Truter, Application for Reconsideration by, [2025] PBRA 196 (23 September 2025) [2025] PBRA 196

PBRA
Truter, Application for Reconsideration by, [2025] PBRA 196 (23 September 2025)
[2025] PBRA 196 · 2025-07-31
[1]This is an application by Truter (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision dated 31 July 2025 not to direct his release. The decision was made by a panel following an oral hearing.[2]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis(a) that the decision contains an error of law,(b) that it is irrational and/or(c) that it is procedurally unfair.[3]I have considered the application on the papers. These are the decision, the dossier (consisting of 1,183 numbered pages), and the application for reconsideration. The application also annexes a letter from the Public Protection Casework Section (PPCS) Litigation Team dated 21 May 2025 and an undated document headed "Recommended programme pathway for Wayne Truter".[4]The application gave rise to a number of further enquiries. I am grateful to the Applicant for his comprehensive response dated 1 September 2025 and his Prison Offender Manager (POM) for a clarifying email relating to the programme pathway document, also dated 1 September 2025.[5]I have also had access to an audio recording of the hearing. Background[6]On 24 September 2014, the Applicant was convicted after trial of a number of sexual offences: a) Sexual activity with a male child under 13 (offender 18 or over, no penetration) x 2; b) Sexual activity with a male child under 16 (offender 18 or over, no penetration) x 4; c) Offender under 18 engaging in non-penetrative sexual activity with a boy 13 to 15; d) Possessing an indecent photograph or pseudo photograph of a child.[7]Following a correction to the structuring of the Applicant's sentence by the Court of Appeal ( R v Truter [2018] EWCA Crim 2453), the net effect of the various sentences on each of the counts resulted in an extended sentence comprising a custodial period of eight years and an extension of seven years ([34]). His sentence expiry date is reported to be in September 2028.[8]The Applicant was 41 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 53 years old.[9]The Applicant's case was first considered by the Parole Board in March 2019. The decision (dated 29 March 2019) notes that the Applicant's parole eligibility date passed in May 2018 and his conditional release date fell in September 2019. The 2019 panel did not direct his release. It documented its concerns about the Applicant challenging key features of the risk management plan, his refusal to disclose pertinent information about his ability to travel and the passports he held, a lack of clarity about his risk factors and triggers to offending, and the [Community] Offender Manager's uncertainty about the content of the risk management plan.[10]The Applicant was automatically released in September 2019. His licence was revoked in May 2020, and he was returned to custody.[11]The circumstances of the Applicant's release on licence and recall are relevant to the application for reconsideration and will be dealt with in the Discussion section below. Request for Reconsideration[12]The application for reconsideration has been submitted by the Applicant. It argues that the decision was irrational and/or procedurally unfair and/or contained errors of law.[13]The submissions are supplemented by written arguments to which reference will be made in the Discussion section below. Current Parole Review[14]The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) to consider whether to direct his release. This is the Applicant's second parole review since his recall.[15]The case proceeded to an oral hearing on 29 July 2025, before a three-member panel. The panel took oral evidence from the Applicant, the POM, and the Community Offender Manager (COM). The Applicant was not legally represented throughout the hearing. There was no professional support for release.[16]The panel concluded that the statutory test for release was not met and made no direction for release. The Relevant Law[17]The Parole Board will direct release if it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)[18]Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).[19]Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).[20]A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay [2019] PBRA 6 . Irrationality[21]The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) by Lord Greene in these words:
" if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere "
. The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.[22]In R(DSD and others) v Parole Board [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin) the Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words (at [116]):
" the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it ."
[23]In R(Wells) v Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was " to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied ". This test was adopted by the Divisional Court in R(Secretary of State for Justice) v Parole Board [2022] EWHC 1282 (Admin).[24]As was made clear by Saini J in Wells, this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.[25]It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.[26]Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses. Procedural unfairness[27]Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.[28]In summary an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;(b) they were not given a fair hearing;(c) they were not properly informed of the case against them;(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly; and/or(e) the panel was not impartial.[29]The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant's case was dealt with justly. Error of law[30]An administrative decision is unlawful under the broad heading of illegality if the panel:a. misinterprets a legal instrument relevant to the function being performed;b. has no legal authority to make the decision;c. fails to fulfil a legal duty;d. exercises discretionary power for an extraneous purpose;e. takes into account irrelevant considerations or fails to take account of relevant considerations; and/orf. improperly delegates decision-making power.[31]The task in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the panel. The instrument will normally be the Parole Board Rules, but it may also be an enunciated policy, or some other common law power. The reply on behalf of the Respondent[32]The Respondent has submitted representations in response to this application which will also be considered in the Discussion section. Discussion Irrationality[33]The Applicant first submits that the panel's decision was irrational. The panel correctly acknowledged that denial is not a bar to progression, but in order to direct release it needed to be satisfied that the Applicant had cooperated fully in assessing his risks, completed necessary core offending behaviour work in custody, and was likely to comply with supervision and licence conditions (para. 4.2). The panel was not satisfied in relation to any of those areas (para. 4.3).[34]The Applicant argues that it was irrational to refuse release on the basis that he had not completed offending behaviour work, since he had been assessed as not eligible for accredited programmes. He relies on R (Gill) v Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWHC 364 (Admin) , in which Cranston J noted (at [80]) that " offending behaviour programmes are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for release ".[35]That reliance is misplaced. Mr Gill was unable to complete programmes because of intellectual disability. The unlawfulness lay in the failure of the Secretary of State to make alternative provision. By contrast, the Applicant's ineligibility for programmes appears to stem not from incapacity but from his maintained position that the index offences did not take place and lack of motivation to engage. The OASys dated 27 June 2025 records that he is " not at all motivated to address offending behaviour " and " displays no interest in engaging in any offence focussed work ." Earlier OASys assessments in 2020, 2022 and 2023 are consistent. He is plainly intellectually capable of undertaking one-to-one or motivational work if he chose to do so. While the Respondent submits that the Applicant should not have submitted the recommended programme pathway document as part of his reconsideration application, I have only considered to the extent that it is reflected in the documents elsewhere within the dossier (and is, as the POM clarified, automatically generated from the content with the OASys).[36]The panel was entitled to conclude that the Applicant's continuing denial, absence of engagement, and lack of insight left his risk of serious harm to children unaddressed. While accredited programmes are not a prerequisite for release, alternative risk reduction work which does not require admission of guilt does exist. To hold otherwise would mean that any prisoner who maintained innocence could render themselves unsuitable for all interventions through lack of motivation and then demand release on the basis that there was no core risk reduction work available to them.[37]I acknowledge that this places the Applicant in a difficult position. However, the panel's task was to decide whether his risks had been reduced to a level that could be safely managed in the community. On the evidence, it was open to the panel to conclude they had not. The public law test for irrationality sets a high bar. This decision was not so outrageous in its defiance of logic as to meet that threshold. This ground therefore fails. Error of law - causal link[38]The Applicant next submits that there was an error of law. He relies primarily upon the High Court authority of R (Dich and Murphy) v Parole Board for England and Wales and Secretary of State for Justice [2023] EWHC 945 (Admin) .[39]The central issue in Dich and Murphy concerned the effect of the decision in R (Secretary of State for Justice) v Parole Board for England and Wales and Johnson [2022] EWHC 1282 (Admin) on the test to be applied by the Parole Board when considering the risk posed to the public by the release of a prisoner serving an extended determinate sentence (as is the case here) or a recalled determinate sentenced prisoner.[40]In particular, the Applicant relies on Dich and Murphy in which the High Court stated (at [17]): "In a non-life case, if continued incarceration up until the sentence expiry date will do nothing to avoid or reduce the risk thereafter, then it is not necessary for the protection of the public that the offender should be confined. The position is different if continued incarceration would reduce the risk to the public after the sentence expiry date (for example, by preventing the prisoner from taking steps that are preparatory to an offence, or by facilitating rehabilitative work that might reduce the risk post release). It follows that there must be a causal link between continued detention and prevention or reduction of risk".[41]The Applicant argues that there cannot be any such causal link because he is not eligible to complete " any alleged 'risk reduction' work in custody". As such he argues that his continued detention will not achieve any risk reduction and thus, following Dich and Murphy he should have been released.[42]It is correct that Dich and Murphy states that in non-life cases, if continued incarceration does nothing to reduce risk after the sentence expiry date, then detention is not necessary for public protection. However, the case also makes clear that continued detention may be justified where it prevents preparation for future offending (after sentence expiry) or facilitates rehabilitative risk-reduction work.[43]The Applicant's argument overlooks that his apparent ineligibility for risk reduction work programmes arises not from incapacity, but from his belief that such work is unnecessary and his consequential lack of motivation. I return to my earlier analysis. If a prisoner is not eligible to complete identified risk reduction work by virtue of his own disinclination or lack of motivation to do so (for whatever reason) it cannot follow that he should be automatically released. In Dich and Murphy , the High Court specifically points to facilitating rehabilitative risk reduction work as a matter that could constitute the causal link necessary for continued lawful detention.[44]Accordingly, I find no error of law relating to the panel's application of the causation principles set out in Dich and Murphy . This ground therefore fails. Error of law - temporal element of risk[45]The Applicant next submits that the panel made an error of law regarding the temporal element of risk within the operation of his extended sentence. His argument is as follows: a) he is serving an extended sentence imposed under section 226A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003; b) detention during the extended part of the sentence is (effectively) a new detention ( Brown v Parole Board for Scotland, the Scottish Ministers and another [2017] UKSC 69 , as applied in Rainey [2019] NICA 76 ); c) the sentencing court made a prima facie decision that any risk could be managed in the community during the extended licence period; d) there is no evidenced link between the recall (which was made on the basis of alleged breaches of three unlawful licence conditions) and the original punitive element of the extended sentence; and e) therefore, the panel incorrectly justified his continued detention by relying on the punitive element of his sentence; a justification which was effectively spent on his conditional release date in September 2019 ( Wells v Parole Board [2007] EWHC 1835 (Admin) .[46]Section 226A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was repealed by the Sentencing Act 2020. At the time of the Applicant's sentencing, the materially relevant parts of the section were such that the court could impose an extended sentence on an offender (s 226A(4)) if it considered that there was a significant risk of serious harm to the public by the commission of further offences (s 226A(1)(b)). The extended sentence comprises the appropriate custodial term and an extension period for which the offender is to be subject to a licence (s 226A(5)). The extension period must be of sufficient length that the court considers necessary to protect the public from serious harm (s 226A(7)).[47]The sentencing remarks within the dossier (p.158 ff. ) indicate that the trial judge found the Applicant to be " devious, manipulative and dangerous" and would " remain dangerous for the foreseeable future" . As such he imposed an extended sentence.[48]Brown concerned a prisoner who has been recalled to custody after committing a further offence during the extension period of his sentence. He remained in prison until his sentence had been served in full. He argued that he was not provided with appropriate rehabilitation courses following his recall, contrary to article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('the Convention') as effected by the Human Rights Act 1998. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the article 5 duty to provide prisoners with a real opportunity for rehabilitation applies to prisoners serving extended sentences.[49]In Brown , the Supreme Court (at [59] - [63]) set out the application of article 5 within the context of extended sentences. Although Brown is a Scottish case, the principles within it clearly also apply within England and Wales: a) Prisoners detained during the extension period of their sentence are in a different position to those serving the custodial element: no court has ordered detention during that period and the risk is prima facie manageable in the community; b) The purpose of detention during the extension period is solely concerned with protecting the public from serious harm (the punitive element already having been spent); c) Continued detention following recall must be supervised by a judicial body, which is met by the provision for periodical reviews by the Parole Board (predicated on the possibility that prisoners may be reformed, and consequently a real opportunity for rehabilitation becomes a necessary element of detention during that period); and d) There must be measures in place aimed at reducing dangerousness and limiting the duration of detention to what is strictly necessary in order to prevent the commission of further offences.[50]The Applicant is correct that Brown was relied on in Rainey , but Rainey (as a Northern Ireland Court of Appeal decision) adds nothing to the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown .[51]The Applicant points out that his recall was triggered as a result of breach of three unlawful licence conditions. Although the Respondent's formal reasons and the request for recall report differ slightly, both relied on additional conditions later admitted by the Respondent to have been unlawfully imposed (CO/1695/2020, 9 November 2020, dossier, p. 363).[52]In such cases, the panel nonetheless has a duty to consider the appropriateness of the recall decision. Following R (Calder) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 4138 (Admin), in order to establish the lawfulness of the decision to recall, the Respondent must first establish that he could on reasonable grounds conclude that the Applicant was in breach of his licence conditions. The Respondent must also show that it was necessary to recall the claimant on the evidence at the time.[53]The panel which first considered the Applicant's recall, concluded that the decision to recall was appropriate. It accepted that the allegations made against the Applicant contributed to the decision to recall as there was " at least credible evidence to link him to further offending ". In an unsuccessful application for reconsideration ( Truter [2023] PBRA 5 ) it was found that the requirements of the Calder decision were fully met in the Panel's consideration of the recall and a clear finding made that the recall was justified on the basis of the information then known to the Probation Service and the Respondent. It is not the function of the Parole Board to enquire as to the lawfulness of the declared basis for recall. In any event, the basis for recall was declared lawful by HHJ Tindal on 17 December 2024 (see para. 68 below).[54]The Applicant relies upon R (Wells) v Parole Board [2007] EWHC 1835 (Admin) [46]. This sets out the proposition that (in the case of a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment for public protection) the justification for detention during the tariff period (akin to the custodial element of the Applicant's extended sentence) is spent at the moment the tariff expires, and ongoing dangerousness can only be ascertained on a continuing basis by periodic assessment.[55]Brown and Wells make the same essential point that after the punitive element of sentence is spent, detention can only be justified by reference to public protection, supervised by a judicial body. Brown goes on to say that, in order to fulfil article 5 duties, rehabilitative opportunities must be provided.[56]The panel in this case found that it was necessary to keep the Applicant detained for the protection of the public. Although the Applicant may argue otherwise, the panel has not retrospectively imposed a further punitive element. The Applicant has been recalled to custody, the Parole Board has no power to quash that recall, an earlier panel found that recall to have been appropriate, the appropriateness of the recall was affirmed as part of an unsuccessful reconsideration application, and the current panel was entitled to assess risk during the periodic assessment required under article 5. As already established, any absence of rehabilitative progress stems from the Applicant's position in relation to it. There is no error of law, and this ground therefore also fails. Procedural unfairness[57]The Applicant raises seven separate complaints under the ground of procedural unfairness. They refer to the panel's treatment of various aspects of his review, which I will deal with in turn as follows: a) documentary evidence and treatment of allegations; b) unlawful licence conditions; c) seized devices and passwords; d) reliance on the previous panel's conclusion; e) reliance on historical psychological risk assessment; f) abscond; and g) other ongoing litigation. Documentary evidence and treatment of allegations[58]The Applicant refers to the judgment of HHJ Tindal which responds to four separate claims and six contested applications dated 17 December 2024 (dossier p. 1134 ff. ). One of these claims refers to the unlawful licence conditions and associated matters brought under the Data Protection Act 1998. In particular, he refers to paragraph 37 of the judgment which states:
"I accept that there is a serious issue to be tried, as it is accepted those conditions are unlawful. I also accept that damages are not an adequate remedy (although they are being sought), as the Claimant is also seeking correction of records... At least until the Claimant particularised the Unlawful Licence Claim, the Defendants would not know what to change. Even after he has done so, it could be administratively challenging to correct all the relevant records before the hearing, especially because - of course - the conditions are part of the factual background to this case and need to be referred to, just as the Claimant refers to them. To make a mandatory injunction at this stage, requiring both Defendants to amend all the documents, would be disproportionate when there is a simpler interim solution: namely, that I could simply declare now, on concession, that the additional conditions were unlawful. That Court Order could then be attached to the relevant files if required to make that clear. However, obviously, the Parole Board and the MOJ/Probation Service must now ensure any new records are correct (and if the claim succeeds, the Claimant can renew his application for a mandatory injunction to correct definitively any records found to be unlawful at that stage)."
[59]The Applicant contends that records and documents created after the date of HHJ Tindal's statement were not updated to be accurate and therefore are not in accordance with his statement.[60]I note that the Applicant raised the same issue in a case conference on 8 May 2025 (dossier, p. 1034 f ). The panel was clear that it could look at underlying facts to see if they raised concerns about risky behaviour.[61]Moreover, a Court Order (dated 22 July 2025, dossier, p. 1170) records that HHJ Tindal dismissed the Applicant's application for an injunction to prevent the Parole Board relying on material relating to an alleged breach of restraining order for which the Applicant was acquitted. Although the matter had been adjudicated upon, resulting in an acquittal, HHJ Tindal held that the Parole Board was entitled to consider allegations resulting in acquittal provided it applies the principles from R(Pearce) v Parole Board [2023] UKSC 13 .[62]In consequence, there can be no procedural unfairness on this basis. HHJ Tindal was clear that the Parole Board may consider allegations resulting in acquittal, which it would be unable to do if all documentary records relating to any such allegations were excised from a dossier on acquittal. Unlawful licence conditions[63]The Applicant next argues that the panel made a number of purported errors of fact, in relation to the unlawful licence conditions. He argues that, as the licence conditions were unlawfully imposed, they were void ab initio rather than "good until declared bad". I accept that, as a matter of principle, the unlawful conditions were indeed void ab initio .[64]However, I do not agree that the panel's treatment of the circumstances of the Applicant's recall to custody was procedurally unfair. Although there could have been no breach of the unlawfully imposed licence conditions, and the Applicant received no further conviction in respect of the alleged breach of restraining order, the decision (at para. 2.5) records that the 2022 panel expressly did not refer to this allegation. The current panel did not, in its decision, appear to give the matter of breach of unlawful licence conditions material consideration. Its decision not to direct release was entirely and properly concerned with the Applicant's assessment of risk. This does not amount to procedural unfairness on the panel's part. Seized devices and passwords[65]The Applicant next takes issue with para. 2.4 of the decision which states that he " refused to provide passwords " for devices found at the time of the recall. He notes that the police settled a claim for unlawful seizure of devices containing material subject to legal privilege. This is recorded in the OASys (dossier, p. 942). The associated court order (2 November 2022; QB-2021-001747) makes a financial award to the Applicant, but there is no admission of liability and no reference to passwords. It does record that the police confirmed deletion of material downloaded from the Applicant's phone " with the exception of evidence that [he] had the contact details of a previous victim in his phone book at the material time".[66]I also note written legal submissions prepared for the Applicant's previous parole review (dated 10 July 2020, dossier p. 141) which state that " in relation to the passwords for the seized devices [the Applicant] is extremely concerned if the police are able to interrogate the devices, they will have access to legally privileged information". He did not, at this stage, appear to argue that he had been forthcoming with regard to passwords, nor that the material in question has not been password protected at all. I do not find that the panel's treatment of this point fell into material procedural unfairness. Reliance on the previous panel's conclusion[67]The Applicant argues that para. 2.5 of the decision relies on the 2022 panel's " erroneous conclusion ". He says that the 2022 panel was misled in terms of a lawful reason for recall (since the licence conditions said to have been breached were unlawful) and that the current panel continued to place reliance on that. I think the Applicant is, in fact, referring to para. 2.6 of the decision:
"The last panel considered that [the Applicant] was in breach of his standard licence conditions by not being open and honest when questioned about the internet devices and also because at the time there was clear evidence linking him to further offending which would have breached another standard licence condition had it been proved. The last panel considered that the decision to recall was appropriate."
[68]This is a factual statement which is commensurate with the 2022 panel's decision. The matter was dispensed with by HHJ Tindal on 17 December 2024 ([12] - [14]). He found that the Applicant's arguments concerning the previous panel's finding on the appropriateness of recall had been refused, not only by the reconsideration mechanism, but also via judicial review. As HHJ Tindal concludes " the analysis [by Lewison LJ in refusing permission to appeal the judicial review] was not reliant on the conditions which are now accepted to be unlawful and is in any event binding on the parties and me" . In doing so, he affirmed the lawfulness of the recall.[69]The 2022 panel's conclusion on recall has been affirmed as lawful. The current panel is perfectly entitled to document it as such. There can be no procedural unfairness here.[70]Further submissions relating to the Respondent's stance regarding recall appear to be subject to ongoing litigation (dossier, p. 1131 ff ) and (as the Respondent correctly asserts) it would not be appropriate for me to address those matters within the reconsideration mechanism. Reliance on previous psychological risk assessment[71]The Applicant next argues that the panel placed reliance on an out-of-date and factually inaccurate psychological risk assessment. The panel's decision notes that the 2022 panel heard evidence from the report's author and the report's findings insofar as potential future risk reduction work was concerned. He contends that he is not eligible to complete any of the identified work, for reasons I have already dealt with comprehensively and dismissed. I have also already dealt with matters concerning the accuracy of information within the dossier. Therefore, I find there to be no procedural unfairness on this point. Abscond[72]The Applicant argues that the 2022 panel was incorrect regarding the matter of abscond. Although the 2022 panel expressed concern at abscond risk (para. 2.9), the current panel did not rely on that point in refusing release. No procedural unfairness arises. Other ongoing litigation[73]The Applicant's final submission relates to ongoing litigation and contends that proceeding with a hearing which relied on contested information would make the decision " procedurally unfair or corrupt" . I can make no comment on the ongoing litigation as that is beyond the scope of reconsideration. However, I have found, for the reasons set out above, that the matters of contested information raised by the Applicant within this reconsideration mechanism were not procedurally unfair.[74]Consequently, taken together, I am not satisfied that any of these complaints demonstrates that the Applicant was denied a fair hearing or that the proceedings were otherwise procedurally unfair. This ground therefore fails. Decision[75]For the reasons set out above, I am not satisfied that the panel's decision was irrational, contained an error of law, or was procedurally unfair. The application for reconsideration is therefore refused and the decision of the panel dated 31 July 2025 becomes final. Stefan Fafinski 23 September 2025