Boris Aaron Stainoff Louis Benjamin SyropouloApplicantBarry Howe (non-attending)Respondent
Before
Tribunal Judge Mark JonesMs Susan Coughlin MCIEHFleur Donnelly-Jackson Justice for Tenants for the Applicantn/a Tenant’s application for a Rent Repayment Order under ss. 40, 41, 43 & for the RespondentDate 6 March 2026Property: Road, London SE1 3BD Boris Aaron StainoffType of application: 44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 Tribunal Judge Mark Jones
DECISION
Decisions of the tribunal(1) The Tribunal orders the Respondent to repay to the Applicants the sum of £9,900.00 by way of rent repayment.(2) The Tribunal also orders the Respondent to reimburse the Applicants the application and hearing fees totalling £341.(3) The above sums, totalling £10,241.00 must be paid by the Respondents to the Applicants within 28 days of the date of this determination. Definitions In this decision, the following terms bear the associated meanings: “the 2016 Act” means the Housing and Planning Act 2016 “the 2004 Act” means the Housing Act 2004 “RRO” means a rent repayment order under ss. 40-44 of the 2016 Act “the 2013 Rules” means The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 Introduction[1]The Applicant tenants made an application dated 12 May 2025 for an RRO against the Respondent landlord under sections 40-44 of the 2016 Act.[2]It is asserted that the Respondent landlord committed an offence of control or management of an unlicenced dwelling contrary to section 95(1) of the 2004 Act, which is an offence under section 40(3) of the 2016 Act.[3]The Applicants originally sought a RRO in the sum of £33,000, for the period 14 May 2023 to 14 May 2024, being the respective dates they moved into, and vacated the property. This claim was (entirely correctly) reduced by 50% in the Applicants’ detailed statement of case, addressed at §4, below.[4]Directions were given in the matter by Judge Tildesley OBE on 25 July 2025, following which the Applicants provided full particulars of their application, by way of a statement of case bearing a statement of truth signed by each of them, dated 22 August 2025. By that statement of case, they limited the sums claimed by way of RRO to £16,500, being the rent paid by them between 01 November 2023 and 14 May 2024, being the actual dates within which the Property was required to be licensed, while occupied by the Applicants. This formed part of the Applicants’ bundle, running to some 121 pages.[5]Paragraph 11 of the Directions dated 25 July 2025 required the Respondent to provide his bundle in response to the application, containing all relevant documents comprised in a single Adobe PDF document, bearing an index and numbered chronologically page by page by 06 October 2025. He produced a ‘Combined Submission’ of some 26 pages, made up of a cover letter, chronology, rebuttal statement, skeleton argument and Defence, accompanied by a large number of separate exhibits in various formats which were not comprised within a single PDF bundle, as directed. The Tribunal was not assisted by having to work with a disparate set of unamalgamated documents.[6]The Applicants filed a detailed reply to the Respondent’s written submissions, together with a letter from Ms Frasi, occupier of a neighbouring flat, dated 06 January 2026. The parties each provided further evidence immediately prior to the hearing, which the Tribunal admitted.[7]Whilst the Tribunal makes it clear that it has read the parties’ bundles and additional evidence, including in particular the series of documents forming the Respondent’s exhibits, the Tribunal does not refer to every one of the documents in detail in this Decision, it being impractical and unnecessary to do so. Where the Tribunal does not refer to specific documents in this Decision, it should not be mistakenly assumed that the Tribunal has ignored or left them out of account.[8]This Decision seeks to focus solely on the key issues. The omission to refer to or make findings about every statement or document mentioned is not a tacit acknowledgement of the accuracy or truth of statements made or documents received. Not all of the various matters mentioned in the bundles or at the hearing require any finding to be made for the purpose of deciding the relevant issues in this application. The Decision is made on the basis of the evidence and arguments the parties presented, as clarified by the Tribunal in the hearing, and is necessarily limited by the matters to which the Tribunal was referred. Hearing[9]This was a face-to-face hearing.[10]The Applicants attended and were represented by Ms Fleur Donnelly-Jackson of Justice for Tenants at the hearing.[11]The Respondent did not attend, having previously advised the Tribunal that he was resident in the United Arab Emirates, and that he had attempted to obtain permission from the authorities in that jurisdiction to permit him to attend via video link, in accordance with the Guidance note highlighted in §13 of the directions, but had received no response. He was unrepresented.[12]Each Applicant, Mr Boris Stainoff and Mr Louis Syropoulo each gave evidence, and confirmed the truth of matters stated in their witness statements, dated, respectively, 02 and 22 August 2025. In the absence of the Respondent the Tribunal asked questions of each of them, essentially putting the Respondent’s case as it was articulated in his combined submission and accompanying exhibits.[13]As to the Respondent’s written evidence, we must make it clear to the parties that the weight to be attached to a statement of a witness who does not attend for cross-examination will almost invariably be reduced in consequence of the fact that the Tribunal has been unable to assess their credibility after questioning. The Property[14]The Alaska Building is a large, striking Art Deco building situated in Bermondsey, constructed in the 1930s, and formerly in use as a factory engaged in the fur trade. The factory closed in the 1960s and the building was converted into residential apartments.[15]The Property is a large, open-plan loft, with no separate rooms besides the bathroom. The open-plan room contains a mezzanine, beneath which is situated an open-plan kitchen, contiguous with the living area. The Property receives natural light through two large single glazed windows in the lower level and two 1 x 0.5 m sky lights above the mezzanine area, and is artificially lit by a large number of light bulbs.[16]We did not inspect the Property, where neither party requested us to do so, and we did not consider it necessary or proportionate to do so to determine the application before us. Tenancy[17]The Applicants are friends who had previously shared accommodation. They occupied the Property pursuant to an assured shorthold tenancy agreement for a term of 12 months commencing on 12 May 2023. Licensing[18]Part 3, Section 80(1) of the 2004 Act permits local authorities to designate particular areas as subject to selective licensing for the purposes of letting to tenants.[19]The Property was situated within an area that was designated as a selective licensing area by the local authority, LB Southwark. The selective licensing scheme in question came into force on 01 November 2023, and is due to cease to have effect on 21 October 2028.[20]The Property fell within the criteria to be licensed under the scheme, and was not subject to any exemption. Applicants’ Case[21]The Applicants state that the Property did not have a licence, but required one, for the entirety of the period 01 November 2023 to 14 May 2024.[22]This was not in the event disputed by the Respondent, where Mr Howe in his submissions entirely sensibly conceded that the Property was subject to a selective licensing scheme at the relevant time, but that no licence had been applied for. He attributed this to the failure of LB Southwark to advise him of the inception of the licensing scheme, where he had previously engaged in correspondence with LB Southwark’s council tax department to advise that body of his status as resident overseas from and after 2015.[23]The Applicants complained of what we find in the main to be minor items of disrepair within the Property, where blinds to cover the skylights were either missing or non-functional, and approximately 50% of the myriad light bulbs in the Property did not work, by the end of their occupation. At least some of this was attributed by an electrician that the Applicants engaged to a problem with circuitry. The Applicants produced evidence of having paid an electrician £211, which was not refunded to them by the Respondent. More serious was the fact that the sole smoke detector was broken: we have seen a photograph and accept the Applicants’ evidence on the issue.[24]The Applicants stated that they were never provided with a Gas Safety Certificate, Energy Performance Certificate (“EPC”), How-to-Rent Guide, or Electrical Installation Condition report. Questioned by the Tribunal, they were unable to confirm whether the Property in fact had a gas supply, or any installations that ran on gas. As for the EPC, we were not particularly impressed with the submission that because the Property was rated ‘F’ for EPC it should not have been let: part of its attraction is the Building’s singular nature, and the Respondent had produced evidence that the Property was exempted from the requirement at the commencement of the tenancy, presumably due to the poor insulation of the building, which exemption had later been renewed. The Respondent provided no evidence to contradict these statements, besides producing evidence that he had obtained an Exemption Certificate for the EPC prior to the commencement of the tenancy.[25]The Applicants further stated that they had paid a deposit in respect of their tenancy in the sum of £4,125. They received no proof of protection within a government backed deposit protection scheme, and at the end of their tenancy the Respondent had failed or refused to return the deposit, or any proportion of it to them.[26]At the end of the tenancy, the Applicants had been particularly receptive to the Respondent’s demands that they show the Property to prospective replacement tenants and putative investment purchasers, and had themselves coordinated a series of viewings with individuals who communicated via a shared WhatsApp group set up by the Respondent to assist in organising viewings. The Respondent’s Case[27]The Respondent contests the application, citing procedural failings by Southwark Council and tenant misconduct. He argues that he was not notified of the Selective Licensing Scheme due to the council’s failure to follow his email-only communication request, as he has been residing abroad since 2014–2015. He highlights the alleged antisocial behaviour of the Applicants, including alleged drug use, late-night parties, and threats, supported by complaints from neighbours and the Building’s managing agents.[28]The Respondent emphasises that the tenancy began before the licensing scheme was introduced, the tenants willingly paid rent, and sought extensions to the period of their tenancy despite claiming the Property suffered from disrepair. He requests the Tribunal dismiss the RRO application or reduce any award to nil, citing the alleged tenant misconduct, council tax arrears, and his good faith efforts to comply with licensing requirements. Additionally, the Respondent requests the Tribunal to compel the managing agent, HML, to disclose evidence of alleged tenant anti-social behaviour, which he claims has been withheld, impacting his ability to defend himself. The Evidence at the Hearing[29]Questioned by the Tribunal, the Applicants denied the anti-social behaviour alleged. Mr Stainoff conceded that he had had perhaps 8 or 9 friends round to the Property to play poker on occasions no more frequently than every 3 or 4 weeks. These poker evenings would go on until perhaps 01.00 am. Neither Applicant smoked, and each denied smoking cannabis in the communal areas outside the Property. One or two of their visitors might have stood outside to smoke cigarettes on occasions.[30]The Tribunal notes that the Building appears likely to contain little or no sound insulation, and that the Property contained no floor covering, so that even the most innocuous of movements would be likely to resonate loudly downstairs, particularly where the downstairs neighbour, Mr Theodore Harding, demonstrated a particular degree of sensitivity to noise from above. We also note that when Mr Harding made complaint of noise to the Respondent and to HML in January 2024, the Respondent spoke of Nick Hughes of HML in highly disparaging terms to the Applicants during WhatsApp exchanges, and supported the Applicants’ position. He appears to have been sceptical about the accusations, on at least one reading of his email dated 27 December 2023.[31]The Applicants stated, and we accept, that on at least one occasion Mr Harding had sought to complain of noise emanating from the Property when they were in fact both on holiday in Spain, so that he could not have been reacting to any conduct by them. The only other evidence that might be said to relate to anti-social conduct was an email from another neighbour, Jane Cochrane, to the effect that on two occasions she had been disturbed in the early hours of the morning by people standing outside the flat smoking and talking loudly. Against this we note a signed letter from another neighbour, Jill Frasi, to the effect that the Applicants were courteous and considerate neighbours, and any noise emanating from the Property was minor, infrequent and did not disturb others.[32]As to the condition of the Property and the viewings by prospective tenants, we watched a video taken by a representative from Foxtons Estate Agents which had somewhat exercised the Respondent at the time, which did not appear to the Tribunal to demonstrate misuse of the Property. While Foxtons described the condition as “messy”, we did not see in the video anything which could be considered to be un-tenantlike behaviour. We bear in mind that the Applicants occupied as their home. The Applicants stated that they had not seen a document said to be a record of inspection dated 18 May 2024 by Mr Carl Dingle, relied upon by the Respondent, prior to issue of these proceedings. We accept that evidence from the Applicants, particularly where Mr Dingle’s record was not referred to in the correspondence immediately following the Applicants’ vacation of the Property, as might have been anticipated were the Respondent to seek to rely upon it as justification for withholding deposit monies.[33]Indeed, we found the Respondent’s correspondence around the end of the tenancy to be brash and overbearing. Two examples illustrate the point. First, against a background where the Applicants were being, as we find, most accommodating in facilitating viewings for prospective new tenants, against the background of the Foxtons video, the Respondent texted “Can’t begin to tell you how pissed I am - Sort it out and stop disrespecting me”, and upon being advised by Mr Stainoff that a cleaner had been booked for the following week responded on 11 April 2024 “Next week is not good enough, the property is in no state to get marketing material or show potential tenants. This is time lost and until it’s done how can you expect me to proceed with anything? All the other previous viewings are worthless and opportunities lost as the property has not been fit to show people. 2 month notice will start once flat is ready for viewing. Ps I’ve asked all agents to video the flat upon every veiwing (sic) to ensure it’s is kept up to a high standard.” This we find to be imposition of wholly unreasonable demands upon the Applicants, and an invasion of their privacy.[34]The second example came in the form of a long message from the Respondent on 15 May 2024, against the Applicants’ request for return of their deposit, which concluded thus: “I suggest you man up with your responsibilities and step up to the table and we can amicably settle this fairly and expeditiously. Or you can try to be clever, using veiled threats and trust me you’ll end up of worse in the long run. Trust me when I say this, I know what I am doing. “If you disrespect me again, we will just go the legal route and I have no liquid assets in the UK (the business runs at a loss) and subsequently nothing to lose which means you have nothing to win.”[35]Against the unpleasant tenor of this correspondence, the Respondent has, as explained above, retained for himself the entire deposit of £4,125, while providing no justification in the form of any receipt or invoice for cleaning or repairs, that he alleges to have been necessitated by the condition of the Property upon vacation by the Applicants.[36]Indeed, we note that in his email to LB Southwark dated 29 October 2024 the Respondent stated that the Applicants’ tenancy was “seamless” between them and Nick Varney and Jessica Vale, and in his email dated 04 November 2024, the respondent advised that the Applicants vacated the Property “...the same day that Jessica arrived”, suggesting that there was no ‘void’ period within which the condition of the Property prevented further letting.[37]Against this evidence, we reject any contention that the Applicants mistreated the Property or left it in such a condition that it required substantial sums to be spent on cleaning, repairs or maintenance. The Statutory Regime[38]An appendix of relevant statutory material is appended at the end of this decision. Tribunal’s analysis[39]The uncontested evidence is that the Property was a dwelling which was required to be licensed but was not licensed at any point during the period of the claim. Having considered that uncontested evidence we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that for the whole period of the claim the Property required a licence, and it was not licensed.[40]It is also clear that the Respondent was the landlord for the purposes of section 43(1) of the 2016 Act, as he is named as landlord in the assured shorthold tenancy agreement dated 12 May 2023 under which the Applicants occupied the Property, and directly received the rent paid. Again, this was undisputed.[41]The next question is whether the Respondent was a “person having control of or managing” the Property within the meaning of section 263 of the 2004 Act. The evidence shows that the rent was paid to the Respondent. The Respondent has not sought to argue that he was not a person having control of or managing the Property or that the rent paid was not the “rack-rent” as defined in section 263. We are, accordingly, satisfied that the Respondent received rent from the Applicants. The Respondent was additionally and in any event at the relevant time a person managing the Property. The defence of “reasonable excuse”[42]Under section 72(5) of the 2004 Act, it is a defence that a person who would otherwise be guilty of the offence of controlling or managing a house which is licensable under Part 3 of the 2004 Act had a reasonable excuse for the failure to obtain a licence. The burden of proof is on the person relying on the defence.[43]In this case, the Respondent sought to advance the defence, on the basis that the selective licensing scheme commenced whilst he was overseas, and it was not advertised or otherwise communicated to him by LB Southwark despite his prior requests for correspondence by email. The Respondent had not had a licence due simply to inadvertence, and upon realising in August 2024 that a new licence was required had made application promptly.[44]We accept that the explanation is credible. Nevertheless, it was the Respondent’s responsibility to appraise himself of relevant regulations when letting the Property. This included, from 01 November 2023, the obligation to obtain a licence and there is nothing in the explanation provided which in our view is sufficient to amount to a complete defence. In particular, there is nothing to suggest that the matter was wholly outside the Respondent’s control or that he was relying on somebody else to take appropriate steps in circumstances where it was reasonable to do so.[45]Moreover, the Respondent provided a copy of email correspondence with Southwark, dated 8 October 2025, asking them for information about whether he needed a licence and how to go about applying indicating that there was, even at that date, no valid application several months into the new tenancy following that of the Applicants.[46]Indeed, close scrutiny of the correspondence adduced in support of this submission reveals that the Respondent’s correspondence prior to the tenancy commencing was with the Council Tax department. This does not demonstrate that he had any discussions about prospective licensing arrangements. He did not request that all correspondence be sent by email until after the scheme came into effect, a point reiterated in LB Southwark’s response to a later complaint made by the Respondent, where it stated that no earlier request to communicate with him by email could be found, and he has produced none to this Tribunal. .[47]In fact, the evidence discloses that in May 2014 the Respondent was asked for a forwarding address and provided one in Kingston Upon Thames.[48]Ultimately, as held by the Upper Tribunal in Newell v Abbott [2024] UKUT 181, a local housing authority is under no obligation to consult with individual property owners and notify them of licensing obligations.[49]The Respondent has adduced no evidence of any steps made by him to endeavour to keep abreast of his legal responsibilities as a landlord. Living overseas as he did, he might have considered it sensible to appoint a local agent to manage the Property. Having elected not to do so, compliance with statutory and regulatory formalities was his own responsibility.[50]As held in Thurrock Council v Daoudi [2020] UKUT 209 (LC), no matter how genuine a person’s ignorance of the need to obtain a licence, unless that failure is reasonable in all the circumstances, it cannot amount to an objectively reasonable excuse.[51]The purpose of the licensing regime is to try to ensure – insofar as is reasonably possible – that properties which are rented out are safe and of an acceptable standard, and it would frustrate that purpose if landlords could be excused compliance simply because their personal circumstances and/or failure to appraise themselves of applicable regulations caused them to neglect to apply for a licence.[52]Applying the objective test adumbrated in Perrin v HMRC [2018] UKUT 156 (TCC), the Tribunal concludes, beyond reasonable doubt, that the Respondent had no reasonable excuse for failing to seek the necessary licence. The offence[53]Section 40 of the 2016 Act confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence listed in the table in sub-section 40(3), subject to certain conditions being satisfied. An offence under section 95(1) of the 2004 Act is one of the offences listed in that table.[54]Section 95(1) states that “A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing a house which is required to be licensed under this Part … but is not so licensed”, and for the reasons given above we are satisfied(a) that the Respondent was a “person managing” the Property for the purposes of section 263 of the 2004 Act,(b) that the Property was required to be licensed throughout the period of claim and(c) that it was not licensed at any point during the period of claim.[55]Under section 41(2), a tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant and the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made. On the basis of the Applicants’ uncontested evidence on these points we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Property was let to the Applicants at the time of commission of the offence and that the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which their application was made.[56]We are accordingly satisfied so as to be sure that the Respondent committed the offence under s.95(1) of the 2004 Act. Process for ascertaining the amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid[57]Based on the above findings, we have the power to make a rent repayment order against the Respondent.[58]The amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid is governed by section 44 of the 2016 Act. Under sub-section 44(2), the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenants in respect of a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence. Under sub-section 44(3), the amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed the rent paid in respect of that period less any relevant award of housing benefit or universal credit paid in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.[59]In this case, the Applicants’ claim relates to the period 01 November 2023 to 14 May 2024.[60]During the period in issue, the Applicants paid rent in the sum of £2,750 per month, totalling £16,500 for the period in issue.[61]We are satisfied on the basis of the evidence that the Applicants were in occupation of the Property for the whole of the period to which this rent repayment application relates and that the Property required a licence for the whole of that period. Therefore, the maximum sum that can be awarded by way of rent repayment is the sum of £16,500, this being the amount paid by the Applicants by way of rent in respect of the period of claim.[62]Under sub-section 44(4), in determining the amount of any rent repayment order the tribunal must, in particular, take into account(a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant,(b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and(c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which the relevant part of the 2016 Act applies.[63]In its decision in Acheampong v Roman and others [2022] UKUT 239 (LC), the Upper Tribunal recommended a four-stage approach to determining the amount to be repaid, which is paraphrased below:-(a) ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period;(b) subtract any element of that sum that represents payment by the landlord for utilities that only benefited the tenant;(c) consider how serious this offence was, both compared to other types of offence in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made and compared to other examples of the same type of offence; and(d) consider whether any deduction from, or addition to, that figure should be made in the light of the other factors set out in section 44(4).[64]Adopting the Acheampong approach, the whole of the rent in this case means the whole of the rent paid by the Applicants out of their own resources, which (where we have been unable to discern any relevant components of Universal Credit) is £16,500. Utilities[65]We accept that the Applicants were solely responsible for payment of utilities: indeed, such was the effect of clause 3.2 in the tenancy agreement, appearing at p.55 of the Applicants’ bundle. Accordingly, no reduction applies under this head.[66]We note that the evidence includes documents indicating that the Applicants did not pay Council Tax during the period of their occupation, a point they conceded in oral evidence, citing ignorance of the requirement to do so. We also note, however, that while LB Southwark initially pursued the Respondent in relation to outstanding Council Tax for the period in issue, by email dated 04 November 2024 it expressly stated that enforcement action against the Respondent had been withdrawn, so that he has suffered no loss thereby.[67]We therefore make no adjustment in relation to council tax. Seriousness[68]In Acheampong at §20(c), Judge Cooke held that the Tribunal must consider how serious the housing offence forming the basis of the application is, both compared to other types of offences in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made, and compared to other examples of the same offence. As the issue was put in §21 of the judgment, this “...is an assessment of the conduct of the landlord specifically in the context of the offence itself; how badly has this landlord behaved in committing the offence?”[69]Failure to license leads – or can lead – to significant health and safety risks for often vulnerable tenants, and sanctions for failure to license have an important deterrent effect on future offending as well as encouraging law-abiding landlords to continue to take the licensing system seriously and to inspire general public confidence in the licensing system.[70]Furthermore, even if it could be argued that the Applicants did not suffer direct loss through the Respondents’ failure to obtain a licence, it is clear that a large part of the purpose of the rent repayment legislation is deterrence. If landlords can successfully argue that the commission by them of a criminal offence to which section 43 of the 2016 Act applies should only have consequences if tenants can show that they have suffered actual loss, this will significantly undermine the deterrence value of the legislation.[71]Against that expression of policy concerns, it is nevertheless the case that the offence under s.95(1) of the 2004 Act is significantly less serious than those in rows 1, 2 and 7 in the table in section 40 of the 2016 Act, and we take that into account, following the guidance the Upper Tribunal in Dowd v Martins [2023] HLR 7, where offences of failing to licence in accordance with the 2004 Act were expressed as being “...generally less serious than others for which a rent repayment order can be made.”[72]The nature of a landlord has been held to be relevant to the seriousness of the offence. In some cases, it has been argued that there is a distinction to be drawn between “professional” and “non-professional” landlords, seriousness being aggravated in the case of the former. The proper approach is as set out by the Deputy President in Daff v Gyalui [2023] UKUT 134 (LC), at paragraph 52: “The circumstances in which a landlord lets property and the scale on which they do so, are relevant considerations when determining the amount of a rent repayment order but the temptation to classify or caricature a landlord as “professional” or “amateur” should be resisted, particularly if that classification is taken to be a threshold to an entirely different level of penalty. … The penalty appropriate to a particular offence must take account of all of the relevant circumstances.”[73]As to the condition of the Property, having considered the evidence adduced by both sides, we conclude that there is little evidence to support the allegations that the Property was in a substantially poor condition, but for the broken smoke detector. We are certainly not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the Applicants treated it in anything other than a tenant-like manner.[74]Against the available evidence, we consider that the Property was of a reasonable standard. We accept however that it would have been hard to heat, bearing in mind its low energy performance rating. However, as indicated above, the Respondent had the necessary Exemption Certificate in place in relation to the EPC at the commencement of the tenancy.[75]In order to assess the starting point at stage (c), we take account of the now substantial guidance in case law from the Upper Tribunal, including cases in which the Upper Tribunal has substituted its own assessments. In particular, we have considered Acheampong itself, Williams v Parmar and Others [2021] UKUT 244 (UT), [2022] H.L.R. 8; Aytan v Moore [2022] UKUT 27 (LC); Hallett v Parker [2022] UKUT 239 (LC); Hancher v David and Others [2022] UKUT 277 (LC); and Dowd v Martins and Others [2022] UKUT 249 (LC). The range of percentage of the maximum possible RRO awarded range from 25% to 90% (i.e. at stage (d) – most of the cases precede Acheampong).[76]We have had particular regard to the case of Newell v Abbott [2024] UKUT 181, where the Upper Tribunal awarded 60% of the rent received to the tenants from a landlord of a single property based upon a lack of licensing due to a lack of attention or inadvertence, where the accommodation was generally of a good standard.[77]While that would generally form our starting point at stage (c), against the facts of the present case we do take account of the Applicant’s circumstances living overseas, and his ignorance of the inception of LB Southwark’s selective licensing scheme which, while not amounting to a defence, informs our decision. We also take into account that the Respondent’s partner suffered a serious illness at the end of May 2023.[78]In the light of the reasonable condition of the Property, where the failure to obtain a licence was a matter of inadvertence rather than a deliberate decision to ignore their responsibilities, we consider that the starting point for this offence at stage (c) should be 50% of the maximum rent payable. That provides a figure of £16,500 x 50% = £8,250. Section 44(4) – Other Factors, Including Conduct[79]At stage (d), we must consider what effect the matters set out in Section 44(4) of the 2016 Act have on our conclusions thus far. Section 44(4) provides that in determining the amount of an RRO, within the maximum, the Tribunal should, in particular, take into account the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, and the financial circumstances of the landlord.[80]As Judge Cooke noted in Acheampong, there is a close relationship in terms of conduct, at least of the landlord, between stages (c) and (d). Insofar as we have already made findings in relation to stage (c) which may also be said to relate to the conduct of the Respondent, we do not double-count them in considering the section 44(4) issues.[81]The most notable factor in dispute, to which the majority of the evidence at the hearing was directed, related to this issue of conduct of the parties.[82]By way of preamble, we find that the Property was for the substantial majority of the Applicants’ occupation in a reasonable state of decoration and repair, and that the Applicants appear to have lived there perfectly happily until the Respondent’s somewhat unjustified reaction to what he apparently considered to be the messy state of the Property appears to have soured relations in the last few weeks of the tenancy.[83]There are, however, two particular issues that we consider must be taken into account against the Respondent. The first relates to the damaged smoke detector, which remained unrepaired through the currency of the Applicants’ occupation. We accept their evidence in that regard, supported as it is by a picture, and reject the uncorroborated document from Mr Carl Dingle dated 18 May 2024, which suggests that he tested a series of smoke detectors on that date and found them to be present, properly installed, and functioning. Had that document genuinely been in the Respondent’s hands on or shortly after 18 May 2024 we find it inconceivable that he would not have relied upon it as ammunition in his dispute with the Applicants regarding return of their deposits.[84]It follows that the evidence discloses that the Property was in a condition that created an appreciable risk to the health and safety of the Applicants, where it contained no functioning smoke detector.[85]The second issue relates to the wholly unjustifiable retention by the Respondent of the Applicants’ deposit, totalling £4,125. There is evidence that the deposit was not protected under any Tenancy Deposit scheme. While any claim to recover that sum is a matter for the jurisdiction of the County Court, and not this Tribunal, we consider that retention to be egregious, warranting an upward adjustment to the sum of the RRO.[86]Ultimately, we find these issues together to warrant an upward adjustment of the RRO to 60% of the rent in issue.[87]Conversely, we find nothing in the conduct of the Applicants that would cause us to adjust the level of an RRO award in their favour, and accordingly we make no such adjustment. Financial Circumstances of the Landlord[88]We are also required to consider the financial circumstances of the landlord under section 44(4).[89]The Respondent provided evidence of personal hardships, including his wife’s life-threatening medical emergencies, his own recent femur surgeries, and financial strain due to service charge disputes and an employment dispute.[90]Vadamalayan v Stewart and others [2020] UKUT 0183 (LC) provides authority for the proposition that a landlord seeking to assert hardship must provide evidence of his financial circumstances.[91]While some medical evidence has been adduced in support of these assertions, the Respondent has produced no financial evidence to demonstrate his resources, whether of a capital nature, real property, assets, or of his income and outgoings. The Tribunal has simply no evidence on which to consider any question of hardship, and we make no finding in that regard. Whether the Landlord has at any time been convicted of a relevant offence[92]The Respondent has not been convicted of a relevant offence. Other Factors[93]It is apparent from the wording of sub-section 44(4) itself that the specific matters listed in that sub-section are not intended to be exhaustive, as sub-section 44(4) states that the Tribunal “must, in particular, take into account” the specified factors.[94]In this case, however, we have been unable to identify any other specific factors which should be taken into account in determining the amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid. Amount to be Repaid[95]The four-stage approach recommended in Acheampong has been set out above. The amount arrived at by considering the first stage is £16,500.[96]No sums are required to be deducted by stage (b) in this case.[97]Considering the further matters required by stages (c) and (d), the Tribunal’s conclusion is that the appropriate amount is reduced to 60% of that sum, and there is nothing to add or subtract for any other factor under s.44(4).[98]Accordingly, taking all the factors together, the rent repayment order will be for 60% of the maximum amount of rent payable. The amount of rent repayable is, therefore, £16,500 x 60% = £9,900.[99]While this is a substantial sum, we have considered our conclusions against the guidance provided by the Upper Tribunal, in particular where it has substituted percentage reductions in redetermining RROs. The key cases are set out in helpful fashion in the course of the redetermination in Newell, referred to above. We do not repeat that analysis, but have been closely guided by it. Reimbursement of Tribunal Fees[100]The Applicants have applied under paragraph 13(2) of the 2013 Rules for an order that the Respondent reimburse their application and hearing fees, in sums totalling £341.[101]In light of our findings, we consider it just and equitable to allow that application. Name: Judge M Jones Date: 06 March 2026 Rights of appeal By rule 36(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013, the tribunal is required to notify the parties about any right of appeal they may have.(a) (A) If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber), then a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office which has been dealing with the case.(b) (B) The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.(c) (C) If the application is not made within the 28-day time limit, such application must include a request for an extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28-day time limit; the tribunal will then look at such reason(s) and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed, despite not being within the time limit.(d) (D) The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal and state the result the party making the application is seeking.(e) (E) If the tribunal refuses to grant permission to appeal, a further application for permission may be made to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber). Appendix 1 - Relevant statutory provisions Housing and Planning Act 2016 Section 40 (1) This Chapter confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies. (2) A rent repayment order is an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing in England to – (a) repay an amount of rent paid by a tenant ... (3) A reference to “an offence to which this Chapter applies” is to an offence, of a description specified in the table, that is committed by a landlord in relation to housing in England let by that landlord. Act section general description of offence[1]Criminal Law Act 1977 section 6(1) violence for securing entry[2]Protection from Eviction Act 1977 section 1(2), (3) or (3A) eviction or harassment of occupiers[3]Housing Act 2004 section 30(1) failure to comply with improvement notice[4]section 32(1) failure to comply with prohibition order etc[5]section 72(1) control or management of unlicensed HMO[6]section 95(1) control or management of unlicensed house[7]This Act section 21 breach of banning order Section 41(1) A tenant or a local housing authority may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies.(2) A tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if – (a) the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant, and (b) the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made. Section 43 (1) The First-tier Tribunal may make a rent repayment order if satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies (whether or not the landlord has been convicted). (2) A rent repayment order under this section may be made only on an application under 41.(3) The amount of a rent repayment order under this section is to be determined in accordance with – (a) section 44 (where the application is made by a tenant) ... Section 44 (1) Where the First-tier Tribunal decides to make a rent repayment order under section 43 in favour of a tenant, the amount is to be determined in accordance with this section. (2) The amount must relate to rent paid during the period mentioned in the table. If the order is made on the ground that the landlord has committed the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of an offence mentioned in row 1 or 2 of the table in section 40(3) the period of 12 months ending with the date of the offence an offence mentioned in row 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the table in section 40(3) a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence (3) The amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed – (a) the rent paid in respect of that period, less (b) any relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.(4) In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account – (a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and (c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies. Housing Act 2004 Section 95 (1) A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing a house which is required to be licensed under this Part (see section 85(1)) but is not so licensed. Section 263 (1) In this Act “person having control”, in relation to premises, means (unless the context otherwise requires) the person who receives the rack-rent of the premises (whether on his own account or as agent or trustee of another person), or who would so receive it if the premises were let at a rack-rent. (2) In subsection (1) “rack-rent” means a rent which is not less than two-thirds of the full net annual value of the premises. (3) In this Act “person managing” means, in relation to premises, the person who, being an owner or lessee of the premises – (a) receives … rents or other payments from … persons who are in occupation as tenants or licensees of parts of the premises, or of the whole of the premises; or (b) would so receive those rents or other payments but for having entered into an arrangement … with another person who is not an owner or lessee of the premises by virtue of which that other person receives the rents or other payments ...