Flat 1, 93-95 Balfour Street, London SE17 1PB LON/00BE/HMF/2024/0637
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
PROPERTY CHAMBER (RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY)
Case No LON/00BE/HMF/2024/0637
Between
Charlotte GuyApplicantEstateagentpower Ltd (1) and Sunette Zone (2)Respondent
Before
Judge P KornMr S Wheeler MCIEH CEnvHBrian Leacock of Justice for Tenants for the ApplicantNot represented for the RespondentDate 27 May 2025Hearing 2025-05-21Property: SE17 1PBType of application: Application for Rent Repayment Order under the Housing and Planning Act 2016
DECISION
Description of hearing This was a face-to-face hearing. Decisions of the tribunal(1) The tribunal orders the First Respondent (Estateagentpower Ltd) to repay to the Applicant the sum of £8,908.72 by way of rent repayment.(2) The tribunal also orders the First Respondent to reimburse to the Applicant her application fee and hearing fee in the aggregate sum of £320.00.(3) The above sums must be paid by the First Respondent to the Applicant within 28 days after the date of this determination.(4) No rent repayment order is made against the Second Respondent. Introduction[1]The Applicant has applied for a rent repayment order against Estateagentpower Ltd (“the First Respondent”) and against Sunette Zone (“the Second Respondent”) under sections 40-44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (“the 2016 Act”).[2]The basis for the application is that each of the Respondents committed an offence of having control of and/or managing a house in multiple occupation (“HMO”) which was required to be licensed but was not licensed, contrary to section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004 (“the 2004 Act”).[3]The Applicant seeks a rent repayment order in the sum of £12,726.74 in respect of rent paid for the period 22 September 2022 to 30 August 2023.[4]The Applicant attended the hearing and was represented by Brian Leacock of Justice for Tenants. Neither the First Respondent nor the Second Respondent attended the hearing and neither of them was represented at the hearing. The First Respondent made some very late written submissions, whilst the Second Respondent made no written submissions. Applicant’s case[5]In written submissions the Applicant states that the Property was a three-bedroom self-contained flat with a shared kitchen and bathroom located in a four-storey purpose-built block of flats. The Applicant was a tenant of the Property, and during the period of claim the Property was occupied by at least three persons living in two or more separate households and occupying the Property as their main residence and paying rent.[6]The Applicant states that the Property was occupied as follows:• The Applicant herself lived at the Property from 22 September 2022 until 30 August 2023.• Someone called ‘Billie’ was already living at the Property before the Applicant moved in and continued to live there after the Applicant moved out.• Darren Martin was also already living at the Property before the Applicant moved in and again continued to live there after the Applicant moved out.[7]The Applicant further states that the Property met all the criteria to be licensed under the local housing authority’s additional licensing scheme as an HMO under section 254 of the 2004 Act and was not subject to any statutory exemption. The appropriate HMO licence was not held during the relevant period, and no licence application was made at any point during the Applicant’s tenancy.[8]The Applicant’s representative’s written submissions contain an analysis as to why it is believed that a rent repayment order can and should be made against both the First Respondent and the Second Respondent.[9]The total amount of rent that the Applicant is seeking to recover is £12,726.74 for the rent paid for the period between 22 September 2022 and 30 August 2023, and the Applicant has provided a calculation together with copy bank statements as evidence of the amounts paid. The Applicant did not receive any housing element of Universal Credit or Housing Benefit.[10]The Applicant states that her conduct was good during the tenancy whilst the Respondents’ conduct was poor. In particular she states that the oven was not functioning from late January to early April 2023 and that the tenants contacted the Respondents’ agent multiple times for a replacement or repair but the responses were slow. She also states that the washing machine broke down and that it took over two months to replace it. During that time, the Applicant had to use dry-cleaning services and go to the laundrette to keep her clothes clean for her part-time job as a waitress, which resulted in financial loss for the Applicant. In addition, there were major problems in connection with the bathroom ceiling as detailed in her witness statement.[11]In relation to utilities, her representative states in written submissions that it is for the Respondents to provide evidence of any utility payments made by them which only benefited the Applicant but that no evidence has been submitted by the Respondents on this point.[12]The Applicant’s hearing bundle contains a copy of her tenancy/licence agreement, a copy of a Land Registry title register, and a copy of the designation of the relevant geographical area as an additional licensing area. Respondents’ lack of engagement[13]As noted above, neither the First Respondent nor the Second Respondent attended the hearing and neither of them was represented at the hearing. The First Respondent made some very late written submissions, whilst the Second Respondent made no written submissions. The First Respondent’s submissions were not received by the tribunal or the Applicant until 19 May 2025, just 2 days before the hearing. This constitutes a serious breach of the tribunal’s directions which required the Respondents’ written submissions to be made by 3 March 2025. Discussion at hearing[14]At the hearing, the tribunal discussed with the Applicant’s representative, Mr Leacock, the basis on which it was being argued that a rent repayment order (“RRO”) could be made against either the First Respondent or the Second Respondent. The tribunal noted that whilst it had to be established that a relevant offence had been committed, it was also the case under sections 40 and 43 of the 2016 Act that an RRO could only be made against a “landlord”. Furthermore, as established by the decision of the Supreme Court in Rakusen v Jepson and others (2023) UKSC 9, an RRO cannot be made against a “superior” landlord.[15]It was noted that as part of the First Respondent’s late submissions the First Respondent had provided a copy of a tenancy agreement relating to the Property made between Docklands Estates Wapping Limited as landlord and the First Respondent as tenant. The period of that tenancy agreement was expressed to be from 5 August 2019 to 5 August 2020, but the thrust of the First Respondent’s submissions indicates an acceptance that the agreement was subsequently renewed and would still have been in place during the time when the Applicant was in occupation.[16]Turning now to the Applicant’s own tenancy (or licence) agreement, the tenancy was granted by the First Respondent. Whilst the first page is arguably ambiguous in that it describes the First Respondent as “The Landlord / Agent on behalf of Landlord”, if one reads it together with the First Respondent’s own tenancy agreement we are satisfied – on the basis of the documentation and submissions before us – that the First Respondent was capable of being (by virtue of its own tenancy agreement), and was in fact, the Applicant’s immediate landlord.[17]As regards the Second Respondent, the Land Registry title document in the hearing bundle shows the Second Respondent to hold a long leasehold interest in the Property for a term of 125 years from 1 February 2007. From the documentation and information before us, given that the First Respondent was the Applicant’s immediate landlord and that the First Respondent’s own landlord was Docklands Estates Wapping Limited, it would seem that the Second Respondent was either Docklands Estates Wapping Limited’s landlord or the landlord of some other entity which was either the direct landlord of, or a superior landlord of, Docklands Estates Wapping Limited. It follows that the Second Respondent was a superior landlord of the Applicant and therefore following the decision of the Supreme Court in Rakusen v Jepson and others (2023), no RRO can be made against the Second Respondent.[18]There was a brief discussion at the hearing regarding the meaning of “person having control of or managing” for the purposes of section 72(1) of the 2004 Act and also a brief discussion about the ‘reasonable excuse’ defence contained in section 72(5) of the 2004 Act.[19]In relation to utilities, Mr Leacock said that only water rates and Wifi were included in the rent, i.e. no other utilities were included. Mr Leacock also commented on the various other factors that the tribunal needs to consider on an RRO application. Witness evidence[20]The tribunal noted the witness evidence from Darren Martin and asked the Applicant some questions on her own witness evidence.[21]The Applicant explained at the hearing how the problems with the washing machine had affected her ability to do her job and how the problems with the oven had affected her quality of life. Her complaint was that she had to keep reminding the Respondents’ agent about the problem and that the agent was slow to respond and did not fix the problems properly until a considerable amount of time had elapsed.[22]The Applicant’s witness evidence also summarises the problems that arose with the bathroom ceiling, including its partial collapse. The Applicant accepted in cross-examination that the initial problems were unlikely to be the Respondents’ fault as they seemed to have been caused by leaking from the floor above, and she further accepted that the problem was not with the Respondents’ initial response. Her complaint was that when the problem recurred the Respondents were very slow to respond, and she spoke about being constantly worried that the ceiling could give way again at any time.[23]The tribunal put it to the Applicant that in its late written submissions the First Respondent’s narrative was very different to hers, but she did not accept the First Respondent’s narrative. Relevant statutory provisions[24]Housing and Planning Act 2016 Section 40(1) This Chapter confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies.(2) A rent repayment order is an order requiring the landlord under a tenancy of housing in England to – (a) repay an amount of rent paid by a tenant ...(3) A reference to “an offence to which this Chapter applies” is to an offence, of a description specified in the table, that is committed by a landlord in relation to housing in England let by that landlord. Act section general description of offence 1 Criminal Law Act 1977 section 6(1) violence for securing entry 2 Protection from Eviction Act 1977 section 1(2), (3) or (3A) eviction or harassment of occupiers 3 Housing Act 2004 section 30(1) failure to comply with improvement notice 4 section 32(1) failure to comply with prohibition order etc 5 section 72(1) control or management of unlicensed HMO 6 section 95(1) control or management of unlicensed house 7 This Act section 21 breach of banning order Section 41 (1) A tenant or a local housing authority may apply to the First-tier Tribunal for a rent repayment order against a person who has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies. (2) A tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if – (a) the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant, and (b) the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made. Section 43 (1) The First-tier Tribunal may make a rent repayment order if satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that a landlord has committed an offence to which this Chapter applies (whether or not the landlord has been convicted). (2) A rent repayment order under this section may be made only on an application under 41. (3) The amount of a rent repayment order under this section is to be determined in accordance with – (a) section 44 (where the application is made by a tenant) ... Section 44 (1) Where the First-tier Tribunal decides to make a rent repayment order under section 43 in favour of a tenant, the amount is to be determined in accordance with this section. (2) The amount must relate to rent paid during the period mentioned in the table. If the order is made on the ground that the landlord has committed the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of an offence mentioned in row 1 or 2 of the table in section 40(3) the period of 12 months ending with the date of the offence an offence mentioned in row 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the table in section 40(3) a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence (3) The amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed – (a) the rent paid in respect of that period, less (b) any relevant award of universal credit paid (to any person) in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.(4) In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account – (a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant, (b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and (c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies. Housing Act 2004 Section 72 (1) A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part … but is not so licensed.(5) In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) … it is a defence that he had a reasonable excuse … for having control of or managing the house in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1) … . Section 263 (1) In this Act “person having control”, in relation to premises, means (unless the context otherwise requires) the person who receives the rack-rent of the premises (whether on his own account or as agent or trustee of another person), or who would so receive it if the premises were let at a rack-rent. (2) In subsection (1) “rack-rent” means a rent which is not less than two-thirds of the full net annual value of the premises. (3) In this Act “person managing” means, in relation to premises, the person who, being an owner or lessee of the premises – (a) receives … rents or other payments from … persons who are in occupation as tenants or licensees of parts of the premises, or of the whole of the premises; or (b) would so receive those rents or other payments but for having entered into an arrangement … with another person who is not an owner or lessee of the premises by virtue of which that other person receives the rents or other payments ... Tribunal’s analysis[25]The Applicant’s uncontested evidence is that the Property was an HMO which was required to be licensed (by virtue of the local housing authority’s additional licensing scheme) but was not licensed at any point during the period of the claim. Having considered that uncontested evidence we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that for the whole period of claim the Property required a licence and it was not licensed.[26]We are also satisfied that the First Respondent was a “landlord” for the purposes of sections 40 and 43 of the 2016 Act, as it was named as landlord/landlord’s agent in the tenancy agreement, there is clear evidence that it received rent, and – importantly – that it had a leasehold interest in the Property through the tenancy agreement with Docklands Estates Wapping Limited from which it is clear that the First Respondent was the Applicant’s landlord and not just the landlord’s agent.[27]In relation to the Second Respondent, we are not satisfied that they were a “landlord”. Instead, they were a superior landlord and therefore pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Rakusen v Jepson and others (2023) no RRO can be made against the Second Respondent.[28]The next question is whether the First Respondent was a “person having control of or managing” the Property within the meaning of section 263 of the 2004 Act. The First Respondent has not made any written or oral submissions on this specific point, and the evidence shows that the First Respondent received the rack-rent of the Property and – being a lessee of the Property – received rents or other payments from the occupiers. We therefore accept that the First Respondent was both a “person having control” and a “person managing” within the meaning of section 263 of the 2004 Act in respect of the Property at the relevant time. The defence of “reasonable excuse”[29]Under section 72(5) of the 2004 Act, it is a defence that a person who would otherwise be guilty of the offence of controlling or managing an HMO which is licensable under Part 2 of the 2004 Act had a reasonable excuse for the failure to obtain a licence. The burden of proof is on the person relying on the defence.[30]In this case, the First Respondent has made very late written submissions suggesting that it did not take any action in relation to licensing because this was “understood and agreed to be the landlord’s responsibility”. As well as being submitted very late in breach of the tribunal’s directions, this is a very weak submission. It does not explain who the First Respondent means by “the landlord” or provide any justification for letting out the flat as an HMO without a licence, and there is no detailed explanation as to what steps (if any) it took to try to ensure that it did not commit a criminal offence. Therefore, on the facts of this case we do not accept that the First Respondent had a reasonable excuse. The offence[31]Section 40 of the 2016 Act confers power on the First-tier Tribunal to make a rent repayment order where a landlord has committed an offence listed in the table in sub-section 40(3), subject to certain conditions being satisfied. An offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act is one of the offences listed in that table. Section 72(1) states that “A person commits an offence if he is a person having control of or managing an HMO which is required to be licensed under this Part … but is not so licensed”, and for the reasons given above we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt(a) that the First Respondent was a “landlord”,(b) that it was a “person having control” of and a “person managing” the Property for the purposes of section 263 of the 2004 Act,(c) that the Property was required to be licensed throughout the period of claim and(d) that it was not licensed at any point during the period of claim.[32]Under section 41(2), a tenant may apply for a rent repayment order only if the offence relates to housing that, at the time of the offence, was let to the tenant and the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which the application is made. On the basis of the Applicant’s uncontested evidence on these points we are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Property was let to the Applicant at the time of commission of the offence and that the offence was committed in the period of 12 months ending with the day on which her application was made. Process for ascertaining the amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid[33]Based on the above findings, we have the power to make a rent repayment order against the First Respondent.[34]The amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid is governed by section 44 of the 2016 Act. Under sub-section 44(2), the amount must relate to rent paid by the tenant in respect of a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence. Under sub-section 44(3), the amount that the landlord may be required to repay in respect of a period must not exceed the rent paid in respect of that period less any relevant award of housing benefit or universal credit paid in respect of rent under the tenancy during that period.[35]In this case, the Applicant’s claim relates to a period not exceeding 12 months. The evidence before us indicates that no part of the rent was covered by the payment of housing benefit, and the First Respondent has not disputed that the rental amount claimed was in fact paid by the Applicant.[36]We are satisfied on the basis of her uncontested evidence that the Applicant was in occupation for the whole of the period to which her rent repayment application relates and that the Property required a licence for the whole of that period. Therefore, the maximum sum that can be awarded by way of rent repayment is the sum referred to in paragraph 3 above, namely £12,726.74, this being the amount paid by the Applicant by way of rent in respect of the period of claim.[37]Under sub-section 44(4), in determining the amount of any rent repayment order the tribunal must, in particular, take into account(a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant,(b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and(c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which the relevant part of the 2016 Act applies.[38]The Upper Tribunal decision in Vadamalayan v Stewart (2020) UKUT 0183 (LC) is one of the authorities on how a tribunal should approach the question of the amount that it should order to be repaid under a rent repayment order if satisfied that an order should be made. Importantly, it was decided after the coming into force of the 2016 Act and takes into account the different approach envisaged by the 2016 Act.[39]In her analysis in Vadamalayan, Judge Cooke states that the rent (i.e. the maximum amount of rent recoverable) is the obvious starting point, and she effectively states that having established the starting point one should then work out what sums if any should be deducted. She departs from the approach of the Upper Tribunal in Parker v Waller (2012) UKUT 301, in part because of the different approach envisaged by the 2016 Act, Parker v Waller having been decided in the context of the 2004 Act. Judge Cooke notes that the 2016 Act contains no requirement that a payment in favour of a tenant should be reasonable. More specifically, she does not consider it appropriate to deduct everything that the landlord has spent on the property during the relevant period, not least because much of that expenditure will have repaired or enhanced the landlord’s own property and/or been incurred in meeting the landlord’s obligations under the tenancy agreement. There is a case for deducting utilities, but otherwise in her view the practice of deducting all of the landlord’s costs in calculating the amount of the rent repayment should cease.[40]In Judge Cooke’s judgment, the only basis for deduction is section 44 of the 2016 Act itself, and she goes on to state that there will be cases where the landlord’s good conduct or financial hardship will justify an order less than the maximum.[41]Since the decision in Vadamalayan, there have been other Upper Tribunal decisions in this area, notably those in Ficcara and others v James (2021) UKUT 0038 (LC) and Awad v Hooley (2021) UKUT 0055 (LC). In Ficcara v James, in making his decision Martin Rodger QC stressed that whilst the maximum amount of rent was indeed the starting point the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) still had discretion to make deductions to reflect the various factors referred to in section 44(4) of the 2016 Act. In addition, he stated that neither party was represented in Vadamalayan, that the Upper Tribunal’s focus in that case was on the relevance of the amount of the landlord’s profit to the amount of rent repayment and that Vadamalayan should not be treated as the last word on the exercise of discretion required by section 44.[42]In Awad v Hooley, Judge Cooke agreed with the analysis in Ficcara v James and said that it will be unusual for there to be absolutely nothing for the FTT to take into account under section 44(4).[43]In Williams v Parmar & Ors [2021] UKUT 244 (LC), Mr Justice Fancourt stated that the FTT had in that case taken too narrow a view of its powers under section 44 to fix the amount of the rent repayment order. There is no presumption in favour of the maximum amount of rent paid during the relevant period, and the factors that may be taken into account are not limited to those mentioned in section 44(4), although the factors in that subsection are the main factors that may be expected to be relevant in the majority of cases.[44]Mr Justice Fancourt went on to state in Williams that the FTT should not have concluded that only meritorious conduct of the landlord, if proved, could reduce the starting point of the (adjusted) maximum rent. The circumstances and seriousness of the offending conduct of the landlord are comprised in the “conduct of the landlord”, and so the FTT may, in an appropriate case, order a lower than maximum amount of rent repayment if what a landlord did or failed to do in committing the offence was relatively low in the scale of seriousness, by reason of mitigating circumstances or otherwise.[45]In Hallett v Parker and others [2022] UKUT 165 (LC), the Upper Tribunal did not accept a submission that the fact that the local authority has decided not to prosecute the landlord should be treated as a “credit factor” which should reduce the amount to be repaid.[46]In its decision in Acheampong v Roman and others [2022] UKUT 239 (LC), the Upper Tribunal recommended a four-stage approach to determining the amount to be repaid, which is paraphrased below:-(a) ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period;(b) subtract any element of that sum that represents payment by the landlord for utilities that only benefited the tenant;(c) consider how serious this offence was, both compared to other types of offence in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made and compared to other examples of the same type of offence; and(d) consider whether any deduction from, or addition to, that figure should be made in the light of the other factors set out in section 44(4).[47]Adopting the Acheampong approach, the whole of the rent means the whole of the rent paid by the Applicant out of her own resources, which is the whole of the rent in this case as no part of the rent was funded by housing benefit.[48]In relation to utilities, we are satisfied on the evidence before us that the Applicant was obliged under her tenancy agreement to pay for gas and electricity herself and therefore that it would not be appropriate to make a deduction from the rent repayment sum for these utilities. As regards water charges and Wifi, we have no evidence before us from the First Respondent and no submission from it that there should be a deduction for water charges and/or Wifi. Furthermore, it could well be the case that any water charge or Wifi charge was a fixed charge not linked to consumption, and therefore in conclusion on this point we do not consider that there should be any deduction for utilities.[49]As regards the seriousness of the type of offence, whilst it could be argued based on the maximum criminal penalty available that there are offences covered by section 40(3) of the 2016 Act which can give rise to a greater criminal sanction, a failure to license is still a serious offence. Failure to license leads – or can lead – to significant health and safety risks for often vulnerable tenants, and sanctions for failure to license have an important deterrent effect on future offending as well as encouraging law-abiding landlords to continue to take the licensing system seriously and inspiring general public confidence in the licensing system.[50]In addition, there has been much publicity about licensing of privately rented property, and there is an argument that good landlords who apply for and obtain a licence promptly may feel that those who fail to obtain a licence gain an unfair benefit thereby and therefore need to be heavily incentivised not to let out licensable properties without first obtaining a licence. Furthermore, even if it could be argued that the Applicant did not suffer direct loss through the Respondent’s failure to obtain a licence, it is clear that a large part of the purpose of the rent repayment legislation is deterrence. If landlords can successfully argue that the commission by them of a criminal offence to which section 43 of the 2016 Act applies should only have consequences if tenants can show that they have suffered actual loss, this will significantly undermine the deterrence value of the legislation.[51]In written submissions, Mr Leacock for the Applicant refers to the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Newell v Abbot (2024) UKUT 181 (LC) and submits that it had a number of material similarities to the present case. In that case the appropriate starting point was determined to be 60% of the rent paid. We agree with Mr Leacock that Newell is a comparable case and agree therefore that 60% represents a fair starting point.[52]As for the seriousness of the offence in this particular case compared to others of the same type, in our view there are some aggravating factors which increase the level of seriousness in this case. Whilst there is no evidence before us that the failure to license was a cynical and deliberate failure to license and whilst the Property was not (with the possible exception of the bathroom ceiling) dangerous to live in, nevertheless there were some significant failings on the part of the First Respondent.[53]First of all, there were problems with the washing machine and the oven. We accept, obviously, that sometimes things can go wrong within a property that are nobody’s fault, and it may well be that the initial problems were not caused by the First Respondent’s wilful default or negligence. However, the Applicant came across as a credible witness and we prefer her evidence to the very late and generalised written submission provided by the First Respondent, evidence on which the First Respondent did not make itself available to be cross-examined. In particular, we are satisfied on the basis of the evidence before us that the Applicant repeatedly raised concerns and that the First Respondent and/or its agent was very slow to respond.[54]Secondly, there were very serious problems with the bathroom ceiling, and for the same reasons as above we prefer the Applicant’s evidence and are satisfied that the First Respondent and/or its agent did not treat the problem nearly seriously enough.[55]We also note the distress caused to the Applicant by the above failings and the effect on her quality of life, and this will or should have been apparent to the First Respondent and/or its agent.[56]On the basis of the above aggravating circumstances in this particular case we consider that the starting point of 60% should be increased to 70%. In our view, though, it would not be appropriate to increase it beyond 70% as no other major issues have been raised by the Applicant.[57]As regards the specific matters listed in section 44, the tribunal is particularly required to take into account(a) the conduct of the parties,(b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and(c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of a relevant offence. We will take these in turn. Conduct of the parties[58]There is no evidence before us that the Applicant’s conduct has been anything other than satisfactory. The First Respondent’s own conduct has already been referred to above in the context of the seriousness of the offence, and it would not be appropriate to increase the amount of the rent repayment further to reflect its poor conduct as this would constitute double counting. Financial circumstances of the landlord[59]The tribunal is required to take the First Respondent’s financial circumstances into account when making its decision. However, in this case the Applicant has no evidence of the First Respondent’s financial circumstances and the First Respondent has not engaged with this process except in a very limited manner and in particular it has not made any submissions as to its financial position. Furthermore, the First Respondent did not attend, and was not represented at, the hearing and the tribunal was therefore unable to cross-examine it on its financial circumstances. In this case, therefore, no adjustment to the amount of the award can be made either upwards or downwards to reflect the First Respondent’s financial circumstances as they are unknown. Whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of a relevant offence[60]The First Respondent has not been convicted of a relevant offence, but it is clear from the Upper Tribunal decision in Hallett v Parker (see above) that this by itself should not be treated as a credit factor. Other factors[61]It is apparent from the wording of sub-section 44(4) itself that the specific matters listed in sub-section 44(4) are not intended to be exhaustive, as sub-section 44(4) states that the tribunal “must, in particular, take into account” the specified factors. However, in this case we are not aware of any other specific factors which should be taken into account in determining the amount of rent to be ordered to be repaid. Amount to be repaid[62]The four-stage approach recommended in Acheampong has already been set out above. The amounts arrived at by going through the first three of those stages is to reduce them to 70% of the maximum amount payable to each Applicant, subject to any adjustment for the section 44(4) factors referred to above.[63]As noted above, in part to avoid double counting, there is nothing to add or subtract for any of the other section 44(4) factors.[64]Therefore, taking all of the factors together, the rent repayment order should be for 70% of the maximum amount payable to the Applicant, namely for £8,908.72. Cost applications[65]The Applicant has applied under paragraph 13(2) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Property Chamber) Rules 2013 for an order that the Respondent reimburse her application fee and the hearing fee in the aggregate amount of £320.00.[66]As the Applicant’s claim has been successful, albeit that there has been a deduction from the maximum payable, we are satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to order the First Respondent to reimburse these fees. Name: Judge P Korn Date: 27 May 2025 RIGHTS OF APPEALa. A. If a party wishes to appeal this decision to the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) a written application for permission must be made to the First-tier Tribunal at the regional office dealing with the case.b. B. The application for permission to appeal must arrive at the regional office within 28 days after the Tribunal sends written reasons for the decision to the person making the application.c. C. If the application is not made within the 28 day time limit, such application must include a request for extension of time and the reason for not complying with the 28 day time limit; the Tribunal will then look at such reason and decide whether to allow the application for permission to appeal to proceed despite not being within the time limit.d. D. The application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates (i.e. give the date, the property and the case number), state the grounds of appeal, and state the result the party making the application is seeking.