Woolger, Application for Reconsideration by, [2025] PBRA 275 (16 December 2025) [2025] PBRA 275

PBRA
Woolger, Application for Reconsideration by, [2025] PBRA 275 (16 December 2025)
[2025] PBRA 275 · 2025-10-14
[1]This is an application by Woolger (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of the Parole Board (following an oral hearing on 14 th October 2025) dated the 20 th October 2025 not to direct his release.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2024) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair. This is an eligible case, and the application was made in time.[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are:a. The dossier now containing 1011 pages including the decision, the subject of this application.b. Grounds of appeal submitted on the Applicant's behalf by his legal representative. Request for Reconsideration[4]The application for reconsideration is dated 29 th October 2025.[5]The grounds for seeking a reconsideration are as follows:
"This application is made on dual bases that firstly, the decision refusing to grant [the Applicant] release ("the Decision") is irrational and, secondly, was made in a procedurally unfair way. Each basis of challenge is addressed under a respective subheading however, there are several grounds in respect of the first basis of challenge, but only one in respect of the second. "
We consider it may assist to provide our summary understanding of the decision before detailing the grounds of challenge. We have not included a summary of the applicable law, it being borne in mind the reader is likely to be familiar with the same. For clarity, we refer to [the Applicant's] parole dossier throughout this document. References to his dossier are references to the dossier version 54. This has 1011 pages excluding the index. Page number references are references to this dossier. "The Decision The decision extends to 20-plus pages in length. The following is not intended to represent an exhaustive rehearsal of its contents. It is a summary of what appear to us to be the material reasons for the decision that was made not to release [the Applicant]. "Reference is made to [the Applicant's] continuing minimisation of his offending. [1] "The panel gave weight to the "punitive and controlling, rape-related thoughts that it is recorded [the Applicant] had" prior to his offending. [2] The panel placed great weight on the fact that [the Applicant] committed the second of his sexual offences whilst on life licence for offending of that nature, having undertaken risk reduction work. "The panel found that [the Applicant's] evidence at the hearing was significantly shallow in his level of insight and his anticipation of how risk may recur. "The panel intimate that [the Applicant's] plans to stay single in the future are shallow or unrealistic, whereas he had "placed greatest protective weight" on these. "The panel placed weight on the fact that [the Applicant] had allegedly not been honest about a terminated relationship with a former partner, "SB". "The panel placed weight on an incident dating to mid-2024 which they found to be offence-paralleling but apparently allowing credit for [the Applicant's] bad health at the time. It is remarked by the panel that this caused [the Applicant's] then [Prison Offender Manager] POM and [Community Offender Manager] COM considerable concern. "The panel note that [the Applicant] had since engaged in work but the psychologist facilitating had observations/reservations about it. "It is further said, in respect of the unanimous recommendations for '[the Applicant's] release, that:
"4.10. The professionals giving evidence to the panel latterly and offering their professional opinions supporting release, have begun their work with him relatively recently and acknowledged that they had not explored [the Applicant's] history afresh or sought to analyse risk in any depth." "
The panel noted there had been concerns raised at a MAPPA review in March 2025. "Irrationality grounds "Ground 1: Minimisation of offending "We recall as a starting point that it was held by the European Court on Human Rights in James, Wells and Lee v The United Kingdom, that "... with the passage of time, the link between the initial conviction and a later deprivation of liberty gradually becomes less strong. [...] the causal link required by sub-paragraph (a) might eventually be broken if a position were reached in which a decision not to release or to re-detain was based on grounds that were inconsistent with the objectives of the initial decision by the sentencing court or on an assessment that was unreasonable in terms of those objectives". [3] "During the hearing, [the Applicant] was asked about the second offence, conviction date [ ], and said that he disputed the sexual element of it. He accepts responsibility for his other offending, and for the non-sexual elements of the second offence. "We submit it is incorrect to cast this evidence as evidence of "minimisation". It is maintenance of innocence in respect of a single aspect of a single offence. [The Applicant] has accepted his guilty verdict in a separate sexual offence, conviction date [ ], and did so at the hearing. "In support of this submission, we note the report of [psychologist FW] of November 2018, which states:
"Extreme Minimisation or Denial refers to "the failure to admit to or accept responsibility for acts of sexual violence and consequences of those acts"; this can include projecting blame elsewhere and onto the victims themselves (RSVP Manual). Based upon, [the Applicant's] presentation in interview, there does not appear to be current any evidence of minimisation or denial of sexual offending with regards to the offences against [Ms C]. During interview, [the Applicant] accepted that he had sexually assaulted her, and that he had done so deliberately to cause her the most harm possible. "
In contrast, [the Applicant] continues to maintain that he did not harm and had no intention to physically or sexually harm [Ms S]. He maintained his innocence of this, and indicated that it had been her behaviour which was responsible for the conflict within their relationship." "Casting [the Applicant's] evidence regarding the conviction against [Ms S] as minimisation, to which the panel had regard in making their decision, is irrational. In our respectful submission, it mischaracterises his evidence both specifically and generally. It mischaracterises his evidence specifically, in that this evidence is properly described as his maintaining innocence and not minimising offence. It also mischaracterises his evidence generally, in that it fails to take account of the responsibility [the Applicant] has taken over his offending other than in relation to [Ms S]. "Accordingly, the decision is vitiated by irrationality insofar and to the extent that the decision draws in support alleged minimisation by [the Applicant]. The decision does in fact draw support in this regard because it reads:
"The starting point and continuing reference point for the panel must be the strikingly violent episodes summarised in #1.1 (above), including either serious sexual harm, as on the first occasion, or the intention to cause that, in the second instance. The circumstances of that episode, reflected in [the Applicant's] conviction, belie his continuing minimising claim that the crime was 'just affray' ." "
Ground 2: Shallow Evidence of Insight "It is submitted that the Panel's reliance in making their decision, in finding that [the Applicant] lacks insight, is irrational. In our respectful submission, it is irrational because it flies in the face of the wider evidence. In specific, we submit, firstly, it irrationally conflates oral hearing performance with real-life performance and, secondly, it fails to give any or appropriate weight to the positive evidence to the contrary, that [the Applicant] does indeed have sound insight. Each is addressed in turn. "Failure to situate the evidence "The Decision, in making the findings about insight, reads:
"While fully recognising that oral hearings pose a challenge to prisoners in giving of their best in that respect, also heeding the parallel experience of how he or she has responded in interviews with professionals". [4] "
However, if the Decision was appropriately allocating weight to the fact of oral hearing performance being other than usual, it would not have ascribed weight to this finding. No mention is made of the finding of professionals who know [the Applicant] outside of oral hearings (per [psychologist M]):
"Additionally, and following previous feedback from [POM R], that [the Applicant] does not present himself well during oral hearings, we discussed the reason for this and how he might apply his learning in this context." "
Furthermore, he does not help himself as he tends to say what he is thinking. [The Applicant] said that he gets frustrated with himself as when he is asked a question, he struggles to find the right words, noting that this had become worse since suffering his latest stroke, and the impact of the restricted blood flow to his brain." [5] "At the previous hearing in December 2024, [psychologist K] had said in evidence that [the Applicant] is able to articulate himself better in his interviews than 'today' (the date of the oral hearing. "Not only is it the opinion of professionals that [the Applicant's] presentation at oral hearings is other than as it is normally, there is also medical evidence that the decision fails to grapple with. The dossier documents that [the Applicant] is in poor health, and [KH], from the Healthcare department, said in evidence at the last oral hearing, in December 2024, that people with diabetes can become irritable and low in mood. "At the previous, part-completed, hearing, [the Applicant] was asked extensive questions. The Decision does not take account of this fact, nor the quality of [the Applicant's] responses to those questions. "We therefore submit the decision is irrational in that it does not at all, or adequately, situate the evidence at the hearing with the wider picture. There is no reference to the feedback of [POM R], [POM M], [KH] or [the Applicant's] evidence at the previous hearing. "Failure to take proper, or any, account of evidence to the contrary "In the psychological case advice note ("PCA-N") one notes that:
"The most recent psychological risk assessment (dated 29.11.2018) recommended additional 1:1 work to provide scope to address outstanding core risk areas and to offer opportunity for targeted consolidation of previous learning." "[Psychologist M] completed a number of sessions of 1-to-1 psychological intervention sessions with [the Applicant]. Her evidence at the hearing was that she was satisfied that he has met his aims. She said they had come as far as they can with him. She further said that he does understand and have insight into grievance thinking. Her evidence in respect of his insight into grievance thinking was not qualified. It was that he has it and that he has successfully completed, even exhausted, his 1:1 work. "
The same sort of evidence on this topic is found within her report:
"I found him to be reflective and note that he had a good recall of the skills he has learned during previous interventions and that in the main, this latest work has served as a refresher for him. [The Applicant] would now benefit from continuing to practise these in the course of his everyday life and discussing these with his POM and COM during supervision sessions." [6] "
A further psychologist was involved in providing evidence and a recommendation to the Parole Board, [psychologist K]. She had of [the Applicant's] insight:
"Overall, [the Applicant] has developed the necessary insight and skills for risk management, [...]" [7] "
There was a part-heard hearing on 2 December 2024, at which [the Applicant's] then-COM said that [the Applicant] has a reasonable insight into his risk factors, despite not recommending his release at that time. "No, or inadequate, account is taken of these contrary opinions or views within the Decision, as it relates to offender insight. It fails to grapple with them. In failing to take proper or any account of inconsistent evidence, the decision is irrational. It does so, respectfully, in that it makes a finding that is inconsistent with the evidence. "Ground 3: [SB] The Decision is further vitiated by irrationality insofar as it holds that [the Applicant] was not being open and honest with professionals about his relationship with [SB] ("SB"). "The dossier contains extensive references to a SB. We note the following:
"During a previous interview (13/03/13) [the Applicant] stated that he had once lived with [SB] for a period of eighteen months. I understand that this relationship ended in December 2012 at [SB's] request; she cited ill-health, which was being impacted upon by the stress of conducting a relationship with someone in prison." [8] "[The Applicant] indicated that the relationship with [SB] commenced after his recall but has since ended. Unlike [Ms S], whom he had come to know through her position as a prison visitor, [the Applicant] reported that he had known [SB] for many years, and that it was a rekindling of a relationship from the past. [The Applicant] reported that he is currently single and does not foresee entering into another intimate relationship." [9] "
Indeed, [the Applicant] has been interviewed about his relationships and disclosed these to professionals. Speaking about relationships is usually standard for psychological risk assessments we understand. "We know of no information within the dossier which is inconsistent with what [the Applicant] said of SB at the oral hearing, namely that the two were in a relationship until 4 or 5 years ago. He had disclosed his relationship to professionals. They were no longer in contact and [the Applicant] had no intention to ever contact her again because the memories they had shared were enough. He has never offended against [SB]. To the extent that they were in contact it was monitored (letters coming into prison get opened unless legally privileged). "That [the Applicant] had not been open and honest with professionals regarding [SB] is irrational. It is irrational because it is inconsistent with the evidence. However, given that the decision relies upon this alleged dishonesty or opaque quality in reaching its Decision, it is seriously flawed. That is to say, the Decision, we submit, is in defiance of logic (it counters the evidence). "Ground 4: mid-2024 Incident "We challenge the decision on irrationality grounds where it places weight on an incident from mid-2024, involving Governor [G], but ignores surrounding evidence. An account of this incident is given at [???] and [the Applicant] accepts this summary. "At the hearing, [psychologist M] was asked about how a psychologist would contextualise this incident. She said that this incident was a lapse. She described the incident as part of the process of change. [Psychologist M] is a senior registered forensic psychologist. "No account is taken within the decision of the way in which the situation was dealt with afterwards:
"After some further debate in which [the Applicant] was encouraged to reflect on the situation more objectively, he conceded that his actions in both cases were unfair and inappropriate, and so agreed that he would apologise to Officer [T] and Governor [G]. I understand that he spoke with them although this would appear to have been more about wanting to "draw a line in the sand" and move forward more positively. [The Applicant] said that he had said to Officer [T], "
We ok?", whilst giving him "the thumbs up". Governor [G] reported similarly. I imagine that this would have been quite difficult for [the Applicant] but there is evidence that he sought to redress his previous behaviours to some degree." [10] "Instead, the decision casts the incident in the following way (absent any regard to the foregoing mitigation or extenuation):
"[...] his recent poor self-control in face of perceived grievance in mid-2024 (#2.13 and #2.15) must be considered prima facie to be offence-paralleling to a degree, due allowance being made for the health worries he was then experiencing. This had caused his then POM and COM considerable concern (#3.11)." "
The incident dates to mid-2024, over a year ago. [The Applicant] had 2 oral hearings within the intervening period. To the extent the Decision relies on this incident in making a no release decision, we submit it is irrational. "Ground 5: Work with the psychologist "The panel held, in a way material to their decision, that [the Applicant] had engaged in work but the psychologist facilitating it had reservations about the work. We submit this finding is materially flawed and irrational. In short, it was not a finding open to the Panel on the evidence, for the following reasons. "The psychologist in question is [psychologist M]. She has two reports within the dossier - at [373], her original report, and [594] which is a memorandum, and [786]. She also gave evidence at both hearings. "We summarise her opinion on the work [the Applicant] had completed as follows, with reference to the evidence in the dossier: - "At no point did he demonstrate any reluctance or resistance to undertaking the work; furthermore, [the Applicant] presented as enthusiastic and engaged throughout, which is to his credit." [11] - "[The Applicant] has engaged well during this course of individual work, which is to his credit. I found him to be reflective and note that he had a good recall of the skills he has learned during previous interventions and that in the main, this latest work has served as a refresher for him." [12] - "[The Applicant] indicated his willingness to engage in additional work with me and to his credit was always prompt to attend sessions. As before, he engaged well and with encouragement was able to reflect more openly on past events." [13] - "Based upon the above, I do not feel that [the Applicant] would benefit from attending further sessions as he is able to recall and identify a range of skills he might use when faced with challenging situations." [14] "At the reconvened hearing, [psychologist M] gave evidence that she had come as far as she could with [the Applicant]. And that he had met his treatment aims. She had no concerns about his ability to retain learning, nor about his commitment to change. It is submitted that any rational interpretation of [psychologist M's] evidence, particularly at the reconvened hearing, was that [the Applicant] had completed his risk reduction work and was suitable for release now. "In view of the above, we firmly submit that to characterise [psychologist M] as harbouring reservations about the further intervention work is a mischaracterisation. It is not a characterisation, we submit, available to a Panel within the bounds of rationality. We therefore submit this finding is irrational, not sustained on the evidence, and materially flawed. That it was relied upon in the Panel's material reasoning materially undermines the Panel's decision. In view of it the decision is flawed and ought to be overturned. "Ground 6: Qualification of Professional Recommendations "The Decision qualifies or adjusts the significance of the unanimous support for release in this case. It states that the professionals giving evidence to the panel "latterly" have begun work with him relatively recently. It is said that they had acknowledged that they had "not explored his history afresh" or sought to analyse risk "in any depth". We submit this is irrational again amounting to a false rendering of the evidence. "We note the following in terms of each professionals involvement in this case: - [Psychologist M] first met [the Applicant] on 12 June 2023, over 2 years ago. [15] He first attended 7 one-to-one sessions with her. She attended 4 more sessions with him at a later date. She then went on to attend 2 oral hearings with him. There is nothing in this process which suggests she had not conducted an in depth review of the case. - [Psychologist K] not only read [the Applicant's] full dossier, but also his case notes which mark his daily interactions with staff, and conducted a 4.5 hour interview with [the Applicant], in order to inform her first report. In terms of her second report, [psychologist K] again reviewed his full parole dossier and PNOMIS case notes, and then carried out a 2 hour addendum risk assessment interview. There is nothing in this process which suggests she had not conducted an in depth review of the case. - [POM G] inherited the case on 14 May 2025 due to the absence of [the Applicant's] previous POM [POM R]. He had two appointments with [the Applicant] between allocation and the hearing. [POM R], the previous POM, had attended the prior hearing in December 2024. She had been allocated his case on 15 February 2023. This means she had managed his case for a period of 21 months. - [COM D] had been involved in the management of the case since at least 27 February 2025. "It is true that the "latter" witnesses, [POM G] and [COM D], had been seized of the case for shorter period of time, emphasising this is in our case irrational. It is contrary to reason we submit to emphasise the brief involvement of some witnesses, but ignore the longer and more detailed involvement of other witnesses. [Psychologist M] and [Psychologist K] have had a longer involvement in the case - particularly [psychologist M]. The decision letter points to shorter involvement of [POM G] and [COM D] but is silent on the longer and more meaningful involvement of the two psychologists involved in the case. We submit this is irrational. Even if some professionals were newer to the case, that fact does not undermine professional recommendations for release, since the recommendations were unanimous, including from professionals with longer involvement in the case. "In any event, it is standard practice that professionals consider the parole dossier before attending an oral hearing. In this case the dossier runs to over 1000 pages of detailed reports, old and new, and risk related information. It cannot be rational to suggest that professional witnesses are not prepared to give sound recommendations in cases in which they have read the dossier, bearing in ming they have extensive forensic knowledge and skill to be so qualified. "The panel placed weight on the fact that there was a MAPPA review in March 2025. Significantly, unlike in the case of the professionals in the case, there is no reference in the decision to the MAPPA attendees' level of interaction with, or knowledge of, the offender. "Procedural fairness ground "Ground 1: Improper Chair Comments "Although we do not retain a written record of this part of the hearing, we are instructed that at the hearing of 2 December 2024, the Chair had concluded the hearing telling [the Applicant] that the Panel were looking towards release. We submit such indications from a Panel are bound to raise an expectation that is procedurally improper. The Panel are free to make a decision either way (provided it is rational and procedurally fair) and to provide a provisional reassurance or indication creates an expectation that is inappropriate and improper. It should be noted that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. [16] We submit panels ought not give indications of their intended decisions before handing down a decision letter. "In this case an indication was given, we are instructed, at a part-heard hearing. [The Applicant] was given an expectation that he was likely to be freed by the panel. This was improper and procedurally unfair. "Ground 2: Misinformation "The decision is vitiated by factual inaccuracy. "At the hearing, we understand the Chair to have said that [the Applicant] had been on 5 RORs. In fact he had been on 10; and was working full time in a farm shop in the community. The chair expressed a belief that the number of RORs was half that of the actual figure. The Decision does not correct this factual inaccuracy. There is no reference to the number of RORs the Claimant had been on. The decision records RORs took place: 1. March 2024; 2. April 2024; 3. August 2024; 4. October 2024; 5. In late February 2025; 6. late March 2025; 7. early May 2025; 8. mid June 2025; 9. mid July 2025. These are entered at separate locations in the decision, not collectively, evidencing there was a misunderstanding as to the number of RORs [the Applicant] had undertaken. "Conclusion "In conclusion, we submit the decision is fundamentally flawed by virtue of irrationality and procedural fairness." Background[6]The index offences were offences of rape, false imprisonment, indecent assault and threatening to kill for which he received life sentences in 1997, and affray and an offence under Section 62 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in 2007. In 2005 he had been released on licence and in 2007 recalled following the commission of the sexual offence that year. Current parole review[7]The Applicant is now 67. In July 2022 his case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State for Justice. In July 2024 a hearing was adjourned because the Applicant was then in hospital. In December 2024 the case was heard by the panel and evidence taken from all the witnesses - including the Applicant - but adjourned again "to enable the risk management plan to be further developed". Following further adjournments the panel reconvened on 14 th October 2025. The panel declined to direct the Applicant's release but recommended that he should continue to be held in open conditions.[8]At the hearing in December 2024 the panel heard evidence from a POM, two psychologists, a Heath Care worker and a COM who "stood in" for the Applicant's then COM.[9]At the hearing in October 2025 the panel heard again from one of the psychologists and the Health Care worker, a different POM, and a different COM from either of the two referred to in the preceding subparagraph. 10.The Applicant gave evidence to the panel at both hearings. The Applicant was represented by the same legal representative at both hearings. 11.By the time of the final hearing the dossier ran to 984 pages. The Relevant Law[12]The panel correctly set out in its decision letter dated 20 th October 2025 the test for release (and the issues to be addressed in making a recommendation to the Secretary of State for his continuing to be held in open conditions.) Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[13]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[14]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)). Irrationality 15.The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words:
" if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere"
. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality. 16.In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board 2018 EWHC 694 (Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to parole board hearings in these words at para 116:
"the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. " 17.In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board 2019 EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied"
. This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R(on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board 2022 EWHC 1282 (Admin). 18.As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J. 19.It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses. 20.Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision. In summary an applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either: (a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision; (b) they were not given a fair hearing; (c) they were not properly informed of the case against them; (d) they were prevented from putting their case properly; (e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or (f) the panel was not impartial. The overriding objective is to ensure that the applicant's case was dealt with justly. Error of law[24]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel: a) misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed; b) has no legal authority to make the decision; c) fails to fulfil a legal duty; d) exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose; e) takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or f) improperly delegates decision-making power.[25]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. Other 26.In Oyston [2000] PLR 45 , at paragraph 47 Lord Bingham said:
" It seems to me generally desirable that the Board should identify in broad terms the matters judged by the Board as pointing towards and against a continuing risk of offending and the Board's reasons for striking the balance that it does. Needless to say, the letter should summarise the considerations which have in fact led to the final decision. It would be wrong to prescribe any standard form of Decision Letter and it would be wrong to require elaborate or impeccable standards of draftsmanship. "
Reconsideration as a discretionary remedy 27.Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That means that, even if an error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness is established, the Reconsideration Member considering the case is not obliged to direct reconsideration of the panel's decision. The Reconsideration Member can decline to make such a direction having taken into account the particular circumstances of the case, the potential for a different decision to be reached by a new panel, and any delay caused by a grant of reconsideration. That discretion must of course be exercised in a way which is fair to both parties. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State 28.The Secretary of State for Justice has not submitted a response to the application. Discussion 29.Ground 1. a. I have followed the advice to reacquaint myself with the case of James, Welsh and Lee [012] ECHR 1706. The judgment is aimed at the government which created the imprisonment for public protection (IPP) sentence rather than at the Parole Board which is bound to assess the risk posed by an offender at the time of the hearing and cannot direct release because the 'system' may have failed to provide appropriate 'instructional courses' to assist the rehabilitation of the offender. b. The use of the term 'minimisation' or, as in this case, "minimising claim" , is commonplace to describe those who, while accepting responsibility for parts of their offending behaviour, deny other aspects of it. It is clear that that is what the panel intended to convey and the finding was borne out by the evidence before the panel - including that of the Applicant. The panel was bound to use the index offences and the danger they posed to intimate partners as its "starting point". 30.Ground 2. The panel's finding of "shallow evidence of insight" . The passage at 4.5 of the decision explicitly makes allowances for the stress felt by all offenders when giving their evidence at an oral hearing. In the end it is for the panel to assess the evidence given by offenders at hearings having, as this panel did, made due allowance for the stress of such proceedings. 31.Ground 3. The relationship with SB (as she is referred in the decision) is properly dealt with at paragraphs 1.7, 1.83, 2.36 and 4.7. The passage at paragraph 1.83 clearly sets out the Applicant's explanation of why he had not mentioned the relationship to SB. 32.Ground 4. The incident concerning Governor [G]. This incident - described within the dossier at pp 697-8 and 788 - was clearly a highly relevant one for the panel to consider when assessing the Applicant's possible risk to members of the public if released. Outbursts of the kind described would, if repeated outside the prison environment, present a significant risk of serious injury to anyone who the Applicant believed was in the wrong in a dispute. 33.The panel referred to this incident among others from 2024 at paragraphs 2.13-2.19. I have listened to the evidence given at the hearing concerning them by the relevant witnesses and the Applicant and find that the discussion and conclusion concerning it within the decision was rational and considered. 34.Ground 5. I have listened to the evidence given by the psychologist [M], read her reports within the dossier and noted the panel's summaries of her evidence, both written and oral, at paragraphs 2.22-2.23. Clearly the work done by [psychologist M] with the Applicant has been valuable and is likely to have reduced the risk posed by him in future. However, she did not express a view on his readiness for release. The panel took full account of her evidence which it summarised at paragraph 2.29. Her evidence therefore, while relevant, was less concerned with the possible risk of serious harm which the Applicant might present if released than with his improved understanding of what he had done and his - somewhat grudging - apology for his actions. There was no irrationality in the way the panel dealt with the evidence. The panel was bound to pay attention to the most recent MAPPA review in March 2025 at pages 878-900 of the dossier. 35.Ground 6 The question of the 'relatively recent' involvement of the professionals on the Applicant's case. The Applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1997 and to an IPP sentence in 2008 for violent offences. He will, like most prisoners serving indeterminate sentences, have been transferred between different POMs and COMs during that period. The involvement of the witnesses who gave evidence was certainly comparatively recent bearing in mind the long history of this case but by no means as recent as many of those now attending parole hearings in many cases. However the panel was entitled to consider the comparatively recent experience of the witnesses against the history of the Applicant's behaviour over the last two decades and particularly after the serious breach of life licence which had led to the IPP sentence when assessing the weight it should attach to their evidence. Procedural Unfairness grounds 36.Ground 1 As the draughter of the grounds will be well aware, whatever optimistic or pessimistic opinions may have been expressed by a parole panel member at a hearing nearly a year before the hearing under consideration for the purpose of this application can have no bearing on a decision made subsequently based on evidence much of which, including that of the offender, had not been read, let alone heard, at the time. There is nothing in this ground. 37.Ground 2 The 'factual inaccuracy' concerning resettlement overnight releases (RORs) alleged. The Applicant was represented by the same solicitors at the hearing as have submitted the grounds for reconsideration. If it had been thought relevant no doubt the mistake, if it was made, would have been corrected. The panel's decision was not based on the issue of the degree of compliance with overnight release conditions but with the broader issues set out at paragraph 4 of the decision. Decision 38.For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational or procedurally unfair and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. Sir David Calvert-Smith 16 December 2025 [1] [1006] [2] Ibid. [3] CASE OF JAMES, WELLS AND LEE v. THE UNITED KINGDOM at [189]. [4] [1007]. [5] [380]. [6] [381]. [7] [424]. [8] [931]. [9] [65]. [10] [788]. [11] [375] [12] [381]. [13] [787] [14] [789]. [15] [374]. [16] R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1923] All ER Rep 233 ; Newbound v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 677 ; Ghadami v Bloomfield [2016] EWHC 1448 (Ch)