Judge S. McKeownMr. J. Stead BSc (Hons), MScIn person for the ApplicantMr. Irudayaraj (manager) Application for a Rent Repayment for the RespondentVenue 10 Alfred Place, London WC1E 7LRDate 15 January 2026Property: High Road, Leytonstone, E11 4ZG (1) Yosra NouiouraType of application: Order, pursuant to sections 40, 41, 43 & 44 Housing and Planning Act 2016
DECISION
Decision of the Tribunal(1) The Tribunal is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent landlord committed an offence under Section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004(2) The Tribunal has determined that it is appropriate to make a rent repayment order.(3) The Tribunal makes a rent repayment order in favour of the Applicants against the Respondent, in the sum of £12,330 (to be apportioned as set out below), to be paid within 28 days of the date of this decision: (i) The First Applicant - £6,165; (ii) The Second Applicant - £6,165.(4) The Tribunal determines that the Respondent shall pay the Applicants an additional £330 as reimbursement of Tribunal fees to be paid within 28 days of the date of this decision. Introduction[1]This is a decision on an application for a rent repayment order under section 41 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”). Application and Background[2]By an application dated 23 November 2024 (A2) the Applicants apply for a rent repayment order. The application is brought on the ground that the Respondent committed an offence of having control or management of an unlicensed House in Multiple Occupation (“HMO”) for failing to have an additional HMO licence (“licence”) for Flat 3, High Stone Apartments, 509 High Road, Leytonstone, E11 4ZG (“the Property”), an offence under section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”).[3]The Property is a three-bedroom flat.[4]It is alleged that the Property was a House in Multiple Occupation (“HMO”) from 26 September 2022-26 April 2024 but did not have a licence. The Property was rented to three people (the Applicants and one other, Ms. Strippoli, who is not a party to this application) who comprised three separate households. There are also allegations of poor property management, failure to address repairs, maintenance issue and inadequate fire safety handling/measures.[5]The Applicants seek a RRO. The total monthly rent was £1,970 and was split between the three tenants as follows: £685 (First Applicant), £685 (Second Applicant), £600 (Ms. Strippoli). The Applicants seek £16,440 (12 x (£685 x 2)).[6]On 20 February 2025 (A17) the Tribunal issued directions for the determination of the application, providing for the parties to provide details of their cases and the preparation of a hearing bundle. The directions stated that it was not clear for what period the RRO was sought and that the Applicants would need to specify this in their statement of reasons.[7]On 6 August 2025 (2A2) the hearing of the application was due to take place. The order from that hearing confirms that the Applicant’s attended, as did Ms. Dauhoo, from Haart, who were identified as the Respondent’s agent in the tenancy agreement and the application. She was unable to confirm whether the Respondent was aware of the application or whether it had appointed Haart to act as its representative at the hearing. The Tribunal confirmed that the outstanding issues were:(a) Whether the Respondent was aware of the application, given that the address for the Respondent given in the Application was an address for Haart, and the Tribunal had received no communications from the Respondent. The Bundle contained a letter from Legal for Lettings dated 23 February 2024 which gave an address for service for the Respondent landlord as 509-525 High Road Leytonstone London E11 4PG. Ms Dauhoo confirmed that this was the address of the Respondent;(b) Whether the Respondent wished to appoint Haart to represent it in connection with the application;(c) Whether the Bundle before the Tribunal contained sufficient evidence that an offence had been committed (the Tribunal needs to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that an offence has been committed);(d) That the Bundle before the Tribunal did not contain sufficient evidence of the payment to the Respondent of the rent claimed;(e) That the Applicants need to specify the twelve month period for which the Applicants seek the RRO.[8]Further directions were given. Documentation[9]The Applicants have provided a bundle of documents referred to comprising a total of 66 pages (references to which will be prefixed by “A__”). This includes a witness statement from Mr. Oredein (A63). There is a further bundle comprising 28 pages from the Applicants (references to which will be prefixed by “2A__”). This includes a joint witness statement from the Applicants (2AR13), a witness statement from the Second Applicant (2A17) and one from the First Applicant (AA19). They confirm that they rented the Property from 26 September 2022-25 April 2024, that the Respondent had a selective licence but the Property did not have an additional licence (2A13). It was said that the claim was for the period 26 April 2023-25 April 2024.[10]There is a bundle of 30 pages from the Respondent (refers to which will be prefixed by “R__”). This contains a witness statement (R12) from Mr. Gopalakrishnan, director of the Respondent company.[11]The Tribunal has had regard primarily to the documents to which it was referred during the hearing. Respondent’s position[12]Mr. Gopalakrisnan states in his witness statement (R12), in summary:(a) The tenancy agreement was managed by Haart and they had management responsibility;(b) He applied for a HMO licence in September 2022 and received it in March 2023. He has a HMO licence for all properties in High Stone except for the Property;(c) Rent was paid to Haart and he received the remainder after deduction of the percentage commission;(d) He was never approached by the Applicants;(e) The Respondent had worked for over 25 years with LB of Waltham Forst and Leytonstone Service Station and there is no history of wrong-doing;(f) Only one person approached Haart to sign the tenancy agreement. That person should have “given the other two friends, as family members” as then the HMO licence may not have been required, otherwise Haart would not have proceeded with the grant of the tenancy;(g) He had applied for a selective licence (R18);(h) The gas safety certificates, EPC and renting instructions were all provided;(i) Ms. Strippoli is not an applicant;(j) There has been damage to the property;(k) The mould was the tenants’ responsibility;(l) The Applicants were harassed from the streets and bicycles were stole, but there was CCTV in the Property and the Property was not unsafe;(m) Haart had not said that they had put three unrelated people in the Property.[13]The witness statement from Mr. Irudayaraj (see below) states, in summary:(a) He is a manager of the Respondent company. He states that he is fully aware of the facts of the case;(b) Haart has not been added as a respondent and the tenancy agreement was signed “between Haart” and the Applicants (although it is also stated that it was signed by Haart on behalf of the Respondent). It is said that the application should be struck out;(c) Haart takes management responsibility and Haart has not been authorised to represent the Respondent;(d) The Property had a selective licence;(e) Ms. Strippoli made the payments and is not an Applicant;(f) It was Haart’s decision as to who the tenants were;(g) The Applicant gave the wrong address for the Respondent;(h) Haart manages the Property. The Hearing[14]On the morning of the hearing, Mr. Gopalakrisnan sent an email to the Tribunal stating, among other things, that he had flu and was attending the doctor later that day (confirmation of an appointment was provided). He states that he has authorised his “manager”, Mr. Irudayaraj, to attend the hearing. Mr. Irudayaraj’s driving licence was provided as was the Mr. Gopalakrisnan’s passport. There was also a witness statement from Mr. Irudayaraj.[15]The Applicants attended the hearing in person.[16]Mr. Irudayaraj attended the hearing to represent the Respondent.[17]The Tribunal provided the Applicants with a hard copy of Mr. Irudayaraj’s witness statement. After allowing some time for them to read it, they confirmed that they had no objection to the Tribunal having regard to it (which it did).[18]The Tribunal confirmed with Mr. Irudayaraj that there was nothing about the earlier issue with the address of the Respondent that would affect matters going forward.[19]Mr. Irudayaraj confirmed that the block in which the Property was situated had nine flats, and Haart managed all of them. Haart collected the rent, set up tenancy agreements and would take commission. He said that the Respondent had no direct contact with tenants, that it had not seen any tenancy agreements and it did not hold keys to the Property.[20]The Second Applicant confirmed the joint witness statement at 2A13 and her witness statement at 2A17. She said that she had presented all the evidence she wished to rely upon.[21]The First Applicant confirmed the joint witness statement at 2A13 and her witness statement at 2A19.[22]Mr. Oredein did not attend the hearing.[23]The Applicants confirmed that Ms. Strippoli was not aware of the application and they did not have any contact with her. They had moved out in April 2024. They had made no attempt to contact her and they were not friends. They confirmed they had not been in receipt of Universal Credit or Housing Benefit during the tenancy and that they paid utilities (they were split between the three tenants). Ms. Strippoli had paid the rent to Haart and the Applicants transferred their share of the rent to her.[24]The First Applicant was asked about the rent in May 2023 (her document is at A26) which was £617. She said that sometimes the amount transferred to Ms. Strippoli was less than £685 because of bills. She was asked about the two payments made on 25 February 2024 and she said that the rent in November 2023 had not been paid because of the leak in the bedroom and she said she would only pay when it was fixed. It was paid in February 2025.[25]She confirmed the leak in the bedroom started in about November 2023 (there was some confusion about this). It started as a stain on the ceiling in bedroom. She reported it as soon as it started leaking by calling Haart but nothing was done – “Tony”, a friend of Mr. Gopalakrisnan came to the Property but nothing was done. She said that she thought the leak was from the boiler in the upstairs property. The stain was eventually covered but was not fixed. The leak did stop in about January 2024 (after the email at A55). She confirmed that there were no rent arrears.[26]Mr. Irudayaraj then asked her some questions.[27]The First Applicant confirmed that the leak started in around November 2023 with a stain, and then it started leaking and she reported it. She then chased that report with the email at A55. She confirmed that she did not have any evidence to show the original report in about November 2023 but she had spoken to Ulugbek, who was the branch manager. She was asked why she had sent the photographs in January 2024 and she said that she was chasing Haart as they were not getting back to her. She confirmed the Property was in a good condition when they moved in. Ms. Strippoli found the Property. They were all friends. The Applicants had lived together before and Ms. Strippoli worked with the Second Applicant. Ms. Strippoli dealt with Haart.[28]It was put to her that Haart was not informed that she would be moving in. She said that Haart did know that and they all signed the tenancy agreement. She said that they were all tenants, there was no “lead tenant” but it was agreed between them that Ms. Strippoli would send the rent money to Haart and they would split payments. She paid Council Tax, the Second Applicant paid the bills and Ms. Strippoli paid the rent.[29]The First Applicant said that after her complaint in January 2024, nothing happened, but at some point there was a reply. Haart said that they could not fix the issue until they had spoken to Mr. Gopalakrisnan.[30]The Applicant was taken to A58 and the emails set out there. She said that there were many issues with the Property and she always chased it and emailed. There was only one month’s rent not paid. It was confirmed that the email said that the rent for January 2023 would not be paid, but noted that the rent had been paid. She said that the issue was resolved and it was probably something to do with winter, pipes, or the boiler.[31]She confirmed they had a two-year fixed term, but they left before the end of the fixed term. She said that they gave notice before the s.21 notice.[32]The Tribunal asked Mr. Irudayaraj about the s.21 notice (A61) and the reason it was served. He said that the Respondent had not served it, Haart had, and the Respondent did not know about it. It was pointed out that the letter states that they were acting on behalf of the Respondent, but Mr. Irudayaraj said that it was not on the Respondent’s instructions.[33]Mr. Irudayaraj then asked the Second Applicant some questions.[34]The Second Applicant confirmed that she moved in on 26 September 2022. She said that she knew there was a vacancy at the Property as they were looking for 3-bedroom flat, and they found it on Right Move. Ms. Strippoli did the viewing and they all put in an offer. Ms. Strippoli was aware of the complaints about mould and the leak. She was asked why Ms. Strippoli had not sent a complaint about the leak in September 2023. The Second Applicant said that the First Applicant was occupying the room with the leak, so she dealt with it, but there were other complaints from her (the Second Applicant). She confirmed that her complaint was about health and safety (A51) in October 2023 about safety, the door, the fire safety panel. The Tribunal asked her if anything was done about the fire panel. She said it was not done immediately. She believed she had sent another email a month later and this time she took pictures. On 9 November she also complaint about the doors being broken. She confirmed that the fire panel had been fixed after about 1.5-2 months. She said that initially she noted that it had been blinking and she was concerned. She took a video and sent it to Haart. The system said there was a fire and she assumed there was something wrong. She confirmed that the photographs at A52 were not those sent with the email on 8 November 2023. She said that she had reported that the doors were broken, she reported it, but nothing had happened. She took the photographs at A52 as nothing was being done.[35]The Tribunal took Mr. Irudayaraj to A41 and he signed that the three tenants had signed it, as had Katie Hunter on behalf of the Respondent. He accepted that the Respondent was the Applicants’ landlord, that Haart were acting as agent and that the selective licence was issued in the name of the Respondent.[36]Mr. Irudayaraj confirmed that the Respondent had not produced anything setting out duties of Haart but he did refer to R30. He said that the Property had been given to Haart to put a family in there. He confirmed there was nothing produced showing the instructions to Haart, but he said that Haart must have known as they had experience in this field, it knew the Property had a selective licence, Haart knew not to put individuals in the Property. He was asked why the Respondent had not obtained a copy of the tenancy agreement. He said that Haart had not sent it and Haart did not want to disclose the identity of its tenants (it was clarified that they were the Respondent’s tenants). He confirmed that the selective licence was issued to the Respondent, and he said that the licence was given to Haart. The Tribunal confirmed with him that there was no witness statement from Haart.[37]Mr. Irudayaraj was asked about what Mr. Gopalakrisnan said (R12) that the tenants should have said they were family members. He said that they may have said that they were family members but confirmed that he had no information that this was the case.[38]He said that the light for a fire (A53) was always on. He confirmed that he had no fire safety training. He said that at the main door (A52) the magnet was broken. The Tribunal confirmed that the smoke detector said that zone 1 has been activated, it indicated that there was a fire in zone 1 and the sounders had been silenced. This indicated that something had set panel the off but the system had not been reset. He said that if Haart had let the Respondent know, they would have sent someone out straightaway. He said that the Respondent had put the fire panels in and he had an agreement with a maintenance company (for the external issues). He confirmed that for big issues, Haart would pass complaints to the Respondent, Haart would fix it and then bill the Respondent.[39]The Tribunal asked him if he wished to say anything about the allegations of a leak and mould. He referred to the tenancy agreement (A34), cl. 10.9. He stated that the plasterboard was taken out in January/February 2024. The Applicants said this was not the case. It was confirmed, however, that the photographs being referred to (A64) were not of the Property. The photographs of mould in the Property were at A56. As to the allegations concerning security, he said that if there was a complaint, the Respondent would send people within 24 hours. Mr. Irudayaraj confirmed that the Property did require an additional licence (but said that the Respondent did not know there were three unrelated occupants).[40]Mr. Irudayaraj said that Haart sent the s.21 notice as there was a complication with the rent. The First Applicant referred to R14 in which Mr. Gopalakrisnan said: “… The possession request was immediately made, as there is an emerging behaviour of damaging the property…. I had requested to provide notice for the landlord to repossession the property, using ‘Legal for Let Services’ on 23 Feb 2024 (See page 61 of the applicant bundle)…”.[41]A61 is the s.21 notice, which was served by Legal for Lettings. Mr. Irudayaraj was asked about this and why he had told the Tribunal that the Respondent did not know of or authorise service of the s.21 notice. He said that from his knowledge he did not know and that when he discussed the case with Mr. Gopalakrisnan, he said he did not say that. He confirmed that he did not read Mr. Gopalakrisnan’s witness statement before the hearing.[42]The Applicants confirmed that they paid one week’s rent as a deposit and entered into a deposit replacement scheme (A44) and after they had moved out, Haart asked them to pay about £1,000 for repairs.[43]Mr. Irudayaraj said that the Property was currently rented to a single household. He was asked how he knew this as it did not have a copy of the tenancy agreement. He said that when the Property was empty, the Respondent checked it. He was asked how it would know there were not three individuals living there, he said that when some works were carried out, he went there and saw one woman. He confirmed that no checks had been made (e.g. requesting the tenancy agreements) for the Property or any of the other flats and that they all still had selective licences.[44]Mr. Irudayaraj was asked if there was anything he wanted the Tribunal to know about the Respondent’s finances. He confirmed it owned the building with 9 flats (in which the Property was situate) but no others.[45]The Applicants then asked him some questions. He confirmed that the Property had a selective licence but there had been no application for an additional licence. He was referred to R14 and asked to note the reference to the ground floor. He confirmed that the Property was on the first floor. He confirmed that the matters at (2) at R14 were speculation. He was asked to comment on the assertion at R13 that the Applicants’ behaviour had not been right. He said that they knew the Property was in good condition, they knew was three people and they should have asked Haart if the Property had correct licence.[46]He was asked about R13 where Mr. Gopalakrisnan said that Haart had assured him that they were good tenants and about the assertion that the Respondent did not know who was living in the Property – they were three women with different names. He said that the Applicant might have told Haart that they were related but admitted he had no basis to assume that they were related. He confirmed that the Respondent carried out no checks. It was aware that they were three women.[47]Mr. Irudayaraj was asked about R14 and the assertion that Haart informed the Respondent that the Applicants were stopping the rent for the mould. It was noted that the rent was paid (it was stopped for one month for the mould as set out above but this was paid). He said that Haart informed the Respondent that the Applicants were stopping the rent and fighting.[48]Mr. Irudayaraj was asked about R12 and Mr. Gopalakrisnan’s assertion that he was always available to everyone at the Property and the First Applicant said that she had never been able to speak to him. Mr. Irudayaraj said that Mr. Gopalakrisnan was next to the flat every day, at the petrol station which he (or the Respondent) owned.[49]The Applicants said that the Property was next to a petrol station, and this caused concern over the fire panel.[50]Mr. Irudayaraj confirmed that all 9 flats had selective licences. Haart checked tenants, placed them in the flats and made sure the rent was paid. It would then pay the Respondent. and pay to us. Mr. Gopalakrisnan might have known that there were three people in the Property but did not know they were separate households. Haart did not inform the Respondent that they were putting three individuals in. They did not tell us to change licence. Any issue inside Haart informed us and sent pictures and they would send invoice for work they done.[51]Mr. Irudayaraj said that Haart was responsible. He said the Respondent’s duty was just when the Property was, to empty check everything was fine, which it did. He said that one of the tenants (of the 9 flats) damaged the external door but accepted it was not necessarily one of the Applicants. He said that the Respondent would attend any issues within 24 hours. He said that Ms. Strippoli had not made any complaints.[52]The First Applicant said that the tenancy was a horrible experience. She understands the Respondent was represented by an agent but the application was brought against the Respondent, who had not carried out checks. The Applicants lived in a property without a licence.[53]The Second Applicant said that most of the Respondent’s evidence was speculation. The Applicants had tried to deal with Haart and raise issues. They only found out about the licence position when they were asked to pay £1,000 for repairs.[54]When asked if there was any reason why the Respondent could not have checked the correct licence position, he said that normally they did not, they told Haart to put a family in the Property but accepted there was no reason the Respondent could not have checked.[55]The Applicants said that they believed they did receive the EPC and How to Rent booklet.[56]The Applicants confirmed that they only sought a RRO for their “share” of the rent.[57]If the application was successful, the Applicants asked for a RRO in the amount of 100%, Mr. Irudayaraj said it should be (if made) 10%.[58]The Applicants asked for reimbursement of Tribunal fees (application fee of £110 and hearing fee of £220). Mr. Irudayaraj had nothing to say about this. Statutory regime[59]The statutory regime is set out in Chapter 4 of Part 2 of the 2016 Act.[60]Rent repayment orders are one of a number of measures introduced with the aim of discouraging rogue landlords and agents and to assist with achieving and maintaining acceptable standards in the rented property market. The relevant provisions relating to rent repayment orders are set out in sections 40-46 Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016”) Act, not all of which relate to the circumstances of this case.[61]Part 2 of the Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”) introduced licensing for certain HMO’s. The Local Authority may designate an area to be subject to additional licencing where other categories of HMO’s occupied by three or more persons forming two or more households are required to be licenced.[62]Section 40 of the 2016 Act gives the Tribunal power to make a RRO where a landlord has committed a relevant offence. Section 40(2) explains that a RRO is an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing in England to repay an amount of rent paid by a tenant (or where relevant to pay a sum to a local authority). A relevant offence is an offence, of a description specified in a table in the section and that is committed by a landlord in relation to housing in England let by that landlord. The table includes s.72(1) Housing Act 2004. 41 Application for a rent repayment order(1) A tenant or a local housing authority may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies.(2) A tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if- (a) the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant, and (b) the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made …[63]Section 41 permits a tenant to apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed a specified offence, if the offence relates to housing rented by the tenant(s) and the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made. 43 Making of rent repayment order(1) The First-tier Tribunal may make a rent repayment order if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, that a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies (whether or not the landlord has been convicted).(2) A rent repayment order under this section may be made only on an application under section 41.(3) The amount of a rent repayment order under this section is to be determined in accordance with- (a) section 44 (where the application is made by a tenant); …[64]Under section 43, the Tribunal may only make a rent repayment order if satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt in relation to matters of fact, that the landlord has committed a specified offence (whether or not the landlord has been convicted). Where reference is made below to the Tribunal being satisfied of a given matter in relation to the commission of an offence, the Tribunal is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, whether stated specifically or not.[65]It has been confirmed by case authorities that a lack of reasonable doubt, which may be expressed as the Tribunal being sure, does not mean proof beyond any doubt whatsoever. Neither does it preclude the Tribunal drawing appropriate inferences from evidence received and accepted. The standard of proof relates to matters of fact. The Tribunal will separately determine the relevant law in the usual manner.[66]Where the application is made by a tenant, and the landlord has not been convicted of a relevant offence, s.44 applies in relation to the amount of a rent repayment order, setting out the maximum amount that may be ordered and matters to be considered. If the offence relates to HMO licensing, the amount must relate to rent paid by the Applicants in a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the Respondent was committing the offence. This aspect is discussed rather more fully below. 44 Amount of order: tenants(1) Where the First-tier Tribunal decides to make a rent repayment order under section 43 in favour of a tenant, the amount is to be determined in accordance with this section.(2) The amount must relate to rent paid during the period mentioned in the table. If the order is made on the ground that the landlord has committed The amount must relate to rent repaid by the tenant in respect of … An offence mentioned in row 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 of the table in section 40(3) A period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence …(3) The amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed- (a) the rent repaid in respect of that period, less (b) any relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.(4) In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account- (a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and (c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies. Determination of the Tribunal[67]The Tribunal has considered the application in four stages-(i) whether the Tribunal was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Respondent had committed an offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act in that at the relevant time the Respondent was a person who controlled or managed an HMO that was required to be licensed under Part 2 of the 2004 Act but was not so licensed.(ii) whether the Applicant was entitled to apply to the Tribunal for a rent repayment order.(iii) Whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to make a rent repayment order.(iv) Determination of the amount of any order. Was the Respondent the Applicants’ landlord at the time of the alleged offence?[68]The Tribunal finds as a fact, that the Respondent was the landlord of the Applicants (and Ms. Strippoli) for the period 26 September 2022-25 April 2024. The Respondent is listed as the landlord on the tenancy agreements (A27) as from 26 September 2022.[69]Mr. Irudayaraj states that Haart has not been joined to the application, but as stated above, the tenancy agreement named the Respondent as landlord and Haart as the landlord’s agent. Mr. Irudayaraj admitted that the Respondent was the Applicants’ landlord. The application has, therefore, properly been brought against the Respondent as landlord and the Tribunal is satisfied that the Respondent was the Applicants’ landlord at the material time.[70]The Tribunal considers the issue of reasonable excuse below. Was a relevant HMO licensing offence committed during the period 26 September 2022-26 April 2024 and by whom?[71]The Tribunal applies, as it must, the criminal standard of proof (s.43(1)).[72]The Tribunal finds that, during the relevant period(s), the Property was a “HMO” (s.254-259) and the Property required an additional licence (A113, A149) in order to be occupiable by three or more persons living in two or more separate households. The Tribunal is also satisfied that the Property was, at the material times, occupied by three people living in more than two separate households.[73]Section 72(1) of the 2004 Act is one of those listed in section 40 of the 2016 Act in respect of which the First-tier Tribunal may make a rent repayment order. The section provides that: “A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed… but is not so licensed”.[74]Section 61(1) states: “Every HMO to which this Part applies must be licensed under this Part unless-(a) a temporary exemption notice is in force in relation to it under section 62, or(b) an interim or final management order is in force in relation to it under Chapter 1 of Part 4”.[75]Section 55 states: “(1) This Part provides for HMOs to be licensed by local housing authorities where-(a) HMOs to which this Part applies (see subsection (2)), and(b) they are required to be licensed under this Part (see section 61(1)). (2) This Part applies to the following HMOs in the case of each local housing authority- (a) any HMO in the authority’s district which falls within any prescribed description of HMO, and (b) if an area is for the time being designated by the authority under section 56 as subject to additional licensing, any HMO in that area which falls within any description of HMO specified in the designation”.[76]The Respondent does not dispute the fact that there was no additional licence during the material period, but in any event, on the evidence, the Tribunal would have found (applying the criminal standard) that there was no additional licence in place during the material time (A49). Mr. Irudayaraj admitted that an additional licence was required but, in any event, the Tribunal would have found that an additional licence was required (2A16). There was a breach of s.72(1).[77]Where the Respondent would otherwise have committed an offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act, there is a defence if the Tribunal finds that there was a reasonable excuse pursuant to section 72(5). The standard of proof in relation to that is the balance of probabilities. Where the Tribunal makes findings of fact in relation to such an aspect of the case, it does so on the basis of which of the two matters it finds more likely. It does not need to be sure in the manner that it does with facts upon which the asserted commission of an offence is based.[78]The offence is strict liability (unless the Respondent had a reasonable excuse) as held in Mohamed v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2020] EWHC 1083. The intention or otherwise of the Respondent to commit the offence is not the question at this stage, albeit there is potential relevance to the amount of any award. The case authority of Sutton v Norwich City Council [2020] UKUT 90 (LC) in relation to reasonable excuse held that the failure of the company, as it was in that case, to inform itself of its responsibilities did not amount to reasonable excuse. The point applies just the same to individuals.[79]The Upper Tribunal gave guidance on what amounts to reasonable excuse defence was given in Marigold & Ors v Wells [2023] UKUT 33 (LC), D’Costa v D’Andrea & Ors [2021] UKUT 144 (LC) and in Aytan v Moore [2022] UKUT 027 (LC):(a) the Tribunal should consider whether the facts raised could give rise to a reasonable excuse defence, even if the defence has not been specifically raised by the Respondent;(b) when considering reasonable excuse defences, the offence is managing or being in control of an HMO without a licence;(c) it is for the Respondent to make out the defence of reasonable excuse to the civil standard of proof.(d) a landlord’s reliance upon an agent will rarely give rise to a defence of reasonable excuse. At the very least, the landlord would need to show that there was a contractual obligation on the part of the agent to keep the landlord informed of licensing requirements; there would need to be evidence that the landlord had good reason to rely on the competence and experience of the agent; and in addition, there would generally be a need to show that there was a reason why the landlord could not inform him/herself of the licensing requirements without relying upon an agent (e.g. because the landlord lived abroad).[80]The Tribunal finds that none of the tenants were related by blood and none of them were in a romantic relationship. The Tribunal also finds that there was no representation to this effect.[81]The tenancy agreement clearly identifies the two Applicants and Ms. Strippoli as tenants and was signed by the three tenants. It was therefore clear that there would be three occupants.[82]The Tribunal accepts that Haart was acting as agent for the Respondent, but there is no evidence of a contractual obligation on the part of Haart to keep the Respondent informed of licensing requirements. Further, there was no reason why the Respondent could not inform itself of the licensing requirements (as admitted by Mr. Irudayaraj). It could have requested the tenancy agreements or made inquiries as to the tenants.[83]The Respondent has not produced the agreement it had with Haart, or even any email or any other document to show the scope of instructions given to Haart.[84]In any event, on the evidence of Mr. Gopalakrisnan, he knew that there were three tenants, who were young women, i.e. it appears he knew that they were not a single household. This is supported by the fact that he states (R13): “… the Applicants (all had European names who could work and stay in the UK…. HAART assured me that they are good tenants. This is all I had required to accept the tenancy with due diligence done by Haart. Moreover, it has been helping young ladies be in a secure environment…”.[85]Mr. Gopalakrisnan states (R12) that the Applicants should have told Haart (untruthfully) that they were family members, so that an additional licence may not have been required – i.e. his position was that the Applicants should have lied to try to avoid the need for an additional licence.[86]Further, the Tribunal finds that the evidence of Mr. Gopalakrisnan and Mr. Irudayaraj lacked credibility. As stated above, Mr. Irudayaraj told the Tribunal that the Respondent (including himself and Mr. Gopalakrisnan) did not know of or authorise service of the s.21 notice (A61). The letter accompanying the notice states that it is being served on instruction from the Respondent and Mr. Gopalakrisnan’s own evidence (R14): “The possession request was immediately made, as there is an emerging behaviour of damaging in the interest of avoiding the payments… I had requested to provide notice for the landlord to repossess the property, using ‘Legal for Let Services’ on 23 Feb 2024 (See page 61 of the applicant bundle)…”.[87]Mr. Irudayaraj told the Tribunal that Mr. Gopalakrisnan told him that he (Mr. Gopalakrisnan) had known nothing of the notice, casting doubt on Mr. Gopalakrisnan’s evidence. Mr. Irudayaraj admitted he had not read the witness statement of Mr. Gopalakrisnan before attending the hearing.[88]The Tribunal therefore finds, on the balance of probabilities, that no reasonable excuse defence is made out.[89]The Tribunal finds that the offence was committed for the period of 26 September 2022-26 April 2024.[90]The next question is by whom the offence was committed. The Tribunal determined that the offence was committed by the Respondent, being the “person” within the meaning of s.71(1) and s.263 Housing Act 2004, who had control of the Property at the material time: the Respondent was listed as the immediate landlord on the tenancy agreement. In any event, the Respondent was the “person” managing the Property during the material time as it was the person who received the rent paid by the Applicants (albeit with commission deducted by Haart). Should the Tribunal make a RRO?[91]Given that the Tribunal is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the Respondent committed an offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act, a ground for making a rent repayment order has been made out.[92]Pursuant to the 2016, a rent repayment order “may” be made if the Tribunal finds that a relevant offence was committed. Whilst the Tribunal could determine that a ground for a rent repayment order is made out but not make such an order, Judge McGrath, President of this Tribunal, said whilst sitting in the Upper Tribunal in the London Borough of Newham v John Francis Harris [2017] UKUT 264 (LC) as follows: “I should add that it will be a rare case where a Tribunal does exercise its discretion not to make an order. If a person has committed a criminal offence and the consequences of doing so are prescribed by legislation to include an obligation to repay rent housing benefit then the Tribunal should be reluctant to refuse an application for rent repayment order”.[93]The very clear purpose of the 2016 Act is that the imposition of a rent repayment order is penal, to discourage landlords from breaking the law, and not to compensate a tenant, who may or may not have other rights to compensation. That must, the Tribunal considers, weigh especially heavily in favour of an order being made if a ground for one is made out.[94]The Tribunal is given a wide discretion and considers that it is entitled to look at all of the circumstances in order to decide whether or not its discretion should be exercised in favour of making a rent repayment order. The Tribunal determines that it is entitled to therefore consider the nature and circumstances of the offence and any relevant conduct found of the parties, together with any other matters that the Tribunal finds to properly be relevant in answering the question of how its discretion ought to be exercised.[95]Taking account of all factors, the evidence and submissions of the parties, including the purpose of the 2004 Act, the Tribunal exercises its discretion to make a rent repayment order in favour of the Applicants. The amount of rent to be repaid[96]Having exercised its discretion to make a rent repayment order, the next decision was how much should the Tribunal order?[97]In Acheampong v Roman [2022] UKUT 239 (LC) at [20] the Upper Tribunal established a four-stage approach for the Tribunal to adopt when assessing the amount of any order:(a) ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period;(b) subtract any element that represents payment for utilities;(c) consider the seriousness of the offence, both compared to other types of offences in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made and compared to other examples of the same type of offence. What proportion of the rent is a fair reflection of the seriousness of this offence? That percentage of the total amount applies for is the starting point; it is the default penalty in the absence of other factors, but it may be higher or lower in light of the final step;(d) consider whether any deductions from, or addition to, that figure should be made in light of the other factors set out in section 44(4)”.[98]In the absence of a conviction, the relevant provision is section 44(3) of the 2016 Act. Therefore, the amount ordered to be repaid must “relate to” rent paid in the period identified as relevant in section 44(2), the subsection which deals with the period identified as relevant in section 44(2), the subsection which deals with the period of rent repayments relevant. The period is different for two different sets of offences. The first is for offences which may be committed on a one-off occasion, albeit they may also be committed repeatedly. The second is for offences committed over a period of time, such as a licensing offence.[99]At [31] of Williams v Parmar [2021] UKUT 244 (LC) it was said: “… [the Tribunal] is not required to be satisfied to the criminal standard on the identity of the period specified in s.44(2). Identifying that period is an aspect of quantifying the amount of the RRO, even though the period is defined in relation to certain offences as being the period during which the landlord was committing the offence”.[100]The Tribunal is mindful of the various decisions of the Upper Tribunal in relation to rent repayment order cases. Section 44 of the 2016 Act does not when referring to the amount include the word “reasonable” in the way that the previous provisions in the 2004 Act did. Judge Cooke stated clearly in her judgement in Vadamalayan v Stewart and others (2020) UKUT 0183 (LC) that there is no longer a requirement of reasonableness. Judge Cooke noted (paragraph 19) that the rent repayment regime was intended to be harsh on landlords and to operate as a fierce deterrent. The judgment held in clear terms, and perhaps most significantly, that the Tribunal must consider the actual rent paid and not simply any profit element which the landlord derives from the property, to which no reference is made in the 2016 Act. The Upper Tribunal additionally made it clear that the benefit obtained by the tenant in having had the accommodation is not a material consideration in relation to the amount of the repayment to order. However, the Tribunal could take account of the rent including the utilities where it did so. In those instances, the rent should be adjusted for that reason.[101]In Vadamalayan, there were also comments about how much rent should be awarded and some confusion later arose. Given the apparent misunderstanding of the judgment in that case, on 6th October 2021, the judgment of The President of the Lands Chamber, Fancourt J, in Williams v Parmar [2021] UKUT 0244 (LC) was handed down. Williams has been applied in more recent decisions of the Upper Tribunal, as well as repeatedly by this Tribunal. The judgment explains at paragraph 50 that: “A tribunal should address specifically what proportion of the maximum amount of rent paid in the relevant period, or reduction from that amount, or a combination of both, is appropriate in all the circumstances, bearing in mind the purpose of the legislative provisions.”[102]The judgment goes on to state that the award should be that which the Tribunal considers appropriate applying the provisions of section 44(4). There are matters which the Tribunal “must, in particular take into account”. The Tribunal is compelled to consider those and to refer to them. The phrase “in particular” suggests those factors should be given greater weight than other factors. In Williams, they are described as “the main factors that may be expected to be relevant in the majority of cases”- and such other ones as it has determined to be relevant, giving them the weight that it considers each should receive. Fancourt J in Williams says this: “A tribunal must have particular regard to the conduct of both parties includes the seriousness of the offences committed), the financial circumstances of the landlord and whether the landlord has been convicted of a relevant offence, The Tribunal should also take into account any other factors that appear to be relevant.”[103]The Tribunal must not order more to be repaid than was actually paid out by the Applicants to the Respondent during that period (ignoring for these purposes a provision about universal credit not of relevance here). That is entirely consistent with the order being one for repayment. The provision refers to the rent paid during the period rather than rent for the period.[104]It was said, in Williams v Parmar, by Sir Timothy Fancourt [43] that the Rent Repayment Orders under the Housing and Planning Act 2016: Guidance for Local Authorities identifies the factors that a local authority should take into account in deciding whether to seek a Rent Repayment Order as being the need to: punish offending landlords; deter the particular landlord from further offences; dissuade other landlords from breaching the law; and remove from landlords the financial benefit of offending. It was indicated [51] that the factors identified in the Guidance will generally justify an order for repayment of at least a substantial part of the rent. It was also said that a full award of 100% of the rent should be reserved for the most serious of cases.[105]The Tribunal has carefully considered the amount of the rent for the relevant period of the licencing offence that should be awarded. Ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period[106]The relevant rent to consider is that paid during “a period, not exceeding twelve months, during which the landlord was committing the offence”.[107]The tenancy agreement (A30) states that the rent was £1,970 pcm.[108]The Applicants paid their share of the rent to Ms. Strippoli and she then paid the total sum to the Respondent. The Tribunal finds that Ms. Strippoli was acting as agent for the Applicants and the Applicants share of the total rent was paid to the Respondent.[109]The Applicants only seek a RRO in respect of their “share” of that rent but the Tribunal must deal with the issue of what the “whole of the rent” for the relevant period was. There is no issue that the Applicant was jointly and severally liable for the whole rent of £1,970 pcm. Ms. Ms. Strippoli is not an applicant and the time period for any application to be made by the other two tenants has expired (in Gurusinghe & Ors v Drumlin Ltd [2021] UKUT 268 (LC), the Upper Tribunal held that s.41(2)(b) prescribes a 12 months’ limitation period for applications for RRO’s and the Tribunal has no power to extend that limitation period).[110]In Moreira v Morrison [2023] UKUT 233 (LC) one tenant paid the rent on behalf of all of the tenants, but the tenant’s own “share” was one fifth. It was noted that, at first instance, the Tribunal had rejected the argument that the RRO should be calculated by reference to the whole of the rent on the basis that each tenant was jointly and severally liable. This was an issue on appeal and the Upper Tribunal said: “11. At paragraph 25 of its decision the FTT said this: ‘Section 44 of the 2016 Act deals with the calculation of an RRO. By section 44(2), ‘[t]he amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed – (a) the rent paid in respect of that period…’. As the terminology of the section (and indeed, this Part of the Act as a whole) makes clear, a rent repayment order is made in respect of an individual tenant. The part does not refer to a tenant’s liability to pay rent, but rather to what rent he or she has actually paid. That concrete payment is in issue is reinforced by the reference to the landlord being obliged (i.e. by an order) to ‘repay’. That implies (as does the title of the order itself) that the order is limited to that which was paid in the first place. If an order could amount to more than what was paid by an individual tenant, if would not be a repayment’.[12]I believe that the intention was to refer to section 44(3), since that is the provision quoted. I respectfully agree with the FTT’s analysis; the word ‘repayment’ is crucial. An order that the landlord pay to the tenant a sum that he or she might have had to pay but had not in fact paid, that would not be a repayment.[13]Moreover, the tenants’ arguments ignores the wording of section 44(2), which says that the amount of the rent repayment order ‘must relate to the rent paid during the period mentioned in the table’ and sets out a table with two columns. The left hand column lists the offences and the right hand column is headed ‘the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of’ (emphasis added) and then lists the relevant periods for the different offences, the period for a section 72(1) offence being a period not exceeding twelve months during which the landlord was committing the offence. So what is relevant is payment by the tenant, not liability to pay, and not payment by anyone else”.[111]The Judge also said: “23. A rent repayment order must be an order for repayment of what an applicant has paid and not of what they might have to pay in circumstances that did not arise, for example where one of their fellow tenants had failed to pay their contribution. That is obviously correct as a matter of language, and I do not see that fairness to the tenants requires any other construction; I do not agree that their joint and several liability for the rent makes it fair that a rent repayment order should be calculated by reference to rent they have not paid.[24]Moreover to do so would be very unfair to the landlord. It would mean that each tenant could apply alone for a rent repayment order and each could receive a rent repayment order calculated by reference to the whole rent, with draconian consequences for the landlord. A rent repayment order is itself a penalty; to multiply it in that way cannot be right and is not an available construction of the statutory language”.[112]The Tribunal therefore finds that the whole of the rent for the relevant period was the total of the Applicants’ shares for this period.[113]The Tribunal has some evidence of payments (A25-6) but it is agreed between the parties that there were no arrears of rent at the end of the tenancy.[114]None of the Applicants were in receipt of Universal Credit or Housing Benefit.[115]The whole of the rent (paid by the two Applicants) for the relevant period is therefore £16,440. Deductions for utilities?[116]The Applicants were liable for all charges in respect of supply and use of utilities and so no deductions are made in this regard. Seriousness of Offence[117]In Williams v Parmar [2021] UKUT 244 (LC) it was said that “the circumstances and seriousness of the offending conduct of the landlord are comprised in the ‘conduct of the landlord’, so the First Tier Tribunal may, in an appropriate case, order a lower than maximum amount of rent repayment, if what a landlord did or failed to do in committing the offence is relatively low in the scale of seriousness of mitigating circumstances or otherwise”.[118]As the Upper Tribunal has made clear, the conduct of the Respondent also embraces the culpability of the Respondent in relation to the offence that is the pre-condition for the making of the Rent Repayment Order. The offence of controlling or managing an unlicensed HMO is a serious offence, although it is clear from the scheme and detailed provisions of the 2016 Act that it is not regarded as the most serious of the offences listed in section 40(3).[119]In Daff v Gyalui [2023] UKUT 134 (LC) it was highlighted that there will be more and less serious examples within the category of offence: [49].[120]The Tribunal determines that the relatively less serious offence committed by the Respondent (i.e. a licensing offence) should be reflected in a deduction from the maximum amount in respect of which a RRO could be made.[121]In Newell v Abbot [2024] UKUT 181 (LC) was an appeal with a number of material similarities to the instant case. In Newell, the appropriate starting point was determined to be 60% of the rent paid. The tribunal took into account that(a) The Respondent is an amateur as opposed to a professional landlord.(b) The breach which occurred was inadvertent.(c) The property was in good condition; and(d) A licencing offence was committed (section 95(1), HA 2004).[122]The Tribunal does find that this is a more serious case than Newell in that the instant case concerned an additional licence and the Respondent cannot be described as an amateur landlord. It is accepted that the Property was generally in a good condition (dealt with more fully under the heading of “conduct”).[123]The starting point for the Tribunal, taking account of this, is that a RRO should be made, reflecting 70% of the total rent paid for the relevant period. Conduct[124]The Tribunal takes into account the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, the financial circumstances of the landlord and whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which Chapter 4 of the 2016 Act applies when considering the amount of such order. Whilst those listed factors must therefore be taken into account, and the Tribunal should have particular regard to them, they are not the entirety of the matters to be considered: other matters are not excluded from consideration. Any other relevant circumstances should also be considered, requiring the Tribunal to identify whether there are such circumstances and, if so, to give any appropriate weight to them.[125]Allegations are made about the conduct of the Respondent:(a) Inadequate security, including broken doors, leading to unauthorised individuals gaining access;(b) Malfunctioning panel on the fire alarm system;(c) Leaks from the ceiling and mould growth of which the Respondent was notified;(d) Unlawful eviction notice (A61).[126]The Tribunal finds as follows:(a) The Property was new when the Applicants moved in and it was, generally, in a good condition;(b) A s.21 notice was served at a time when it could not lawfully be served (as there was no additional licence) but this was at a time when the Applicants were planning to leave in any event (A60 - so no adjustment is made in respect of this);(c) There was an issue with the main door as of January 2023 (A56). Haart’s response was that they were not responsible for it (A51). It was ongoing in October and November 2023 (A51, A52) and in January 2024 (A55). Mr. Irudayaraj’s response (that one of the tenants of the block must have been damaging it) did not adequately address the issue or the Respondent’s responsibilities;(d) There was an issue with a leak to the ceiling of one bedroom (which was not resolved for some time (A56, A54, A55, A58);(e) There was some mould in the Property. The Tribunal had no evidence as to the cause (i.e. whether it was lifestyle or whether it fell within the Respondent’s repairing obligations), but in any event, it was relatively minor (A57);(f) There was an issue with the fire detection panel, meaning that it was showing a fire in Zone 1 for some time (A51, A53). As the Property is situated next to a petrol station, the Tribunal accepts that this must have been a concern for the Applicants;(g) Whilst reports may have been made to Haart, the Respondent was the Applicants’ landlord and these issues were the Respondent’s responsibility. If there were issues between Haart and the Respondent that is a matter between them, not does not affect the Respondent’s liability in this regard.[127]Whilst there was a general allegation made by Mr. Gopalakrisnan that there had been damage to the Property, this has not been made out.[128]Mr. Irudayaraj alleged that the Applicants should have checked the licence position, but the legal obligation is on the Respondent and the Respondent could (and should) have checked the position.[129]Taking account of this and balancing all the factors, the Tribunal makes an adjustment to the amount of the RRO in the amount of 5%, i.e. deciding that a RRO should be made, reflecting 75% of the total rent paid for the relevant period. Whether landlord convicted of an offence[130]Section 44(4)(c) of the 2016 Act requires the Tribunal to take into account whether the Respondent has at any time been convicted of any of the offences listed in section 40(3). The Respondent has no such convictions. Financial circumstances of the Respondent[131]The Tribunal takes account of what it was told about the financial circumstances of the Respondent and makes no adjustment. The amount of the repayment[132]The Tribunal determines that, in order to reflect the factors discussed above, the maximum repayment amount should be discounted by 25% (i.e. the fine is 75% of the rent paid in the material period). The Tribunal therefore orders under s.43(1) of the 2016 Act that the Respondent repay to the Applicants the total sum of £12, 330:(i) The First Applicant - £6,165;(ii) The Second Applicant - £6,165.[133]The Tribunal has had regard to all the circumstances in setting a time for payment, including the amount of the RRO. Application for refund of fees[134]The Applicants asked the Tribunal to award the fees paid in respect of the application should they be successful, namely reimbursement of the issue fee and the hearing fee. The Tribunal does order the Respondent to pay all of the fees paid by the Applicants and so the sum of £330. Judge Sarah McKeown 7 January 2026 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber)