Stefanos ManosApplicantBillboards Property Group LtdRespondent
Before
Judge Tildesley OBEMr A Gee RIBARespondent : Billboards Property Group Ltd Representative : for the ApplicantDate 26 August 2025Property: 22 Malden Road, Cheam SM3 8QFType of application: Application for a rent repayment order by tenant Sections 40, 41, 43 & 44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016
DECISION
Senior President of Tribunals Practice Direction: Reasons for Decisions 4 June 2024[1]This Practice Direction states basic and important principles on the giving of written reasons for decisions in the First-tier Tribunal. It is of general application throughout the First-tier Tribunal. It relates to the whole range of substantive and procedural decision-making in the Tribunal, by both judges and non-legal members. Accordingly, it must always be read and applied having regard to the particular nature of the decision in question and the particular circumstances in which that decision is made (paragraph 1).[2]Where reasons are given, they must always be adequate, clear, appropriately concise, and focused upon the principal controversial issues on which the outcome of the case has turned. To be adequate, the reasons for a judicial decision must explain to the parties why they have won and lost. The reasons must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the main issues in dispute. They must always enable an appellate body to understand why the decision was reached, so that it is able to assess whether the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law. These fundamental principles apply to the tribunals as well as to the courts (paragraph 5).[3]Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved (paragraph 6).[4]Stating reasons at any greater length than is necessary in the particular case is not in the interests of justice. To do so is an inefficient use of judicial time, does not assist either the parties or an appellate court or tribunal, and is therefore inconsistent with the overriding objective. Providing concise reasons is to be encouraged. Adequate reasons for a substantive decision may often be short. In some cases a few succinct paragraphs will suffice. For a procedural decision the reasons required will usually be shorter (Paragraph 7). Application and Procedural History[5]On 14 January 2025 the Tribunal received an Application for a rent repayment order (“RRO” under section 41 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“2016 Act) for the offence of having control of, or managing, an unlicensed HMO, under Part 2 of section 72(1) Housing Act 2004 which is an offence under s40(3) of the 2016 Act. The Applicant was seeking an order for the period 1 February 2024 to 31 July 2024, in the sum of £4,650.00.[6]On 12 March 2025 the Tribunal notified the Respondent that an application for RRO had been received on 14 January 2025, and that the Tribunal was awaiting further information from the Applicant.[7]On 14 March 2025 the Tribunal informed the Respondent that the further information had been received, and provided the Respondent with a copy of the Application.[8]On 25 March 2025 the Tribunal directed the Application to be heard on a date to be fixed and required the parties to prepare bundles in readiness for the hearing. The Tribunal sent the directions to both parties.[9]On 15 April 2025 the Tribunal notified the parties that the hearing would be held on 15 August 2025 at 10 am at 10 Alfred Place, London WC1E 7LR.[10]The Applicant complied with the directions to prepare a hearing bundle which he emailed to the Tribunal and to the Respondent on 18 April 2025.[11]The Respondent did not send its bundle of documents by the due date of 13 June 2025.[12]On 28 July 2025 the Tribunal resent the notice of hearing by post to 20-22 Wenlock Road, London, N1 7GU which is the address of the Respondent, and also the registered address at Companies House.[13]On 1 August 2025 the Tribunal sent a notice reminding the parties of the hearing on 15 August 2025. The reminder was emailed and posted to the Respondent[14]On 6 August 2025 the Case officer contacted the Respondent by phone on both the landline and mobile numbers given for the Respondent on its official documentation. The calls went to voicemail. The case officer left a message on each of the lines stating that notices of hearing had been sent to them by email and post and that they were expected to attend the hearing on 15 August 2025. The case officer also gave contact details of her name and telephone number. The Respondent did not respond to the voice mails.[15]On 15 August 2025 the Applicant attended the hearing in person, and was later joined by his witness Mr Oluwaseun Olarawaju, the licensee at room 6. The Respondent did not attend. The Applicant indicated that he wished to proceed with the hearing.[16]The Tribunal considered the provisions of rule 34 of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2013. The Tribunal noted that the case officer had communicated with the Respondent on seven separate occasions about the proceedings. The Notice of Hearing had been sent to the Respondent on three occasions by email and two occasions by post. In addition the case officer had left voice messages about the hearing on the two telephone numbers given for the Respondent. The Tribunal was, therefore, satisfied that the Respondent had been notified of the hearing. The Tribunal found that(1) the Applicant was in a position to proceed with the Application;(2) the Applicant had complied with the directions; and(3) the Respondent had ignored the directions and had failed to respond to the various communications from the Tribunal. The Tribunal concluded that it was in the interests of justice to hear the application in the absence of the Respondent. The Tribunal announced its decision before proceeding with the evidence of the Applicant and his witness.[17]In reaching its decision the Tribunal had regard to the relevant details in the Application, the directions, the oral testimony of the Applicant and his witness and their witness statements, the documents in the Applicant’s hearing bundle and entries in the Companies Register which is a public record. The Tribunal applied the law as set out in in sections 40 to 47 of the 2016 Act, and took account of the following authorities: Williams v Parmar [2021] UKUT 244 (LC); Acheampong v Roman and others [2022] UKUT 239 (LC); Cabo v Dezotti [2022] UKUT 240 (LC); Kowalek & Anor v Hassanein Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1041; Rakusen v Jepsen and others [2023] UKSC 9; Cabo v Dezotti [2024] EWCA Civ 1358; and Newell v Abbott and other [2024] UKUT 181 (LC). Decision[18]The Tribunal orders the Respondent to pay to the Applicant the sum of £3,587.00 and to reimburse him with the Tribunal application and hearing fees in the sum of £337.00 within 28 days from the date of this decision.
REASONS
[19]The Tribunal makes the following findings of fact: a) The property is a semi- detached house most likely constructed in the early 1900’s. The property has gas central heating with a garden at the rear. b) The property is organised over four levels. The basement which is accessed via stairs from the kitchen on the ground level and originally housed room 2. On 22 May 2024 the local authority issued an emergency order prohibiting the use of room 2 as sleeping accommodation with immediate effect. On the ground floor there is a kitchen, dining room and a shower room with toilet and wash basin which are shared by the residents in the house together with room 1. Rooms 3, 4 and 5 together with a shared bathroom with a three piece suite are located on the first floor. The loft area has been converted to provide a further room with sleeping accommodation known as room 6. c) Rooms 1 – 6 which had their own code operated locks were let as bed sitting rooms under individual licence agreements. The agreements were entitled “Licence to Occupy Rooms” with a sub-heading of “Licence for Shared Occupation of a Furnished House with a Non-Resident Licensor”. d) The terms of the agreements for the six rooms were the same except for the details of the individual licensee. The agreements named the Respondent as the “Licensor”. In that capacity the Respondent permitted “The Licensee” to occupy the room personally and to use the furniture and furnishings for use as residential purposes only. The agreements prohibited the Licensee from running a business from the premises. The agreements gave the Licensee the right to use the front door, entrance hall, staircase and landings of the house and to use the communal kitchen, communal lavatories and bathrooms. In return for occupation of the room and the use of shared facilities the Licensee paid the Licensor a licence fee per calendar month. The licence fee included payment for utilities defined in the agreement as “council tax, central heating, water rates, electricity and broadband”. e) The Applicant occupied room 5 from 1 February 2024 to 31 December 2024 in consideration of rent of £775.00 per calendar month which included a contribution to utilities. The Applicant produced a copy of his licence agreement for the period of 1 February 2024 to 31 July 2024. The Applicant supplied records of his payments of rent for the period 1 February 2024 to 1 August 2024 which were made to the bank account of Billboards Estate Agency Limited. The Applicant confirmed that he was gainfully employed throughout the period he lived at the property, and that he was not related to any of the other residents during his occupation of room 5. Finally the Applicant stated that he occupied room 5 as his only or main residence. f) The Tribunal accepted the Applicant’s evidence about the occupants of the other five rooms in the property during his time at the property. The Applicant’s evidence was corroborated by the inclusion of the licence agreements for rooms 1, 2, 5 and 6 in the documents bundle which were for various periods of time but not covering the complete period of the Applicant’s occupation and by the evidence of Mr Oluwaseun Olarewaju who took up occupation of room 6 on 2 March 2024 and still lives there. g) The Applicant stated that Ms Finlaye Johnson occupied room 2 (basement) from 28 August 2023 to 22 May 2024 when the emergency prohibition order took effect. The Applicant said that Ms Johnson remained in the house after 22 May 2024 by sharing a room with another occupant. Ms Fazeena Bachus occupied room 1 (ground floor) from 17 April 2023 to April 2025 when she left following a notice of eviction. Ms Hannah Smith occupied room 3 (first floor) in February 2024 and left in January 2025. Mr Mohamed Lans Camara occupied room 4 (first floor) from 16 February 2023 to the end of July/beginning of August 2024. The Applicant believed that room 4 remained empty after Mr Camara left. Mr Oluwaseun Olarewaju occupied room 6 from 2 March 2024 to the present day. The Applicant and Mr Olarewaju confirmed that the property had been occupied by another person immediately prior to Mr Olarewaju’s occupation. h) The Applicant stated to the best of his knowledge that the occupants at the property during the period 1 February 2024 to 1 January 2025 were not related to each other and that they lived there as their only or main residence. The Applicant also said that all the occupants were in gainful employment except Ms Bacchus.[20]The Tribunal is satisfied from the above facts that the property meets the standard test for an HMO in section 254(b) of the Housing Act 2004, namely;(1) consisting of one more units of living accommodation not consisting of a self-contained flat;(2) the living accommodation is occupied by persons who do not form a single household;(3) the living accommodation is occupied by those persons as their only or main residence;(4) their occupation of the living accommodation constitutes their only use of it;(5) rents are payable in respect of at least one of those person’s occupation of the living accommodation; and(6) two or more of the households who occupy the living accommodation share one or more basic amenities (toilet; washing facilities or kitchen).[21]The Tribunal is also satisfied from the above facts that the property as an HMO was subject to mandatory licensing under section 55(2)(a) of the Housing Act 2004 because during the period of the Applicant’s occupation from the 1 February 2024 to 1 January 2025 the property was occupied by at least five persons (six up to the period of end July 2024) living in five or six separate households.[22]The Applicant produced a letter addressed to him from Mr J Botten Environmental Protection Officer of Kingston and Sutton Shared Environmental Services dated 11 June 2024 stating that “Following an inspection of the above property (22 Malden Road, Cheam) on 22 May 2024, the London Borough of Sutton are satisfied that the property has been operating as a House in Multiple Occupation (HMO) without the correct licence to do so. You are currently an occupier of this property. The person in control of the management of the property has now been served with a Notice of Intention to impose a Financial Penalty for offences in relation to licensing of HMOs under section 72 of the Housing Act 2004 and offences in relation to the management of HMO’s under Section 234 of the Housing Act 2004”.[23]On 10 October 2024 Mr J Botten informed the Applicant that the Respondent had applied for an HMO licence on 3 July 2024 which was granted on 29 August 2024. The licence is in the Respondent’s name and is subject to a maximum occupancy of five persons.[24]The Tribunal is satisfied on the evidence of Mr Botten, and the Local Authority HMO Register that the property was not licensed as an HMO from 1 February 2024 to 3 July 2024.[25]The Register of Companies held at Companies House shows that the Respondent was incorporated on 10 January 2017, its nature of business is the management of real estate on a fee or contract basis, and its registered address is 20-22 Wenlock Road, London. Mr Hakim Habib is named as the director and the person with significant control. Billboards Estate Agency Limited incorporated on 9 October 2014 shares the same registered address and the same nature of business with the Respondent. Mr Hakim Habib is also its director and the person with significant control. The Respondent and Billboard Estate Agency Limited are connected companies. The Tribunal finds that the Respondent had significant experience as a property manager and should have been aware of the licensing requirements for HMOs.[26]The Applicant supplied a copy of The HM Land Registry entry for 22 Malden Road, Cheam, Sutton under title number SGL3496 which showed that Amrit Othi and Harpreet Othi were registered as freeholders of the property with absolute title from 29 November 2022. The Applicant had no knowledge of the freeholders named in the Register Entry. The Applicant said that he dealt with Hakim and a lady at Billboards Estate agency in respect of his occupation at the property. There was no evidence of a connection between the registered freehold owners and the Respondent and no evidence of the Respondent’s legal interest in the property.[27]The Tribunal did, however, have evidence that the Respondent was named as the Licensor in the agreements with the occupants at the property and that the Respondent was entitled to receive the licence fees from them for their occupation. Further the facts showed that the Applicant’s licence fees were paid into the bank account of Billboards Estate Agency Limited which was a connected company with the Respondent. The Tribunal is satisfied that the amount of fees paid for occupation of the property which ranged from £3,875 to £4,650 per month depending upon whether it was 5/6 occupants was equivalent to the rack rent for the property. Next the Applicant said that his dealings with the property were with Hakim who was most likely Hakim Habib the person with significant control of the two Billboards companies. Finally Mr Botten gave evidence that the HMO licence was granted in the name of the Respondent.[28]Given the above evidence which was not challenged the Tribunal finds that the Respondent was the person who received the rank rent for the property on its own account, and, therefore, met the definition of a person having control of an HMO as defined by section 263(1) of the Housing Act 2004.[29]The Tribunal finds that: i. The property was an HMO subject to mandatory licensing by virtue of section 55(2)(a) of the Housing Act 2004. ii. The property was not licensed as an HMO for the period 1 February 2024 to 3 July 2024. iii. The Respondent was the person having control of the property as an HMO during 1 February 2024 to 3 July 2024. iv. The Respondent is an experienced property manager and has given no explanation for why the property did not have an HMO licence during the relevant period.[30]The Tribunal is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt from the findings in paragraph 29 above that the Respondent had committed the specified offence of control or management of an unlicensed HMO contrary to section 72(1) of the 2004 Act from 1 February 2024 to 3 July 2024 in respect of the property and that it did not have a defence of reasonable excuse. Should the Tribunal make a RRO?[31]Section 40(2) of the 2016 Act defines an RRO as an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing to repay an amount of rent paid by a tenant. An RRO can only be made against an immediate landlord. Under section 56 of the 2002 Act a tenancy includes a licence. In this case the fact that the Respondent has granted a licence does not enable it to avoid the provisions regarding RROs. The Tribunal is satisfied that the Respondent was the Applicant’s immediate landlord and that it has committed an offence of no HMO licence which is one of the specified offences in section 40(3) giving rise to the making of an RRO. In those circumstances the Tribunal decides to exercise its discretion to make an RRO. What is the Amount of the RRO? What is the whole of the rent for the Relevant Period?[32]The Applicant occupied Room 5 at the property from 1 February 2024 to 31 December 2024. The offence of no HMO licence was committed from 1 February 2024 to 3 July 2024, which was the date the Respondent applied for a licence. The maximum amount of rent is the amount paid by the Applicant for the period of 1 February 2024 to 3 July 2024, a period of 5 months and 2 days. The Applicant paid £775.00 rent per calendar month which gives a daily rate of £25.00.[33]The Tribunal decides that the total amount of rent paid by the Applicant during 1 February 2024 to 3 July 2024 was £3,925.00. Should there be any deduction for any element of the rent that represents payment for utilities?[34]The licence agreements stated that the rent included payment for utilities which was defined as “council tax, central heating, water rates, electricity and broadband”. The agreement of Mr Camara of room 4 dated 16 February 2023 to 15 August 2023 specified a utility allowance of £400.00 for the six month period which equated to £66.67 per month for each resident. The Applicant agreed that this figure of £66.67 was a reasonable amount for utilities. The Tribunal, therefore, decides that there should be a deduction of £338.00 for utilities for the period of five months and 2 days (5 x £66.67 and 2 days at £4.30 rounded up to £338). This meant that the maximum amount of rent after deduction for utilities eligible for RRO was £3,587.00. What is the Seriousness of the Offence?[35]The offence fell in the less serious category of offences covered by section 40(3) of the 2016 Act.[36]The Tribunal finds the following in relation to the spectrum of seriousness for no HMO licences: i. The Respondent was an experienced residential property manager who should have been aware of the licensing requirements for HMOs. ii. The property was a large HMO subject to the mandatory licensing scheme for HMOs which has been in force since the passing of the Housing Act 2004. Large HMOs are known to be high risk buildings, particularly in relation to fire safety. iii. In view of the Respondent’s experience as a property manager and the absence of an explanation, the Tribunal concludes that the Respondent’s commission of the offence was deliberate. iv. The evidence of the licence agreements suggested that the property had been operating as HMO from at least February 2023 and that the offending continued until July 2024, a period of about 15 months. v. Mr Botten, Environmental Protection Officer, inspected the property on 22 May 2024 and found that the basement room (Room 2) posed a serious fire risk which resulted in the issuing of an emergency order prohibiting the use of the basement room as sleeping accommodation with immediate effect. He found that “The basement bedroom is located off of the kitchen, with no separation from the escape route. The only window in this room is not wide enough to be considered a Fire Exit, and bars prohibit the occupier from accessing the front of the house (place of safety) if a fire was to occur. This room also contains a cupboard with the consumer unit that has not been fire protected”. vi. On 5 July 2024 Mr Botten carried out HHSRS inspection of the property and identified a category 1 hazard of fire , and a category 2 hazard of damp and mould. The deficiencies giving rise to the category 1 hazard of fire were: incorrect fire detection system, deficient fire doors to the five rooms occupied by the residents, no fire door to the kitchen, no self closing mechanisms to all the bedroom doors and the kitchen, no keyless lock to the front and rear door, the fire blanket in the kitchen was not wall mounted, the electrical cupboard in the basement room was not protected, no emergency lighting and no fire signage. Mr Botten decided to issue a Preliminary Improvement Notice to give the Respondent an opportunity to complete the necessary works by 25 September 2024. The Applicant stated that only part of the works were completed, and the works were to an unsatisfactory standard. This resulted in Mr Botten issuing a formal improvement notice on 6 November 2024 requiring works to be done in respect of the category 1 hazard of fire and category 2 hazard of damp and mould by 1 January 2025. The Tribunal has no evidence of whether the Respondent complied with the improvement notice. vii. The Applicant and his witness gave evidence about the Respondent’s tardiness in responding to residents’ requests for repairs and maintenance. The Applicant supplied photographs of the bath which was covered to its rim in mould and of faulty electrical fittings. The Applicant said that he reported the mouldy bath on several occasions to the Respondent. The Applicant stated that major works were required to the drains to prevent mould from accumulating in the bath which the Respondent was not prepared to do. The Applicant also mentioned the Respondent’s failure to replace a fridge promptly which had broken down and meant that residents lost their fresh food. The Applicant added that when the fridge was replaced it was half the size of the previous fridge and did not provide sufficient space for the residents’ fresh food. Next the Applicant stated that the Respondent had failed to install a lock on the rear door which posed a risk of unauthorised entry particularly when the fence enclosing the rear garden had fallen down. Finally the Applicant said that the Respondent attempted to evict all the residents in November 2024 which according to the Applicant the Respondent was not entitled to do. The Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence of the Applicant and his witness on the Respondent’s shortcomings in responding to residents’ requests about the state of property and the attempted eviction notices were indicative of the Respondent’s poor management practices in respect of the HMO.[37]In the Upper Tribunal decision of Newell v Abbott and Okrojek [2024] UKUT 181 (LC) at paragraph 57, Martin Rodger KC, Deputy Chamber President, summarised the principles governing the level of RROs in licensing offences: “This brief review of recent decisions of this Tribunal in appeals involving licensing offences illustrates that the level of rent repayment orders varies widely depending on the circumstances of the case. Awards of up to 85% or 90% of the rent paid (net of services). are not unknown but are not the norm. Factors which have tended to result in higher penalties include that the offence was committed deliberately, or by a commercial landlord or an individual with a larger Property portfolio, or where tenants have been exposed to poor or dangerous conditions which have been prolonged by the failure to licence. Factors tending to justify lower penalties include inadvertence on the part of a smaller landlord, Property in good condition such that a licence would have been granted without additional work being required, and mitigating factors which go some way to explaining the offence, without excusing it, such as the failure of a letting agent to warn of the need for a licence, or personal incapacity due to poor health”[38]The Tribunal turns to its assessment of the seriousness of the offence. The Tribunal takes into account that the offence under section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 is not one of the more serious of the offences for which a rent repayment order can be made. The Tribunal, however, finds that this offence fell within the top range of seriousness for a section 72(1) offence.[39]The Tribunal’s assessment of seriousness is based on its findings that(1) the Respondent was an experienced property manager who would be aware of the licensing requirements for HMOs;(2) the Respondent’s offending was deliberate and committed over a significant period of 15 months;(3) the condition of the property posed serious risks of fire to the life and safety of the residents;(4) the Respondents’ willingness to let a room in the basement with no effective fire escape and inherent fire risks displayed a blatant disregard to the safety of the occupants, and(5) the Respondent’s poor management practices as evidenced by the category 2 hazard, the inadequate responses to residents requests for repairs and replacement of facilities and the defective eviction notices.[40]The Tribunal forms the view that the Respondent’s conduct has all the hallmarks of a rogue landlord who knowingly lets out unsafe accommodation to vulnerable tenants whilst flouting the legal obligations in respect of HMOs. The Tribunals considers that the circumstances of this case in particular the Respondent’s blatant disregard to the safety of the residents justified an order of the maximum amount of rent payable in the sum of £3,587.00 to reflect the seriousness of the offence. Whether Adjustments should be made in the light of the factors identified in Section 44(4) of the 2016 Act?[41]The Respondent did not participate in the proceedings and offered no mitigation. The Tribunal has no information on his financial circumstances.[42]The Tribunal considered whether the Respondent’s application for a licence merited a reduction in the amount. The Tribunal concluded that it did not because it would appear from the timing of the provisional improvement notice and the grant of the licence, that the licence was granted subject to carrying out the necessary fire prevention works. This would be, in the Tribunal’s experience, a normal condition to an HMO licence. The issue of a formal improvement notice in November 2024 was compelling evidence that the Respondent did not make the property safe from risks of fire, and of a potential non-compliance with conditions of the HMO licence.[43]The Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant acted as a reasonable tenant and paid his rent on time.[44]The Tribunal decides that no adjustments should be made in the light of section 44(4) of the 2016 Act. Determination[45]The Tribunal determines that the amount of the RRO should be the maximum amount of rent paid less deduction for utilities in the sum of £3,587.00 during the relevant period of 1 February 2024 to 3 July 2024. Reimbursement of Fees[46]Under rule 13(1) of the Tribunal Procedure Rules 2013 the Tribunal has a discretion to make an order requiring a party to reimburse the other party the whole or part of the fees. The Tribunal took the view that the Applicant had been successful and had been awarded a substantial RRO. The Tribunal decides that the Respondent should reimburse the Applicants with the application and hearing fee totalling £337.00. RIGHTS OF APPEAL[1]A person wishing to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) must seek permission to do so by making written application to the First-tier Tribunal at the Regional office which has been dealing with the case.[2]The application must arrive at the Tribunal within 28 days after the Tribunal sends to the person making the application written reasons for the decision.[3]If the person wishing to appeal does not comply with the 28 day time limit, the person shall include with the application for permission to appeal a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then decide whether to extend time or not to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed.[4]The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.