Masters, Application for Reconsideration by [2024] PBRA 78 (26 April 2024) [2024] PBRA 78

PBRA
Masters, Application for Reconsideration by [2024] PBRA 78 (26 April 2024)
[2024] PBRA 78 · 2024-02-19
[66]“ 66. In our view, the time has now come to accept that a mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness is a separate head of challenge in an appeal on a point of law, at least in those statutory contexts where the parties share an interest in co-operating to achieve the correct result. Asylum law is undoubtedly such an area. Without seeking to lay down a precise code, the ordinary requirements for a finding of unfairness are apparent from the above analysis of CICB. First, there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter. Secondly, the fact or evidence must have been “established”, in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable. Thirdly, the appellant (or his advisers) must not have been responsible for the mistake. Fourthly, the mistake must have played a material (not necessarily decisive) part in the Tribunal's reasoning. ” Current parole review 8. The case was referred to the Parole Board by the Respondent on 4 January 2023. The Relevant Law 9. The panel correctly set out in the DL the tests for release. Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) 10. Under Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 the only kind of decision which is eligible for reconsideration is a decision that the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence. Such a decision is eligible for reconsideration whether it is made by a paper panel (Rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (Rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (Rule 21(7)). Irrationality 11. In R (DSD and others) v the Parole Board [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin) , the Divisional Court set out the test for irrationality to be applied in judicial reviews of Parole Board decisions. It said at para. 116, “the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. ” 12. This test was set out by Lord Diplock in CCSU v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 . The Divisional Court in DSD went on to indicate that in deciding whether a decision of the Parole Board was irrational, due deference had to be given to the expertise of the Parole Board in making decisions relating to parole. The Board, when considering whether or not to direct a reconsideration, will adopt the same high standard for establishing ‘irrationality’. The fact that Rule 28 contains the same adjective as is used in judicial review shows that the same test is to be applied. 13. The application of this test has been confirmed in previous decisions on applications for reconsideration under rule 28: Preston [2019] PBRA 1 and others. 14. In addition the Applicant has cited a relevant passage from E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044 :
“….there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter; the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; the appellant (or his advisors) must not have been responsible for the mistake; and the mistake must have played a material (though not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning.” 15. In Oyston [2000] PLR 45 , at paragraph 47 Lord Bingham said: “ It seems to me generally desirable that the Board should identify in broad terms the matters judged by the Board as pointing towards and against a continuing risk of offending and the Board's reasons for striking the balance that it does. Needless to say, the letter should summarise the considerations which have in fact led to the final decision. It would be wrong to prescribe any standard form of Decision Letter and it would be wrong to require elaborate or impeccable standards of draftsmanship. " Procedural unfairness 16. Procedural unfairness means some procedural impropriety or unfairness which resulted in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore producing a manifestly unfair, flawed or unjust result. 17. In summary an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under Rule 28 must satisfy me that: (a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision; and/or (b) s/he was not given a fair hearing; and/or (c) s/he was not properly informed of the case against them; and/or (d) s/he was prevented from putting their case properly; and/or (e) the panel was not impartial. 18. The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant’s case was dealt with justly . 19. While considering the submissions on behalf of the Applicant I asked for and was supplied with the recording of the hearing. It became clear that from the start to the finish of the hearing the voice of the Chair of the panel was not audible. It seemed to be the case that on the few occasions when the Chair was speaking the recording stopped picking up any voices (although there are a few audible but muffled noises which indicate that persons were speaking). Thus, until the next person, co-panellist, Prison Offender Manager (POM), Applicant, Community Offender Manager (COM) or the legal representative “ took the floor ”, everything said during the period when the Chair was speaking was lost. (a) The first few minutes are clearly taken up with trying to ensure that the witnesses and others were linked to the hearing and are very indistinct. The fact that the application was for release is clear. (b) The evidence of the first witness, the POM, is fully recorded from the outset. She gave evidence for a little more than half an hour. (c) Following her evidence there is effectively silence - save a reference to the “ Chair ” from 57.11 minutes until 1 hour 4 minutes into the recording of the hearing. (d) The evidence of the Applicant is fully audible. It finished at 2 hours 35 minutes into the recording. There is then a short pause during which it is reasonable to assume that the Chair was speaking before the evidence of the COM was heard. (e) There is less than a minute’s “ silence ” then until the COM‘s evidence is taken until 3 hours 18 minutes into the recording. This is clear throughout. (f) At the conclusion of the evidence the Applicant makes some additional comments criticising the evidence of the COM, at the conclusion of which there is a short “ silence ” following which the Chair is mentioned by name. The rest of the hearing is audible and includes the closing submissions from the legal representative. 20. In these circumstances I have considered whether the deficiencies in the recording - whether on their own or put together with the grounds submitted might either - (a) Afford the Applicant a valid ground of appeal on the basis of procedural irregularity - or (b) Support the existing grounds summarised above. 21. I have come to the conclusion that they do not. The recorded parts of the hearing amount to well over 3 hours of evidence and submission and there was a dossier containing some 360 pages of evidence. The passages relevant to the two issues raised in the grounds namely the circumstances of the incident leading to the recall and the perceived lack of a viable release plan with appropriate licence conditions are covered in detail during the audible parts of the evidence of the three witnesses and the submissions at the close of the hearing. The reply on behalf of the Respondent 22. The Respondent has offered no representations , although as I understand it he has not been informed of the defective recording of the hearing. Discussion 23. Irrationality. a. As to paragraph 7a above. i. There was no dispute that there was a quarrel between the Applicant and the woman with whom he was then living which resulted in the woman calling the police. It was common ground that there had been such an incident. The panel was not bound to accept in terms the account given by the Applicant and was entitled to consider the incident in the light of all the evidence and in particular that of the Applicant and the way in which he gave it. ii. The question of whether the argument began while they were having sexual intercourse or afterwards was hardly relevant to the issue before the panel. iii. I have not found any reference in the dossier to the word “ toxic ”
. Nor did I hear it on listening to the recording, to that extent the ground put forward has merit. However, the important matters before the panel were the incident which led to the recall, the opinions and the reasons for them of the professionals, and the panel’s assessment of the Applicant’s current risk rather than the question of the “ toxicity ” or otherwise of the relationship generally. iv. While of course panels have to make up their minds about incidents such as these about which there is no conviction of crime or even a charge and trial, the panel was entitled to conclude that even on the limited basis of the evidence before it that it represented a significant increase in the risk posed by the Applicant of serious harm. The fact that another panel may have come to a different conclusion does not lead to the conclusion that the conclusion drawn by the panel was " irrational ”. b. As to paragraph 7b above. Panels are frequently faced with the fact that for reasons beyond their control and that of the relevant professionals there is no viable release plan which could reduce the risk posed by an offender of causing serious harm to members of the public. In this case, the panel adopted the wholly rational solution of recommending that the Applicant be transferred to open conditions in the hope that a gradual reintroduction to the community, combined, no doubt, with the creation of a viable release plan and appropriate licence conditions, would lead to a direction for the Applicant’s release in due course. c. In addition, it is clear that both in her report for the purposes of the hearing and in her evidence at it, the COM was firm in her view that the risk of serious harm currently posed by the Applicant was such that she could not recommend his release. For a panel decision which is supported by the person who would be most directly concerned with the supervision of an offender if released to be deemed irrational a very serious procedural failing or a clear and relevant factual error would be necessary. This is not such a case. Decision 24. Accordingly, this application is refused. Sir David Calvert-Smith 26th April 2024