12 Padstow House, Three Colt Street, London E14 8AH: LON/00BG/HMF/2025/0833 LON/00BG/HMF/2025/0833

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)
Case No LON/00BG/HMF/2025/0833
Between
Hossain, Asif E Elahi and Monjur Ahmed ArifApplicantJahanara BegumRespondent
Before
Judge P KornMr A Thomas FRICS RBIMichael Field of Counsel instructed by Freemans Solicitors for the ApplicantNot represented for the RespondentDate 24 March 2026Hearing 2026-03-23Property: Street, London E14 8AH Md Mahmudal Hasan, Md IlliasType of application: Application for Rent Repayment Order under the Housing and Planning Act 2016

DECISION

Description of hearing This was a face-to-face hearing. © CROWN COPYRIGHT Decisions of the tribunal(1) (2) (3) The tribunal orders the Respondent to repay to the Applicants the following sums by way of rent repayment:• £4,356.00 to Mr Hasan;• £3,996.00 to Mr Hossein;• £3,996.00 to Mr Elahi; and• £3,996.00 to Mr Arif. The tribunal also orders the Respondent to reimburse to the Applicants their application fee of £114.00 and the hearing of £227.00. The above sums must be paid by the Respondent to the Applicants within 28 days after the date of this determination. Introduction[4]The Applicants have applied for a rent repayment order against the Respondent under sections 40-44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”). The basis for the application is that the Respondent committed an offence of having control of and/or managing a house in multiple occupation (“HMO”) which was required to be licensed but was not licensed, contrary to section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”). The Applicants each seek a rent repayment order (“RRO”) in respect of rent paid for the period 15 July 2023 to 14 July 2024. The amount sought by each Applicant is as follows:• £4,840.00 by Mr Hasan;• £4,440.00 by Mr Hossein;• £4,440.00 by Mr Elahi; and• £4,440.00 by Mr Arif this being a total of £18,160.00 in aggregate. Two of the Applicants, Mr Hasan and Mr Hossein, attended the hearing and, the Applicants were represented by Michael Field of Counsel. The Respondent did not attend, and was not represented at, the hearing. 2 Application at start of hearing[10]At the start of the hearing, Mr Field for the Applicants asked for confirmation that the tribunal was prepared to proceed with the hearing notwithstanding the Respondent’s absence. The tribunal noted that the Respondent had not engaged with these proceedings at all, and it raised with Mr Field the possibility that the Respondent was unaware that these proceedings were taking place. In response, Mr Field referred the tribunal to a witness statement dated 20 March 2026 made by Nipa Paul, a paralegal at Freemans Solicitors. In her witness statement, Ms Paul sets out the steps taken by her to contact the Respondent in connection with these proceedings. These steps included telephoning the Respondent on the mobile number for her provided by the Applicants, sending her relevant documents (including a copy of the RRO application) via ‘WhatsApp’ and posting relevant documents to her registered address using a Royal Mail tracker. Ms Paul states that when she telephoned the Respondent’s number and asked the person who answered whether she was Jahanara Begum, that person confirmed that she was Jahanara Begum but then hung up the telephone when Ms Paul revealed her own identity. Paragraph 34 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 states as follows: “If a party fails to attend a hearing the Tribunal may proceed with the hearing if the Tribunal-(a) is satisfied that the party has been notified of the hearing or that reasonable steps have been taken to notify the party of the hearing; and(b) considers that it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing”. On the basis of the evidence before the tribunal we confirmed at the hearing that we were satisfied that the Respondent had been notified of the hearing or (in the alternative) that reasonable steps had been taken to notify her of the hearing. We also considered that it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing. The combined evidence indicated that the Respondent was aware that the application had been made and that the final hearing was scheduled to take place on 23 March 2026 but that the Respondent had chosen not to engage with the process. Accordingly, we confirmed that the hearing could proceed. Applicants’ case[11]In written submissions the Applicants state that, together with Sadia Tasnim (who is not one of the Applicants), they were assured shorthold 3 tenants of the Property. They entered into a 12-month fixed tenancy from 15 July 2022 to 15 July 2023 but then no further tenancy agreement was provided after the formal expiry date of the initial tenancy agreement and the Applicants continued to live there – paying rent – on an assumed rolling basis until 15 July 2024.[15]The tenants paid increasing sums of rent according to the amount requested amount by the Respondent without any notice. The tenants between them paid £1,800.00 in respect of the first month within the period of claim, £1,850.00 per month for the next two months and then £1,900.00 per month for the other nine months. For the period of the claim the rent was paid to Nazira Khanom, who the Applicants believe to be the daughter of the Respondent and who collected the rent on behalf of the Respondent. There was no managing agent for the Property, and it was managed by the Respondent herself. The total amount of rent paid during the period of claim was £22,600.00, but this included an amount paid by Sadia Tasnim, the fifth tenant. The rent was paid by Mr Hasan and then he recovered the other tenants’ share of the rent from them separately. At the hearing, Mr Field – with the help of Mr Hasan and Mr Hossein – clarified for the tribunal the amount paid by each tenant during the period of claim. He said that Mr Hasan had paid £4,840.00 and that the other tenants had each paid £4,440.00. This made an aggregate amount of £22,600.00, but as Ms Tasnim was not part of the claim the claim was the lower amount of £18,160.00, this being the sum of £22,600.00 less Ms Tasnim’s share of £4,440.00. The Applicants state that under section 263(3) of the 2004 Act “a person managing” means in relation to the premises, the person who, being an owner or lessee of the premises –(a) received (whether directions or through an agent or trustee) rents or other payments from in the case of a house in multiple occupation, persons who are in occupation as tenants or licences of parts of the premises or(b) would so receive those rents or other payments but for having entered into an arrangement (whether in pursuance of a court order or otherwise) with another person who is not an owner or lessee of the premises by virtue of which that other person receives the rents or other payments. In the Applicants’ submission the Respondent was a person managing the Property under section 263(a) of the 2004 Act for the relevant period. The Respondent is named on the tenancy agreement as the landlord and is also named the registered owner of the freehold title for the Property. She was also in receipt of the rents from the Applicants who were in occupation of the Property as tenants through her daughter Nazira Khanom. From 1 April 2019 the London Borough of Tower Hamlets designated the Borough of Tower Hamlets an area of additional licencing under section 56 of the 2004 Act 2004 and regulation 9 of the Licencing and 4 Management of Houses in Multiple Occupation and Other Houses (Miscellaneous Provisions) (England) Regulations 2006. The Applicants state that the designation applied to all HMOs as defined in section 254 of the 2004 Act and that the Property is located in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets within the designated area. During the period of the claim, the Property was occupied by 5 people from 4 separate households as their main residence and the Property had no other use other than as the tenants’ accommodation. The Applicants all had shared use of the bathroom and kitchen in the Property, and in the Applicants’ submission the Property was therefore an HMO under the standard test during the period in which they were in occupation.[20]Tower Hamlets’ original designation ceased on 31 March 2024, but then the property was subject to a subsequent similar designation which commended on 1 April 2024 and is set to continue until 31 March 2029. In his witness statement, as clarified slightly at the hearing, Mr Hasan said that he had asked the Respondent about whether she had obtained an HMO licence but he had not received a clear and satisfactory answer. At the hearing he added that he had raised this question with Mr Mohammed Williams at Tower Hamlets Council who had told him that the Property did not have an HMO licence. Putting all of the above together, the Applicants submit that the Respondent committed an offence under section 72(1) 2004 Act by being a person managing a Property which was required to be licensed and was not so licensed. The Applicants state that throughout the tenancy the Respondent’s conduct was poor. She was assertive and aggressive and did not always listen to the Applicants when they reported a fault with the Property. She would enter the Property without giving notice and tampered with all the bedroom locks to allow her to enter the bedrooms during visits. She did not allow the Applicants access to the living room and would instead use the space for her own guests. Only when the Applicants stated they would alert the Council to the fact that 7 people were now occupying the Property did she remove her guests. They also state that the Property was not well looked after. There was persistent mould and the Respondent did not properly fix the boiler despite the problem being reported several times. The Property did not have fire alarms or smoke detectors, the central heating did not work, and the Applicants were only able to use electric heaters. There were also cockroaches and the Respondent did not resolve this problem. The kitchen sink would continuously become clogged, and the Respondent did not provide a permanent solution to this problem either. The Respondent continuously raised the rent without appropriate notice, she did not place the Applicants’ rent deposit in a deposit protection 5 scheme, and as at the date of the application she had not returned the deposit to the Applicants.[22]In relation to utilities, the Applicants state that they paid these themselves in addition to the rent. The Applicants’ hearing bundle contains a copy of the tenancy agreement, a copy of a Land Registry title register and a copy of the designation of the relevant geographical area as an additional licensing area.] Respondent’s lack of engagement[23]As noted above, the Respondent did not attend, and was not represented at, the hearing. In addition, she has made no written submissions despite, in our view, being fully aware of this application and therefore having had ample opportunity to do so. Discussion at hearing[24]At the hearing, Mr Field took the tribunal through the Applicants’ case. He added that the Applicants had no information on the Respondent’s financial circumstances or on whether she has previously been convicted of an offence to which Chapter 4 of the 2016 Act applies. Witness evidence[26]The tribunal noted the witness evidence from Mr Hasan and Mr Elahi. Mr Elahi was not at the hearing, but the tribunal cross-examined Mr Hasan on his witness evidence, primarily in order to test the credibility of that evidence in the absence of the Respondent having challenged any specific points or indeed engaged at all with these proceedings. The tribunal noted Mr Hasan’s evidence of persistent mould leading to breathing issues, of the boiler not working properly from mid-2023 onwards, of the lack of fire alarms and smoke detectors, of the central heating not working, of rental increases without notice and problems with the rent deposit and of various other problems. 6 Relevant statutory provisions[27]Housing and Planning Act 2016 Section 40(1) (2) (3) This Chapter confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies. A rent repayment order is an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing in England to – (a) repay an amount of rent paid by a tenant ... A reference to “an offence to which this Chapter applies” is to an offence, of a description specified in the table, that is committed by a landlord in relation to housing in England let by that landlord. Act section general description of offence 1 Criminal Law Act 1977 section 6(1) violence for securing entry 2 Protection from Eviction Act 1977 section 1(2), (3) or (3A) eviction or harassment of occupiers 3 Housing Act 2004 section 30(1) failure to comply with improvement notice 4 section 32(1) failure to comply with prohibition order etc 5 section 72(1) control or management of unlicensed HMO 6 section 95(1) control or management of unlicensed house 7 7 Section 41 (1) This Act section 21 breach of banning order A tenant or a local housing authority may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies. (2) A tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if – (a) the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant, and (b) the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made. Section 43 (1) (2) (3) The First-tier Tribunal may make a rent repayment order if satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies (whether or not the landlord has been convicted). A rent repayment order under this section may be made only on an application under 41. The amount of a rent repayment order under this section is to be determined in accordance with – (a) section 44 (where the application is made by a tenant) ... Section 44 (1) (2) Where the First-tier Tribunal decides to make a rent repayment order under section 43 in favour of a tenant, the amount is to be determined in accordance with this section. The amount must relate to rent paid during the period mentioned in the table. If the order is made on the ground that the landlord has committed an offence mentioned in row 1 or 2 of the table in section 40(3) the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of the period of 12 months ending with the date of the offence 8 an offence mentioned in row 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the table in section 40(3) (3) a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence The amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed – (a) the rent paid in respect of that period, less (b) any relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.(4) In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account – (a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and (c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies. Housing Act 2004 Section 72 (1)(5) A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part … but is not so licensed. In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) … it is a defence that he had a reasonable excuse … for having control of or managing the house in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1) … . Section 263 (1) (2) (3) In this Act “person having control”, in relation to premises, means (unless the context otherwise requires) the person who receives the rack-rent of the premises (whether on his own account or as agent or trustee of another person), or who would so receive it if the premises were let at a rack-rent. In subsection (1) “rack-rent” means a rent which is not less than two-thirds of the full net annual value of the premises. In this Act “person managing” means, in relation to premises, the person who, being an owner or lessee of the premises – (a) receives … rents or other payments from … persons who are in occupation as tenants or licensees of parts of the premises, or of the whole of the premises; or (b) would so receive those rents or 9 other payments but for having entered into an arrangement … with another person who is not an owner or lessee of the premises by virtue of which that other person receives the rents or other payments ... Tribunal’s analysis[31]The Applicants’ uncontested evidence is that the Property was an HMO which was required to be licensed (by virtue of the local housing authority’s additional licensing scheme) but was not licensed at any point during the period of the claim. Whilst the Applicants should have strengthened their evidence by for example obtaining email confirmation from the local housing authority that the Property was unlicensed throughout the period of claim, their evidence is uncontested. In addition, if the Property had been licensed the local housing would have required the heating issue, the fire alarm issue and the severe mould problem to be remedied urgently as a condition of granting an HMO licence, and the failure to remedy these defects therefore constitutes further evidence that the Property was not so licensed. Having considered both the Applicants’ uncontested evidence and the extreme unlikelihood that there could be an HMO licence in place without the abovementioned serious defects having been remedied, we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that for the whole period of claim the Property required an HMO licence and was not so licensed. We are also satisfied that the Respondent was a “landlord” for the purposes of sections 40 and 43 of the 2016 Act, as she was named as landlord in the tenancy agreement and is the registered freehold owner of the Property. The next question is whether the Respondent was a “person having control of or managing” the Property within the meaning of section 263 of the 2004 Act. She has not made any written or oral submissions on this point, and the Applicants’ uncontested evidence is that they paid rent to the Respondent’s daughter as the Respondent’s agent. This shows in our view that at the very least the Respondent was a “person managing” within the meaning of section 263 of the 2004 Act in respect of the Property at the relevant time as the phrase “person managing” is defined in section 263(3) as meaning “in relation to premises, the person who, being an owner or lessee of the premises … receives (whether directly or through an agent or trustee) rents or other payments from … in the case of a house in multiple occupation, persons who are in occupation as tenants or licensees of parts of the premises …”. 10 The defence of “reasonable excuse”[33]Under section 72(5) of the 2004 Act, it is a defence that a person who would otherwise be guilty of the offence of controlling or managing an HMO which is licensable under Part 2 of the 2004 Act had a reasonable excuse for the failure to obtain a licence. The burden of proof is on the person relying on the defence. In this case, the Respondent has not made any submissions and there is no basis on the information before the tribunal to conclude that the Respondent did have a reasonable excuse for the failure to obtain a licence. The offence[35]Section 40 of the 2016 Act confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence listed in the table in sub-section 40(3), subject to certain conditions being satisfied. An offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act is one of the offences listed in that table. Section 72(1) states that “A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part … but is not so licensed”, and for the reasons given above we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt(a) that the Respondent was a “landlord”,(b) that she was a “person managing” the Property for the purposes of section 263 of the 2004 Act,(c) that the Property was required to be licensed throughout the period of claim and(d) that it was not licensed at any point during the period of claim. Under section 41(2), a tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant and the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made. On the basis of the Applicants’ uncontested evidence on these points we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Property was let to the Applicants at the time of commission of the offence and that the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which their application was made. Process for ascertaining the amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid[37]Based on the above findings, we have the power to make a rent repayment order against the Respondent. The amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid is governed by section 44 of the 2016 Act. Under sub-section 44(2), the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence. Under sub 11 section 44(3), the amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed the rent paid in respect of that period less any relevant award of housing benefit or universal credit paid in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.[42]In this case, the Applicants’ claim relates to a period not exceeding 12 months. The evidence before us indicates that no part of the rent was covered by the payment of housing benefit, and the Respondent has not disputed that the rental amount claimed was in fact paid by the Applicants. We are satisfied on the basis of their uncontested evidence that the Applicants were in occupation for the whole of the period to which their rent repayment application relates and that the Property required a licence for the whole of that period. Therefore, the maximum sum that can be awarded by way of rent repayment (appropriately divided up between the individual Applicants to reflect the amount paid by each of them) is the sum referred to in paragraph 3 above, namely £18,160.00, this being the aggregate amount paid by the Applicants by way of rent in respect of the period of claim. Under sub-section 44(4), in determining the amount of any rent repayment order the tribunal must, in particular, take into account(a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant,(b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and(c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which the relevant part of the 2016 Act applies. The Upper Tribunal decision in Vadamalayan v Stewart (2020) UKUT 0183 (LC) is one of the authorities on how a tribunal should approach the question of the amount that it should order to be repaid under a rent repayment order if satisfied that an order should be made. Importantly, it was decided after the coming into force of the 2016 Act and takes into account the different approach envisaged by the 2016 Act. In her analysis in Vadamalayan, Judge Cooke states that the rent (i.e. the maximum amount of rent recoverable) is the obvious starting point, and she effectively states that having established the starting point one should then work out what sums if any should be deducted. She departs from the approach of the Upper Tribunal in Parker v Waller (2012) UKUT 301, in part because of the different approach envisaged by the 2016 Act, Parker v Waller having been decided in the context of the 2004 Act. Judge Cooke notes that the 2016 Act contains no requirement that a payment in favour of a tenant should be reasonable. More specifically, she does not consider it appropriate to deduct everything that the landlord has spent on the property during the relevant period, not least because much of that expenditure will have repaired or enhanced the landlord’s own property and/or been incurred 12 in meeting the landlord’s obligations under the tenancy agreement. There is a case for deducting utilities, but otherwise in her view the practice of deducting all of the landlord’s costs in calculating the amount of the rent repayment should cease.[48]Since the decision in Vadamalayan, there have been other Upper Tribunal decisions in this area, notably those in Ficcara and others v James (2021) UKUT 0038 (LC) and Awad v Hooley (2021) UKUT 0055 (LC). In Ficcara v James, in making his decision Martin Rodger QC stressed that whilst the maximum amount of rent was indeed the starting point the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) still had discretion to make deductions to reflect the various factors referred to in section 44(4) of the 2016 Act. In Awad v Hooley, Judge Cooke agreed with the analysis in Ficcara v James and said that it will be unusual for there to be absolutely nothing for the FTT to take into account under section 44(4). In Williams v Parmar & Ors [2021] UKUT 244 (LC), Mr Justice Fancourt stated that the FTT had in that case taken too narrow a view of its powers under section 44 to fix the amount of the rent repayment order. There is no presumption in favour of the maximum amount of rent paid during the relevant period, and the factors that may be taken into account are not limited to those mentioned in section 44(4), although the factors in that subsection are the main factors that may be expected to be relevant in the majority of cases. Mr Justice Fancourt went on to state in Williams that the FTT should not have concluded that only meritorious conduct of the landlord, if proved, could reduce the starting point of the (adjusted) maximum rent. The circumstances and seriousness of the offending conduct of the landlord are comprised in the “conduct of the landlord”, and so the FTT may, in an appropriate case, order a lower than maximum amount of rent repayment if what a landlord did or failed to do in committing the offence was relatively low in the scale of seriousness, by reason of mitigating circumstances or otherwise. In Hallett v Parker and others [2022] UKUT 165 (LC), the Upper Tribunal did not accept a submission that the fact that the local authority has decided not to prosecute the landlord should be treated as a “credit factor” which should reduce the amount to be repaid. In its decision in Acheampong v Roman and others [2022] UKUT 239 (LC), the Upper Tribunal recommended a four-stage approach to determining the amount to be repaid, which is paraphrased below:-(a) ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period; 13(b) subtract any element of that sum that represents payment by the landlord for utilities that only benefited the tenant;(c) consider how serious this offence was, both compared to other types of offence in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made and compared to other examples of the same type of offence; and(d) consider whether any deduction from, or addition to, that figure should be made in the light of the other factors set out in section 44(4).[53]Adopting the Acheampong approach, the whole of the rent means the whole of the rent paid by the Applicants out of their own resources, which is the whole of the rent in this case as no part of the rent was funded by housing benefit. In relation to utilities, we are satisfied on the evidence before us that the Applicants paid for utilities themselves on top of the rent and therefore that it would not be appropriate to make a deduction from the rent repayment sum for utilities. As regards the seriousness of the type of offence, whilst it could be argued based on the maximum criminal penalty available that there are offences covered by section 40(3) of the 2016 Act which can give rise to a greater criminal sanction, a failure to license is still a serious offence. Failure to license leads – or can lead – to significant health and safety risks for often vulnerable tenants, and sanctions for failure to license have an important deterrent effect on future offending as well as encouraging law-abiding landlords to continue to take the licensing system seriously and inspiring general public confidence in the licensing system. In addition, there has been much publicity about licensing of privately rented property, and there is an argument that good landlords who apply for and obtain a licence promptly may feel that those who fail to obtain a licence gain an unfair benefit thereby and therefore need to be heavily incentivised not to let out licensable properties without first obtaining a licence. Furthermore, even if it could be argued that the Applicants did not suffer direct loss through the Respondent’s failure to obtain a licence, it is clear that a large part of the purpose of the rent repayment legislation is deterrence. If landlords can successfully argue that the commission by them of a criminal offence to which section 43 of the 2016 Act applies should only have consequences if tenants can show that they have suffered actual loss, this will significantly undermine the deterrence value of the legislation. We turn now to the seriousness of the offence in this particular case compared to others of the same type which have been considered by the Upper Tribunal. 14[54]Newell v Abbott and another [2024] UKUT 181 (LC) related to a situation where the offence was committed by the landlord of a single property and was the result of inadvertence, or lack of attention, rather than being deliberate, although the failure was prolonged. The accommodation provided was generally of a good standard which attracted long term residents and which the tenants were disappointed to leave. There was insufficient information on the parties’ conduct for this to be taken into consideration and there was no evidence of the landlord’s financial circumstances. The Upper Tribunal decided that the appropriate order in the circumstances was for the repayment of 60% of the rent received.[58]Irvine v Metcalfe and others [2023] UKUT 283 (LC) related to a situation where the offence was committed by a couple who owned a number of large properties and who the evidence indicated were aware of the need for an HMO licence, and therefore there was an element of deliberate avoidance. There were no defects in the property and no complaints which were regarded as being serious enough to warrant increasing the amount of rent repayment. The Upper Tribunal decided that the appropriate order in the circumstances was for the repayment of 75% of the rent received. The present case has a number of features which make it more serious than Newell v Abbott or even Irvine v Metcalfe. Unlike in Newell v Abbott, there is no evidence before us that the failure to license was inadvertent, and the Respondent has had ample opportunity to offer such mitigation in written and/or oral submissions. In addition, unlike in Irvine v Metcalfe, there were various defects in the Property and various complaints from the Applicants in this case which we consider to be serious enough to warrant increasing the amount of rent repayment by a significant amount. The evidence indicates that there were no fire alarms or smoke detectors, that there was a very significant amount of mould potentially giving rise to health problems, and that the gas boiler was not working properly at any time since mid-2023. These are all very serious matters. In addition, not quite as seriously but still very significantly, the cooker was not working for long periods, the Respondent removed locks from the bedrooms seemingly to be able to enter them without notice, the Respondent entered the Property itself without giving the notice required under the tenancy agreement, the Respondent’s communication was a mixture of poor and aggressive, the Respondent raised the rent more than once without notice and she did not protect the rent deposit or repay it when asked. On the basis of the above serious aggravating circumstances in this particular case we consider that 90% of the maximum amount is payable, subject only to any adjustment needed to take into account the factors referred to below. 15 Section 44(4) factors[59]As regards the specific matters listed in section 44(4), the tribunal is particularly required to take into account(a) the conduct of the parties,(b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and(c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of a relevant offence. We will take these in turn. Conduct of the parties[60]There is no evidence before us that the Applicants’ conduct has been anything other than satisfactory. The Respondent’s own conduct has already been referred to above in the context of the seriousness of the offence, and it would not be appropriate to increase the amount of the rent repayment further to reflect her poor conduct as this would constitute double counting. Financial circumstances of the landlord[61]The tribunal is required to take the Respondent’s financial circumstances into account when making its decision. However, in this case the tribunal has no evidence of the Respondent’s financial circumstances and therefore no adjustment to the amount of the award can be made either upwards or downwards to reflect the Respondent’s financial circumstances as they are unknown. Whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of a relevant offence[62]There is no evidence before us that the Respondent has been convicted of a relevant offence, but it is clear from the Upper Tribunal decision in Hallett v Parker (see above) that this by itself should not be treated as a credit factor. Other factors[63]It is apparent from the wording of sub-section 44(4) itself that the specific matters listed in sub-section 44(4) are not intended to be exhaustive, as sub-section 44(4) states that the tribunal “must, in particular, take into account” the specified factors. However, in this case we are not aware of any other specific factors which should be taken into account in determining the amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid. Amount to be repaid[64]The four-stage approach recommended in Acheampong has already been set out above. The amounts arrived at by going through the first 16 three of those stages is to reduce them to 90% of the maximum amount payable to each Applicant, subject to any adjustment for the section 44(4) factors referred to above.[66]As noted above, in part to avoid double counting, there is nothing to add or subtract for any of the other section 44(4) factors. Therefore, taking all of the factors together, the rent repayment order should be for 90% of the maximum amount payable to each Applicant, namely for:• £4,356.00 to Mr Hasan;• £3,996.00 to Mr Hossein;• £3,996.00 to Mr Elahi; and• £3,996.00 to Mr Arif. Cost applications[68]The Applicants have applied under paragraph 13(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 for an order that the Respondent reimburse their application fee of £114.00 and the hearing fee of £227.00. As the Applicants’ claims have been successful, albeit that there has been a deduction from the maximum payable, we are satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to order the Respondent to reimburse these fees. Name: Judge P Korn RIGHTS OF APPEALa. A. Date: 24 March 2026 If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office dealing with the case. 17b. B. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.c. C.d. D. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. 18