Tribunal Judge Prof R PercivalMs S Coughlin MCIEHMuhammed Williams, London Borough of Tower Hamlets for the ApplicantIn person Application for a rent repayment for the RespondentDate 27 August 2025Property: London E2 6BE. Ms. Molly CardiffType of application: order by a tenant Tribunal Judge Prof R Percival
DECISION
[1]The Tribunal makes rent repayment orders against the Respondent to each of the Applicants in the following sums, to be paid within 28 days: Ms Cardiff: £7,235 Ms Quill: £7,280 Ms Sullivan: £7,105[2]The Tribunal orders under Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)(Property Chamber) Rules 2013, rule 13(2) that the Respondent reimburse the Applicants together the application and hearing fees in respect of this application in the sum of £320. The application[1]On 23 August 2024, the Tribunal received an application under section 41 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”) for Rent Repayment Orders (“RROs”) under Part 2, Chapter 4 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. Directions were given on 25 October 2024.[2]In accordance with the directions, we were provided with an Applicant’s bundle of 164 pages, a Respondent’s bundle of 63 pages, a two-page Applicants’ response. The Respondent was also permitted to submit a further three pages of additional evidence. The hearing Introductory[3]Mr M Williams, of the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, represented the Applicants. Ms Begum represented herself.[4]McDougall House appears to be a mid-century purpose built block of flats of four storeys. Number 8 is a three bedroom flat on the third floor. Preliminary issue[5]Mr Williams raised as a preliminary issue an application on behalf of Ms Franchesca di Donato, one of the tenants, to withdraw from the application. He had made the application on a form Order 1 dated 1 May 2025. Ms di Donato did not attend the hearing.[6]Mr Williams had said on the form that Ms di Donato wished to withdraw because continuing with the application was having an effect on her health, which we assume meant at least primarily her mental health. He referred on the form to a letter before action delivered to the Applicants on 30 April by email and on 1 May by post, for which see below. In the hearing, we asked Mr Williams if it was the receipt of the letter before action that had precipitated the effects on Ms di Donato’s health and her desire to withdraw. He said that she had not indicated any health issues to him before the letter.[7]It appears that the Respondent had told the three other Applicants that one of their number (ie Ms di Donato) had “settled” the matter with her. We asked Ms Begum if there had been a formal settlement, and she said that there had. As the start of the hearing, therefore, we asked Mr Williams if he could try to contact Ms di Donato to see if it was also her position that there had been a formal settlement.[8]After the mid-morning break, Mr Williams told us that Ms di Donato had told him that there was no formal settlement, but that Ms Begum had said that if she withdrew from this application, that would be the end of the matter, including the counter claim set out in a letter before action.[9]We reserved our decision until the conclusion of the hearing, but at that point gave our consent to Ms di Donato’s withdrawal.[10]For the reasons we give below, we concluded that the letter before action was purely an attempt by the Respondent to pressurise the Applicants to withdraw their applications for RROs and that it was on its face absurd. That meant that, if we acceded to Ms di Donato’s application to withdraw, that illegitimate pressure would be successful. As we note above, Ms di Donato was not present herself, so we were reliant on what Mr Williams could glean from his communications with her.[11]Nonetheless it appeared to us that the core of Ms di Donato’s application was that withdrawal would remove a pressure that was endangering her mental health. Ms di Donato must be the arbiter of her own mental well-being, and therefore, and reluctantly, we felt that we must accede to the application.[12]Whether there was or was not a formal settlement agreement was not, therefore, a question we considered we had to determine. The alleged criminal offence[13]The Applicants allege that the Respondent was guilty of the having control of, or managing, an unlicensed house in multiple occupation contrary to Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”), section 72(1). The offence is set out in Housing and Planning Act 2016, section 40(3), as one of the offences which, if committed, allows the Tribunal to make a rent repayment order under Part 2, chapter 4 of the 2016 Act.[14]The Applicants’ case is that the property was situated within an additional licensing area as designated by London Borough of Tower Hamlets (“the council”). It was not contested by the Respondent.[15]The Applicants’ case as to occupation is that Ms Cardiff, Ms Quill and Ms Sullivan signed an assured shorthold tenancy agreement for a one year fixed term with the Respondent commencing on 7 September 2022, at a monthly rent of the whole flat of £2,600. Ms Sullivan left then left the property. The remaining Applicants and Ms di Donato signed a similar agreement for the same rent starting on 7 September 2023. The Applicants’ contributions to the rent varied according to the size of their rooms.[16]Ms Cardiff and Ms Quill were friends who had shared a flat earlier. They recruited Ms Sullivan as a third sharer, who in turn recruited Ms di Donato when she wished to leave after the first year.[17]None of the Applicants were members of a household with any of the others.[18]The Respondent applied for a licence on 6 February 2024.[19]Ms Begum accepted at the hearing that she could not and did not contest liability for the criminal offence. She said that there had been no intention to rent as an HMO, however. Her earlier statement, provided in her bundle, suggested that she thought that if a property were let with a single tenancy agreement, albeit to three unrelated joint tenants, that meant that it could not be an HMO.[20]Ms Begum did not advance a defence of reasonable excuse, and the Tribunal did not consider that there were facts which called upon the Tribunal to consider as a reasonable excuse in any event.[21]Ms Begum is the leaseholder of the property. She was named as the landlord in the tenancy agreement and was in receipt of the rent of the property. She is both a “person having control” of the property, being in receipt of the rack rent, and a “person managing” the property as defined in section 263(1) and (3) of the 2004 Act.[22]We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the offence was committed. The amount of the RRO[23]In considering the amount of an RRO, the Tribunal will take the approach set out in Acheampong v Roman and Others [2022] UKUT 239 (LC) at paragraph 20: “The following approach will ensure consistency with the authorities:(a) Ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period;(b) Subtract any element of that sum that represents payment for utilities that only benefited the tenant, for example gas, electricity and internet access. …(c) Consider how serious this offence was, both compared to other types of offence in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made … and compared to other examples of the same type of offence. What proportion of the rent (after deduction as above) is a fair reflection of the seriousness of this offence? That figure is then the starting point (in the sense that that term is used in criminal sentencing); it is the default penalty in the absence of any other factors but it may be higher or lower in light of the final step:(d) Consider whether any deduction from, or addition to, that figure should be made in the light of the other factors set out in section 44(4).”[24]In respect of the relationship between stages (c) and (d), in Acheampong Judge Cooke went on to say at paragraph [21] “I would add that step (c) above is part of what is required under section 44(4)(a) [conduct of the parties]. It is an assessment of the conduct of the landlord specifically in the context of the offence itself; how badly has this landlord behaved in committing the offence? I have set it out as a separate step because it is the matter that has most frequently been overlooked.”[25]As to stage (a), by sections 44(2) and (3) of the 2016 Act, the maximum possible RRO is the rent paid during a period of 12 months, minus any universal credit (or Housing Benefit – section 51) paid during that period.[26]There was some confusion in the initial papers as to exactly what was being claimed and in respect of which periods, albeit at a low level of significance in financial terms. We established at the hearing that the appropriate monthly rental payments were £886.40 for each of Ms Cardiff and Ms Quill, and £846 for Ms Sullivan (a figure which takes into account a small underpayment of 60p for ten of the months). After the hearing, the Tribunal established that the relevant totals for each of the Applicants is as shown below. At the hearing, it appears we miscalculated the totals for Ms Cardiff and Ms Quill, but Ms Begum did not contest that the monthly sums were as stated, and the error was purely arithmetical. Applicant Rent/month Period Total paid Ms Cardiff £868.70 07.02.2023 – 06.02.2024 £10,342.05 Ms Quill £886.70 07.02.2023 – 06.02.2024 £10,400.40 Ms Sullivan £846 06.09.2022 to 5.09.2023 £10,15.42[27]According to the tenancy agreement, utilities were paid by tenants, so no deduction is required at stage (b) of the Acheampong process.[28]In assessing the seriousness starting point under stage (c), there are two axes of seriousness. The first is the seriousness of the offence, compared to the other offences specified in section 41 of the 2004 Act. The offence under section 72(1) is significantly less serious than those in rows 1, 2 and 7 in the table in section 40 of the 2016 Act, and we take that into account (see Ficcara v James [2021] UKUT 38 (LC), paragraphs [32] and [50]: Hallet v Parker [2022] UKUT 239 (LC), paragraph [30]; Daff v Gyalui [2023] UKUT 134 (LC), paragraphs [48] to [49] and the discussion in Newell v Abbott and Okrojeck [2024] UKUT 181 (LC), paragraphs [34] to [39]).[29]We turn to the seriousness of the offence committed by the Respondents compared to other offences against section 72(1).[30]In respect of this application, the point made by Judge Cooke noted at paragraph 23 above is particularly salient. Accordingly, when considering the seriousness of this particular section 72(1) offence, we will consider both stage (c) and the conduct of the parties under stage (d) at the same time. We deal with the financial circumstances of the landlord – the remaining element of stage (d) – separately thereafter.[31]In assessing the quantum of the RROs at stages (c) and (d), we have taken account of the guidance provided by the Upper Tribunal, including particularly where the Upper Tribunal has substituted percentage reductions in making a redetermination. The key cases are set out in (with respect) a most helpful manner in the course of the re-determination in Newell v Abbott and Okrojeck [2024] UKUT 181 (LC) from paragraph [47] to [57]. We do not repeat that material here, but have been guided by it.[32]We do so mindful of the strictures in Newell at paragraph [61]. We are not expected to “conduct an audit of the occasional defaults and inconsequential lapses … typical of most landlord and tenant relationships.” Rather, our focus should be “on conduct with serious or potentially serious consequences, in keeping with the objectives of the legislation. Conduct which, even if proven, would not be sufficiently serious to move the dial one way or the other, can be dealt with summarily and disposed of in a sentence or two.”[33]This was the only property let by the Respondent. It had been her family home. They were obliged to move because her elderly and asthmatic father could not manage the stairs. They therefore moved out and let the property to finance renting another property. Her father died in 2013.[34]On the general issue of Ms Begum’s knowledge of her responsibilities as a landlord, she said she relied on the tenancy agreement itself, which had been provided by a letting agency, and on what that agency had told her (she referred to the need for a gas safety certificate and an electrical installation condition report, both of which are also referred to in the tenancy agreement). She had never consulted the council’s website in relation to licensing, had not seen any of the council’s advertising relating to the additional scheme and had not joined or consulted any of the landlord organisations. The tenor of her responses was that she considered that it was sufficient for her to understand her obligations if she abided by the professionally produced tenancy agreement.[35]A key issue between the parties related to mould growth in parts of the flat, in part because it led to the complaint which resulted in the licensing status of the property becoming known to the Applicants. It is also relevant to the counter-claim issue (see below).[36]The Applicants’ evidence was that mould started becoming seriously apparent in the winter of 2023 on one side of the flat (that consisting of the kitchen, bathroom and Ms Cardiff’s bedroom). Initially, the Applicants sought to control the mould growth, but in December, via Ms di Donato, a complaint was made to the Respondent, on 9 December 2023. Ms Quill sent a further message to the Respondent on 3 January 2024, there having been no response to the first complaint. The Applicants’ evidence was that the Respondent’s initial response was to observe that mould was normal in domestic settings. The Applicants persisted (Ms Cardiff’s evidence was that it was affecting her health, as she was asthmatic), and eventually Ms Cardiff contacted the council. It was as a result of this contact that the Applicants were informed that the property was not licensed. The Applicants evidence was that the Respondent thereafter made threats to evict them via a break clause in the agreement. The Respondent’s evidence that the relevant communications were merely her asking if the Applicants might wish to terminate the agreement if they were unhappy with the property.[37]Personal relations between the Applicants and the Respondent became difficult, at least largely as a result of the mould issues. Ms Cardiff and Ms Quinn objected to the Respondent’s tone in some communications, and by early 2024, it appears that responsibility for communicating with the Respondent devolved on Ms di Donato alone.[38]The Respondent engaged a firm called Academy Remedial Surveyors Ltd to conduct a survey in (on her evidence) April 2024. She produced in her bundle the first page only of a letter covering a report from the firm, dated 13 March 2024, and subsequently engaged a plumber to clean the mould and redecorate. She also disclosed a single page from the report, which showed photographs of linen and clothes being dried over clothes horses indoors (not, as the text states, over radiators). The report states that doing so should never take place.[39]The tenants had no access to outside areas to dry clothes, and no tumble dryer had been provided.[40]The Respondent relied on this isolated page from the report to assert that “the tenants have caused the growth [of the mould] by not allowing enough ventilation into the property” (her email to a council officer dated 18 March 2024). The selected page does not say that. It does not, in fact, include any conclusions as to causation.[41]On that same page, there is also a brief reference to the presence of a positive input ventilation system in the flat. The surveyor remarks in connection with the system that it was important that the system was maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions to ensure it remained fully functional.[42]In answer to questions from our professional member, Ms Begum said that the flat had a system of air vents in all of the rooms in the flat to prevent condensation which had been installed by the council during the period when Ms Begum was a tenant living there. She stopped living in the property in about 2012 or 2013. She had not told the tenants that they had to maintain the system by cleaning the vents when they moved in. She said that she had told Ms di Donato that the vents had to be cleared at some point after the mould issue came up. She said that when it was working, the system made a quiet wind sound. She was referred to a screen print of a text from Ms Quinn where, in the context of the complaint about mould in January 2024, Ms Quinn wrote “Maybe a good idea to have the extractor in the bathroom fixed also, that might help get rid of it”. Her answer was “Okay I’ll be on to it. Can’t predict a time frame until I have someone look at it”. She agreed she had not referred to the system at that point, but she had taken a hard copy of the tenancy agreement to show Ms di Donato when they spoke together on 21 January 2024. As a result of the tenancy agreement, she said, it was the tenants’ responsibility to maintain the ventilation system.[43]Ms Begum said at one point when questioned by the Tribunal that she had paid a cleaner to, amongst other things, clean the vents in the system, at some earlier point, but that this arrangement did not continue during the Applicants’ tenancy. Rather, she asserted that it was the responsibility of the tenants to maintain the ventilation system under the terms of the tenancy agreement.[44]It was clear that the tenants were not at any time aware that there was a positive input ventilation system in the flat. They assumed that the vent in the bathroom was a standard individual ventilation fan which had never worked. In the email exchange referred to above, Ms Begum did not say otherwise. Ms Begum agreed that she had not told them about the system at any time.[45]It is clear to us, and we find as a fact, that the positive input ventilation system was not operational at any time during the tenancy. Such a system requires maintenance. It makes use of a (low powered) electrically operated fan. Its proper operation, as Ms Begum confirmed, would result in a gentle wind noise that the tenants would, we consider, have noticed. Ms Begum sought to assimilate the maintenance of such as system to merely cleaning the vents, which is not the case when the system is clearly not operating at all.[46]Ms Begum did not identify the clause in the tenancy agreement upon which she relied for her contention that maintenance was the responsibility of the tenants. It would not be covered by the general obligation of the tenants “to take reasonable steps to keep the interior of the premises and the fixtures and fittings in the same decorative order and condition throughout the term as at the start of the tenancy” (schedule 1, paragraph 5.1). Nor do we think that maintenance of the system as a whole is covered by the covenant to “take reasonable precautions to keep all gutters sewers drains sanitary apparatus water and waste pipes and vents and duct free of obstruction” (clause 5.13).[47]There was also a clause requiring the tenants to “take reasonable precautions to prevent condensation by keeping the premises adequately ventilated …” (clause 5.12). But where a positive input ventilation system had been installed, and was not maintained, it is difficult to see what “reasonable precautions” remained for the tenants to take.[48]On the other hand, maintenance of the system seems to us likely to be covered by the landlord’s obligation “to keep in repair and proper working order all mechanical and electrical items belonging to the landlord and forming part of the fixtures and fittings” (schedule 2, paragraph 5.1), even if, which we doubt, it is not covered by the statutory repairing obligation imposed by section 11 of the 1985 Act (and referred to in the tenancy agreement).[49]The installation of the positive input ventilation system earlier than 2012 or thereabout by the freeholder (the council) has a further significance. It is strongly suggestive that damp was a problem experienced by flats in the block and/or similar blocks before that date, and that the system was installed to deal with that problem.[50]Our conclusions in relation to mould are that there was a genuine problem and that it adversely affected the tenants, particularly Ms Cardiff. We have seen a small number of photographs showing significant mould growth, although not to the most serious extent.[51]In the light of the evidence – only properly brought out at the hearing – as to the positive input ventilation system, and the lack of outside space or a tumble dryer, we do not consider that the presence of the mould can possibly be attributed to poor conduct on the part of the Applicants.[52]On the other hand, we find that Ms Begum’s failure to maintain the ventilation system, and failure to even inform the Applicants of its existence, does constitute poor conduct. The seriousness of that poor conduct is exacerbated by her extended, if ineffective, attempts to blame the Applicants for the appearance of the mould. We have no doubt that, if the report she obtained from the surveyor had made a finding that the Applicants bad behaviour had caused the mould, she would have disclosed it, rather than just disclosing an isolated page as described above. And the one page that was disclosed clearly indicated that the system required maintenance.[53]The Applicants also relied on the Respondent’s failure to protect their deposits. When Ms Cardiff contacted the council in relation to the mould problem, she was advised to check whether the Applicants’ deposits had been protected. She found that they were not. As a result, the Respondent did use a deposit protection scheme, but only in February 2024. The deposits of all the tenants were returned without deductions.[54]The tenancy agreement itself – the provisions of which Ms Begum said she relied on to set out her obligations – specified that the deposits be protected, setting out in terms, broadly, the statutory requirements.[55]The Applicants also relied on failures in fire protection. It was uncontested that there were no fire doors on any of the bedrooms, as the licence conditions required, and at the minimum the door to the kitchen was not equipped with a closer. We put it like that, as in her oral evidence, Ms Begum appeared to concede that the door itself was not a fire door, but when the council’s official, Mr Thompson, inspected the property following the licence application, his email (dated 6 February 2024) only referred to the closer.[56]There was some ambiguity as to evidence of mains-wired smoke alarms in the hall or the bedrooms and a heat detector in the kitchen, but as they were not referred to in Mr Thompson’s email, we must conclude that the provision of alarms was sufficient at that time.[57]There were some complaints by the Applicants about the speed with which disrepair issues were dealt with by Ms Begum. The highest that this went was when, in the first year, a boiler fault resulted in a period of two weeks without hot water, before a new boiler was installed. For the most part, we would put these issues into the category of “occasional defaults … typical of most landlord and tenant relationships” which do not move the dial, and so say no more about them. The two-week hiatus with hot water might warrant a nudge of the dial, but no more.[58]Relationships broke down, as we have described above. The Applicants case was that Ms Begum had become rude and aggressive in her behaviour towards them, as evidenced in their witness statements. They did not rely to a significant extent on this as poor conduct for the purposes of section 44, and we do not consider that it really amounted to significantly bad conduct beyond the threshold described in Newell.[59]Mr Williams submitted that there had been sustained offending. He could not argue that the offence under section 72(1) had been committed before the Applicant’s tenancy in the absence of occupancy evidence, and did not do so. Ms Begum’s evidence was that earlier lettings had been to families. But he did make the point that the property had required a selective licence since 2016, and none had been applied for or granted (a fact not contested by Ms Begum). So, even on Ms Begum’s case, there had been a substantial period during which the offence under section 95(1) of the 1985 Act had been committed.[60]Ms Begum relied on what she said was a breach of the tenancy agreement, in that the Applicants had a pet cat, which was prohibited by paragraph 11 of schedule 1 to the agreement.[61]The presence of the cat was admitted by the Applicants. The cat, on Ms Quill’s evidence, belonged to her ex-partner, for whom she had on occasions cat-sat. She did not consider that she had to obtain permission to cat-sit, rather than to have a cat herself as a pet.[62]The relevant provision of the agreement required the tenants “not to keep any animal … in or on the premises without the prior written consent of the landlord … which will not be unreasonably withheld”.[63]The provision thus bites on the concept of “keeping” a pet, so there may be some issue as to how long an animal has to be present to amount to being “kept”. The evidence is not entirely clear as to how long the cat was present in the flat. While the Respondent’s evidence of occasional observation, and photographing, of cat paraphernalia did not go very far in establishing the duration of its presence, Ms Quill evidence, however, did suggest it may have been for fairly prolonged periods (the cat sitting arose out of a dispute between a new cat and the ex-partner’s old cat).[64]So on the face of it, it does seem reasonable to conclude that the cat was “kept” without the necessary consent. On the other hand, we doubt whether, if consent had been sought, it could reasonably have been withheld.[65]Our conclusion is that the cat probably was “kept”, and that constituted a breach, absent consent. However, we do not consider it a serious matter in assessing the conduct of the Applicants, as it occasioned no detriment to the landlord, and had consent been requested, it most probably would have to have been granted. It may, in the Deputy President’s words in Newell, move the dial, but if it does so, it is only by a small margin.[66]The nature of a landlord has been held to be relevant to the seriousness of the offence. The proper approach to the “professional” versus “non-professional” landlord distinction is set out in Daff v Gyalui [2023] UKUT 134 (LC), at paragraph 52, which abjures a binary distinction based on the classification or caricature of a landlord as one or the other. Rather, “The penalty appropriate to a particular offence must take account of all of the relevant circumstances”. In this case, we take into account the Respondent’s uncontested evidence that this is the only property she lets and that it was previously the family home.[67]We now turn to an aspect of this application which is of particular importance, the threatened counter-claim by the Respondent.[68]Ms Cardiff’s evidence was that in December 2024 (and via Mr Williams, who was by then acting for them) the Respondent threatened a counter claim of at least £30,000 for damage to the property and another £20,000 for “malicious damage”.[69]This was followed by a formal letter before action (as it described itself) which was emailed to the tenants on 30 April, two days before the hearing, and copied to them by post the next day.[70]The letter notified the tenants that Ms Begum intended to pursue a legal claim against all four relevant tenants (Ms Cardiff, Ms di Donato, Ms Sullivan and Ms Quill) for “serious breaches of the tenancy agreement and substantial damage caused to the property”.[71]The letter stated that the damage had been caused by mould, which was “due to failure to ventilate and maintain the property responsibly” and the keeping of the cat, which resulted in “serious and lasting contamination and damage”. The letter went on to particularise the damage as follows• “Replacement of damaged furniture and flooring• Professional mould treatment and repairs• Redecoration throughout the property• Cleaning and disinfecting• Replacement of kitchen and bathroom units• Independent surveyor and inspection costs• Loss of rental income during remedial works”[72]The total value of the claim was given as £44,711.02.[73]The letter went on to say this: “You are jointly and severally liable for this amount, and I reserve the right to claim the full sum from any one or more of you should it proceed to court. Should any party seek to demonstrate limited liability, the balance will be pursued from the remaining tenants.”[74]As we stated above, Ms Begum did not seek to retain any part of the deposits. When questioned, Ms Begum could give no coherent reason for not retaining the deposits, when, at the same time (on her evidence) she had already deciding to sue the tenants in the County Court.[75]Ms Begum was questioned about the work required once she had made her application for a licence, the context being what, if anything, she had to do to receive the licence. The email sent by Mr Thompson, referred to above, specified as matters needing attention, in addition to the fire doors, the mould (which Ms Begum was not contesting) and the repair of cracks and old damp marks, but no more than that. Ms Begum said in evidence that there was no disrepair in the flat other than those matters.[76]The flat was re-let within two months of the tenants’ departure.[77]The Respondent provided in her bundle a quotation which, she said, supported the sums claimed. The works required amounted to ripping out the existing laminate floors throughout the flat and replacing them with a new wooden floor, removing and replacing all of the wallpaper in the flat, painting the flat, removing and replacing all the tiles in the bathroom and the lavatory, and replacing them and the lavatory itself, and the associated re-plumbing of the bath, sink etc, removing the kitchen units and tiles and installing new (and re-installing existing appliances), and electrical works in connection with the whole project. The total sum, including VAT, is given as £36,045.10.[78]When questioned by the Tribunal, we asked how this works could be justified by the few photographs provided in her bundle. None of the photographs indicated anything like a degree of damage that would justify the work specified in the quotation. As an example, Ms Begum indicated a photograph showing some mould on a sealant in the bathroom. This, she said, meant that all the tiles had to be replaced, because mould was “coming up through the sealant”, so it was necessary to take up the tiles and the floor to remove mould underneath them. In the kitchen, she said “mould was escaping through the tiles”. She claimed that the cat had (she inferred) urinated on a part of the laminate floor, which justified its removal throughout. The photographs simply did not bear out this charge.[79]Our concluded view is that the proposed claim amounts to a complete refurbishment of the entire flat. There was no evidence whatsoever to support the necessity for doing so. That this is so is supported by the objective evidence of the only minor works required by the council, and by the fact that the flat had been successfully re-let at a higher rent. In our view, the letter before action and the preceding reference to a possible action amount to a transparent attempt to bully the tenants into withdrawing their application for the RRO. That attempt has, unfortunately, been partially successful, in that it appears that that is the reason behind Ms di Donato’s application for withdrawal, which, for the reasons we give above, we felt compelled to consent to.[80]We turn to our overall assessment of the seriousness of the offence at stages (c) and (d).[81]This we approach in two stages. We deal first with the issues before consideration of the counter claim letter. The second deals with the letter.[82]In the first stage, we take into account, first, the failure of Ms Begum to take any appropriate steps to inform herself of the responsibilities of landlords beyond adhering to the tenancy agreement, which in any event she did not do in respect of the protection of the deposits and her repairing obligations. We accept that the failure to licence was not deliberate, in the sense that she knew about the obligation and ignored it. But she made no effort to understand what her obligations were.[83]Secondly, we take account of our conclusions as to ventilation and mould. Ms Begum was at serious fault in not maintaining the positive ventilation input system, and in not even informing the tenants of its presence.[84]Thirdly, the failure to licence meant that the property was not compliant with the conditions that the council would have imposed in relation to fire safety. That applies to the lack of fire doors to each bedroom. More significant, in our view, is the fire safety implication of there being no closing mechanism on the one fire door that there was within the flat, that to the kitchen. The kitchen of an HMO is by far the most likely source of fire, and a fire door without a self-closer is nearly as bad as no fire door at all.[85]Fourthly, the failure to protect the deposits stands as an aggravating feature in its own right, as well as being relevant in respect of knowledge of a landlord’s obligations.[86]Fifthly, we give weight to Mr Williams’ point about the length of the offending under section 95(1) as well as that under section 72(1). It would appear that the former offence had, indeed, been committed for a substantial period, probably comparable to that which aggravated seriousness by 10% in Newell. But we were not called upon, and did not, make a finding of fact to the criminal standard that the offence had been committed. We think it appropriate, therefore, to give the high, one might say very high, likelihood of long-term offending some weight, but not as much as the direct criminality that founded our jurisdiction to make an RRO in the first place, in relation to section 72(1). In giving it limited weight, we are also conscious of not double-counting in relation to the failure of the Respondent to take proper steps to the inform herself of her responsibilities.[87]Finally, we take some small account of the earlier disrepair issues relating to the boiler.[88]On the other side of ledger as regards the Respondent, we accept that she is not a professional landlord and that the property was the ex-family home.[89]On the tenants’ side, the keeping of the cat is the only conduct element that we consider we should take into account, and that is minor.[90]Thus far, we would put the seriousness of the offence as such as to justify an RRO of 55% of the maximum possible. It is well above the bottom of the spectrum (eg Hallett v Parker [2022] UKUT 239 (LC), Daff), but also below the seriousness of deliberate offences committed by large landlords, featuring, for instance, worse repair conditions and/or worse fire protection issues (eg Williams v Parmar and Others [2021] UKUT 244 (UT), [2022] H.L.R. 8; Aytan v Moore [2022] UKUT 27 (LC), Simpson House 3 Ltd v Osserman [2022] UKUT 164 (LC) etc). We think the right figure is somewhat higher than the figure at which the Deputy President arrived at in Newell itself (50%), before adding a further 10% in respect of the length of time the offence had been committed (which was not precisely determined, but was much longer than the index offence was committed in this case), the features collectively in this case being somewhat more serious than those in that, even if the facts of the two cases are different.[91]However, for the reasons we give above, we take a very serious view of the conduct of the landlord in relation to the counter-claim letter. As we set out, it was an egregious attempt to bully the Applicants into dropping this application. To mark the seriousness of that, we increase the percentage of the total possible by 20%.[92]We turn to the Respondent’s financial circumstances. Despite the invitation to do so in the directions, the Respondent did not provide any documentary evidence relevant to her financial circumstances. She did, however, provide a narrative account, in which she states that there is an outstanding mortgage on the property of £167,093. It was an interest only mortgage. She had a net surplus of £12,383 for the “period of the RRO claim”, that is, presumably, the relevant 12 month period. The proceeds of the letting were devoted to the rent of her mother’s accommodation. She did not have more then minimal savings. She was unable to give any figure for the value of the flat.[93]As to her personal circumstances, she was a single mother with three school-age children, and carer for her mother. She works as a teacher. She lived in rented accommodation. She was unable to give any figure for the value of the flat. There is no reason documentary evidence of these matters could not have been provided. Nonetheless, we are prepared to accept that the broad picture described by Ms Begum in probably reasonably accurate. In the light of it, we are prepared to reduce the percentage of the total by 5%.[94]The end result is that we award an RRO at 70% of the total possible. The exact figures, which are given at the start of this decision, are rounded to £5, and reflect the amount that, on their own evidence, the Applicants paid in rent. Reimbursement of Tribunal fees[95]The Applicant applied for the reimbursement of the application and hearing fees paid by the Applicants under Rule 13(2) of the Rules. In the light of our findings, we allow that application. Rights of appeal[96]If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the London regional office.[97]The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.[98]If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, the application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at these reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.[99]The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, give the date, the property and the case number; state the grounds of appeal; and state the result the party making the application is seeking. Name: Tribunal Judge Richard Percival Date: 27 August 2025Appendix of Relevant Legislation Housing Act 2004 72 Offences in relation to licensing of HMOs(1) A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part (see section 61(1)) but is not so licensed. Housing and Planning Act 2016 40 Introduction and key definitions (1) This Chapter confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord and committed an offence to which this Chapter applies.(2) A rent repayment order is an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing in England to – (a) repay an amount of rent paid by a tenant, or (b) pay a local housing authority an amount in respect of a relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy.[3]A reference to “an offence to which this Chapter applies” is to an offence, of a description specified in the table, that is committed by a landlord in relation to housing in England let to that landlord. Act section general description of offence 1 Criminal Law Act 1977 section 6(1) violence for securing entry 2 Protection from Eviction Act 1977 section 1(2), (3) or (3A) eviction or harassment of occupiers 3 Housing Act 2004 section 30(1) failure to comply with improvement notice 4 section 32(1) failure to comply with prohibition order etc 5 section 72(1) control or management of unlicensed HMO 6 section 95(1) control or management of unlicensed house 7 This Act section 21 breach of banning order[4]For the purposes of subsection (3), an offence under section 30(1) or 32(1) of the Housing Act 2004 is committed in relation to housing in England let by a landlord only if the improvement notice or prohibition order mentioned in that section was given in respect of a hazard on the premises let by the landlord (as opposed, for example, to common parts). 41 Application for rent repayment order(1) A tenant or a local housing authority may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies.(2) A tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if – (a) the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant, and (b) the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made.(3) A local housing authority may apply for a rent repayment order only if – (a) the offence relates to housing in the authority’s area, and (b) the authority has complied with section 42.(4) In deciding whether to apply for a rent repayment order a local housing authority must have regard to any guidance given by the Secretary of State. 42 Notice of intended proceedings (1) Before applying for a rent repayment order a local housing authority must give the landlord a notice of intended proceedings. (2) A notice of intended proceedings must— (a) inform the landlord that the authority is proposing to apply for a rent repayment order and explain why, (b) state the amount that the authority seeks to recover, and (c) invite the landlord to make representations within a period specified in the notice of not less than 28 days (“the notice period”). (3) The authority must consider any representations made during the notice period. (4) The authority must wait until the notice period has ended before applying for a rent repayment order.[5]A notice of intended proceedings may not be given after the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which the landlord committed the offence to which it relates. 43 Making of a rent repayment order(1) The First-tier Tribunal may make a rent repayment order if satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies (whether or not the landlord had been convicted).(2) A rent repayment order under this section may be made only on an application under section 41.(3) The amount of a rent repayment order under this section is to be determined with – (a) section 44 (where the application is made by a tenant); (b) section 45 (where the application is made by a local housing authority); (c) section 46 (in certain cases where the landlord has been convicted etc). 44 Amount of order: tenants (1) Where the First-tier Tribunal decides to make a rent repayment order under section 43 in favour of a tenant, the amount is to be determined in accordance with this section. (2) The amount must relate to rent paid during the period mentioned in this table. If the order is made on the ground that the landlord has committed the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of an offence mentioned in row 1 or 2 of the table in section 40(3) the period of 12 months ending with the date of the offence an offence mentioned in row 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the table in section 40(3) a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence (3) The amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed – (a) the rent in respect of that period, less (b) any relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.(4) In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account – (a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, (c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies.