Greaney, Application for Reconsideration [2025] PBRA 258 (26 November 2025) [2025] PBRA 258

PBRA
Greaney, Application for Reconsideration [2025] PBRA 258 (26 November 2025)
[2025] PBRA 258 · 2025-10-27
[1]This is an application by Greaney (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of an oral hearing panel dated the 27 October 2025 the decision was not to direct release.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2024) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair. This is an eligible case, and the application was made in time.[3]I have considered the application on the papers and an audio recording of the hearing. The papers are the dossier, the application for reconsideration drafted by the Applicant's legal adviser and the representations by the Secretary of State (the Respondent). Request for Reconsideration[4]The application for reconsideration is dated 5 November 2025.[5]The grounds for seeking a reconsideration are set out below. The application was in a narrative form. I have attempted to reflect the various grounds below. Background[6]The Applicant is serving a sentence of life imprisonment for the offences of murder and of wounding contrary to S18. The circumstances of the murder were a dispute in the street. The Applicant had been taking crack cocaine and alcohol. A friend of the Applicant had been injured in an initial altercation. Later the Applicant returned to the scene and called out the victim. The Applicant had armed himself with a large knife. When the victim stepped from his home the Applicant fatally stabbed the victim in the chest and a second victim in the thigh. The Applicant was 23 years old when sentenced. He was 46 years old at the time of the oral hearing. On 25 January 2017 the Applicant was released on licence by the Parole Board. He was recalled on 22 December 2024 following an incident which is detailed below. Current parole review[7]The Respondent referred the Applicant to the Parole Board to consider whether there should be a direction for release. If not a direction for release the Parole Board were requested to consider whether there should be a recommendation for transfer to an open prison.[8]The panel hearing took place on 24 October 2025. The panel consisted of an independent Parole Board chair and a further judicial member of the Parole Board. Evidence was given at the hearing by the Community Offender Manager (COM) and the Prison Offender Manager (POM). The Applicant was legally represented at the hearing. The Relevant Law[9]The panel correctly sets out in its decision letter dated 27 October 2025 the test for release and the issues to be addressed in making a recommendation to the Secretary of State for a progressive move to open conditions. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[10]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[11]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).[12]A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay [2019] PBRA 6 . Irrationality[13]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words " if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere". The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[14]In R(DSD and others) -v- the Parole Board 2018 EWHC 694 (Admin) a Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words at para 116 "the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. "[15]In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board 2019 EWHC 2710 (Admin ) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R (on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board 2022 EWHC 1282 (Admin).[16]As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in Parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.[17]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.[18]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness[19]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.[20]In summary an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;(b) they were not given a fair hearing;(c) they were not properly informed of the case against them;(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or(f) the panel was not impartial.[21]The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant's case was dealt with justly. Error of law[22]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel: a) misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed; b) has no legal authority to make the decision; c) fails to fulfil a legal duty; d) exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose; e) takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or f) improperly delegates decision-making power.[23]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. Other[24]The test to be applied when considering the question of transfer to open conditions is the subject of a well-established line of authorities going back to R (Hill) v Parole Board [2011] EWHC 809 (Admin) and including R (Rowe) v Parole Board [2013] EWHC 3838 (Admin) , R (Hutt) v Parole Board [2018] EWHC 1041 (Admin) . The test for transfer to open conditions is different from the test for release on licence and the two decisions must be approached separately and the correct test applied in each case. The panel must identify the factors which have led it to make its decision. The criteria are now set out in the Secretary of State's Directions to the Parole Board of the 1 August 2023.[25]Before recommending the transfer of a prisoner to open conditions, the Parole Board must consider all information before it, including any written or oral evidence obtained by the Board and whether the following criteria are met: · the prisoner has made sufficient progress during the sentence in addressing and reducing risk to a level consistent with protecting the public from harm (in circumstances where the prisoner in open conditions may be in the community, unsupervised under licensed temporary release); and · the prisoner is assessed as presenting a low risk of abscond.[26]The Parole Board must recommend a move to open conditions only where it is satisfied that the two criteria are met.[27]In Oyston [2000] PLR 45 , at paragraph 47 Lord Bingham said:
" It seems to me generally desirable that the Board should identify in broad terms the matters judged by the Board as pointing towards and against a continuing risk of offending and the Board's reasons for striking the balance that it does. Needless to say, the letter should summarise the considerations which have in fact led to the final decision. It would be wrong to prescribe any standard form of Decision Letter and it would be wrong to require elaborate or impeccable standards of draftsmanship. "
[28]R (on the application of Pearce and another) (Respondents) v Parole Board of England and Wales (Appellant) [2023] UKSC 13 . Summary of paragraph 87 of the judgement:
"87. We summarise our conclusions as follows: "(i) There is no general legal rule that in making a risk assessment the Board must adopt a two-stage process of making findings of fact on the balance of probabilities and then treating only those matters on which it has made findings of fact as relevant to the assessment of risk. "(ii) The Board's task is to address whether the safety of members of the public requires that the prisoner should remain confined. In so doing, the Board must have regard to the consequences of its decision on the interests of the prisoner, and the hardship he may suffer if he no longer needs to be confined in order to protect the public. "(iii) There is no rule of substantive fairness, akin to a legitimate expectation, which requires the Board to have regard only to found facts in its assessment of risk. "(iv) What procedural fairness requires of the Board in its impartial performance of its statutory remit is determined by the statutory terms of that remit and the wider legal context of the common law. "(v) If weight is to be given to an allegation of criminal or other misbehaviour in the risk assessment, the Board should first attempt to investigate the facts to enable it to make findings on the truthfulness of the allegation. If, as may often be the case despite its efforts to obtain the needed information, the Board is not able to make such a finding, it should investigate the facts to make findings as to the surrounding circumstances of the allegation which may or may not point to behaviour by the prisoner which is relevant to the assessment of risk. "(vi) In some circumstances, however, the Board may not be able to make findings of fact as to the truth of an allegation either because of an inability to obtain sufficiently reliable evidence or because it would be unfair to expect the prisoner to give an answer to the allegation when he is facing criminal or prison disciplinary proceedings in relation to that allegation. "(vii) In such circumstances the Board, having regard to public safety, may take into account the allegation or allegations and give it or them such weight as it considers appropriate in a holistic assessment of all the information before it, where it is concerned that there is a serious possibility that those allegations may be true. But the Board must proceed with considerable caution in this exercise because of the consequences of its decision on the prisoner. Procedural fairness requires the Board to give the prisoner the opportunity to make submissions about how the Board ought to proceed. There may be circumstances where, because of the inadequacy of the information available to the Board, it concludes that it should not take account of an allegation at all. There may also be circumstances where the information is less than would be desired but the allegation causes sufficient concern as to risk that the Board treats it as relevant. Its assessment of the weight to be attached to an allegation is subject to the constraints of public law rationality. "(viii) Thus, a failure to make findings of fact where it was reasonably practicable to do so or an irrational reliance on insubstantial allegations could be a ground of a successful public law challenge."
Reconsideration as a discretionary remedy[29]Reconsideration is a discretionary remedy. That means that, even if an error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness is established, the Reconsideration Member considering the case is not obliged to direct reconsideration of the panel's decision. The Reconsideration Member can decline to make such a direction having taken into account the particular circumstances of the case, the potential for a different decision to be reached by a new panel, and any delay caused by a grant of reconsideration. That discretion must of course be exercised in a way which is fair to both parties. The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State.[30]The Respondent offered no representations. Grounds and Discussion Ground 1[31]The Applicant's legal adviser notes that a hearing which was scheduled for 29 September 2025 was adjourned on Friday, 26 September and that no representations were invited from the Applicant or his legal adviser. Discussion[32]It is a matter of both courtesy and fairness that parties to a Parole Board hearing should have the opportunity to make representations in relation to any adjournment. Panel chairs are urged by the Parole Board to ensure that every effort is made to allow parties to submit their views particularly if an adjournment is happening after a lengthy wait by a prisoner. In this case however I note that efforts were made to secure the material, which was necessary for the oral hearing, up until a few days before the hearing date was scheduled. When that material did not arrive by the Friday before the hearing on the following Monday the panel chair clearly took the decision to adjourn. It is clear that there would not have been sufficient time to secure representations from the parties. The alternative would have been to list a hearing which would not have been effective and would have taken the time of a number of witnesses and the parties themselves. This is not an issue which engages reconsideration however the principle of ensuring that notice is given to parties before decisions are made, particularly in relation to adjournment, is entirely reasonable and accepted by the Board. Ground 2[33]It is submitted by the Applicant's legal adviser that one of the members of the Parole Board panel (who was a judicial member) explained to the Applicant the standard of proof which is applicable to allegations in Parole Board hearings. It is also submitted that the judicial member explained that the standard of proof in criminal proceedings is different. The complaint is that these explanations were a " conflation of legal standards " and were inappropriate and may have influenced the panel's approach to the assessment of risk. It is further suggested that the tone and content of the explanation suggested a " judicial mindset " which was more suited to criminal matters than to parole. Discussion[34]The context of this submission was that a fundamental part of this Parole Board hearing was an analysis of an incident which led to the Applicant's recall to prison. The Applicant, as noted above, had been recalled following an incident. The incident was said to involve an attack by the Applicant which caused injury to another man. The incident occurred outside a public house after the Applicant had been attending a party organised by his employer. The police had investigated the matter. They had gathered various comments and allegations from the parties. The police file was available on the dossier, as were some video clips. The matter did not proceed to a criminal charge or trial, and no further action was taken against the Applicant.[35]The panel explained to the Applicant that it would be necessary to make an assessment of the allegations. The panel were not only entitled, but obliged, to address the allegations taking account of the case of Pearce and the Parole Board Guidance on Allegations. In my determination it was not unreasonable for the panel to explain the fact that they were not conducting a trial, but that they were obliged to investigate the allegations in order to reach a conclusion as to whether they impacted upon the Applicant's risk.[36]Having listened to the audiotape of the hearing it is clear that the judicial member explained that the questions may seem negative but indicated that by the very nature of investigating allegations such questions will arise. The judicial member explained that this did not mean the panel had a negative view of the Applicant himself.[37]The judicial member undertook a measured and forensic analysis of the circumstances surrounding the allegations. The judicial member tested the Applicant's account, as this was clearly a matter where there were competing views as to what occurred. Having listened with care to the entirety of the examination and assessment of this topic by the judicial member in the hearing, I am not persuaded that there was evidence that the matter was dealt with in an intimidating manner (as submitted on the Applicant's behalf).[38]The judicial member in fact explained to the Applicant that because he had a legal background his questions may appear direct or long-winded. The judicial member made it clear that if any question was misunderstood or poorly delivered, the Applicant was at liberty to ask for the question to be recast. It should also be said that the Applicant was supported by a legal adviser who had every opportunity to appropriately intervene if it was felt that the Applicant was suffering an element of unfairness or intimidation.[39]It is understandable that the Applicant felt uncomfortable about the assessment of the allegations. It is not unusual for prisoners, who do not face criminal proceedings in relation to allegations, to take the view that the assessments pursuant to the case of Pearce appear to be unfair. However, Parole Board panels have a duty to assess allegations and to reach conclusions applying the appropriate test.[40]I am not persuaded that there is evidence of unfairness or intimidation of the Applicant based upon the assessment by the panel of the allegations in this case. Ground 3[41]It is submitted on behalf of the Applicant, by his legal adviser, that the judicial member raised with the Applicant the fact that he had made " no comment " during his interview with the police. Discussion[42]Having listened to the audiotape of the hearing it is apparent that the judicial member asked the Applicant about his decision not to explain what had happened to the police at the time of interview. The Applicant told the panel that he had elected to make no comment to the police upon the advice of his solicitor.[43]The complaint on behalf of the Applicant is that the panel placed undue weight on the Applicant's decision not to participate in the police interview. Having considered the written decision in this case it appears to me that the Applicant's decision to remain silent at the police interview was not a substantially persuasive factor in the panel's final decision in relation to risk and directing release. For this reason, I do not find that this complaint amounts to procedural irregularity in the sense set out above. Ground 3[44]The Applicant's legal adviser submits that the panel placed undue weight upon the circumstances of the allegation of assault and that the panel failed to take account of the fact that the matter was not pursued by the police. It is also submitted that the panel failed to take account of the fact that (in the view of the Applicants legal adviser) the police evidence and other material lacked credibility as it had not been tested in court or corroborated by independent evidence. Also noted is the fact that the alleged victim of the assault was himself intoxicated and unable to communicate effectively to the police. The Applicant's legal adviser submits, in some detail, the arguments in support of evidential discrepancies in the material considered by the panel in relation to the allegation of assault by the Applicant. Discussion[45]As indicated above, having listened to the audio recording of the hearing, it is clear that the panel investigated the allegations entirely within the parameters of Pearce. The Applicant was given a full opportunity to respond to the evidence which was disclosed in the dossier and in video evidence. The panel had the advantage of seeing and hearing the Applicant. Where there is a conflict of opinion it was plainly a matter for the panel to determine the evidence they preferred and considered credible. Provided the reasons given by a panel are soundly based on evidence, as well as rational and reasonable, it will be inappropriate to direct that the decision be reconsidered unless it is manifestly obvious that there are compelling reasons for interfering with that decision.[46]The panel set out in some detail, in their decision, the basis upon which they had reached their conclusions. There was cogent and substantive material upon which the panel could reach a conclusion upon the allegations. The panel set out, between paragraphs 2.12 and 2.21 of the decision, the rationale and evidence upon which the panel reached its conclusion. That conclusion was that the Applicant had been affected by alcohol and on balance, responsible for a serious assault upon the victim which had resulted in injuries to the head of the victim.[47]The reconsideration mechanism is not a process whereby the judgement of the panel when assessing risk and allegations can be lightly interfered with. Nor is it a mechanism for substituting my view with that of the panel unless, of course, it is manifestly obvious that there are compelling reasons for interfering with the decision of the panel. In my determination the panel's rationale for reaching its conclusion in connection with the allegations are soundly based upon evidence and reasonable and rational. Ground 4[48]It is submitted that the decision letter failed to provide any clear reasoning as to why open conditions were not recommended. Discussion[49]The panel addressed the issue of open conditions at paragraph 4.8. The panel had indicated that the reason for declining to direct release was that it was apparent that the Applicant would need to embark upon further work to address risk factors, given the findings of the panel in relation to the recall. The panel were not persuaded that the Applicant had sufficient internal controls to manage the risk of serious harm. The panel further indicated that because of the need for risk focused work, the panel's determination was that such work would need to be completed in the closed estate and accordingly did not recommend a transfer to the open estate.[50]I have considered this ground. The panel explained its reasons for declining to direct release and for declining to recommend a transfer to an open prison. I am not persuaded that the reasoning amounts to irrationality in the sense set out above. Ground 5[51]It is submitted that the panel failed to take appropriate account of the views of the COM and the POM both of whom were recommending release. It is also submitted that the panel lacked transparency and consistency by concluding that the Applicant's risk of serious harm was more likely to be high than that suggested by the COM (medium). Discussion[52]Panels of the Parole Board are not obliged to adopt the opinions and recommendations of professional witnesses. It is their responsibility to make their own risk assessments and to evaluate the likely effectiveness of any risk management plan proposed. They must make up their own minds on the totality of the evidence that they hear, including any evidence from the Applicant. They would be failing in their duty to protect the public from serious harm (while also protecting the prisoner from unnecessary incarceration) if they failed to do just that. As was observed by the divisional Court in DSD they have the expertise to do it.[53]The panel explained why they did not follow the recommendations of the two professional witnesses. Firstly, the recommendations of those witnesses rested substantially on the premise that the Applicant had not been convicted of any offence and therefore it appeared that the professionals' recommendations were based upon a cautious acceptance of the Applicant's explanation.[54]The professional witnesses were also asked by the panel whether their recommendations, relating to release of the Applicant, would change if the account given by the victim of the alleged assault were accepted. Both professionals appeared to take the view that even if the Applicant were the aggressor and had been involved in assaulting the victim, and stamping upon him on the ground, they would have recommended release.[55]The panel took the view that greater weight should have been placed upon the seriousness of the incident involving violence. The panel had found that the victim was stamped on, and that the Applicant (upon his own admission) had been under the influence of alcohol at the time when these incidents occurred. In the light of the index offence and the Applicant's risk factors, the panel explained that they had reached an alternative view to the professionals in relation to the management of the Applicant's risk. The panel also took account of the lengthy period of time that the Applicant had been in the community but were not persuaded that that period of time could be relied upon given the nature of the later allegations and the degree of violence which they found to have been perpetrated by the Applicant.[56]As noted above when panels make a decision contrary to the opinions and recommendations of professional witnesses it is important that the panel explains clearly its reasons for doing so. Its stated reasons should also be sufficient to justify its conclusions see Wells above. In this case I am satisfied that the panel explained its reasons for not adopting the views of the professional witnesses in this case. For that reason, I do not find that the panel's decision was irrational. Decision[57]For the reasons I have given, I do not consider that the decision was irrational or procedurally unfair and accordingly the application for reconsideration is refused. HH Stephen Dawson 26 November 2025