anyone" as demonstrating he lacked insight.[34]The ground relies upon a single sentence taken out of the context of the surrounding paragraph which explains that the Therapeutic Community report contained a mixed picture of the Applicant's progress in reducing his risk of violence in relationships. It was acknowledged that the Applicant had made some progress and that he needed to continue to practice the skills he had learnt. The decision recorded the panel's conclusion that the Applicant had not fundamentally moved away from the thinking and attitudes which led him to commit the index offence[35]The decision of the panel when considered as a whole plainly does not rely upon this solitary statement as evidencing an absence of insight and I have no hesitation in dismissing this ground which is not meritorious. Ground 4 - Irrational conclusion regarding disclosure of relationships[36]This ground challenges the conclusion of the panel that it was not confident the Applicant would disclose any developing relationships to his offender supervisor, which was based upon his history of non-compliance. The representations claim that the relevant period for the panel to consider is only during the currency of the sentence.[37]The panel is entirely at liberty to take into account historical information outside of the currency of the index offending in order to inform its decision making. The Applicant had demonstrated non-compliance when he committed historical offending during the period of a conditional discharge (imposed for an offence of violence against the same victim), and breached a restraining order. The index offending included a further breach of a restraining order.[38]This ground has no merit and I dismiss it. Ground 5 - Inconsistency in the treatment of unsupported assertions[39]This ground states that the panel were internally inconsistent in their approach to evidence, applying a different standard to the assertions favourable to the Applicant than those adverse to him. It is said that the panel did not give weight to the Applicant's assertions that his wife was mentally unstable and a liar as it was unsubstantiated but then accepted the COM's concerns which were (in the words of the representations) "without objective evidential foundation".[40]The reference in the decision to the Applicant's assertions that his wife was mentally unstable and a liar, was said to be "at the time of the PSR" and reflects the text of that report, which also observed that there was no supporting evidence of this. It does not appear to be the conclusion of the panel, rather that they were citing evidence they considered relevant from the PSR.[41]In any event even if the panel did not give weight to the Applicant's assertions, and then went on to accept the concerns of the COM, this of itself is not demonstrative of an internal inconsistency. The panel is entitled to analyse the whole of the evidence received and reach its own conclusions on each element. It is not irrational to accept the evidence presented by the COM that in her professional judgment she had ongoing concerns about grievance thinking and rumination, this having been identified by the sentencing judge and then by psychologists as a critical risk factor. Similarly, it would not be irrational for the panel to reject the Applicant's unsupported characterisation of his victim. These exercises in judgment are precisely the work the Panel are qualified to undertake. There is nothing in this ground and I dismiss it. Ground 6 - Irrational finding regarding patriarchal attitudes[42]This ground argues that it is irrational for the panel to have accepted the prison psychologist's formulation that the Applicant had a patriarchal and misogynistic outlook when this was not the extent of the report, with this formulation using "speculative and conditional language".[43]This single sentence is extracted from a wider paragraph which sets out the range of evidence given in the psychologist's formulation both in written and oral evidence, as well as the panel's acknowledgement that both viewpoints given by the psychologists could be valid. The extraction of a sentence in this ground is to misrepresent its meaning, which must logically be considered in context. There is nothing in this ground and I dismiss it. Ground 7 - Inaccurate finding regarding employment[44]The ground states that the finding in the decision that the Applicant "has not sought employment in the community" is factually inaccurate and implies a lack of motivation on his behalf. It is a matter of fact that the Applicant is not employed in the community. He submits that this is due to wider problems faced by prisoners in gaining employment and it is wrong to imply a lack of motivation.[45]If I accept for present purposes that this is accurate, in my judgment it cannot be characterised as a fundamental mistake of fact which has played any material part in the panel's reasoning. There is also nothing in the decision which implies that the panel believed the Applicant to be lacking in motivation to gain employment, with the decision recording in the following sentence that he is engaged in undertaking a business course. I do not consider that this ground is made out and I dismiss it. Ground 8 - Failure to engage adequately with situational risk factors and the expert formulation of Professor McGuire[46]The ground states that the panel failed to adequately engage with the "situational" formulation provided by the prisoner appointed psychologist.[47]This ground does not properly reflect the decision as a whole, which engaged with the evidence of both psychologists. The panel directly referenced the differing risk factors found by the two psychologist witnesses, and acknowledged that both viewpoints could be valid. They explained their view that the attitudes and personality traits of the Applicant were contributory factors which went beyond the circumstances of his relationship with the victim, explaining why they preferred the expert formulation of the prison appointed psychologist. There is nothing in this ground and I dismiss it. Ground 9 - Misleading, inconsistent and inaccurate evidence by the COM which was relied upon by the Panel and preferred over the other professional witnesses[48]This ground is formed on wider criticisms of the COM and does not indicate any irrationality in the decision. The Applicant was legally represented at the oral hearing and had the opportunity to present his case and challenge any perceived deficiencies in the evidence of the COM.[49]There is nothing to suggest that the Applicant did not have a fair and just hearing, with the panel hearing from each of the witnesses and assessing the evidence in the dossier as well as listening to the representations made by his legal representative. There is no evidence the panel relied solely upon the COM and preferred it in every aspect as the ground suggests, with the decision reflecting the reasons and conclusions the panel drew from the entirety of the evidence. I am satisfied there is no irrationality established and I dismiss this ground. Ground 10 - Failure to put a central concern to the Applicant before concluding against him[50]It is said that a procedural unfairness arises from the observation of the panel in the decision that "it was not clear whether he understood what he would need to do if he faced the inevitable difficulties within any relationship or perceived his partner to be cheating" , as this was a question never directly put to the Applicant.[51]The panel's cited observation followed the finding of the panel that the Applicant "lacks insight into his behaviour and relies much too heavily on an explanation based on his mental health". I am more than satisfied that the Applicant had the opportunity directly during the oral hearing to address the central concerns of ongoing risks in relationships and insight. The observation of the panel that his understanding was unclear is their reflection on that evidence, and is not properly characterised as a central concern which was not 'put' as a question to the Applicant. There is nothing here to suggest that there was a procedural unfairness and I dismiss this ground. Ground 11 - Failure to adequately direct progress on the Skills for Relationships Toolkit[52]This ground claims that there is a procedural unfairness as the panel failed to 'direct' the progress of the Applicant on the 'Skills for Relationships Toolkit' which was proposed for him. This ground misunderstands the role of a panel of the Parole Board, which is not to direct sentence planning. In its concluding paragraph the panel did observe that the next panel may benefit from updates on the 'Skills for Relationships' sessions, but it did not (and cannot) direct this work to take place. There is therefore nothing in this ground and I dismiss it. Ground 12 - Failure to apply anxious scrutiny[53]This ground is a generic rearguing of the Applicant's application for release. It is claimed that the panel failed to give a fair review by not adjourning or directing further evidence, given their reliance upon the evidence of the COM.[54]The Applicant did not seek an adjournment or the direction of further evidence at the oral hearing. The reports of the COM were contained in the dossier that the Applicant had in advance of the hearing and he had the opportunity to challenge her live evidence at the oral hearing. This ground has no evidential basis and I dismiss it. Decision[55]For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational or procedurally unfair and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. Angharad Davies 18 May 2026