Cecil, Application for Reconsideration [2025] PBRA 242 (11 November 2025) [2025] PBRA 242

PBRA

Cecil, Application for Reconsideration [2025] PBRA 242 (11 November 2025)

[2025] PBRA 242 · 2025-10-06

[1]This is an application by Cecil (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision dated 6 October 2025 not to direct his release. The decision was made by a panel following an oral hearing.

[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) (the Parole Board Rules ) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,

(b) that it is irrational and/or

[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the decision, the dossier (consisting of 262 numbered pages), and the application for reconsideration. I have also seen the victim personal statement, the application for its non-disclosure and the decision directing the disclosure of a gist only. Background

[4]On 16 March 2023, the Applicant was convicted of meeting a girl under 16 years of age following grooming to which he pleaded guilty. He received an extended sentence comprising four years imprisonment with a two year period on extended licence. He was also made subject to a sex offenders notice for an indefinite period. On the same occasion he was further convicted of three counts of breaching a sexual harm prevention order, engaging in sexual communication with a child, and engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a child aged under 16. He received four concurrent determinate 12 month sentences and one concurrent eight month determinate sentence (all now served).

[5]The Applicant was 34 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 36 years old.

[6]Key dates relevant to his sentence are reported to be: a) Parole eligibility date: July 2025; b) Conditional release date (CRD): November 2026; and c) Sentence expiry date: November 2028. Request for Reconsideration

[7]The application for reconsideration has been submitted by the Applicant. It argues that the decision was irrational and/or procedurally unfair and/or contained an error of law.

[8]The submissions are supplemented by written arguments to which reference will be made in the Discussion section below. Current Parole Review

[9]The Applicant’s case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) in October 2024 to consider whether or not it would be appropriate to direct his release. This is the Applicant’s second parole review.

[10]The case proceeded to an oral hearing on 29 September 2025, before a two-member panel. The panel heard oral evidence from the Applicant, the Prison Offender Manager (POM), and the Community Offender Manager (COM). The Applicant was legally represented throughout the hearing. There was no professional support for release.

[11]The panel concluded that the statutory test for release was not met and made no direction for release. The Relevant Law

[12]The Parole Board will direct release if it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

[13]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

[14]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).

[15]A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay

[2019] PBRA 6

. Irrationality

[16]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation

[1948] 1 KB 223

(CA) by Lord Greene in these words:

“ if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere ”

. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.

[17]In R(DSD and others) v Parole Board

[2018] EWHC 694 (Admin)

the Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words (at [116]):

“ the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it .”

[18]In R(Wells) v Parole Board

[2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin)

Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was “ to test the decision maker’s ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel’s expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied ”. This test was adopted by the Divisional Court in R(Secretary of State for Justice) v Parole Board

[2022] EWHC 1282 (Admin)

[19]As was made clear by Saini J in Wells, this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.

[20]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.

[21]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision. In summary an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;

(b) they were not given a fair hearing;

(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;

(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or

(f) the panel was not impartial. The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant’s case was dealt with justly. Error of law

[25]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel:a. misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed;

b. has no legal authority to make the decision;

c. fails to fulfil a legal duty;

d. exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose;

e. takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/or

f. improperly delegates decision-making power.

[26]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. The reply on behalf of the Respondent

[27]The Respondent has advised that no representations will be offered in response to this application. Discussion Irrationality

[28]The Applicant raises a number of contentions under the heading of irrationality.

[29]He first argues that it was irrational for the panel to rely on the POM and COM’s “ fixation” that core risk reduction work in custody is necessary when no such work has been made available to him. He further argues that the identified programme has not yet been shown to reduce reoffending.

[30]The lack of availability of any such work (regardless of proof of efficacy) does not mean that risk reduction work is not necessary. To say otherwise would undermine the Parole Board’s role in public protection. If a prisoner requires risk reduction work for public protection purposes, the fact that such work is not available does not negate that risk.

[31]The Applicant also argues that it was irrational for the panel to conclude that core risk reduction work could be completed by April 2026. The panel did not conclude as such. It recorded the POM’s evidence on the matter without making any evaluative judgement. In any event, as already explained, timing and availability does not negate risk.

[32]The Applicant further argues that it was irrational for the panel to conclude he had limited insight into the impact of his offending on the victim when a victim statement had never been disclosed to him. He says that every victim of a crime has a unique response, and that, until that response is known, he can only acknowledge a limited understanding.

[33]The victim statement was subject to a non-disclosure application. A gist of the statement was disclosed to the Applicant noting “ The statement details the deep emotional and life impact that the offence has had on the victim and their direct family and describes the ongoing impact the offence continues to have to this day ”.

[34]While this is necessarily generic, it nonetheless conveyed the essence and longevity of the harm described and allowed the Applicant to consider the emotional and practical consequences of his offending. Insight is not dependent upon knowledge of a victim’s precise words but upon an offender’s ability to appreciate the broader human impact of their actions on their victim and family.

[35]The Applicant also argues that it was irrational for the panel to consider that a high level of technical skill was a risk factor. He submits that his technological skill is, in fact, a protective factor as it demonstrates intellectual capability. He also notes that it is a factor that will be unchanged upon his release at CRD.

[36]The Applicant’s argument misses the point that the index offences included sending images and videos of his genitals to a 13-year-old girl with contact via various apps. He has previous convictions for similar offences. His technical skill would be a protective factor if he had never used it to help facilitate sexual offences against children. The circumstances of his offending history and the index offence clearly demonstrate that his technical aptitude is risky. While that risk factor will remain unchanged at CRD, it may remain as a risk while the Applicant is on extended licence and potentially thereafter.

[37]The Applicant also argues that the panel failed to give sufficient weight to risk reduction work undertaken of his own volition and in response to his self-identified risk factors. The weight the panel gives to each piece of evidence forms part of its overall risk assessment exercise, and disagreeing with the panel’s weighting does not automatically make its decision irrational. In this instance, the panel acknowledged that the Applicant had undertaken work but gave clear reasons why it did not consider this to have reduced his risk to a level commensurate with the codified public protection test.

[38]The Applicant next argues that it was irrational to refuse release on the basis that he had not completed offending behaviour work, since he had not been offered such work. He relies on R (Gill) v Secretary of State for Justice

[2010] EWHC 364 (Admin)

, in which Cranston J noted (at [80]) that “ offending behaviour programmes are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for release ”.

[39]That reliance is misplaced. Mr Gill was unable to complete programmes because of intellectual disability. The unlawfulness lay in the failure of the Secretary of State to make alternative provision so as not to “ discriminate against [an] intellectually disabled prisoner” (also at [80]). Gill is concerned with the Secretary of State’s duty to provide appropriate offending behaviour work so that a prisoner may have “ the opportunity to demonstrate, eventually, his safety for release” . Other recognised pathways exist to reduce reoffending and achieve release. Therefore, although Gill is authority for the proposition that offending behaviour programmes are not, of themselves necessary or sufficient for release, their absence for whatever reason does not obviate the need for a risky prisoner to demonstrate risk reduction via a suitable mechanism afforded by the Secretary of State. In the Applicant’s case, the risk reduction work he had undertaken was considered insufficient by the panel, and that is the end of the matter.

[40]Accordingly, none of the alleged matters of irrationality are made out and this ground fails. Procedural unfairness

[41]The Applicant next argues a number of points under the heading of procedural unfairness.

[42]He first argues that it was procedurally unfair for the panel to summarise his risk factors without setting out the underlying reasons or weight given to each. There is no requirement for a panel to rehearse every consideration or to assign explicit weightings to each factor in its written decision. The panel’s reasoning was sufficient to show how it reached its overall conclusion and how it applied the statutory release test.

[43]He next argues that the panel failed to give adequate weight to accredited and non-accredited work completed of his own volition, while relying instead on a single “ core risk reduction ” programme. This does not amount to procedural unfairness. Panels are required to consider all relevant evidence and to explain their conclusion in a rational way; they are not obliged to accept the Applicant’s own evaluation of his progress. The decision shows that the panel took his self-directed work into account but concluded that it did not sufficiently reduce the assessed risk.

[44]The Applicant further contends that it was procedurally unfair to expect him to respond to the victim impact statement when the full statement had not been disclosed. As already explained, a gist of the statement was disclosed, and the panel was entitled to draw its own conclusions about insight from the Applicant’s evidence as a whole. The limited disclosure arose from a lawful non-disclosure direction and does not render the process unfair.

[45]He also submits that it was procedurally unfair to rely on reports from the POM and COM given their limited contact with him. Those reports were properly before the panel and formed part of the dossier. The panel was aware of the extent of contact and was entitled to take that into account when assessing the weight to give to their opinions. The fairness of the proceedings does not depend on the volume of professional contact but on whether the Applicant had a fair opportunity to challenge and supplement that evidence, which he did at the oral hearing.

[46]The Applicant argues that the panel acted unfairly by endorsing a recommendation for a psychological assessment following the completion of core risk reduction work when there was no confirmed start date for that work. The panel’s role is to assess risk and identify the further steps needed to reduce it. Recommending additional assessment is not procedurally unfair but a rational and protective measure consistent with its statutory function.

[47]Finally, the Applicant asserts that the panel’s approach to the proposed risk management plan was unfair because the same plan will take effect at his CRD. The panel’s task, however, is to assess current risk and the effectiveness of proposed management arrangements if release were directed now, not at some future mandatory release point. The fact that statutory release will occur at a later date does not make the present process unfair.

[48]Accordingly, none of the alleged matters of procedural unfairness are made out. Errors of law

[49]The Applicant raises several alleged errors of law. These concern reliance on allegedly inaccurate OASys material, non-disclosure of the victim personal statement, and reliance on licence conditions said to be unlawful.

[50]The Applicant contends that the OASys report relied upon was inaccurate and that the panel thereby acted unlawfully and in breach of the Data Protection Act 2018. The OASys assessments were properly before the panel as official risk assessments prepared by qualified professionals. The Applicant had the opportunity to challenge their accuracy both in writing and during the oral hearing. He was legally represented at the hearing. There is nothing in the decision to suggest that the panel relied on any demonstrably false material or failed to consider any challenge put forward by the Applicant regarding the content of the OASys assessments.

[51]The non-disclosure of the victim personal statement was governed by a lawful non-disclosure application which was considered and determined in accordance with the Parole Board Rules. The Applicant was provided with an appropriate gist. There is no authority that

Article 6 ECHR

requires the full disclosure of a victim’s statement in circumstances where the Board has determined that non-disclosure is necessary and proportionate. The reasoning in R (Lord) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[2003] EWHC 2073 (Admin)

, on which the Applicant relies, concerned the complete absence of disclosure of potentially exculpatory material. It is therefore distinguishable from his case, which concerns partial disclosure of a victim statement. I have already stated that this did not undermine the panel’s finding regarding the Applicant’s limited insight into victim impact.

[52]Finally, the Applicant’s argument that the panel relied on unlawful licence conditions imposed under the extended determinate sentence regime is misplaced. The panel was assessing risk at the point of consideration for discretionary release; the statutory provisions governing automatic release and the imposition of standard licence conditions do not fetter that function. The panel was entitled to take account of the proposed risk-management plan, including any proposed conditions, when determining whether the statutory release test was met.

[53]There is accordingly no error of law in the panel’s approach or reasoning. Decision

[54]For the reasons set out above, the application for reconsideration is refused and the panel’s decision not to direct release becomes final. Stefan Fafinski 11 November 2025