Teall, Application for Reconsideration [2025] PBRA 271 (09 December 2025) [2025] PBRA 271

PBRA
Teall, Application for Reconsideration [2025] PBRA 271 (09 December 2025)
[2025] PBRA 271 · 2025-10-20
[1]This is an application by Teall (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision dated 20 October 2025 not to direct his release. The decision was made by a panel following an oral hearing.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) (the Parole Board Rules ) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair.[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the decision, the dossier (consisting of 398 numbered pages), and the application for reconsideration. I have also listened to an audio recording of the hearing. Background[4]On 8 August 2019, the Applicant was convicted of a number of serious sexual offences involving children and received an extended sentence consisting of eight years imprisonment followed by a four year period on extended licence together with concurrent determinate sentences and a sexual harm prevention order.[5]The Applicant was 29 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 35 years old[6]Key dates relevant to his sentence are reported to be: a) Parole eligibility date: November 2024; b) Conditional release date: July 2027; and c) Sentence expiry date: July 2031. Request for Reconsideration[7]The application for reconsideration has been submitted by solicitors on behalf of the Applicant. It argues that the decision was irrational and/or procedurally unfair.[8]The submissions are supplemented by written arguments to which reference will be made in the Discussion section below. Current Parole Review[9]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) to consider whether or not it would be appropriate to direct his release. This is the Applicant's first parole review.[10]The case proceeded to an oral hearing on 6 October 2025, before a three-member panel. The panel took oral evidence from the Applicant, the Prison Offender Manager (POM), the Community Offender Manager (COM), and a forensic psychologist commissioned by HMPPS. The Applicant was legally represented throughout the hearing.[11]The panel's primary concern was that, in its view, the Applicant had not yet developed sufficient insight into the factors that contributed to his offending or how these factors could re-emerge in the community. Although he had completed accredited work and could recall some of its concepts, the panel found limited evidence that he could apply these strategies in practice or identify meaningful early-warning signs of risk escalation. The panel also considered that key areas, such as his emotional needs, relationship patterns, and aspects of the Applicant's sexual thinking, had not been adequately explored or understood, and therefore remained outstanding contributors to his risk profile.[12]The panel went on to conclude that the Applicant's internal controls were underdeveloped and that he was not yet able to demonstrate the level of self-disclosure required for safe release. He was described as someone who had historically struggled to speak openly with professionals, and the panel considered that this pattern persisted. The panel was not persuaded that he would reliably volunteer information about thoughts or situations relevant to risk, and they regarded this as central to his safe management in the community. In its view, the absence of sexual-thinking diaries, relapse-prevention planning and other evidence of independent internalisation meant that too much of the proposed plan relied on external monitoring.[13]Although the professional witnesses supported release, the panel was not satisfied that the Applicant's risk had reduced to no more than minimal. It considered that the proposed community framework relied heavily on controls, restrictions, and surveillance, whereas the underlying causes of the Applicant's behaviour had not been sufficiently addressed. The panel concluded that these factors, taken together, meant it remained necessary for the protection of the public that the Applicant remain confined, and it therefore did not direct his release. The Relevant Law[14]The Parole Board will direct release if it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[15]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[16]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).[17]A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay [2019] PBRA 6 . Irrationality[18]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) by Lord Greene in these words:
" if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere "
. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[19]In R(DSD and others) v Parole Board [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin) the Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words (at [116]):
" the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it ."
[20]In R(Wells) v Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was " to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied ". This test was adopted by the Divisional Court in R(Secretary of State for Justice) v Parole Board [2022] EWHC 1282 (Admin).[21]As was made clear by Saini J in Wells, this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.[22]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.[23]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness[24]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.[25]In summary an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;(b) they were not given a fair hearing;(c) they were not properly informed of the case against them;(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly; and/or(e) the panel was not impartial.[26]The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant's case was dealt with justly. The reply on behalf of the Respondent[27]The Respondent has advised that no representations will be submitted in response to this application. Discussion[28]The Applicant argues that the panel's decision was procedurally unfair and/or irrational.[29]Paragraph 2.13 of the decision states: Of particular concern to the Panel was [the Applicant's] response to being asked who he found attractive. He mentioned the actress Gal Gadot but also the actress Hilary Duff. The latter became famous as a teen star for younger audiences; her physical resemblance was to a pubescent girl. This indicated to the Panel that [the Applicant] may have an ongoing sexual attraction to similar girls and a lack of insight into his own risk factors.[30]It is submitted that the Applicant was asked who an " ideal person " for him would be, but there were no follow up questions exploring areas such as when he became attracted to the actresses he named, which films he had seen them in or when he watched such films. Although it is accepted that Hilary Duff had played roles as a teenager, she is now 38 years old and continues to appear in film and television. The Applicant disputes the conclusion reached by the panel on this point, and it is submitted that this was a question asked with disguised assumptions. In short it is argued that this question was a trap, rather than a genuine enquiry into the Applicant's outlook or his current sexual thinking.[31]I have listened to the audio recording of the hearing, the relevant part of which is transcribed as follows: Panel chair (PC): In your mind, what would you describe - you know - what sort of woman (or man) would you find attractive, what would they be like, ideal person? Applicant (A): Ideal person, six foot, blonde hair. PC: In the context of a celebrity maybe - who would you find attractive? A: Gal Gadot. Hilary Duff. Couple of 'em. PC: OK, all right. Thank you, I have no more questions for you.[32]Immediately beforehand, the Applicant was asked about his understanding of healthy sexual thinking: Panel chair (PC): What would you describe as healthy sexual thinking? Applicant (A): If you're going to be thinking of sex, make sure it's an age-appropriate person, for starters, make sure that what you're watching is legal, if you've got something on your mind keep it on your mind, if you think it's something that needs help talk to someone about it. There are some other bits in here that I've written.[33]The Applicant then referred to a written list of pointers that he finds helpful to refresh his mind, particularly as he finds it difficult to speak sometimes.[34]As a start point, rule 24(2)(b) permits a panel to ask any question to satisfy itself of the level of risk of a prisoner. Therefore, there is nothing inherently unlawful about the questions asked by the panel chair.[35]However, I note that there is nothing in the panel's analysis that refers to the Applicant's evidence about his initial preference for an ideal person who was six feet tall (and therefore highly unlikely to be a young girl), nor his articulation (albeit assisted by notes) of what constituted healthy sexual thinking. This gives rise to concerns about imbalanced treatment of the evidence in order to support the panel's conclusion which differed from that of the professional witnesses.[36]Moreover, there is an unevidenced leap of logic from the Applicant naming Hilary Duff as a celebrity that he found attractive to a conclusion of an ongoing sexual attraction to pubescent girls and a lack of insight into risk. Of course, the panel's conclusion on this point may be correct, but without further exploration by questioning, it could not be certain. Moreover, no consideration was given to the alternative of Gal Gadot put forward by the Applicant (who appears to have achieved mainstream fame in her late 20s/early 30s). In my view, the line of questioning was concluded at the moment that the Applicant named a former child star without further explanation. Having listened to the hearing carefully, I agree with the submission that the question either was, or felt like, a trap, which renders it and the conclusions drawn from it inherently procedurally unfair. This is not to impugn the panel's intentions, but to recognise that fairness requires questioning to be conducted in a way that does not inadvertently predetermine the significance of an answer without an opportunity for response.[37]Even if the panel's inference might ultimately be correct, procedural fairness required that it be put to the Applicant, so he had a fair opportunity to respond, particularly because the point subsequently became central to the panel's rejection of unanimous professional evidence.[38]Moreover, the unevidenced leap of logic to which I have already referred renders that part of the panel's reasoning irrational. Nothing in the decision explains how or why the Applicant's reference to Gal Gadot, or his initial description of an adult partner of mature stature, was not equally relevant to the panel's analysis. The selective treatment of the evidence reinforces the irrationality of the conclusion.[39]I therefore find the decision not to direct the Applicant's release to be both procedurally unfair and irrational.[40]This is sufficient for the application for reconsideration to be granted. However, for completeness I will deal briefly with the other submissions made on the Applicant's behalf.[41]It is also submitted that the expectation that the Applicant should or would be aware of the term 'emotional congruence' was procedurally unfair. A careful reading of the decision at para. 2.11 shows that the Applicant had not heard the term 'emotional congruence' but it does not link this lack of knowledge to its finding that this was not an area which had been properly explored by professionals. The mere fact that a prisoner does not understand a technical term does not of itself render a decision unfair; what matters is whether the panel relied on that misunderstanding to draw an adverse inference. Paragraph 2.11 shows that it did not.[42]This submission therefore fails.[43]It is further submitted that the panel's criticism of the Applicant's understanding of the proposed licence conditions was unfair. The licence condition in question related to non-contact with children and the Applicant stated that he would like to be in contact with his nephew and his uncle's children. The decision notes that the Applicant understood he might be restricted in terms of contact but hoped to speak with them on the telephone. The panel concluded that this indicated the Applicant may not understand his licence conditions, how they relate to risk and why they would be necessary.[44]While this is argued under the heading of procedural unfairness as the Applicant was prevented from putting his case properly (which I do not find), I do consider that the panel's conclusion on this point was unsupported by the evidence and therefore irrational. The Applicant understood that he might be restricted in terms of contact and the licence condition not only exactly such a restriction, but also that contact may be permitted by the supervising officer. A panel is entitled to test a prisoner's understanding of risk boundaries. It is not entitled to conclude that he lacks such understanding in the absence of firm evidence.[45]Finally, it is submitted that the panel's disagreement with the proposed risk management plan was so unreasonable as to amount to irrationality. Although the panel put forward its reasons for disagreeing with the professional opinions of witnesses (as it is perfectly entitled to do), I have already found that analysis was based on unfair and irrational findings on material risk-related matters, which renders the entire decision irrational. Because the panel's evaluation of the risk management plan was inseparable from the flawed reasoning already identified, its ultimate conclusion cannot be regarded as rationally sustainable. Decision[46]For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied that the panel's decision was both irrational and procedurally unfair. The application for reconsideration is therefore granted. Stefan Fafinski 9 December 2025