Mr Jonathas MassuiaApplicant(1) Ms Badr-un-Nisa Anwar (2) Ms Najm Anwar (3) Ms Khalida AnwarRespondent
Before
Judge Mark JonesMrs Louise Crane MCIEHn/a for the ApplicantIn person Tenant’s application for a Rent for the RespondentVenue 10 Alfred Place, London WC1E 7LRDate 14 April 2025Hearing 2025-04-14Property: 92 Millfield Avenue, London, E17 5HLType of application: Repayment Order Rule 13 Costs Application Judge Mark Jones
DECISION
2 Decisions of the tribunal(1) The Applicant’s application for a Rent Repayment Order is dismissed.(2) The Tribunal finds that the Applicant has not acted unreasonably in bringing or conducting proceedings, and dismisses the Respondents’ application for an award of costs under Rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013. The RRO Application - Introduction[1]By application dated 01 August 2024, the Applicant tenant applied for a rent repayment order (“RRO”) against the Respondent landlords under sections 40-44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”).[2]Section 40 of the 2016 Act confers power on the First-Tier Tribunal to make an RRO where a landlord has committed an offence to which the section applies. Such offences are specified in a table contained in the section, which are committed by a landlord in relation to housing in England let by that landlord.[3]The basis for the application was that it was alleged that the Respondents committed an offence of having control of, and/or managing, an unlicensed house in multiple occupation (“HMO”) which was required to be licensed, contrary to Part 2, section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”), which is an offence under section 40(3) of the 2016 Act.[4]The subject property is a five-bedroom house comprised of two floors. The Applicant alleged that between 16 February 2023 and 13 March 2024 there were 3 or more unrelated occupants residing in the property, sharing the kitchen, living room, bathroom and wc facilities, constituting an HMO under the additional licensing scheme ordered by the local housing authority, the London Borough of Waltham Forest (“LBWF”).[5]The Applicant sought an RRO for the period 16 February 2023 to 16 February 2024, in the sum of £7,095.[6]Directions in the matter were given on 1 November 2024. In compliance with those directions, the Applicant and then the Respondents each submitted bundles of documents, the Applicant’s bundle comprising some 126 pages, and the Respondent’s bundle some 88 pages.[7]The Tribunal did not inspect the property as it considered the documentation and information before it in the parties’ bundles enabled it to proceed with the hearing and this determination. 3 The Basis for the Application[8]The Applicant’s application was predicated on his assertion that the property was required to be licensed, but was not so licensed, during the period in issue. This was based upon information that he had been provided with by officers or employees working for LBWF.[9]On 11 June 2024, Ms Galia Stefanova, (then) a Licensing Enforcement Officer employed in LBWF’s Private Sector Housing team, emailed the Applicant in the following terms: “Dear Jonathas, “Thank you for your email. Further to my visit last week and our conformation (sic). I can confirm that there was no licence in place since 26/5/2022, after the previous one expired.”[10]In reliance upon that information, as the Tribunal infers, the Applicant sent a letter before action to the Respondents dated 15 July 2024, articulating his claim to be entitled to seek an RRO, stating “...An investigator from Waltham Forest Council has confirmed that this property has not had a valid licence in place since 26 May 2022, following the expiration of the previous licence.”[11]The Respondent Ms Badr Anwar responded to the letter before action on behalf of all Respondents, by email dated 16 July 2024. The email did not positively state that a valid licence subsisted, but rather approached the issue somewhat obliquely, thus: “From this you are assuming that I am unlawfully renting out my property. “If that were the case, then the Council would have taken appropriate action against me.”[12]After issue of his application in August 2024 and the directions of 1 November 2024, it appears that the Applicant made further enquiries of LBWF prior to the deadline of 18 December to file his bundle. These elicited the following response from Ms Sharon Smith, Private Sector Housing & Licensing Assistant, Regulatory Services, Neighbourhoods and Environment Directorate employed by LBWF, by email dated 04 December 2024: “Dear Jonathas, “Thank you for your email. 4 “I can confirm that the property known as 92 Millfield Avenue E17 5HL if it was being rented to 3 unrelated individuals between the dates advised 16 February 2023 to 15 July 2024. During this period - up until 13 March 2024 would have required an Additional HMO licence. “I can confirm that there was no such licence in place for your reported dates. The property would have required an Additional HMO licence.”[13]These emails were each included in the Applicant’s evidence bundle, which also included a witness statement in which he referred to the former. The Respondents’ Response[14]The Respondents’ Statement of Reasons for opposing the Application stated, at §23, that the Applicant had been informed by text message that the property was licensed, and referred to confirmation that it was licensed, contained in an email dated 06 June 2022 from a Private Sector Housing & Licensing Enforcement Officer named Ms Elizabeth Fletcher. The relevant paragraph continued: “During this period there were delays by the Council. If the licence was not issued, then it is the Council’s responsibility to issue it as confirmed by Elizabeth Fletcher in her email dt. 06 June 2022 ... as the application had been made in 2021 and the full five-year fee paid.”[15]The text message in the Respondents’ bundle takes things little further forward, while the relevant parts of the email from Ms Fletcher dated 06 June 2022 referred to read as follows: “...Mr Carr’s email does not state that the HMO use is lawful. “The council have now made additional checks and noted that the property has been in use since 2007 as a house in multiple occupation and in light of this the licence will be varied for the full five year term from the date of first issue. “The licence fee is not pro rata and the full fee is payable irrespective of the licence being granted for one year or five years. “A copy of the varied licence will be sent to you once the variation has been actioned.”[16]The Respondents each signed witness statements. These were principally concerned with various allegations made regarding the property and their conduct by the Applicant, and with their own accounts of his conduct. Very little was said about the issue of licensing, being confined to (just) a very short paragraph in the statement of Ms Badr- 5 un -Nisa Anwar, viz “I am a law-abiding citizen and have complied with all the rules/regulations for an HMO.”[17]Thus were the parties’ respective positions articulated in advance of the hearing. On Thursday 10 April the Respondents submitted a skeleton argument, a schedule of loss and an article taken from the Landlord Today website, which transpired to be a reference to Judge Jones’ decision in Boulema and ors. v Hoppe-Foster Ventures Limited, Case ref. LON/00BE/HMF/2024/0191. The Respondents’ purpose in referring to that case, in which the Tribunal found that LB Southwark had provided a succession of demonstrably inaccurate information to parties, was to illustrate a point in the skeleton argument to the effect that it was a known fact that council records were not updated. The Withdrawal Application[18]At 12.16 pm on Friday 11 April 2025, the working day before the hearing, the Applicant emailed the Tribunal to request the withdrawal of his application for an RRO. The email was accompanied by 3 documents, viz:(i) An email from the aforementioned Ms Fletcher of LBWF, dated 11 April 2025 and timed at 11.44 ;(ii) An explanatory letter; and(iii) A draft form of consent to withdrawal.[19]The Applicant’s letter explained that he had on that very day, 11 April 2025, received information from LBWF which confirmed that the property was subject to a valid HMO licence granted on 26 May 2021, which should have been varied to expire on 25 May 2026. He explained that the council had confirmed that the failure to vary the licence at the time was due to an internal system error.[20]The email from Ms Fletcher corroborated this account, as follows: “Dear Jonathas, “Thank you for your email, and please accept my apologies for the delay in responding. “I can confirm that the licence granted on 26th May 2021 should have been varied to expire on 25th May 2026. However, due to a system error, this was unfortunately missed and not actioned at the time. “We have since informed the landlord of the error and confirmed that the licence should have been varied until 25th May 2026 and any 6 enforcement action regarding failure to licence has now been withdrawn. “Please do let me know if you have any other queries regarding this matter.”[21]The Respondents replied by email received at 15.19 on 11 April to the effect that they did not consent to the withdrawal of the application, and that they wished to apply for their costs.[22]Upon considering those emails, Judge Jones directed that the hearing listed for 14 April 2o25 would proceed, and the Tribunal would hear the parties’ submissions. This was communicated to the parties by email late in the afternoon of 11 April. The Hearing[23]The Applicant did not attend the hearing. No reasons were communicated to the Tribunal.[24]All three Respondents attended. Each addressed us: the majority of submissions were made by Ms Badr-un-Nisa Anwar, and Ms Kalida Anwar and Ms Najm Anwar assisted with additional submissions on occasions. Decision - RRO[25]Part 2 of the 2004 Act relates to the designation of areas subject to additional licensing of HMOs. Section 72 specifies a number of offences in relation to the licensing thereof, and provides where relevant to this case: (1) A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part … but is not so licensed. (4) In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) it is a defence that, at the material time- (b) an application for a licence had been duly made in respect of the house under section 63, and that ... application was still effective... (5) In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) … it is a defence that he had a reasonable excuse … for having control of or managing the house in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1) …, or for failing to comply with the condition . 7[26]The evidence discussed above demonstrated either that a valid HMO licence had been in force in respect of the property from 26 May 2021, which will remain extant to 25 May 2026, or that a valid application had been made to convert or extend a licence initially granted on 26 May 2021 for a period of one year to a 5-year licence, but due to internal errors on the part of LBWF the appropriate action had not been taken at the time.[27]In the first instance, it would amount to a complete defence to a claim based upon an alleged absence of the appropriate licence.[28]The alternative would engage the defence provided by s.72(4)(b), that an application for the appropriate licence had been duly made.[29]We are also satisfied that these circumstances would amount to a ‘reasonable excuse’ under s.72(5).[30]Accordingly, it is clear to the Tribunal that the alleged offence was not committed by the Respondents, and we so find.[31]In the circumstances, against the Applicant’s request to withdraw his application, the Respondents’ objections to such course, the Applicant’s failure to attend the hearing and the Respondents’ desire to make certain further representations, the Tribunal considers it appropriate not to grant consent for the withdrawal, but rather to dismiss the application. Rule 13 Costs Application[32]Somewhat unusually, we were persuaded to hear the Respondents’ oral application that they be awarded their costs of the RRO application, where this had been specifically mentioned in the Respondents’ statement of case, and the grounds articulated in their skeleton argument circulated in advance of the hearing. The Law[33]Rule 13 of the Tribunal Rules provides, insofar as is relevant to this application (emphasis added):[13]Orders for costs, reimbursement of fees and interest on costs (1) The Tribunal may make an order in respect of costs only: (b) if a person has acted unreasonably in bringing, defending or conducting proceedings in— 8 ...... (ii) a residential property case;[34]In Willow Court Management Company (1985) Ltd v Alexander [2016]UKUT 290 (LC), the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) gave guidance on how First-tier Tribunals (“FTTs”) should apply Rule 13. The UT for the case consisted of the Deputy President of the UT and the President of the FTT.[35]The UT set out a three-stage test:(i) Has the person acted unreasonably applying an objective standard?(ii) If unreasonable conduct is found, should an order for costs be made, or not?(iii) If so, what should the terms of the order be?[36]In Willow Court, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205, where the Court considered the meaning of ‘unreasonable’. Both cases were considered and approved in Kathryn Anne Lea (and other leaseholders) v GP Ilfracombe Management Company Limited [2024] EWCA Civ 1241, where Lord Justice Coulson referred to the authorities as follows: “In Ridehalgh v Horsefield ... the Court of Appeal was concerned with wasted costs orders. One of the requirements for such an order is that the conduct must be ‘unreasonable’. Sir Thomas Bingham MR (as he then was) said at 232 E-G: “‘Unreasonable’ also means what it has been understood to mean in this context for at least half a century. The expression aptly describes conduct which is vexatious, designed to harass the other side rather than advance the resolution of the case, and it makes no difference that the conduct is the product of excessive zeal and not improper motive. But conduct cannot be described as unreasonable simply because it leads in the event to an unsuccessful result or because other more cautious legal representatives would have acted differently. The acid test is whether the conduct permits of a reasonable explanation. If so, the course adopted may be regarded as optimistic and as reflecting on a practitioner’s judgment, but it is not unreasonable.”[37]The UT noted at §25 of Willow Court: 9 “...for a lay person to be unfamiliar with the substantive law or with tribunal procedure, to fail properly to appreciate the strengths or weaknesses of their own or their opponent's case, to lack skill in presentation, or to perform poorly in the tribunal room, should not be treated as unreasonable.”[38]It added at §32 of Willow Court: “...In the context of rule 13(1)(b) we consider that the fact that a party acts without legal advice is relevant at the first stage of the inquiry. When considering objectively whether a party has acted reasonably or not, the question is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances in which the party in question found themselves would have acted in the way in which that party acted. In making that assessment it would be wrong, we consider, to assume a greater degree of legal knowledge or familiarity with the procedures of the tribunal and the conduct of proceedings before it, than is in fact possessed by the party whose conduct is under consideration. The behaviour of an unrepresented party with no legal knowledge should be judged by the standards of a reasonable person who does not have legal advice. The crucial question is always whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the party has acted unreasonably in the conduct of the proceedings.”[39]As to whether, if unreasonable conduct is found, the Tribunal should make a costs order, this is a question of exercise of discretion on the part of the Tribunal. As expressed at §28 of Willow Court: “A decision that the conduct of a party has been unreasonable does not involve an exercise of discretion but rather the application of an objective standard of conduct to the facts of the case. If there is no reasonable explanation for the conduct complained of, the behaviour will properly be adjudged to be unreasonable, and the threshold for the making of an order will have been crossed. A discretionary power is then engaged and the decision maker moves to a second stage of the inquiry. At that second stage it is essential for the tribunal to consider whether, in the light of the unreasonable conduct it has found to have been demonstrated, it ought to make an order for costs or not...”[40]As explained at para 40 of Willow Court, there is no need for a causal link between the behaviour complained about and the costs incurred: “Unreasonable conduct is a condition of the FTT's power to order the payment of costs by a party, but once that condition has been satisfied the exercise of the power is not constrained by the need to establish a causal nexus between the costs incurred and the behaviour to be sanctioned...”[41]The unreasonable conduct is not irrelevant, as identified at §42 of Willow Court: 10 “...the unreasonable conduct, its nature, extent and consequences are relevant factors to be taken into account in deciding whether to make an order for costs and the form of the order...”[42]The Court of Appeal in Lea approved and followed those earlier decisions. Several other points of principle were made in the case. Firstly, neither Ridehalgh nor Willow Court decide that unreasonable conduct must involve vexatious conduct or harassment. Secondly, deciding whether there has been unreasonable conduct and, if so, whether an adverse order for costs should be made, is a fact-specific exercise. A good practical rule is for the Tribunal to ask: ‘would a reasonable person, acting reasonably, have acted in this way? Is there a reasonable explanation for the conduct in issue?’[43]Tribunals should not be over-zealous in detecting unreasonable conduct after the event. As noted in “Service Charges” (Tanfield Chambers, 5th edn.) at §32-37, “the approach in Willow Court is restrictive, and it is clear that r.13(1)(b) orders will be the exceptions, and not the rule.” Analysis[44]The Respondents’ submissions were wide-ranging: what follows is a brief synopsis of what appear to the Tribunal to be the most pertinent points.[45]First (chronologically) they raise a series of complaints concerning the Applicant’s alleged conduct whilst he was their tenant, and his (alleged) distortion, exaggeration and dishonesty in making claims as to the poor state of the property. In this regard, they refer the Tribunal to the decisions of the FTT in Angelini and anor. v Want-Sibley LON/00AU/HMF/2023/0218, and in Leibel v Baird CHI/29UC/HMF/2020/0035, as persuasive in relation to making false allegations in respect of proceedings.[46]While these issues may have been of relevance in considering the amount of any RRO based upon grounds of alleged conduct, it does not assist the Tribunal in its consideration of the questions that arise under Rule 13. Ms Anwar complained that by failing to attend she had been denied the opportunity to put questions to the Applicant: given the dismissal of his application, it is highly unlikely that the Tribunal would have permitted cross-examination in relation to an application for costs, even had the Applicant attended. The Tribunal has heard no evidence, and consequently declines to make any finding of fact that the Applicant, or any other party has embroidered his evidence, as alleged.[47]Second, the Respondents assert that by contacting LBWF, arranging for a visit by Ms Stefanova, and soliciting information from her regarding the licensing situation, the Applicant behaved deceitfully, when he should (on the Respondents’ case) have simply asked them whether they had a licence. 11[48]The Tribunal rejects this argument: in seeking information as to whether his landlord had, or had not complied with the statutory licensing regime in force, there was nothing reprehensible in seeking information from the local housing authority. Indeed, it would have been very surprising had the Applicant not done so, in circumstances where he suspected there might be a breach.[49]It is highly regrettable that the information then provided by LBWF to the Applicant, in the course of their inspection and then by email dated 11 June 2024, was demonstrably inaccurate. Had that email contained a true account of matters, it appears to the Tribunal that the present application would most probably never have been brought. The misinformation was, however, demonstrably not the Applicant’s fault and is entirely to be laid at the door of LBWF.[50]The Respondents’ third contention was that the letter before action dated 15 July 2024 amounted to coercion, blackmail and extortion, in that it contained the intimation of the commencement of proceedings, against a demand for money.[51]The sense of moral outrage that Ms Badr-un-Nisa Anwar sought to convey in this regard was somewhat diluted by the tenor of her response, dated 16 July 2024, in which she intimated a claim or counterclaim against the Applicant for harassment, for damages of £15,000, and threatened to report him to the police for extortion. In response to questions from the Tribunal, Ms Anwar confirmed that none of those steps had in fact been taken, some 9 months later.[52]We reject the Respondents’ characterisation of the letter before action. While doubtless an unpleasant piece of correspondence for the Respondents to receive, it was politely phrased, dealt with a series of factual assertions, and made an open offer of settlement of the Applicant’s claim. It was by its terms on all fours with the recommendations of the Practice Direction – Pre-Action Conduct and Protocols, and we find that it was an entirely proper letter to have been sent, in the circumstances, based upon the information provided to the Applicant by LBWF’s officer. Indeed, the Tribunal encourages the sending of such letters as a precursor to any legal proceedings, in an effort to seek resolution of disputes before applications are filed and the temperature of disputes inevitably raised.[53]The response to the letter before action did not, as might be expected, contain a positive assertion that the Respondents or some of them were in possession of a valid licence. Rather, the most it stated on the topic was the assertion, that we have found to have been oblique, set out in §11 of this decision. We find that the email dated 16 July 2024 was far from clear as to the Respondents’ position in relation to the allegation that they lacked the requisite licence and somewhat inexplicably did not attach any form of correspondence to seek to demonstrate that the appropriate licence was held, or had at least been applied for. 12[54]In considering the reasonableness of the Applicant’s conduct, the Tribunal cannot ignore the fact that LBWF reinforced its misinformation by the email dated 4 December 2024, addressed in §12, above. Put shortly, given the repeated advice from the council to the effect that no licence was in existence, it was (we find) entirely reasonable of the Applicant to consider that his case was well founded, and to comply with the directions given by the Tribunal.[55]The Respondents’ best point, we find, was the reference to their statement of case, supporting witness evidence and the production of the email dated 06 February 2022, served on or about 03 February 2025. Ms Anwar’s submission was to the effect that having been provided with that body of evidence, it was unreasonable of the Applicant to continue with his claim, and he should have withdrawn it shortly thereafter.[56]We disagree, for the following reasons.[57]First, the statement of the Respondents’ position in the Statement of Reasons was equivocal. As set out at §14 of this decision, it included the words “...If the licence was not issued, then it is the Council’s responsibility to issue it as confirmed by Elizabeth Fletcher in her email dt. 06 June 2022...” That, we find, was far from a clear and unambiguous assertion that a valid licence existed, and indeed admitted of the proposition that it might not have been, albeit that responsibility in that case was attributed to LBWF.[33]Second, the witness statement of Ms Badr-un-Nisa Anwar said almost nothing about the question of licensing, and once more contained no positive assertion that a valid licence had been obtained or applied for, being confined to the words, “I am a law-abiding citizen and have complied with all the rules/regulations for an HMO.”[58]That, we find, rather begged the question(s), what rules and regulations did Ms Anwar assert she had followed?[59]The statements of Ms Khalida Anwar and of Ms Najm Anwar were silent as to the issue of licensing.[60]That leaves the email of 06 June 2022 to be considered. Its terms are set out in §15 above. It does not state definitively that a licence has been granted, rather it states that a licence “will be varied for the full five year term from the date of first issue.” It is silent as to what date of first issue that might be, and it is wholly unclear from that email what five-year period might be included.[61]The paragraph regarding the licence fee can be understood in two ways, either as an acknowledgment that no further fee need be paid, or alternatively that money was due: “...the full fee is payable...” This creates an absence of clarity as to whether the licence under discussion was contingent upon payment. 13[62]The assertion that a copy of the varied licence would be sent out once the variation had been actioned rather begs the question, why had the Respondents not produced such varied licence, either in response to the letter before action, or in their evidence bundle prepared for the Tribunal.[63]Further clarity might be inferred from Ms Khalida Anwar’s previous email of 31 May 2022, to which Ms Fletcher responded, but of itself we find that the email of 06 June 2022 does not establish beyond peradventure what LBWF had, or had not granted in respect of the property, or for what period, and raises a series of questions.[64]We therefore do not accept Ms Anwar’s submission that it was most unreasonable of the Applicant to continue with his application after receiving that evidence. We find that what a reasonable person, acting reasonably might do at such stage, was to ask further questions of LBWF as to the meaning of the information provided.[65]That is, self-evidently, what the Applicant did. That his enquiry had been outstanding for some time may be discerned from the opening line of Ms Fletcher’s email of 11 April 2025: “...please accept my apologies for the delay in responding.”[66]That email established, for the first time in the chronological development of the matter, that LBWF had erred in not extending the licence first granted on 26 May 2021 to be validated or extended until the expiry date of 25 May 2026.[67]We find that none of the information provided by the Respondents in their evidence bundle enabled those matters to be discerned with any degree of clarity.[68]The Applicant’s response, upon receipt of that email, was commendable. Obviously realising its import, he almost immediately forwarded a copy to the Tribunal and the Respondents, and entirely properly sought to withdraw his application, providing what we find was a candid account of how the information had come to light so late in his explanatory letter.[69]Lastly, Ms Anwar submits that it was wholly unreasonable of the Applicant not to have attended the hearing. It is regrettable that he did not, as against the direction given late on Friday 11 April, and that he did not contact the Tribunal to explain his absence. Nevertheless, we do not consider that the Respondents were caused any unfair prejudice by his non-attendance, and against the evidence produced on 11 April and his application to withdraw, we do not find his failure to attend as and of itself to constitute unreasonable conduct within the meaning of Rule 13. 14 Findings[70]The Tribunal does not accept that the Applicant’s application was wilfully dishonest, or malicious as alleged by the Respondents.[71]The Tribunal holds that the Applicant was misled on at least two occasions by officers of LBWF as to the absence of a licence in respect of the property for the relevant period, and that his application was brought in good faith, based upon his reasonable belief in what he had been told.[72]We find that the Respondents’ responses, both to the letter of claim and then in their evidence bundle, were unclear as to the licensing position, and that the Applicant was entirely reasonably prompted to make further enquiries of LBWF.[73]We find that upon receipt of the 11 April email from LBWF, the Applicant acted entirely reasonably in informing the Respondents and the Tribunal, and in immediately seeking to withdraw his application.[74]For those reasons the Tribunal does not find any unreasonable conduct by the Applicant in relation to the Tribunal proceedings, within the meaning of Rule 13.[75]It is therefore unnecessary for the Tribunal to consider the second and third stages adumbrated in Willow Court.[76]The application for costs is accordingly refused. Name: Judge Mark Jones Date: 14 April 2025 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application. 15 If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber).